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The Process of Change in a Public-Private Partnership: 
Work and Culture 
A Case Study of Durham National Savings and Investments 
:By: Andrew Smith 
Thesis Abstract 
The thesis investigates the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) ofNational Savings and 
Investments, a Civil Service department. Initially a Conservative policy, the PPP 
was reformulated by 'New' Labour whereby a 'partnership' between the public and 
private sectors is the favoured method of modernising public services. The study 
seeks to investigate the compatibility of a 'partnership' between two sectors which 
are fundamentally different, whereby a private sector 'partner' is attempting to make 
a profit out of a non-profit public sector financial institution. The process of 
organisational culture change is explored, as prior to the PPP a plethora of 
government directives were introduced at National Savings involving 
commercialisation and peripheral privatisation. The thesis attempts to understand the 
impact such initiatives have had on the lives ofworkers on the shop floor. Organised 
resistance from the trade unions and their members to these governmental directives 
are further examined. The research strategy involves semi-structured interviews with 
trade union officials and oral history interviews with workers - although 
management refused to participate in the research - together with various 
documentary sources. The thesis argues that the culmination of these changes has 
created a more pressurised and uncertain working environment, and those on shop 
floor who have little job autonomy and control have borne the brunt of much of this 
intensification. The PPP marked the most profound changes with the end of the 
long-accepted 'job for life', as the creation of a multi-tier workforce, together with 
the insourcing, outsourcing and offshoring of work have left workers in precarious 
positions of employment. Yet there has been both formal and informal resistance to 
many of these directives, as organisational culture change is a complex and 
continually negotiated process,. rather than smooth aDd unproblematic. 
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Chapter One - Introduction and Methodology 
Introduction 
On the 1st of April 1999 National Savings became a Public-Private Partnership (PPP), 
at the time this was the largest ever outsourcing of Civil Service work to the private 
sector. Siemens Business Services (SBS), a subdivision of Siemens AG (Aktien 
Gesellschaft), the multi-national corporation, were awarded the contract and will be 
paid £1 billion in instalments over a 10 year period, with a possible option to extend 
the contract to 15 years. Under this 'partnership' agreement SBS must deliver the 
service and provide new technology in order to modernise operations to offer more 
customer choice, thereby enhancing levels of service. Whilst 120 employees remain 
civil servants at National Savings' London headquarters in control of business policy, 
product design and pricing; the other 4, 100 civil servants had their employment 
transferred over to SBS. Although the PPP was the most significant change initiative 
introduced at National Savings, it must be seen in the context of a process of change 
as a plethora of initiatives have been introduced to transform the organisation. 
National Savings (NS) was established as a Civil Service department in 1969 
and the Millburngate House complex, which houses Durham National Savings 
(DNS), was officially opened in 1970, as the department was despatched to new 
offices in Durham, Glasgow and Blackpool respectively. However, the organisation 
has a much longer history and was founded in 1861 under its original name of the 
Post Office Savings Bank, with Savings Certificates initially issued as far back as 
World War One and Premium Bonds first introduced in 1956 (NS&I, 2004). 
National Savings is a public sector organisation, which operates in the financial 
services market. It is used by the government as one method of financing the 
National Debt, by offering a range of savings and investment packages to the general 
public (NS&I, 2002). All National Savings products are guaranteed by the Treasury 
and provide the Exchequer with a means of borrowing off the small saver to fund 
public spending (NS&I, 2004). However, National Savings is not a typical bank, it is 
a public service, and depending upon government fmances, the organisation does not 
always want to attract new business. This is an important distinction between 
National Savings and commerdal banks, particularly now that the service delivery 
has been outsourced to a private company. The organisation was given a new 
2 
corporate identity and renamed National Savings and Investments (NS&I) in 
February 2002, in line with its modernisation programme (NAO, 2003: 10. NS&I, 
2003). NS&I still issue Savings Certificates and Premium Bonds, together with 
Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), Children's Bonus Bonds, Pensioners 
Guaranteed Income Bonds and a host of related products, resulting in the 
organisation having 30 million customers, more than any other retail organisation in 
Britain (NAO, 2003: 9). Over £62 billion is invested in National Savings (NAO, 
2003: 35), and as a public financial institution it funds around 20% of net 
government debt (NAO, 2003: 7). 
In the thesis I will be critically examining a range of initiatives which, prior to 
PPP, were introduced to change the culture, structure, nature and ethos of National 
Savings, and the Civil Service more generally. Such policies must be situated within 
wider debates of about bureaucracy being seen as an outdated organisational form, 
and the need for the public sector to modernise and adopt the 'cutting edge' methods 
of the private sector. This resulted in a process of commercialisation and the 
introduction of elements of privatisation into the Civil Service from the Thatcher 
Conservative governments onwards. However, such policies were not without their 
critics who consistently argued that such methods were entirely inappropriate to the 
public sector, with its own distinctive ethos. This thesis aims to understand the 
reality of working life for those on the actual shop floor at Durham National Savings 
and Investments (DNS&I), and to answer the question - to what extent have these 
culture change initiatives impacted upon working lives? 
Whilst organisational change must be seen as a social process, it was the 
implementation of the PPP initiative which was the single most important act in 
transforming the organisational culture at National Savings. The investigation of the 
impact of the Public-Private Partnership at DNS&I is the main focus of the thesis. 
Under the PPP hybrid, National Savings' entire operational service delivery was 
outsourced to SBS, which takes the part-privatisation of a public institution to its 
ultimate limit and in doing so raises a whole set of fresh questions and dilemmas. 
Both the Public-Private Partnership programme and the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) were originally policies of the Conservative government of John Major, and 
were later reformulated by 'New' Labour with a renewed emphasis on 'partnership' 
to become one of the foundations of 'Third Way' politics. Proponents argue that the 
prime advantages of PPP and PFI are that private sector expertise and finance can be 
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used in 'partnership' with the public sector to deliver modem public services. 
However, both of the main political parties and advocates of the PPP philosophy 
completely fail to take account of the different motives, aims, goals and interests of 
the public and private sectors. The fundamental question of the research is how can 
both sectors be married in a supposed 'partnership' when the private sector 'partner' 
is attempting to make a profit out of National Savings, a non-profit public institution? 
Moreover, whilst an element of profitability is written into the original PPP contract, 
SBS can attempt to make further profits by reducing the headcount and courting 
additional Third Party Business. Such conflicts over profitability versus the public 
sector ethos arise throughout the research. I shall investigate how the introduction of 
the PPP initiative affects those on the front line at Durham National Savings, to 
attempt to understand how they perceive and make sense of such fundamental 
changes in their daily working lives. 
Regarding my personal interest in the research topic, this must be seen in the 
context of my own employment history and academic interests. I worked in a similar 
Civil Service department for several years and experienced many of the same 
organisational changes that have taken place at National Savings. Upon leaving 
Sixth Form education after attaining a couple of mediocre 'A' levels, I was 
unemployed for a short period and spent three months at the 'Job Club' in Durham 
Job Centre. At this stage in my life I was rather uncertain as to what occupational 
path to take, and in the milieu of a depressed regional economy which was struggling 
to come to terms with deindustrialisation, my options were limited. In the summer of 
1988 two of Durham City's major employers, being two of its Civil Service 
departments - National Savings and the Land Registry - were conducting major 
recruitment drives. I can vividly remember seeing people queuing outside Durham 
Job Centre and all of the way up the road waiting to collect application forms for the 
administrative jobs advertised. These were to be two of the last major recruitment 
exercises carried out by each department. After successfully completing an 
interview at Durham Land Registry (DLR), I started work as an Administrative 
Officer in September 1988. At that time, these Civil Service jobs were much sought 
after as they offered security, status and a relatively good salary. Such employment 
was commonly acknowledged to be a 'job for life'; indeed on my first working day 
an Executive Officer, who had worked in the office for over 20 years, proudly 
proclaimed that DLR offered stable lifetime employment. 
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However, as I never intentionally set out to become a civil servant I felt no real 
occupational identity and regarded working at the Land Registry as simply 'a job', 
rather than a career. I soon found bureaucratic administrative work to be 
unsatisfying, unchallenging and uninteresting. Moreover, as the property market 
collapsed at the tum of the 1990s, so did any opportunities for progression in the 
Land Registry and the department was stagnant for over a decade. Yet, I was to find 
more fulfilment and satisfaction when I became a local trade union representative in 
1990, and then Branch Treasurer the following year. I attended two national union 
conferences as an observer, although I was never actively involved in any union 
factions. I became more involved with the trade union as I was interested in the 
changes that were taking place in the department including re-grading exercises, the 
introduction of Performance-Related Pay and the contracting out of services to the 
private sector. Indeed it was my growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with 
such initiatives that led to me taking an 'A' level Sociology course at the local 
college, after much encouragement from my father. I then took a three year career-
break in September 1995 to study full-time for a degree in Sociology at Sunderland 
University. It was here that I became increasingly interested in the Sociology of 
Work and the commercialisation of the public sector. I returned to DLR in 1998 on a 
part-time basis whilst studying for a Masters Degree in Policy Studies, and my 
dissertation focused on the commercialisation and application of lean production 
working methods to the Land Registry. Hence, it seemed highly appropriate that for 
a doctorate I research the Public-Private Partnership of a similar Civil Service 
department less than one mile from my original place of work. 
I have kept in contact with several former colleagues from DLR who all claim 
that the organisation operates in a much more commercial direction than ever before. 
Yet most interestingly, they all continue to regard it as a 'job for life' -which is 
clearly evident in the very small number of workers who leave the organisation - and 
many now openly talk of having less than 30 years to go until retirement. 
Methodology 
In the following section I will discuss the natural history of the research process and 
explain how it unfolds and takes shape over time. This research investigating the 
impact of the Public-Private Partnership at Durham National Savings is a specific 
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case study. A case study is a research strategy employed to examine in detail 
organisational processes to develop fuller understandings of change (Hartley, 2004. 
Silverman, 2005: ch. 9). Many of the most profound changes at National Savings 
were occurring whilst I was carrying out my research. A qualitative methodology 
was employed including semi-structured interviews, oral history interviews and 
documentary analysis to explore the experiences, perspectives and opinions of those 
working at National Savings. Qualitative methods have the flexibility to develop 
deeper understandings of cultures (Alasuutari, 1996: ch. 12. Geertz, 2002). Whilst it 
is commonly inferred that qualitative research produces specific data, a number of 
social researchers have argued that generalisations can be drawn from case study 
evidence (Bryman, 1995: ch. 6. Alasuutari, 1996: ch. 12. Hartley, 2004). 
Comparisons and generalisations can be made between studies relating to theoretical 
and analytical issues (Bryman, 1995: ch. 6. Hartley, 2004). Whilst A1asuutari agrees, 
he prefers to use the term extrapolation rather than generalisation in qualitative 
research, when relating studies to their wider meanings (1996: ch. 12). I will relate 
my findings at National Savings to broader issues, including changes across the Civil 
Service, 'Third Way' politics and the changing nature of trade unionism. Silverman 
emphasises the importance of research diaries in noting important events, developing 
one's thinking and spelling out one's reasoning (2005: ch. 16). Throughout my 
research at Durham National Savings I kept a detailed research diary documenting 
significant events and cataloguing the problems that I encountered - of which there 
were many - and recording the key decisions which were taken to overcome such 
issues. I will now discuss the research process as it emerged and developed. 
I initially attempted to gain research access at Durham National Savings through 
SBS management. In May 2001 I wrote to the Personnel Manager seeking 
permission to research the Public-Private Partnership process at DNS, as this was a 
major government policy being implemented at a crucial time. Having received no 
acknowledgement from SBS management after one month, I sent a reminder letter in 
June. I received a reply from SBS management in July stating that whilst they 
receive many requests regarding research at DNS, they could neither spare the time 
nor the resources to assist me as they were busy restructuring the organisation. They 
went on to state that if I sent a small number of specific questions they would then 
consider replying. A set of questions were promptly despatched, but again no 
response was received. By the time I had sent another reminder to SBS management, 
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I had already started negotiating access with the trade umon and conducted 
interviews with key union representatives. I did inform SBS management of these 
developments in the hope that it would encourage them to participate in the research, 
but I was to receive no further correspondence from them. I do realise that SBS's 
unwillingness to take part in the research is a limitation, as I do not have first hand 
accounts of their vision of organisational culture change, strategies or profit 
predictions. This also hindered my access to official statistics, such as, the number 
of staff employed throughout the organisation, those employed by private sector 
employment agencies and redundancy figures. However, SBS were presented with 
several opportunities to put forward their case. 
As mentioned, I was able to attain research access at Durham National Savings 
through the independent trade union. Whilst encountering research access 
difficulties with SBS management, I decided to try another avenue of enquiry. In 
July 2001 I made contact with my former trade union colleagues at Durham Land 
Registry, Julie Kelly, the Branch Chair, and Tony Colwell, the full-time Group 
Executive Officer, who were able to give me the contact details of the branch 
officials at DNS. Other researchers have noted how existing social networks can be 
useful in gaining access to organisations (Bryman, 1995: ch. 5. Hartley, 2004). As 
the vast majority of civil servants are now represented by the one trade union, the 
Public and Commercial Services union (PCS), local branch officials are often in 
regular contact with one another and frequently attend conferences, workshops and 
meetings. I wrote to the branch officials outlining my plan to research the PPP at 
National Savings, explaining that SBS management were reluctant to participate but 
that I had received their details from the union reps at Durham Land Registry, in the 
hope that they could help. A meeting was quickly arranged, the branch reps stated 
that I had been the only researcher to contact the union about the PPP of National 
Savings and they were keen to participate. I explained the purposes of my research, 
that it was original and independent, and that I would present a report of my findings 
to the National Savings Group of the PCS union. It is commonplace for researchers 
to offer a report in exchange for access to organisations (Bryman, 2001: 295. Robson, 
2002: ch. 15). I think the fact that I was once a civil servant and a union 
representative, and friends with their PCS comrades at the Land Registry, helped 
ease my research access and gain the trust of the branch officials. Hence, the union 
representatives at Durham National Savings became my research gatekeepers. Social 
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researchers rely on their gatekeepers to gain access to interviewees, and this access is 
ongoing (Bryman, 2001: 295. Hartley, 2004). 
My research at Durham National Savings was conducted over two separate 
phases. The first period was from August 2001 to April 2002, where the bulk of the 
interviews with the trade union officials took place. During phase two of the 
research, the vast majority of the worker interviews at DNS were carried out, 
between June 2003 and June 2004. 
From the contacts formed with my original gatekeepers, I was able to interview 
a range of union representatives, all of whom were long serving and had a wealth of 
experience. All of the interviews with the trade union officials were semi-structured 
and tape recorded, with additional field notes taken where I would note down 
reflections and observations from each interview. These interviews focused on 
specific policies which were introduced to both change the workplace culture and 
working practices, and addressed the stance of the union towards such initiatives. By 
employing a semi-structured interviewing technique I was able to enjoy the 
flexibility of being able to alter and add questions when necessary to explore fresh 
avenues of enquiry that arose in the narrative (Bryman, 2001: ch. 15. Byrne, 2004). 
Advocates of this method argue that it enhances the level of depth and understanding, 
resulting in the unearthing of rich and illuminating data (Robson, 2002: ch. 9. Byrne, 
2004). I have changed the names and altered the biographies to make all of the trade 
union representatives anonymous; I feel that this was necessary due to the 
increasingly acrimonious industrial relations at National Savings post-PPP. The 
ethical importance of protecting research participants is widely acknowledged 
(Bryman, 2001: ch. 24. Robson, 2002: 65 - 76. Ali and Kelly, 2004). In total 5 
senior trade union officials from National Savings were interviewed. The full details 
of the reps interviewed, the number and dates of the interviews conducted, and their 
length of active involvement in the union are set out in table 1.1 below. 
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Table 1.1. Details of the trade union officials interviewed. 
Name Current position Length of active Date(s) 
involvement interviewed 
Steve Senior union 15 years August 2001 
representative February 2002 
Tracy Senior union 10 years November 2001 
representative December 2001 
Paul Senior union 12 years November 2001 
representative September 2003 
October 2003 
Chris Senior union 15 years January 2002 
representative February 2002 
August 2003 
Jim Senior union 15 years March 2002 
representative 
Whilst my access to the umon officials at National Savings was relatively 
smooth, it was hampered by several interview postponements due to a number of key 
issues that the union reps had to urgently deal with. This is indicative of the 
continuous changes introduced by SBS management, and planned research 
interviews were delayed due to the proposed further outsourcings of work to other 
private sector contractors, discussions over redundancy programmes, personal cases 
and pay negotiations. 
As I was in regular contact with my gatekeepers at Durham National Savings via 
e-mail, telephone and correspondence, a good working relationship soon developed. 
All of the union representatives were very helpful; I would often bump into some of 
them in town and chat about the organisational changes taking place and the progress 
of my research, together with more everyday matters such as football, music and 
politics. 
In February 2002 I was invited by the union officials at National Savings to 
attend the PCS Commercial Sector Forum for two days at the union's headquarters in 
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London. At this meeting, delegates from union branches throughout the Commercial 
Sector were to come together to share common experiences and ideas, in order to 
formulate strategies and policies. This was an opportunity for me to meet other 
delegates, observe the debates and conduct further research interviews. Also present 
as observers at this gathering were managers from private sector companies whose 
employees were PCS union members. When mixing with the union delegates, some 
expressed concern at private sector managers being invited to attend a trade union 
conference. Likewise, I observed displeasure from managers to union opposition to 
two-tier workforces and individual contracts of employment. 
Furthermore, through my gatekeepers I was given access to numerous trade 
union documentary sources including Branch Annual Reports and group circulars 
which were issued to all union members at National Savings. These sources, 
together with the union's national website, were valuable as they chronologically 
documented the evolving changes at National Savings and outlined management's 
objectives and the union's responses. The information contained within 
documentary sources and archived material can be particularly useful to researchers 
in attempting to understand organisational change (Bryman, 1995: ch. 7. Gidley, 
2004). 
Another documentary source which was extremely useful during my research 
was the National Audit Office Report of2003 PPP in Practice. National Savings and 
Investments' Deal with Siemens Business Services, Four Years On. Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General. The National Audit Office (NAO) Report is 
official and independent; it is also available to the public and presents in-depth 
information which I would not have had access to otherwise. The report details the 
actual PPP bidding process, stating why SBS were awarded the contract and exactly 
what the modernisation ofNational Savings involves. The report goes on to discuss 
the difficulties faced by SBS on this deal and the likelihood of the company making a 
profitable return. This information is particularly valuable as both the union and 
staff were not privy to such detailed confidential information, and whilst I uncovered 
anecdotal evidence and union circulars discussed the problems encountered by SBS, 
senior union officials told me that they could not disclose information on SBS 's 
profits even ifthey knew. 
During phase two of the research schedule a different strategy was used when 
interviewing workers at Durham National Savings, being that of oral history. The 
------------------------------------------------· 
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aim was that with the help of my gatekeepers and contacts I would be able interview 
workers who were also PCS union members. As trade union membership is 
phenomenally high throughout the organisation and stands at 90% at Durham 
National Savings, it was believed that generating a sample of workers to interview 
would be relatively straight forward. However, this proved to be much more difficult 
than originally anticipated and I was plagued with problems along the way, which 
will be fully documented later in this section. 
The advantages of using the life/ oral history research method are that by asking 
open-ended questions workers have the freedom to tell their story, offering a greater 
appreciation of the realities of their working lives. Advocates of the life/ oral history 
approach argue that this develops the narrative in a more qualitative way and is 
unique as the voices of the ordinary members of society are particularly pertinent, 
but all too often ignored (Portelli, 1997 and 2001. Miller, 2000). Therefore, it was 
essential to interview those on the shop floor at Durham National Savings to 
understand their accounts, experiences and perceptions of workplace culture changes. 
This depth of analysis, therefore, goes beyond the espoused culture, to attempt to 
understand the changing cultures within the organisation. I will go on to argue that 
National Savings, in common with the majority of complex organisations, is a 
multicultural department and such cultures are dynamic and fluid, rather than static 
and monolithic; such notions will be discussed in more theoretical depth in chapter 
two. 
Access was continually negotiated with gatekeepers throughout the research 
process, and via the union reps I had initially planned to begin phase two of my 
research in June 2003 with the aim of generating a sample of workers to interview. 
The plan was that I would be able to interview workers during their lunch breaks or 
at the end of the working day in one of the union rooms on site. There was a union 
e-circular sent to all PCS members at Durham National Savings informing them of 
my research and requesting volunteers. However, I did not get to view this 
electronic circular, which also contained other union news items, and after a lengthy 
wait there were unfortunately no takers. In the meantime, I did have some limited 
success with snowball sampling. This is where the researcher asks established 
contacts if they know of friends or colleagues who would be prepared to be 
interviewed (Byrne, 2004). However, this method of sampling is unlikely to be 
representative of the population being studied (Bryman, 200 1 : ch. 4). I did manage 
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to obtain some worker interviews, yet all too often with snowball sampling I 
frustratingly hit a dead end. Furthermore, several interviews had to be delayed due 
to a combination of sick leave, vacations and work commitments. Indeed one 
particular interview was postponed on several occasions as this interviewee often had 
to work at other National Savings offices, and also her grandson was in hospital for a 
short time, but fortunately quickly made a full recovery. The union officials felt that 
the main reason why I was encountering difficulties in obtaining a sample of worker 
interviewees was that due to external commitments and workplace pressures, staff 
were not keen to sacrifice their own free time. This must be seen in the context that 
Durham National Savings is an ageing workforce and, together with working 
arduous eight hour days, many workers have families with young children to care for. 
Moreover, one union rep believed that another difficulty I faced was that "people 
think that they are letting themselves in for more than they actually are"; meaning 
that workers were under the mistaken impression that they would have to endure a 
particularly formal, lengthy and complex interrogation session. I also think that the 
common local perception of Durham University worked against me, as workers 
thought they would be interviewed by a middle class academic who they would not 
be able to relate to. Yet in reality the opposite was the case, all of the interviews 
were very informal and open, and as I am a local working class mature student who 
has worked in a similar environment, those workers interviewed readily identified 
with me. 
A further complication was that the union officials were all extremely busy with 
their own work commitments, together with domestic responsibilities. Yet to their 
enormous credit, the union reps always went out of their way to be as helpful as 
possible. 
By October I was becoming increasingly frustrated with the chequered results of 
snowball sampling. I asked the union reps if I could send them an e-mail which they 
could then forward on to union members outlining my research and emphasising the 
need to speak to workers on the shop floor. The officials said that this would be a 
problem due to increasingly sour union-management relations at Durham National 
Savings. The reps explained that they had recently been "bollocked" off senior SBS 
managers on site for comments made in a trade union e-circular to members, where 
the PCS had criticised plans by the far-right British National Party to stand 
candidates in a local election. Apparently management had not been best pleased as 
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they felt that this was an external issue and not specifically work-related. Therefore, 
the reps stated that they were not in a position to forward my e-mail to union 
members in such a hostile working environment as they had already been severely 
reprimanded for "inappropriate use of the company network." 
This tum of events presented me with a major research headache. I decided to 
contact the PCS officials at Glasgow National Savings and Investments (GNS&I), to 
see if they could assist in helping me obtain a sample of shop floor workers to 
interview at Glasgow. The union officials informed me that previously, under the 
Civil Service, the union had been granted facility time for their own researchers to 
conduct focus groups with the membership. The union reps contacted local SBS 
management requesting facility time so that I could interview shop floor union 
members on site. Within a matter of days the union reps got back to me stating that 
SBS management had unfortunately turned down the union's request. The reps 
added that they could not envisage many workers at GNS&I giving up their own 
time to be interviewed, thus, I would face the same problems I had experienced at the 
Durham site. 
This was undoubtedly the most frustrating point in the entire research process. 
It meant yet again chasing up those people I had already interviewed in the hope that 
I could generate a few more interviewees. I did not particularly enjoy having to be 
so forward, and while my contacts were always friendly and pleasant, this method 
was not particularly fruitful. 
Thus, different lines of enquiry were pursued and I contacted my former union 
colleagues at DLR to ask if they knew of any workers at Durham National Savings 
who would be prepared to give up an hour of their time to be interviewed. Julie 
Kelly mentioned my research during the following Branch Executive Committee 
meeting, and I did get to interview one former employee from Durham National 
Savings. I also attended a PCS rally in Newcastle with Kevin Kelly, the Branch 
Secretary at Durham Land Registry, who was the guest speaker. I handed out over 
60 flyers detailing my research and seeking volunteers, but sadly received no positive 
responses. I asked colleagues at Northumbria University and my seminar students if 
they knew of any National Savings workers who would be prepared to be 
interviewed, but yet again drew a blank. I also asked friends and relatives if they 
could help, a few knew of ex-workers from Durham National Savings, but they had 
left the organisation long ago, prior to commercialisation. One friend did put me in 
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contact with a former Durham National Savings worker who had recently left the 
organisation after PPP, who was keen to be interviewed. 
Due to the catalogue of difficulties I encountered m obtaining worker 
interviewees, I decided to re-interview some of the union reps to ask about their 
frontline work experiences at Durham National Savings. This reflects the 
multicultural nature of complex organisations, and whilst one might automatically 
assume that such accounts would be one-sided and biased, this actually proved to be 
very interesting and revealed the many identities and contradictions of everyday life. 
Interestingly, there were different responses to some initiatives reflecting the 
multiple identities, changing opinions and differing experiences on the actual shop 
floor; and one interviewee did openly acknowledge this in talking of metaphorically 
wearing "union hats" and "worker hats". Moreover, interviewees did not always 
adhere to traditional trade union principles and some of the reps interviewed took 
SBS up on the Siemens Share Scheme offer; although one interviewee did admit to 
this being a contradictory position and confessed to feeling like a "phoney socialist". 
I eventually conducted 10 interviews with workers at Durham National Savings, 
including 3 with workers who had recently left the organisation after the PPP through 
'voluntary' redundancy. As Durham National Savings has a long-established 
workforce, the length of service ranged from a minimum of 15 years to a maximum 
of 25 years. The interviews covered a range of grades including administrative 
workers, specialist grades and managers, and some were interviewed more than once. 
Full details of the workers interviewed, including current grades, length of service 
and interview dates are detailed in table 1.2 below. 
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Table 1.2. Details of the workers interviewed from DNS. 
Name Current grade Length of service Date(s) 
interviewed 
Angela Administrative 20 years (left on March 2002 
worker redundancy) 
David Manager 20 years April2002 
Kevin Specialist 24 years July 2003 
August 2003 
Julie Administrative 25 years July 2003 
worker August 2003 
Colin Specialist 24 years August 2003 
Dermot Administrative 15 years September 2003 
worker 
Alan Manager 25 years (left on September 2003 
redundancy) 
Doreen Specialist 18 years October 2003 
Jason Administrative 21 years (left on November 2003 
worker redundancy) 
Michael Administrative 21 years June 2004 
worker 
However, as the majority of workers at National Savings are in the lower grades, 
this sample was somewhat top heavy with managers and specialists and I really 
needed to interview at least one current administrative worker to investigate SBS's 
new Team Working and Lean initiatives. The union reps had arranged for me to 
interview one particular worker, but he was not prepared to meet me in his own time 
after work. Instead, the plan was that once the new trade union structure, the Reps 
Network, was in place, I could unofficially interview this worker in union facility 
time. However, the problem was that SBS approval of this new Reps Network was 
continually delayed. Thus, the final worker interview was eventually completed in 
Juhe 2004, after a seven month wait. Yet patience is indeed a virtue, and this proved 
to be one of the most rewarding interviews of the entire research process. Whilst the 
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initial plan was to interview a range of workers in terms of age, gender, ethnicity and 
grade, including full-time and part-time staff from different sections; in the end I had 
no choice but to work with the volunteers available. 
All of the worker interviews were tape recorded and the respondents were made 
fully aware of the aims of the research and why they were being interviewed; in 
keeping with the accepted guidelines on informed consent (Ali and Kelly, 2004). In 
order to protect the participants, all of the worker interviewees had their names and 
biographies changed to make them non-identifiable. The worker interviews were 
conducted in an array of locations, most were carried out in one of the union rooms 
on a lunchtime, but others took place in public settings, such as, bars and restaurants. 
Before starting all of the interviews, I told the respondents about my own 
employment background and, as mentioned earlier, I feel that this aided the research 
as the participants could identify with me through similar work experiences. All of 
the interviews were informal and participant led, in that workers were given the 
freedom to express what they saw as the important changes to their working lives. 
This method proved to be particularly fruitful and all of the interviews were rather 
lengthy, lasting from between one hour to ninety minutes in duration. As the 
introductory questions were open and wide-ranging, the interviewees soon felt at 
ease and almost immediately forgot about the presence of the tape recorder. This 
helped develop the narrative and all of the interviews soon went off on tangents, 
which was interesting as it usually raised a whole host of fresh and unanticipated 
issues. I needed to be an active and receptive listener in order to digest information 
and ask further questions to allow a deeper understanding. Rapport and trust were 
soon built up and workers honestly and openly talked of their working experiences 
and informal activities; and many later mentioned how they enjoyed retelling and 
reminiscing about the mischief and camaraderie of working life at Durham National 
Savings. 
Outline of the Thesis 
The proceeding chapters are all situated within current Sociological debates, with 
much of the thesis being directly related to the Sociology of Work and Employment, 
as well as Industrial Relations. In chapter two, I examine the central debates and 
arguments relating to the changes that have taken place at National Savings, which 
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will theoretically inform the findings chapters. Criticisms of the bureaucratic 
organisation of the public sector are long-standing, but it was only with the 
development of New Public Management that concerted cultural change really took 
place. New Public Management is inextricably linked with efforts to transform the 
culture of the public sector, and the competing theories of organisational culture 
change will be examined in detail. I will go on to argue that there are major 
theoretical problems with Public-Private Partnership approaches, as the interests of 
business are fundamentally at odds with the ethos of public administration. 
The empirical research findings are analysed in the following four chapters. 
Chapter three sets the context of the National Savings department and the reasons for 
modernisation. The impact of successive organisational culture change initiatives, 
prior to the introduction of the PPP, are investigated. It is argued that the process of 
commercialisation and partial privatisation was gradual at first, but workers at 
National Savings were increasingly concerned about the future. 
Whilst the PPP did signal profound cultural transformations, it was only after 
the instatement of a new SBS management team that rapid change took place. 
Chapter four examines the difficulties encountered by SBS with modernisation 
together with further insourcings and outsourcings, arguing that the company did not 
conduct thorough research and failed to understand the long-established traditions 
and cultures of the organisation. 
This theme of organisational culture change is continued in chapter five, where 
new management techniques, such as, Team Working, Lean and employee 
involvement initiatives are investigated. It is argued that these new working methods 
create an intensification of work, particularly for those with little organisational 
power on the shop floor, and the incentive schemes are divisive and counter-
productive. 
Chapter six analyses formal trade umon opposition, together with informal 
resistance from shop floor workers, to attempts to change the organisational culture 
ofNational Savings. There was trade union opposition to many of the Conservatives 
directives, including strikes against Market Testing. However, there was also 
reluctance on the part of National Savings management to the implementation of 
certain initiatives. The PPP ofNational Savings was proposed by the Conservatives 
and implemented by 'New' Labour, despite opposition from the majority of staff. 
This culminated in the first industrial action to be taken against 'New' Labour. In 
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this chapter I go on to argue that despite there being an implicit 'partnership' 
between SBS and the union written into the PPP contract, industrial relations at 
National Savings are now more heated and acrimonious. Yet there has also been 
informal resistance on the shop floor, involving cynicism and desubordination, as 
workers are unwilling to embrace the managerially defined norms and values of the 
new SBS culture. 
Finally, the thesis argues that rather than there being one coherent, integrated 
and homogenous culture, complex organisations are made up of an array of nested 
and overlapping subcultural groupings which are in a constant state of flux. Hence, 
organisational culture change is a complex, contested and time-consuming process. 
This is particularly the case at National Savings with the implementation of the PPP 
programme, as SBS are endeavouring to change the core values, norms and beliefs of 
a long-serving workforce in order to make a profitable return on this 'partnership' 
deal. As a direct result of many of the initiatives introduced by SBS, the pressures 
on shop floor workers have intensified with the one-time National Savings 'job for 
life' being shrouded in uncertainty. 
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Chapter Two - Organisational Culture Change: from a 
Pubnic Sector Bureaucracy to a Pu.blic-Private Partnership 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the central theoretical debates relating to 
culture change at National Savings, before and after the Public-Private Partnership of 
the organisation. The core related themes of New Public Management and 
organisational culture change, and how they build on one another, lie at the very 
heart of the thesis. I will examine the key political arguments and demonstrate how 
they influenced the policy directives, which were introduced at National Savings. 
This will then act as a theoretical framework for the rest of the thesis, as key themes 
run concurrently throughout the empirical research findings chapters. 
I will explain how the Civil Service was built upon bureaucratic foundations 
with a strong public service ethic. Whilst there has been a long history of criticisms 
of bureaucracy, it was only through the emergence ofNew Public Management that 
serious political attempts were made to operate public sector bureaucracies along 
business lines, thereby transforming the culture of public sector organisations. Such 
management strategies evolved over time, and I will review the extant literature 
detailing their application to the Civil Service, involving both commercialisation and 
part-privatisation. A further development of New Public Management involves the 
Public-Private Partnership and Private Finance Initiative policies, with increasing 
private sector participation in the delivery of public services. 'New' Labour claim 
that the modernisation of the public sector under a 'partnership' approach renders the 
divisions between the public and private sectors obsolete. Yet, I will go on to argue 
that such distinctions remain fundamental, and the fact that a private sector 'partner' 
is attempting to make a profit out of a non-profit public sector financial organisation 
is a major dilemma of the research. 
A central element ofNew Public Management involves transforming the culture 
of the Civil Service. The proposed cultural model to follow has been that of the 
private sector, with directives aimed at shedding the bureaucratic traditions of the 
Civil Service and embracing the norms, values and beliefs of business. I will 
examine in detail the competing theories regarding attempts to manage, control and 
change organisational cultures. A broad range of literature, much of it inter-
------------------- --
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disciplinary, is reviewed in this chapter, covering: Sociology, Social Anthropology, 
Organisational Studies, Political Science, Business Studies, Policy Studies and 
Public Administration. However, much of the literature relating to changes across 
the Civil Service is descriptive rather than critical, and automatically assumes that 
the culture of the higher echelons in Whitehall is simply the same as the workplace 
cultures of those on the shop floor across Civil Service departments. I will go on to 
argue throughout this chapter that such explanations are inadequate in dealing with 
the complexity of workplace cultures. This literature also fails to account for the 
experiences of the ordinary civil servants up and down the country, and how they 
understand and deal with the changes imposed upon them through successive 
government policies. There is limited research on Public-Private Partnership 
initiatives and the implications such schemes have for workers; and this research will 
help fill such voids and develop understandings. 
Weber and Bureaucracy 
Max Weber was the main social theorist associated with the study of bureaucracy, 
and he believed that as an ideal-type it was the most technically superior form of 
organisation. Bureaucracy developed fully in modem society, and due to its formal 
rationality, precision and effectiveness it became the administrative model to follow. 
Indeed, all public sector organisations were based upon bureaucratic principles, 
including the British Civil Service (Pilkington, 1999), and such a model was 
commonly used throughout the private sector too. I will now discuss the historical 
development of bureaucracy, the key characteristics of it as an organisational form, 
together with the role of the bureaucrat which made it the favoured organisational 
type. 
Interestingly, Weber did not actually define the term bureaucracy, but he did 
trace its origins and development, and specified the essential features of the most 
rational forms of bureaucracy (Albrow, 1970: ch. 2). Bureaucratic forms of 
organisation can be traced as far back as China in 165 BC (Albrow, 1970: ch. 1), and 
were effectively employed in both the Roman and Byzantine Empires (Weber, 1968: 
ch. 11 ). State administration was used in Ancient Egypt with public regulation of 
water from the River Nile and the military organisation of construction (Weber, 1968: 
972. Pilkington, 1999: 1). Such early bureaucracies were simple, traditional, 
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patrimonial and highly irrational; but once established they continued to develop and 
progress (Weber, 2000: 156). Bureaucracy developed with the money economy, 
taxation, private property and the movement to systematic budgets through public 
demand for order and protection (Weber, 1967: 204- 213). Hence, with the growth 
of an increasingly more complex society, the state had to be administered and 
regulated in a public and collective way (Weber, 1968: 964). Bureaucracy became 
fully developed in the most advanced industrial societies during the twentieth century, 
it played a pivotal role in the rationalisation of the modem world and could be found 
in practically all areas of social life including: schools, universities, hospitals, 
government departments, armies, businesses and the majority of workplaces (Weber, 
1968: ch. 11. Albrow, 1970. Watson, 2001). Indeed, bureaucracy pervaded both the 
public and private sectors. 
Weber outlined abstract descriptions of the key features which made up the 
ideal-type bureaucracy, being bureaucracy in its purest organisational form. This 
ideal-type was an intentionally one-sided representation of the perfect functioning 
bureaucracy, so that organisations could be evaluated against this model and the 
closer they were to this, the more effective their performance would be (Jaffee, 2001: 
ch. 5. Watson, 2001: 66). However, this ideal-type can never be replicated in reality. 
Firstly, ideal-type bureaucracies have a monocratically organised hierarchy; this 
resembles a pyramid structure where there is a chain of command from the top of the 
organisation to the bottom. Secondly, authority is legitimised with a clearly defined 
grading system and division of labour within the hierarchy, with superordinate and 
subordinate relations. Thirdly, communication within the bureaucracy is centralised 
and vertical, in that information and orders are passed down through the hierarchy. 
Fourthly, management is based on written documents and files to govern the conduct 
of bureaucrats, which is intrinsic to administrative order. Fifthly, duties and 
authority are attached to positions not persons. Therefore, bureaucrats must follow 
objective and general rules, as opposed to the previous traditions of nepotism and 
patrimonialism. Sixthly, all bureaucrats are given special technical training so that 
they have full knowledge of the rules and procedures of the organisation (Weber, 
1967: ch. 8 and 1968: ch. 11). 
Regarding the official's position, terms and conditions of employment, Weber 
described how bureaucrats were recruited, distributed and controlled within the 
bureaucracy. Firstly, recruitment into the bureaucracy is based on educational 
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qualifications and exams. Secondly, Weber saw office holding as a vocation, where 
officials had fixed duties and responsibilities, and had to work to their full capacity. 
Thirdly, the employment tenure of the official is normally seen as a secure 'job for 
life', as there can be no arbitrary removal from office in public bureaucracies. 
Fourthly, the salaries of bureaucrats are fixed and based on grade, function and 
length of service, and include a pension. Hence, due to the employment security 
associated with such public administration jobs, office holders achieved a high social 
status and such jobs were sought after. Fifthly, there are fixed career paths within the 
hierarchy with promotion by one grade at a time, based on individual merit and 
seniority. Sixthly, there is the functional specialisation of tasks within the 
bureaucracy, which are specific, distinct and methodical, which allows work to flow 
smoothly from one department to another, and all duties combine to achieve the 
overall goals of the organisation (Weber, 1967: ch. 8 and 1968: ch. 11). Weber 
argued that bureaucracies were potentially superior to all other organisational forms, 
as they operate under explicit principles which results in an economical, 
unambiguous, continuous and permanent structure (Weber, 1967: ch. 8. Albrow, 
1970. Watson, 2001: 66). 
However, Weber was deeply ambivalent about bureaucracy; whilst he saw it as 
the most rational organisational form, he was also critical of its development. 
Although he devised an ideal-type, Weber was well aware that in reality 
bureaucracies were not as rational as initially planned (Albrow, 1970). Indeed, 
Weber was cautious as he did not advocate the use of bureaucracy, nor did he 
address the concerns of managers (Watson, 2001: 242). Weber had a very negative 
world view of the future of bureaucracy, where increasing regulation would 
demystify social life. He believed that once established, bureaucracy was impossible 
to destroy and humanity would become trapped within its 'iron cage'. Organisations 
would become lifeless machines with a congealed spirit striving towards irresistible 
rationalisation, and bureaucratic workers would become mere cogs in the 
organisational machine (Weber, 1967: 228 - 229 and 2000: 156 - 157. Mitzman, 
1985). 
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The Informal Workings of Bureaucracy 
Whilst Weber was thorough in his account of formal bureaucratic work, he failed to 
discuss informal and flexible relations and behaviours which exist in all 
organisations. Blau (1963) argues that without the informal, there would be no 
formal organisation, and workers mediate between the formal and informal 
continuously. 
Unprescribed actions and behaviours can have both positive and negative effects 
on bureaucracy. Brown (1992: 93) argues that Weber's description of bureaucracy 
does not account for unofficial acts, which can contribute to organisational goals. 
Blau (1963) also claims that informal actions can have positive implications, where 
workers can take short-cuts and help each other out to increase productivity. Yet, 
Merton ( 1968: ch. 8) states that the other side of this is the bureaucratic personality, 
where workers become so preoccupied with observing bureaucratic rules and 
regulations that the rules actually become ends in themselves, which creates 
organisational inefficiency. These notions of bureaucratic inefficiency will be 
discussed in greater depth later in this chapter, when dealing with the challenge to 
bureaucracy. 
As bureaucracies are much more than lifeless abstractions, it is necessary to 
investigate informal relationships and workings to understand how workers make 
sense of and live their lives at work (Bradley et al, 2000: ch. 9). This is why it was 
essential for me to uncover the reality of working life at Durham National Savings. 
In the following section, I will set out the reasoning behind the establishment of 
the public sector, and the characteristics of this model which distinguish it from the 
private sector. I will then discuss how Weber's theory of bureaucracy was used as 
the template for the traditional model of public administration. 
The Ethos of Public Administration 
The public sector was originally established to provide services to citizens which the 
market either failed or was unwilling to provide. The values the public sector 
pursues are of equity, honesty, justice and fairness (Flynn, 2002. Hoggett, 2005). All 
public sector bureaucracies are open and accountable to Parliament and the general 
public, in an effort to counter favouritism and corruption (Marquand, 2004: ch. 2). 
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There are fundamental differences between the private sector and the public 
sector in terms of ownership, goals and responsibility. The criteria for success in 
private business is profitability, and such organisations are accountable to their 
owners and shareholders. In stark contrast, the public sector provides services for the 
well-being of citizens, often where it would be unprofitable for the market to do so 
(Nutley and Osborne, 1994: ch. 2. Doherty and Home, 2002: ch. 1). Hence, there is 
a different relationship with the users of services, as such organisations serve the 
public interest and their goals are politically defined (Farnham and Horton, 1996b. 
Doherty and Home, 2002: ch. 1). Therefore, the public sector plays an essential role 
in democratic society, and such organisations are ultimately accountable to the public 
whom they serve, as opposed to shareholders (Flynn, 2002. Goodsell, 2005). As 
documented in chapter one, the Department of National Savings is also a public 
service, its values are philanthropic, in that it aims to help the small saver, whereas 
commercial banks are directed by profit maximisation. 
Historically, the public sector shares many of the features of Weber's ideal-type 
bureaucracy, in that it is hierarchical with a high division of labour, and based on 
written documents with intellectually analysable rules (Lane, 1993. Clegg, 1994. 
Hughes, 2003: ch. 2). Public administration is concerned with predictable, consistent 
and standard procedures, so that professional practice results in equal treatment for 
all (Nutley and Osborne, 1994. Farnham and Horton, 1996b). Indeed, the Civil 
Service was fully established around the time of Weber's writing, with the Northcote 
Trevelyan Reforms of 1854 establishing the service as a modem bureaucracy, as 
opposed to a system based on patronage and nepotism (Horton, 1996. Marquand, 
2004: ch. 2). Although, it was only in 1919 that a national, unified and centralised 
Civil Service came into existence, with permanently appointed professional staff who 
were able to transfer between departments (Pilkington, 1999: chs. 1 and 3). 
The British Civil Service, including the Department of National Savings, 
traditionally has a very hierarchical grading structure, beginning with the 
administrative positions of Administrative Assistant (AA) and Administrative 
Officer (AO), through to the executive grades, being lower and middle managerial 
posts, starting with Executive Officer (EO), to Higher Executive Officer (HEO) and 
Senior Executive Officer (SEO), and then onto senior managers who run departments. 
Recruitment is based on formal interview, educational qualifications and, for 
executive posts, Civil Service exams. All staff are given technical training on how to 
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complete tasks. Authority is centralised running from the top down through the 
organisation. There are fixed career paths with promotion up the hierarchy being by 
one grade at a time based on merit and seniority, and judged by supervisors. Salaries 
are fixed to a national rate for the grade with annual increments, including 
occupational pensions and such employment is safe and secure (Drewry and Butcher, 
1991. Pilkington, 1999). 
Hughes (2003: ch. 2) argues that the 'Golden Age of Public Administration' 
existed from the 1920s until the early 1970s; yet, as will be discussed in the 
following section, there have been political attempts from the 1960s onwards to 
change the culture, nature, ethos and structure of the Civil Service. 
Bureaucracy under Attack 
Whilst in theory the public and private sectors are essentially different, this 
distinction has been continually contested with attempts to utilise private sector 
management techniques and privatise public services. Moreover, criticisms of public 
bureaucracies are not new; there is a long history of such debates, which are still very 
prominent today. Bureaucracy has been popularly portrayed in pejorative terms as 
creating waste and inefficiency, by being too rule-bound and inflexible in the modem 
world; and the only solution has been to operate bureaucracies along business lines. 
Yet, those who defend bureaucracy argue that it is inappropriate to run public 
services in such a manner, as they have an entirely different ethos. In this section of 
the literature review I will analyse these debates and examine the early attempts to 
move from an administrative to a managerial Civil Service culture. 
The most stinging attacks on bureaucracy have come from Neo Liberals. 
Ludwig Von Mises ( 1946) blames bureaucratic maladministration for spiralling costs 
and inefficiency, which he argues are the very antithesis ofbusiness values. Similar 
claims are made by Crozier (1964) when comparing public bureaucracy to business, 
as bureaucracy is guilty of being inflexible and stifling, where bureaucrats are not 
encouraged to use their initiative. Parkinson (1958), in his satirical account of 
bureaucracy entitled 'Parkinson's law', claimed that bureaucrats perpetuate 
themselves by looking busy and creating extra tasks when none actually exist, and 
such procrastination is allowed as there is no incentive for bureaucrats to be efficient. 
Although this account is anecdotal, it does fuel the fires of those on the right who see 
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bureaucracy in disparaging terms. These claims continue to be hugely influential and 
commonly used today. 
Whilst in the past bureaucracy had been the organising model used in both the 
public and private sectors, from the 1950s and 1960s onwards the private sector 
introduced new management practices to increase efficiency and improve 
performance. This involved the dismantling of bureaucracy through decentralisation 
and devolved authority; and there was pressure on the public sector to follow this 
lead of cultural transformation (Hughes, 2003: chs. 2 and 3). The first modem 
attempt at trying to introduce managerial reform and culture change to the Civil 
Service came in 1961 with the Plowden Report. This proposed stricter financial 
controls with the establishment of Public Expenditure Survey (PES) limits, and 
stressed the need for efficiency by encouraging collaboration between managers in 
the Civil Service with their counterparts in business to exchange ideas and 
experience (Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). Furthermore, the 1968 Fulton 
Report criticised the Civil Service for being ineffectively organised and managed. 
The report insisted that there was an urgent need for more accountable Civil Service 
management in terms of directing staff, setting targets and measuring results. 
Further suggestions included splitting separate functional departments into 
autonomous Agencies and even contracting work out to the private sector (Pyper, 
1991: ch. 6. Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). 
Although these reports put the management of the Civil Service onto the 
political agenda, only some of these suggestions were introduced (Pyper, 1991: ch. 6. 
Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). Callaghan's Labour government did introduce tighter 
spending controls (Batkin, 1983. Hall, 1983. Likierman, 1984 ), and there were 
further plans to privatise elements of the service and introduce Performance-Related 
Pay (Horton, 1996). However, as the Civil Service was left to reform itself, very 
little was done to actually challenge its size, hierarchy and inefficiencies, as it 
continued to be dominated by elite administrators (Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: 
ch. 6). Yet, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, there is no discussion in the literature 
of how these changes affected the day to day working lives of ordinary civil servants. 
Whilst bureaucracy is often criticised for being inefficient, Albrow (1970) is one 
of the few theorists with a thorough and accurate understanding of Weber's ideal-
type, and is correct in arguing that, for Weber, bureaucracy was never about 
efficiency. Indeed, the stated advantages of bureaucracy are its rationality, 
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impartiality and precision, and this is what made it the most superior way to organise 
public services (Weber, 1968). Furthermore, the ethos of public administration is 
one of equality of service, which makes the application of business values and 
methods completely inappropriate (du Gay, 1996 and 2000). 
Although these early attempts at managerial and cultural change in the Civil 
Service proposed stricter financial controls, the contracting out of work to the private 
sector and the creation of Agencies; such ideas were to be the central elements of 
New Public Management. In the following section, I will investigate the evolution of 
New Public Management and how its principles were to fundamentally transform the 
organisational culture of the Civil Service. 
New :Public Management 
I will now examine the emergence of New Public Management (NPM), set out its 
key characteristics and discuss its development as an international trend. At its most 
basic level, advocates of NPM claim that public sector bureaucracies are lacking in 
comparison to the private sector, therefore, they endorse privatisation, and where that 
is not possible, public organisations should operate along market lines. A central 
element of the NPM agenda is that senior managers can take control of the culture of 
their organisation and transform values, norms and attitudes to improve both 
employee commitment and productivity. I will examine attempts to apply the key 
principles of New Public Management to the Civil Service. Many of the ideas 
associated with NPM are not new, but after the election of the first Thatcher 
Conservative government in 1979 there were significant, sustained and persistent 
efforts which changed the culture, structure and nature of the service. The key 
features of NPM have dominated government policies on the public sector from the 
early 1980s to the present day, and some theorists argue that this has led to the 
emergence of a new political consensus, as there has been a continuation of this 
thinking with 'New' Labour's 'Third Way' philosophy. 
The Emergence of New Public Management 
As stated earlier, challenges to bureaucracy and public administration are not new, 
yet increasingly from the 1960s and 1970s onwards criticisms were mounting which 
diagnosed bureaucracy as a failed model, and offered the market as the solution. 
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Those predominantly from the right of the political spectrum portrayed bureaucracy 
in negative terms, depicting it as bloated, sluggish, too rigid, inefficient, 
unproductive, wasteful, bound up with unnecessary red tape and outdated. Their 
antidote to these ills, based on the assumption of the superiority of the private sector, 
was to either privatise or managerialise public sector bureaucracies. I will now 
examine the main theoretical roots of New Public Management, which are 
inextricably linked with managerial attempts to transform the culture of public sector 
organisations. 
The bases of NPM are to be found in the theories of private sector management 
and economic liberalism (Hughes, 2003). Ostrom, a key theorist in public 
administration, originally writing in the 1970s, claims that there are essentially two 
forms of organisation: bureaucracy and markets. He argues that there is a crisis of 
confidence in public sector bureaucracies as they are less efficient and effective than 
markets and, as they are monopolies, no choice is offered to customers; hence, 
market-based alternatives are essential (Ostrom, 1989: ch. 1 ). Similarly, Public 
Choice Theorists, such as Buchanan and Tullock (1972) believe that the introduction 
of private sector competition will offer the users of public services more options and 
flexibility, whilst making the service providers more accountable. Also, hugely 
influential were the Neo Liberal economists Friedman (1962) and Hayek (1971), 
who wanted minimal state intervention and argued that the market was more flexible, 
efficient and creative than government. 
Several theorists noted similar trends occurring across the public sector from the 
early 1980s and throughout the 1990s, most notably in the UK and USA. These 
changes involved the privatisation or quasi-privatisation of nationalised industries or 
public services, together with the application of private sector styles of management. 
The key early theorists all used different terms to describe the same phenomena, 
Pollitt (1990) termed this 'Managerialism', Osborne and Gaebler (1992) tagged this 
'Entrepreneurial Government', and Hood (1991) coined the term 'New Public 
Management'; which has since become the generally agreed label. Whilst these 
theorists all identified similar patterns of change, Hood and Pollitt are critical of the 
direction that the public services have taken, yet Osborne and Gaebler are 
enthusiastic supporters who influenced the Clinton administration (Ferlie et al, 1996: 
ch. 1. Doherty and Home, 2002: ch. 1). NPM is most commonly associated with the 
rise of the 'New Right' in the early 1980s, particularly the Thatcher Conservative 
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and Reagan Republican governments in the UK and USA respectively (Massey, 
1993). Yet its features have also been identified in several 'centre left' European 
countries (Ferlie et al, 1996: ch. 1), together with Australia and New Zealand (E. 
Wilson, 1993. Zifcak, 1994). 
Advocates ofNPM claim that it is the solution to the weaknesses ofbureaucratic 
public administration. By moving from a bureaucratic to a managerialist model, 
there will be more accountability of performance which will improve both 
organisational efficiency and effectiveness. The use of 'cutting edge' private sector 
management practices will lead to a focus on costs, objectives and results. This new 
orientation towards the performance measurement of both organisations and their 
staff ensures better use of resources, improved value for money for taxpayers and 
more customer-focused services. NPM also involves the introduction of outside 
competition, where private sector providers are allowed to tender for government 
contracts to improve efficiency and response rates (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992. 
Hughes, 2003). I shall now examine the defining characteristics ofNPM. 
New Public Management has been applied across the public sector from the 
Thatcher governments onwards, and its features have been identified in the Civil 
Service, National Health Service (NHS), local government and education (Farnham 
and Horton, 1996c. Ferlie et al, 1996: ch. 1). Some writers, such as, Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992) have purported that there is a distinctive style of NPM which is a 
global phenomenon. This view has been criticised by several theorists for being too 
simplistic and over-deterministic, they argue that there is no international 
convergence of one coherent NPM trend, rather there are a variety of models which 
are continually evolving and changing (Ferlie et al, 1996. Hood, 1998. Pollitt, 2002). 
For this reason, I will map out the key characteristics of NPM as identified by the 
main theorists. The first feature is the application of private sector management 
techniques and the transference of private sector managers to the public sector, in 
order to transform organisational cultures (Hood, 1991. E. Wilson, 1993). Isaac-
Henry (1993) claims that the Conservative governments believed that public sector 
managers lacked the skills and determination to bring about organisational culture 
change, and this led to the deliberate recruitment of senior managers from the 
business sector. Secondly, organisational aims and objectives are clearly defined 
(Hood, 1991 ). Thirdly, explicit standards are used to evaluate organisational 
performance, typically involving the use of quantitative measures, such as, 
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Performance Indicators (Hood, 1991. Farnham and Horton, 1996b). Fourthly, and 
linked to the previous point, there is personal responsibility on managers to achieve 
results and make year on year improvements in the performance of the organisation. 
This involves the movement towards performance management, with the use of 
Performance-Related Pay to incentivise all employees, not only senior managers 
(Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002. Hughes, 2003: ch. 3). The fifth characteristic is the 
disaggregation of centralised bureaucracies to create smaller more manageable units. 
This entails the separation of policy from service delivery, in order to increase 
accountability and responsibility (Hood, 1991. Nutley and Osborne, 1994: ch. 1). 
Sixthly, NPM involves increasing competition in the provision of services, with the 
use of private sector contractors in an attempt to reduce costs and improve standards 
(Hood, 1991. Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002. Hughes, 2003: ch. 3). The seventh 
facet of NPM is that public sector organisations are placed under increasing financial 
control, with the use of cost centres to prove that resources have been efficiently used 
(Pollitt, 1990. Nutley and Osborne, 1994: ch. 1. Farnham and Horton, 1996b ). The 
eighth trait is that there is a concerted effort to impose stronger discipline on the 
workforce and resist trade union demands by reasserting management's right to 
manage (Hood, 1991 ). The ninth factor involves organisations becoming more 
flexible with the delayering of hierarchies, the hiring of temporary staff and the 
decentralisation of national pay and conditions (Pollitt, 1990. Ferlie et al, 1996: ch. 
1 ). Lastly, NPM involves a greater focus on quality and the rights of service users 
(Nutley and Osborne, 1994: ch. 1 ). New Public Management is a complex and 
multifaceted concept that involves an array of techniques. Yet the components of 
NPM are firmly interlocked with efforts to radically transform the cultures of public 
sector bureaucracies. 
Before moving on to discuss how the principles of NPM were applied to the 
Civil Service, I will examine some of the fundamental objections to using these 
techniques in the public sector. 
Criticisms of New Public Management Approaches 
There are several key arguments put forward by a variety of theorists as to why NPM 
is unsuitable and harmful to the public sector. First and foremost, it is the antithesis 
of public administration and it goes against its foundational values, namely: equity, 
30 
neutrality, honesty, fairness and justice (Hood, 1991. Hoggett, 2005). As mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, what distinguishes the public sector from business are its 
different aims, accountability and ownership. It operates in the pursuit of the 
common good, and bureaucratic procedures are necessary to ensure that the public 
interest continues to be served, which is why the public sector was originally 
established (Marquand, 2004). Yet the distinctive ethos of public administration is 
threatened by many of the features of NPM. For instance, the politicisation of 
management with the recruitment of Chief Executives from the private sector goes 
against the neutrality of bureaucracy (Farnham and Horton, 1996c), as many are 
politically committed to the government of the day and are used to drive forward 
culture change programmes (Hughes, 2003: ch. 3). Similarly, the adoption of 
individual incentives to staff, such as, Performance-Related Pay, together with the 
devolvement of national pay and conditions, dismantles bureaucratic procedures 
which are in place to ensure honesty and equality of treatment (Hood, 1991). 
Furthermore, the contracting out of public sector work to business also threatens the 
ethos of bureaucracy, and blurs the essential distinctions between the two sectors 
(Nutley and Osborne, 1994. Marquand, 2004). 
Several commentators argue that managers cannot impose business methods on 
the public sector due to its fundamental distinctiveness (Pollitt, 1990. Hood, 1991). 
It is difficult to measure the performance of the public sector and quantify results. 
Whereas, in the private sector this is more straightforward as it is primarily based on 
profitability (Lane, 1993. Nutley and Osborne, 1994). Hence, a profit and loss 
system cannot be simply used to determine the objectives and service provision of 
the public sector (Self, 1993: ch. 6). 
It has been argued that much of the agenda ofNPM is simply about cutting costs 
and reducing staffmg levels (Pollitt, 1990. Hood, 1991). Indeed, Farnham and 
Horton ( 1996c) claim that increasing pressure is placed on public servants to 
improve productivity, as a cover up for a lack of financial investment from central 
government. The taken for granted assumption of NPM proponents that the private 
sector is inherently superior to the public sector has long been disputed and contested 
(Pollitt, 1990. Hood, 1991. Marquand, 2004). Moreover, du Gay (2000) argues that 
bureaucracy is only ineffective when it is judged on the terms of business. Critics 
also argue that the principles of NPM do not improve service delivery (Hood, 1991. 
Farnham and Horton, 1996a). Furthermore, Pollitt (2002) states that there are very 
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few independent evaluations of NPM, and those that do exist have a narrow 
definition of results which cannot be solely attributable to such techniques. 
There is little regard from NPM supporters as to the impact such cultural and 
structural changes have on those who work in the public sector. Critics argue that 
such transitions typically have negative consequences in terms of a loss of job 
security, with an increasingly pressurised pace ofwork (Farnham and Horton, 1996c. 
Pollitt, 2002. Hoggett, 2005). 
Despite these criticisms of NPM, successive governments have enthusiastically 
pressed ahead with public sector culture change, and the impact such directives have 
had on the Civil Service will be addressed in the following section. 
'fhe Application of New Public Management to the Civil Service 
From the election of the first Thatcher Conservative government onwards, private 
sector management techniques have been introduced with the aim of improving the 
efficiency, effectiveness and value for money of the Civil Service. These initiatives 
were aimed at dismantling many of the bureaucratic traditions of the service, and 
generating a more commercial culture. I shall now review the extant literature on the 
impact these changes have had on the Civil Service. 
Initially the Conservatives had no coherent radical set agenda for change in the 
public sector, only general goals and ideological beliefs (Isaac-Henry, 1993. Zifcak, 
1994. Horton, 1996). In their 1979 manifesto the Conservatives outlined four broad 
aims: to reduce the size of the public sector, to cut public expenditure, to curb 
bureaucratic waste, and restrict, what they saw as, the excessive power of public 
sector trade unions (Isaac-Henry, 1993. Farnham and Horton, 1996a. Pilkington, 
1999: ch. 6). Yet, change in the Civil Service was introduced in an improvised, 
incremental and pragmatic manner (Isaac-Henry, 1993. Farnham and Horton, 1996a. 
Marquand, 2004). Many of the ideas used by the Conservatives were not new, but 
their application was as policies were introduced in a much more determined fashion 
and imposed from above (Hood, 1991. Johnson, 1993. Self, 1993: ch. 6. Horton, 
1996). Influenced by right-wing think tanks, such as, the Institute for Economic 
Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute and the Centre for Policy Studies (Johnson, 1993. 
Farnham and Horton, 1996a), the Conservatives introduced policies which were later 
to be identified as foundational features ofNew Public Management. 
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Reform of the Civil Service began slowly at first (Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6), but 
there were a series of significant measures which set the scene for what was to follow. 
In 1979, the Conservatives brought in Sir Derek Rayner, from High Street retailers 
Marks and Spencer, to head the newly established Efficiency Unit, with the aim of 
eliminating waste and inefficiency (Likierman, 1984. Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: 
ch. 6). The mantra of the Efficiency Unit was paraphrased by the 'Three Es': 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness; and members from the unit were deployed to 
scrutinise Civil Service departments in the drive to improve value for money (Pyper, 
1995: ch. 3. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). This resulted in the size of the Civil Service 
being cut by one-third between 1979 and 1991 (Pyper, 1995: ch. 3). However, critics 
argued that this demonstrated the antipathy of the Conservatives towards the Civil 
Service, and such cuts would have a detrimental effect on the quality of service 
received by the general public (Hall, 1983. Isaac-Henry, 1993). 
The Financial Management Initiative (FMI) was introduced in all Civil Service 
departments in May 1982, with three main aims: to set clear objectives, to measure 
performance and introduce cost centres (Pollitt, 1990. Drewry and Butcher, 1991: 
204- 206. Ferlie et al, 1996: ch. 2). However, there was no absolute FMI model to 
copy, instead each department was free to develop their own version (Pyper, 1995: 
ch. 3. Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). The Conservatives claimed that the 
FMI did increase productivity, and savings of around £1 billion were made between 
1982 and 1987 (Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). However, there were concerns that such 
reforms were being deliberately restricted by those in Whitehall who felt that the 
cultural values of the private sector were not suited to public administration 
(Likierman, 1984. Metcalfe and Richards, 1984). 
In 1983 Sir Robin Ibbs was seconded from ICI to be the new Head of the 
Efficiency Unit, replacing Sir Derek Rayner, and his task was to make the Civil 
Service more efficient (Pyper, 1991: ch. 7. Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). 
The Ibbs Report was published in 1988 entitled Improving Management in 
Government: The Next Steps, and the report stated that with over 600, 000 employees 
the Civil Service was too large, diverse and complex to be managed as one single 
entity. It recommended that the national Civil Service be divided up into separate 
Executive Agencies, where policy decisio11s were separated from service delivery 
(Hood, 1991 ). Chief Executives were to head Agencies and, in a further effort to 
commercialise the Civil Service, the government favoured the appointment of 
33 
executives from the private sector (Pyper, 1995. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 7). Agency 
Chief Executives had personal responsibility for the day to day running of operations 
and the achievement of set targets (Clarke, 1995. Horton, 1996). Under the Civil 
Service (Management Functions) Act 1992, recruitment, training, pay, terms and 
conditions were devolved to Chief Executives (Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 
8). Approximately 60% of civil servants now work in 108 Executive Agencies 
(Flynn, 2002: ch. 1), and the last national Civil Service pay settlement was in 1996 
(Gagnon, 1996. Horton, 1996). 
The Civil Service was also subject to privatisation during the 1980s and 1990s 
through the Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) of peripheral services, and, 
on a much broader scale, Market Testing. By the end of 1993 there had been 389 
Market Tests conducted in the Civil Service, with budget savings of around 22% 
(Pilkington, 1999: ch. 7). However, there are a number of critics who question the 
alleged efficiency, reliability and quality of the private sector over the public sector, 
arguing that this has never actually been proven (Batkin, 1983. Ascher, 1987. J. 
Wilson, 1993. Morgan, 1995. Thomason, 1995). Moreover, any savings made would 
be at the expense of those workers who are already amongst the lowest paid (Ascher, 
1987. Wilson, 1995). 
It is clear from the changes discussed above, that several of the key principles of 
NPM run throughout many of the Conservative governments' Civil Service 
directives. Hence, there is a sustained and rigorous emphasis on performance 
objectives and budget controls, with the use of private sector managers and methods, 
which sees the transformation from a bureaucratic to a managerial service. A major 
limitation of the literature on the changes that have taken place in the Civil Service is 
that much of it only relates to policy matters. There is only some limited discussion 
of the effects on those working in the Civil Service. Foster and Hoggett (1999), in 
their research on the Benefits Agency, discovered that staff felt increasingly 
pressurised and were cynical of many of these initiatives, seeing them as a 
smokescreen for a lack of government investment. Other researchers have found that 
privatisation through CCT and Market Testing has led to worse employee terms and 
conditions, and declining staff morale (Ascher, 1987. J. Wilson, 1993. Pilkington, 
19QQ). This gap in the literature is, therefore, why it is essential to investigate the 
impact that these initiatives have had on the lives of workers at National Savings, 
particularly to attempt to understand the process of organisational culture change 
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both before and after the Public-Private Partnership. It is the evolution of this policy 
which I will now examine, together with how this led to the emergence of a new 
cross-party consensus. 
New Public Management- Increasing Private Sector Participation 
Whilst elements of privatisation had already been introduced into the Civil Service, 
the Private Finance Initiative and Public-Private Partnership policies were new 
developments in the involvement of private business in the public sector. Originally 
Conservative government initiatives, both policies were later enthusiastically 
embraced and reformulated to become part of 'New' Labour's 'Third Way' political 
philosophy, and marked a further stage in the evolvement of New Public 
Management. 
In 1992 the Conservatives launched the Private Finance Initiative, initially as a 
source of private capital investment to finance public sector building projects 
(Department of the Environment, 1996). This act is significant as it spells a shift in 
capital funding from the government to the private sector (Hazell and Zubick, 1995). 
PFI projects began with private sector investment in the construction of new NHS 
hospitals, and later spread across a range of public sector settings (Ruane, 2002). 
Following developments made to the PFI policy, from 1994 onwards private sector 
companies were invited to design, build, maintain and operate services for the public 
sector (Ruane, 2002). This initiative keeps government borrowing down, as private 
sector companies are under contract to provide new buildings and run services. The 
contractors are paid an annual fee by the government, and lease the building back to 
the public sector over the duration of the contract. The private company also bears 
part of the risk involved in the project, and at the end of the contract the assets are 
returned to full public ownership (Flynn, 2002. Marquand, 2004: ch. 1 ). 
In April 1996 the Conservatives set up the Public-Private Partnership 
Programme, where the private sector together with the public sector were to be 
involved in capital investment and delivering public services (Department of the 
Environment, 1996). Such plans for private contractors delivering pubic services had 
been originally mooted back in the early 1980s (Batkin, 1983), although at that time 
the term PPP was not in existence. 
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The use of PPPs in the Civil Service is an extension of Agency Status with the 
separation of policy from administration, yet instead service delivery is outsourced to 
a private sector 'partner'. The initial plan for the Public-Private Partnership of 
National Savings was proposed in 1996, by the then Conservative government under 
the leadership of John Major. 
The Conservatives claimed that the advantages of PFI and PPP were that private 
sector investment, management skills, experience and expertise would be used to 
transform failing public sector organisations. Through the risk and skills transfer to 
the private sector, new dynamic managers would use 'cutting edge' innovative 
approaches to drive up efficiencies and improve overall value for money (Hazell and 
Zubick, 1995. Cowie, 1996. Department of the Environment, 1996). 
Initially, when in opposition, the Labour Party were opposed to PFI claiming 
that it was the thin end of the privatisation wedge (Ruane, 2002). Yet, under the 
Conservatives no major PFI deals were secured prior to 1997 (Ruane, 2002). How 
ironic it is that once re-christened 'New' Labour, such PPP and PFI deals were to 
spread throughout the public sector (Curwen, 1999). I shall now discuss the 
emergence of 'New' Labour and the Blair project, and how PPP was reformulated to 
become a cornerstone of 'Third Way' thinking. 
'New' :Labour, New Public Management and a New Political 
Consensus 
The election of Tony Blair as leader of the Labour Party in July 1994 resulted in not 
only a re-naming of the party to 'New' Labour, but also a re-branding and re-
evaluation of its entire political direction. The most significant act in this exercise of 
reassessment was the re-writing of the party's constitution, particularly Clause Four, 
which was emblematic of 'Old' Labour with their support of Keynesian economics 
and nationalisation, with the common ownership of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange (Burden et al, 2000: ch. 1 ). Instead, the new Clause Four 
stipulates that the party now stands for a dynamic economy, which uses the 
enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition in partnership and cooperation 
with a thriving private sector to provide high quality public services (Panitch and 
Leys, 2001 ). This is important as it signals a radical break from the past and an 
acceptance by 'New' Labour of the reforms made by previous Conservative 
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governments from 1979 to 1997 (Burden et al, 2000: ch. 1. Panitch and Leys, 2001 ). 
Moreover, Tony Blair (1998) claims that the Conservative's reforms of the public 
sector were necessary, and that the spirit of enterprise applies as much to the public 
sector as it does to business (New Labour, 2001 ). 
'New' Labour have been hugely influenced by the ideas of Anthony Giddens, 
and the 'Third Way' is portrayed as representing new, progressive, challenging and 
radial politics of the 'centre left' (Blair, 1998. Giddens, 2000). Proponents of the 
'Third Way' argue that in a rapidly changing world, the dogmatic debates of the past 
over nationalisation versus privatisation, and the public sector versus the private 
sector, are outdated and no longer relevant (Giddens, 1998. HM Treasury, 2000). 
They argue that there is no longer any difference between the public and private 
sectors, as they now both work in 'partnership' to deliver excellent public services 
(Giddens, 1998 and 2000. The Cabinet Office, 2003). Thus, the 'Third Way' moves 
beyond the old political divisions between the 'left' and 'right', and this ideological 
gulf is bridged in the quest for modernisation (Blair, 1998. Giddens, 1998). 
Once 'New' Labour had reformulated their political agenda, they were able to 
take on board the previous government's PFI and PPP policies and reinvigorate them 
in order to increase their effectiveness. 'Partnerships' became one of the 
cornerstones of 'New' Labour's modernisation programme and they came to power 
determined to make this policy a success (Falconer, 1999. Ruane, 2002). There was 
to be a new political language and discourse under 'New' Labour, being one of 
'partnership', based on cooperation and collaboration between both the public and 
private sectors (Newman, 2002. Ruane, 2002); this emphasis was lacking under the 
Conservatives (Blair, 1998. Flynn, 2002). Whilst there is a recognition that both 
sectors are different, in 'partnership' they compliment each other by combining their 
own distinctive advantages (HM Treasury, 2000), where the customer service of the 
public sector works in tandem with the effectiveness of the private sector. 'New' 
Labour support a range of PPP forms including: joint PPP ventures, PFI deals, the 
sale of equity stakes in state-owned businesses and outsourcing to the private sector. 
They are also keen to develop new forms of 'partnerships' (HM Treasury, 2000). 
What is also different under 'New' Labour is that the government play a fundamental 
role in setting out stringent performance criteria for all PPP deals; such vigorous 
accountability of private contractors did not previously exist. As there is a transfer of 
risk to the private sector, the government must ensure that delivery meets 
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specifications relating to quality, costs and productivity (Blair, 1998. HM Treasury, 
2000). In addition, 'partnerships' under 'New' Labour are now long-term and PPP 
deals are to benefit all parties (HM Treasury, 2000). 'New' Labour are in complete 
agreement with the Conservatives over the advantages of PPP, compared to 
traditional methods of financing public services, namely: improved management, 
private sector innovation, increased efficiency and value for money (Blair, 1998. 
Giddens, 1998. HM Treasury, 2000). Yet, one key difference is the huge escalation 
of PPP projects since 'New' Labour took office (HM Treasury, 2000), and this 
continues to rise. 
There is a clear continuation of the key principles ofNPM under 'New' Labour, 
and several commentators have noted the emergence of a new political consensus 
(Farnham and Horton, 1999b. Horton, 1996. Flynn, 2002. Hall, 2003. Marquand, 
2004). There is broad cross-party support for the foundational values of NPM, with 
the use of private sector managers and practices to improve the efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of the public sector (Farnham and Horton, 1999b. Horton, 1996. 
Newman, 2002). Hence, 'New' Labour take on board many of the Conservatives' 
criticisms of the public sector, and likewise endorse the use of performance 
management, financial controls and outsourcing (Flynn, 2002. Marquand, 2004). 
Such ideas have helped change the culture, values and norms of public sector 
organisations, and there is now a core belief that the public sector has to be just as 
effective as the private sector (Giddens, 2000). 
However, under 'New' Labour the principles of NPM are enshrined in a new 
language of 'modernisation', whereas the Conservatives phrased such changes as 
'reform'. Also, NPM has been advanced and redirected under 'New' Labour with a 
reformulation and prioritisation of a 'partnership' between the public and private 
sectors (HM Treasury, 2000. Ferlie and Fitzgerald, 2002). Moreover, 'partnership' 
with the private sector is now the main form of public sector investment and under 
this new political consensus there is to be no return to raising direct taxation to fund 
public investment (Blair, 1998). This is important in relation to the PPP of National 
Savings, which was initially proposed by the Conservatives so that a private sector 
'partner' could modernise the operational service, deliver new technology and 
improve customer choice (NAO, 2003). As 'New' Labour were adhering to the 
previous Conservative administration's budgetary plans (Falconer, 1999), the 
government argued that they, therefore, had no choice but to proceed with the 
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'partnership' of National Savings. However, such 'partnerships' with the private 
sector are not without their criticisms, challenges and contradictions, and these 
thorny issues will be discussed next. 
Theoretical Problems of 'Partnership' Approaches 
Many of the criticisms of New Public Management mentioned earlier in this chapter 
remain relevant when examining 'partnership' programmes, but new dilemmas also 
arise. Such controversies will now be addressed, including the increasingly blurred 
distinction between the public and private sectors, and the contradiction of business 
attempting to make a profit out of the non-profit sector. 
I will now take issue with the wider political questions concerning the 'Third 
Way' and 'partnership' programmes. Whilst it is true that we live in an ever 
changing world, I want to argue that traditional ideological principles are still of 
great importance and relevance. Giddens (1998 and 2000) and Blair (1998) both 
claim that the 'Third Way' is the new radical politics of 'the centre', which moves 
beyond the, apparently outdated, divisions of the 'left' versus the 'right', and 
privatisation versus nationalisation. Yet there is no coherent or convincing 
explanation as to why these fundamental debates cease to exist. Indeed, the 'Third 
Way' not only takes on board the public sector reforms of the Thatcher and Major 
governments, which were openly Neo Liberal, but 'New' Labour are actually more 
effective at driving forward PPP and PFI part-privatisation policies than the 
Conservatives ever were. Hence, critics such as Panitch and Leys (200 1) accuse 
'New' Labour of being Neo Liberal, and Hall (2003) argues that they are more 
'centre right' than 'centre left'. 
Another major failing of the 'Third Way' is that it does not account for any of 
the fundamental differences between the public and private sectors. Giddens (2000) 
attempts to sidestep this issue by claiming that such thinking is now "archaic", but 
singularly fails to address the different aims, ethics, motives and loyalties of these 
two distinctive sectors. A central dilemma of this research is that the private sector 
'partner' - SBS - are attempting to profiteer out of National Savings, a non-profit 
public institution, and SBS's primary responsibility is to their shareholders. Yet, 
those in favour of 'partnerships' do not envisage any conflict of interest between the 
two sectors, even though they are essentially very distinctive with their own 
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particular aims, goals and values. Marquand (2004) argues that the notion of how 
the public interest is served by the ethical values of public administration, as opposed 
to business, has been dropped from the political agenda. Although 'partnership' 
approaches are relatively new, many of the ideas associated with them, such as, 
contracting out and incentive pay were used and abandoned in the past as they led to 
favouritism and corruption (Hood, 1998. Marquand, 2004). Moreover, Pollock and 
Price (2000) claim that governments are now under increasing pressure from the 
World Trade Organisation to open up more and more of their public services to free 
trade, creating a whole new outsourcing market which powerful multi-national 
corporations are planning to penetrate. 
'New' Labour, together with the Conservatives before them, simply take for 
granted that the public sector is somehow lacking and inept, and can only be rescued 
by adopting private sector management techniques. Toynbee and Walker (2003) 
question the superiority of the private sector regarding such 'partnerships'; and in 
keeping with the arguments made earlier over privatisation, they argue that there is 
no conclusive evidence to support the apparent effectiveness of the private sector 
over the public sector. All PPP contracts are measured against a hypothetical Public 
Sector Comparator, to assess the advantages of private sector involvement relating to 
risk transfer, effectiveness and value for money. However, critics argue that such 
mathematics are heavily weighted in favour of a PPP approach, and under this 
evaluation the public sector is assumed to be more costly and ineffective (Hutton, 
2000. Pollock and Vickers, 2000). Moreover, as 'New' Labour have a vested interest 
in the success of the PPP policy, they have been under-fining private sector 
'partners' who have failed to meet requirements. For example, SBS are also 
involved in modernising the computer systems at the Passport Agency in a PFI deal, 
and although the widely documented computer failures cost the Agency £12.6 
million, SBS agreed to pay only £2.45 million of the costs, even though they were 
fully liable under risk transfer (Pollock and Vickers, 2000. Toynbee and Walker, 
2003). Also, one must question whether it really is more cost effective with a private 
sector 'partner' on board, as additional monies by way of the contractor's profit 
margin must be written into PPP deals. Furthermore, National Savings could have 
been modernised with public money raised through progressive taxation, and this 
was the main argument used by the trade union in their campaign to oppose the PPP. 
Indeed, Flynn (2002: ch. 12) argues that as governments can borrow at lower rates of 
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interest than private companies, this would be cheaper than paying a private sector 
'partner' to modernise public services. 
The PPP ofNational Savings signalled the beginning of profound organisational 
culture changes, much more so than any of the previous directives, as now the 
organisation is in 'partnership' with a private sector company which has to make a 
profitable return. As shall be discussed in the following findings chapters, the trade 
unions and workers at National Savings did not see this issue as beyond outdated 
debates over nationalisation versus privatisation. Instead they saw PPP as a very real 
threat to job security and organisational stability, and continue to do so. Despite 
these genuine concerns, 'New' Labour proceeded to drive forward the PPP, just as 
the Conservatives had done with their previous Civil Service reforms; thus, it was a 
forced 'partnership'. 
As PPP is such a new initiative, there is only limited research into its impact as a 
change programme. Grimshaw et al (2002) and Hebson et al (2003) have conducted 
recent research on such initiatives in the public sector, but not relating to the Civil 
Service. Both teams of researchers have identified a clear clash between the two 
sectors over the profit motive; and I want to argue that such an occurrence IS 
inevitable and not seriously addressed by proponents of 'Third Way' politics. 
In keeping with a new political consensus, both main political parties support 
the foundational principles of New Public Management, and they also view the 
cultural traditions of public sector bureaucracies as being problematic. Moreover, as 
NPM and organisational culture change are indelibly intertwined, in the subsequent 
sections I will examine the theoretical debates around the cultures of organisations, 
and question whether culture can be managed, controlled and transformed to suit the 
ends of organisational leaders. This is a fundamental issue in the research, as there 
have been continual attempts to change the culture of National Savings to make the 
organisation more business-orientated. 
Organisational Culture(s) 
In the following sections, I will examine the much contested area of organisational 
culture change. This research is centred around the process of culture change at 
National Savings, both before and after the PPP of the organisation. There is a 
strong correlation between the principles of NPM and organisational culture change, 
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as the public sector is under increasing pressure to emulate current management 
techniques in order to become more business-focused. There has been growing 
managerial, practitioner and academic interest in this field from the early 1980s 
onwards, with several influential 'best seller' management books devoted to 
organisational culture change. However, there are heated debates concerning how 
culture is created, who possesses it, and to what extent it can be controlled and 
managed. 
At its most basic level, culture can be seen as a way of life. We become 
accustomed to cultures and, as we are perceptive beings, we are instantly aware that 
when we are entering unfamiliar settings we are experiencing different cultures. It 
has long been recognised by researchers that organisations have their own unique 
and distinctive cultures, in that different workplaces have different atmospheres 
(Handel, 2003: 347). Brown (1995: ch. 1) argues that the origins of organisational 
culture can be traced back to two intellectual traditions: Anthropology and 
Organisational Sociology. The term 'culture' was coined by the anthropologist 
Edward B. Taylor in 1871, and incorporated knowledge, morals and customs 
acquired by members of a society (cited in Brown, 1995: 3). Geertz (2002) 
developed this concept further, stating that we are suspended in webs of significance; 
these webs are cultural, and socially constructed. Jacques (1951) was the first 
sociologist to apply the term culture to an industrial setting, in his book The 
Changing Culture of a Factory. For Jacques, culture involved the customs and 
traditions of the workplace, the values placed on particular types of work, and the 
belief in joint management/ union consultation. It also covered the objectives of the 
organisation, methods of working, technical knowledge, payment systems, and 
attitudes to discipline. Jacques saw that new members had to learn the organisational 
culture, and at least partly accept it (Jacques, 1951: 251 - 253). However, Jacques' 
definition of organisational culture has been criticised by both Turner (1971: ch. 1) 
and Elsmore (2001: ch. 3) for being too structural-functional; although Elsmore does 
acknowledge that much of Jacques' analysis remains relevant. As shall be discussed 
next, there are competing views of the cultures of organisations, along with how and 
why they should be studied. 
As culture is something that is perceived and felt, it is umque to each 
organisation. Yet, it is an abstract concept which cannot be precisely defined (Handy, 
1993: ch. 7). There is no agreed definition of the term culture amongst 
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anthropologists (Alvesson, 2002: ch. 1). Moreover, there are competing 
interpretations of the concept of organisational culture, which involve political 
connotations resulting in little consensus of opinion (Schein, 1991: ch. 1. Anthony, 
1994: ch. 3. Brown, 1995: ch. 1. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 1). Yet there is general 
agreement that culture is shared, and formed around common experiences, meanings 
and beliefs (Frost et al, 1985. Schein, 1991: ch. 1. Trice, 1993: ch. 1). Cultures are 
built upon abstract facets, being norms, values and beliefs. Norms are standards that 
designate expected and acceptable behaviour in organisations, with sanctions for 
those who fail to conform (Brown, 1995: ch. 1. Watson, 2001). Values are 
guidelines for what is appreciated in a culture and what ought to take place (Pheysey, 
1993: ch. 1. Brown, 1995: ch. 1), with beliefs being principles that organisational 
members hold to be true (Brown, 1995: ch. 1 ). Culture is manifest in the customs, 
traditions, rituals, language and jargon of an organisation (Schein, 1991: ch. 1. Trice, 
1993: ch. 1. Elsmore, 2001: ch. 3). The ownership, goals and objectives of an 
organisation give an indication of its culture, as does the environment in which it 
operates (Handy, 1993: ch. 7). The organisation of work, formal rules and 
procedures, together with informal modes of behaviour and interaction, are also 
cultural (Martin, 1992: ch. 1 ). Indeed, an organisations culture includes the number 
and type of staff employed, along with grading, promotion and payment systems 
(Martin, 1992: ch. 1. Handy, 1993: ch. 7). Culture is also visual, encompassing the 
physical layout ofbuildings, dress codes and the use of symbols (Handy, 1993: ch. 7. 
Brown, 1995: ch. 1). Hence, the culture of an organisation is made up of a vast and 
complex array of concepts and signifiers, making each culture different and unique. 
There are two schools of thought regarding the study of organisational cultures. 
Firstly, from the perspective of management, who want to understand an 
organisation's culture in order to make it more effective and productive. Secondly, 
the anthropological view involves developing broader understandings with critical 
reflections on the cultures of organisations (Meek, 1993. Anthony, 1994. Alvesson, 
2002). Whilst Alvesson (2002) argues that the two are not mutually exclusive; I will 
set out the main reasonings behind such thinking, which will be discussed in greater 
theoretical depth in the following sections. 
There have been a number of 'popular' management texts which have stressed 
that leaders can create strong cultures to increase organisational performance (see 
Ouchi, 1981. Peters and Waterman, 1982. Deal and Kennedy, 2000). Hence, culture 
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is seen as something that an organisation possesses, and this can be managed and 
controlled for purely instrumental reasons. As employees intemalise new norms and 
core values, managerial controls are no longer necessary, as there is now worker 
loyalty through subtle cultural conformity. 
Anthropological approaches aim to analyse, interpret and understand the 
complexities, richness and variations of organisational life (Gregory, 1983. Wright, 
1994. Geertz, 2002). Many of those who endorse this approach argue that culture 
cannot simply be managerially imposed; it is the emergent property of all 
organisational members (Wright, 1994. Meek, 1995. Roberts, 1997). It is continually 
created and re-created, and people actively produce culture in order to make sense of 
their daily lives at work (Trice, 1993. Meek, 1995). The majority of theorists state 
that complex organisations are multicultural and most members belong to more than 
one cultural group at any one time. Hence, different departments within the one 
organisation have their own distinctive cultures. New organisational members go 
through a process of socialisation, and must learn the culturally accepted beliefs, 
values and behaviours of particular groups (Brown, 1995: ch. 2. Alvesson, 2002). 
Cultures are embedded in the history of the organisation, and the past impinges upon 
the present and future cultural practices of organisational members (Frost et al, 1985. 
Nord, 1985. Anthony, 1994: ch. 3). Therefore, certain behaviours, values, norms and 
beliefs become deeply ingrained and embedded in the culture of an organisation 
(Elsmore, 2001 ). Yet cultures are not monolithic and static, they are dynamic and 
constantly changing. The study of organisational cultures is a complex and debated 
arena, and I will now set out the competing theories. 
The Competing Perspectives of Organisational Culture(s) 
I will draw on the work of Joanne Martin (1992) who sets out an analytical 
framework, and identifies three broadly competing theories of organisational culture. 
These perspectives have differing explanations of culture, the role that it plays in 
organisations, how culture changes, and whether it can be managed and controlled. 
However, Martin does emphasise that these models are ideal-types, and there are 
variations within these broad theoretical categories. I will now set out the main 
features of these competing standpoints. I will then go on to review in detail the 
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work of key authors within the integration and differentiation perspectives, and 
explain the conceptual difficulties in utilising the fragmentation viewpoint. 
Those coming from an integration perspective typically view organisations as 
possessing one homogenous and harmonious culture (Martin, 1992: chs. 1, 3 and 4). 
Culture is shared and agreed upon, and acts as the social glue that binds 
organisational members together. This is a particularly functionalist take on 
organisational culture, where cultural unity generates consistency, clarity and 
consensus. The integration perspective is the dominant view of organisational 
researchers and practitioners (Gregory, 1983. Martin, 1992: ch. 4. Willmott, 1993. 
Brown, 1995: ch. 1. Alvesson, 2002). It is appealing to senior managers, who are 
seen as the creators and transformers of an organisation's culture, as by changing 
core values they can apparently increase employee commitment and productivity 
(Martin, 1992: ch. 4. Handel, 2003: 347- 349). 
In contrast to the integration perspective, where organisations are seen to 
possess one agreed and shared culture, differentiation theorists argue that there are a 
plurality of cultural forms. This standpoint challenges the espoused culture of 
consensus and harmony, which is often purported by senior managers, and critically 
addresses the differing power and group interests that exist in all complex 
organisations (Martin, 1992: ch. 5). For differentiation theorists there are nested and 
overlapping subcultures, which are complex and dynamic, and can co-exist in 
harmony, indifference or conflict. The different group interests of managers and 
workers are accounted for in this model, which are absent from the integration 
perspective. Rather than seeing organisation-wide consensus, for differentiation 
theorists there is only consensus within subcultures. Yet organisational actors can be 
members of various subcultures at any one time, resulting in them having multiple 
identities (Martin, 1992: ch. 6). Given the complexity of organisational cultures, 
differentiation theorists are highly suspicious of managerial attempts at imposing 
culture change initiatives, and argue that this can be a difficult and lengthy process 
(Martin, 1992. Handel, 2003: 347- 349). 
The fragmentation perspective is most commonly associated with postmodem 
accounts of the cultures of organisations (Martin, 1992: ch. 8). Ambiguity and 
confusion are at the core of this perspective, which is marked by dissensus, rather 
than consensus. Hence, there is no cultural or subcultural clarity or cohesion over 
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core values, all that exists is paradox, uncertainty and disorder (Martin, 1992: chs. 1, 
7 and 8. Jaffee, 2001: 175 - 176. Handel, 2003: 347 - 349). 
Whilst Jaffee (2001: 175 - 176) claims that most organisations are typically 
fragmented and lack consistency. Handel (2003: 349) argues that the fragmentation 
perspective is an uncomfortable and problematic model when analysing 
organisational cultures. Although the differentiation and fragmentation perspectives 
see organisations as possessing a plurality of cultures, which are in a constant state of 
flux, they differ as to whether there can be any cohesion and unifying features 
amongst cultural groupings. Hence, it is difficult to analyse organisational cultures 
and change using a fragmentation perspective. For this reason, I shall investigate the 
integration and differentiation standpoints, as the vast majority of the literature on 
organisational culture falls within these two perspectives. 
Integration Perspectives of Organisational Culture Change 
In this section I will review accounts from those writers who argue that culture can 
be managed and controlled to create organisational success for all. The culture 
management industry is big business (Willmott, 1993. Alvesson, 2002); and I will 
assess the claims put forward by Ouchi (1981) and Peters and Waterman (1982) that 
transforming an organisation's culture to gain competitive advantage is relatively 
straightforward. I will then examine the arguments of other integration theorists that 
culture change is more difficult than Ouchi and Peters and Waterman suggest, but 
this can still be achieved with impressive results. The ability to manage an 
organisation's culture is popularly seen as the key to success in both the private and 
public sectors. Whilst many of these authors talk of corporate culture, their ideas 
have also been influential in stimulating public sector change (Pollitt, 1990). Indeed, 
one of the central features of New Public Management is that for public sector 
reform to be successful, organisations must emulate more commercial cultures. 
It was widely believed, in the business community, that the reasons for Japan's 
phenomenal economic success during the 1970s and 1980s were cultural. Ouchi, in 
Theory Z. How American Business can meet the Japanese Challenge, compared the 
cultures of Japanese and American companies. Ouchi (1981) claimed that 
management control in Japanese companies was subtle, and consensus was achieved 
by offering workers greater participation and input in the decision making processes. 
46 
This helped managers create strong and coherent organisational cultures with 
committed and focused workforces. These methods were less costly than financial 
incentives and bureaucratic rules, as through intemalising new cultural norms and 
values, workers would instinctively know how to act and why. Ouchi argued that for 
American companies to enjoy the same economic success, they had to learn from the 
cultural practices of their Japanese competitors. 
In Search of Excellence. Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies by Peters 
and Waterman (1982) is a hugely influential book which examines the cultures of, 
what they deemed to be, excellent businesses. They found that the best performing 
companies all had strong and coherent organisational cultures. Not only can culture 
be managed, but Peters and Waterman emphasise that it is the responsibility of senior 
managers to strengthen their organisation's culture. Leaders must generate the right 
values, norms and attitudes in their staff, and through creating cultural consensus, not 
only will staff be more motivated and committed, but performance and productivity, 
as a consequence, will dramatically improve. In keeping with Ouchi, Peters and 
Waterman state that through shared norms there is no need for bureaucratic red tape; 
although those who do not adhere to the new culture must be replaced. In conclusion, 
they claim that the secret to organisational success is not to be found in Japan, but in 
America's traditional cultural values and beliefs. 
Deal and Kennedy (2000), like Peters and Waterman, also compare the cultures 
of corporations. Similarly, they argue that the development of strong cultures is a 
huge factor in determining organisational success. Deal and Kennedy claim that 
senior managers can build and nourish strong cultures, and the impact that this can 
have on productivity is amazing (2000: 15). However, Deal and Kennedy differ 
from Ouchi and also Peters and Waterman, in that they do acknowledge the presence 
of subcultures in organisations. They make the distinction between strong and weak 
cultures, and what differentiates weak cultures is that subcultural groups have 
become too powerful. Senior managers must rectify this situation by fine-tuning the 
values of staff and generating cultural cohesion so that all parties concur to the 
organisation's aims. 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) in Corporate Culture and Performance agree with 
Ouchi, Peters and Waterman, and also Deal and Kennedy that strong cultures have a 
positive impact on employee loyalty, commitment and performance. Likewise, they 
call for organisational agreement on norms and values, where "employees march to 
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the same drummer" (Kotter and Heskett, 1992: 16). They quote a Chief Executive 
Officer who echoes these sentiments and is critical of companies with weak or non-
existent cultures (Kotter and Heskett, 1992: 16). Like Peters and Waterman before 
them, Kotter and Heskett compared the strength of cultures in relation to economic 
performance. From their research they found that organisations with strong cultures 
generally had the most impressive long-term economic performance. However, 
some companies with strong cultures did not always have an excellent performance. 
Kotter and Heskett do acknowledge that culture change can be time-consuming and 
difficult. They are also aware of the existence of conflicting subcultures, and, like 
Peters and Waterman, they advocate the replacement of managers whose values and 
norms are not consistent with the new culture. 
Hampden-Turner (1990), in keeping with the majority of integration theorists, 
argues that organisational culture can be measured and changed in order to improve 
performance and shareholder value. He sees culture as originating from 
organisational members, but it is inconsistent so leaders must shape culture to "extol 
the vision" of the company (Hampden-Turner, 1990: 17). To generate cultural 
cohesion, leaders must encourage all parties to meet the organisation's goals, which 
also involves moderating trade union demands to create harmonious industrial 
relations. 
Morgan (1997: ch. 5) also believes that leaders have a difficult task in 
transforming an organisation's culture. The management of culture can be achieved 
by replacing bureaucracy with new cultural values to achieve success. However, 
Morgan states that subcultures can exist, and warns that trade unions are foremost in 
organisational countercultures. 
Schein (1991) is an organisational psychologist and consultant who, in 
Organizational Culture and Leadership, aims to help leaders understand their 
company's culture so that they can transform it. He stresses that leaders create 
culture, whilst it is the task of managers to manage it. Moreover, Schein claims that 
leaders can generate, develop, manipulate and destroy cultures. Leaders have the 
foresight to perceive weaknesses in their organisation's culture and the ability to 
change it. In order to transform the culture of an organisation, Schein ( 1991 : ch. 15) 
states that the existing culture should be unfrozen so that core values can be re-
defined and behaviours altered. Once new values, norms and attitudes are in place 
and stabilised, the culture can then be refrozen. However, Schein does acknowledge 
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that culture change can be difficult, and it can be particularly time-consuming in 
long-established organisations. He believes that culture plays a positive role in 
organisational life and is the solution to problems, as cultures are always striving for 
integration (Schein, 1991: ch. 12). Indeed, for Schein, managers play a paramount 
role in the socialisation of new members into the organisation's values, norms and 
beliefs, thereby enhancing cultural cohesion. Schein concedes that most complex 
organisations are multicultural, with subcultures and even countercultures in 
existence. He states that trade unions can be countercultural in nature, but along with 
Hampden-Turner (1990), argues that managers have to bring both sides together to 
achieve organisational goals (Schein, 1991: ch. 13). Yet, managers must be ruthless, 
and those from the old culture who are unwilling to change, have to be released. 
Criticisms of Integration Perspectives 
Integration accounts of organisational culture change have been criticised by a 
number of theorists for making exaggerated claims, being overtly simplistic, and 
suffering from management bias. Indeed, several of the 'best seller' books reviewed 
in the previous section are written by management consultants who have a vested 
interest in emphasising the relative ease and speed at which managers can transform 
their organisation's culture (Anthony, 1994. Alvesson, 2002). Integrationists have 
been criticised for having a monolithic view of culture, rather than appreciating its 
dynamic and complex nature (Gregory, 1983. Martin et al, 1985. Elsmore, 2001). 
Whilst some integration theorists do discuss subcultural and countercultural elements, 
they fail to adequately account for any conflict or resistance (Gregory, 1983. Martin 
et al, 1985. Salaman, 1997)- and these issues will be discussed in greater theoretical 
depth in the following section on differentiation perspectives. Many of those writing 
from an integration standpoint use vague definitions of organisational culture 
(Elsmore, 2001), and are purely interested in quick fixes (Alvesson, 2002). 
Those who argue that an organisation's culture should be 'strong' (see Peters 
and Waterman, 1982. Kotter and Heskett, 1991. Deal and Kennedy, 2000), have been 
criticised for trivialising culture (Alvesson, 2002). Indeed for Kotter and Heskett 
(1992: 16) to quote a Chief Executive who is critical of companies with weak or non-
existent cultures, singularly fails to appreciate both the formation and ownership of 
cultures. Moreover, given that it is an abstract phenomenon, several commentators 
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question how culture can be measured as being 'strong' or 'weak', or 'right' or 
'wrong' (Van Maanen and Barley, 1985. Elsmore, 2001. Alvesson, 2002). 
Obviously, for those coming from an integration standpoint, a 'strong' culture is 
where employees adhere to the prescribed values, norms and beliefs of senior 
managers; and the possible totalitarian implications of this will be examined later in 
this section. 
Methodologically there are several criticisms of integrationist accounts of 
organisational culture change. Firstly, many of the research findings of these authors 
derive from questionnaires, and quantitative methods have been criticised for failing 
to capture the detail, variety and complexity of culture (Elsmore, 2001 ). Moreover, it 
is highly questionable whether values, norms and beliefs can be measured and 
compared (Elsmore, 2001. Alves son, 2002). When qualitative interviews are 
conducted by integrationists, Alvesson (2002) states that they are predominantly with 
senior managers. There is a clear danger that this could result in biased accounts 
representing the espoused culture, as other organisational members, particularly 
those on the shop floor, are all too often ignored. Furthermore, this view assumes 
that senior managers are aware of all organisational matters, including the 
evolvement of subcultural groups. 
In Right Enough to be Dangerously Wrong: An Analysis of the 'In Search of 
Excellence' Phenomenon, David Guest (1995) is particularly critical of the methods 
used by Peters and Waterman (1982). Guest argues that they are unclear as to who 
was interviewed, what data was collected and for what purposes. This is not the only 
criticism of such literature, as although they are typically littered with accounts of 
how 'heroes' have turned around failing companies, there is little detail of what 
managing culture change actually involves. Elsmore (200 1) argues that many of 
these texts involve a very basic analysis of culture change. Brown (1995: ch. 1) 
states that managing culture is not so simplistic or mechanistic. A major weakness is 
that these books often fail to account for an organisation's history and traditions, 
along with the difficulties and complexities of implementing change initiatives. 
They typically over-emphasise cultural cohesion and harmony, and I would argue 
that some are little more than pep talks prescribing what a culture should be. 
Alvesson (2002: ch. 5) states that leaders certainly do have an impact on the culture 
of an organisation, but this is often over-stated. Furthermore, the economic success 
enjoyed by some of the companies that Peters and Waterman (1982) labelled as 
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'excellent' was short-lived (Guest, 1995. Alvesson, 2002). Indeed, Alvesson (2002) 
argues that it is too simplistic to claim that culture change will increase productivity, 
as there are many other factors involved in the equation. Salaman (1997) claims that 
culture change programmes became a passing fad once managers realised how 
difficult and time-consuming this process could be. 
Schein (1991) has also been criticised for his claim that senior managers are able 
to unfreeze an organisation's culture, change it to meet their objectives, and then 
refreeze it. Culture is not static, it is dynamic and constantly changing, therefore, 
Alvesson (2002: ch. 8) argues that culture cannot be frozen. Schein (1991: ch. 12) 
also maintains that cultures are always striving for integration, but this does not take 
on board the fact that subcultures and, particularly, countercultures can pull in 
opposite directions. Yet again, this fails to account for any conflict, and merely 
hoping to pacify unions does not seriously tackle any notion of resistance in the 
workplace. Furthermore, the power of senior managers is again over-emphasised, 
with Schein asserting that managers are all knowing of the 'weaknesses' of an 
organisation's culture and are active in employee socialisation. For all that this top-
down account of managers imposing their cultural vision on a workforce may be 
wishful thinking; other theorists see a more sinister side to such claims. 
Roberts and Strangleman (1998) argue that the lure of the 'cultural exotic' of 
Japan appeals to senior managers, as they attempt to purge the old organisational 
norms and values, and implant their own prescribed culture. Hence, culture becomes 
a tool of managerial control (Willmott, 1993. Wright, 1994. Kunda, 2003), and 
Willmott fears that this has possible totalitarian implications. This is an attempt at 
colonising the culture of an organisation, and is essentially a hearts and minds issue, 
where managers aim to control what workers think and how they behave (Willmott, 
1993. Salaman, 1997. Kunda, 2003). The managerial plan is that employees will 
intemalise new norms and values through workshops, training courses, presentations 
and incentive schemes (Salaman, 1997. Kunda, 2003). Through cultural engineering, 
senior managers hope to persuade employees to embrace organisational goals, aims 
and values; this is an attempt to resolve the conflict of interest that lies at the heart of 
the employment relationship (Salaman, 1997. Kunda, 2003). 
However, there are serious questions as to whether the culture of an 
organisation can be so easily manipulated, controlled and predicted. Salaman (1997) 
argues that there are real difficulties in managers attempting to define the meaning of 
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work for employees. Furthermore, workers are not mere objects in this process, who 
are simply to be culturally programmed. 'Popular' managerial texts do not account 
for any agency on the part of workers, nor do they examine how new values and 
norms are interpreted and acted upon. Indeed, any deviation or resistance in the 
process of changing an organisation's culture is absent from integration accounts, but, 
as will be examined next, these issues are addressed by differentiation theorists. 
Differentiation Perspectives of Organisational Culture Change 
Differentiation theorists see organisations as possessing a number of nested and 
embedded cultures, which are layered and complex. Therefore, managerial attempts 
to control and change the cultures of an organisation will be fraught with tensions, 
contradictions and difficulties. These theorists criticise integrationists for being 
naive in assuming that all members adhere to one homogenous organisational culture, 
and for failing to account for the complexity and strength of cultures. Differentiation 
theorists view large organisations as being multicultural. In identifying 
organisational pluralism, differentiation theorists accept that there will be competing 
interests between subcultural groups, which can be conflictual. It is the formation 
and evolution of subcultures, together with the multiple identities of organisational 
members, which will be examined next. 
Members of large organisations are usually affiliated to various subcultural 
groupings. As subcultures emerge over time, they can often be inconsistent and 
contradictory (Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). Hence, levels of subcultural belonging and 
commitment can fluctuate and change (Gregory, 1983. Brown, 1998: ch. 3). 
Subcultural groupings are scattered throughout organisations, and many members are 
unaware of the existence of other subcultures (Van Maanen and Barley, 1985). 
There are typically two subcultural forms in organisations: firstly, occupational 
subcultures and, secondly, trade union subcultures. 
Turner in his 1971 book Exploring the Industrial Subculture was the first to 
identify subcultural groupings in organisations. He saw that subcultures had 
distinctive norms, values and perceptions, which distinguished them from the main 
organisational culture. Other theorists have taken these ideas forward, and argue that 
occupational subcultures are produced and re-produced by workers and are, therefore, 
relatively autonomous, being the indigenous property of the inhabitants (Van 
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Maanen and Barley, 1985. Anthony, 1994. Wright, 1994. Meek, 1998). These 
subcultures are formed around common work experiences, together with group 
interaction, communication and coordination (Wright, 1994. Brown, 1998: ch. 3. 
Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). Age, income, education and occupational grade also play a 
role in establishing subcultural allegiances (Trice, 1993. Brown, 1998: ch. 3). As 
shared understandings are formed and re-affirmed, this gives meaning to the norms, 
values and beliefs of a subculture, which can result in embedded subcultural 
practices (Alvesson, 2002: chs. 3 and 7). Hence, different workers within the same 
department in an organisation can develop their own distinctive subcultures. Indeed, 
some theorists argue that different subcultural groups are formed amongst all grades, 
including middle and senior management (VanMaanen and Barley, 1985. Alvesson, 
2002: ch. 5). Yet, as these groupings are sustained and constantly created and re-
created, they change and transform over time (VanMaanen and Barley, 1985). 
The general acceptance that large organisations are comprised of numerous 
subcultures dispels the notion that there is one homogenous organisational culture 
that all members partake in. Moreover, the daily experiences of shop floor workers 
are usually very different to those of senior managers, and there are typically huge 
differences in terms of pay, power and status. Integration theorists fail to account for 
such inequalities, and do not address how subcultural groups are formed and how 
they have differing norms and values to management (Alvesson, 2002: ch. 3). 
Often prominent amongst organisational subcultures are trade unions, being the 
independently elected representatives of the workforce (Turner, 1971. Brown, 1998: 
ch. 3. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). Brown (1998: ch. 3) states that members of union 
subcultures embrace norms and values that involve supporting worker collectivism 
and the right to strike. Yet, as discussed in the previous section, integrationists, such 
as, Morgan (1997: ch. 5) view trade unions as the main countercultural force in 
organisations, and Schein ( 1991 : ch. 13) claims that management and unions can be 
locked in permanent conflict. However, I would argue that this is a 
misunderstanding of the employment relationship. Countercultural groups are 
opposed to the main cultural values of an organisation. Whilst trade unions typically 
bargain for improvements in terms and conditions for their members, they also want 
organisational success, as without this their members wquld be without jobs. 
Management aim to increase profitability, but any increase in wages reduces their 
profit margin. This is the contradiction that lies at the heart of the employment 
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relationship, as both sides are reliant upon one another but also have competing 
interests - and this will be discussed in more theoretical detail in chapter six. Hence, 
calls from integrationists, such as, Hampden-Turner ( 1990) and Schein ( 1991: ch. 13) 
to bring both sides together to moderate trade unions, fails to recognise that such 
conflicts are irresolvable. 
Hence, differentiation theorists state that complex organisations are made up of 
a variety of subcultures that are honeycombed, layered and overlapping. Yet this is a 
complex situation as subcultures are subdivided, unstable and transient (Pollitt, 1990. 
Anthony, 1994: ch. 5. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). As members can be affiliated to a 
number of different subcultural groups at any one time, there can be competing and 
contrasting subcultures (Pollitt, 1990. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). There can be dual 
commitment from employees to both senior management and the trade union, but 
these allegiances can vary depending upon the situation. Hence, there can be 
conflicts and tensions between subcultural groups, particularly with trade unions 
resisting management demands (Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). Moreover, as subcultures 
become embedded, they can be increasingly defensive, and difficult to manage and 
control (Anthony, 1994: ch. 8). Yet subcultural groups can also bind together to 
become the dominant force in an organisation. 
Given that organisational cultures are complex, layered and multi-dimensional, 
they are extremely difficult to manage and change, particularly on a massive scale 
(Elsmore, 2001. Alvesson, 2002). Moreover, the strength of subcultures can restrict 
managerial attempts to introduce change, and Elsmore (200 1 : ch. 6) questions 
whether certain cynical subcultural groupings will ever embrace new norms and 
values. Alvesson (2002: ch. 8) states that organisational cultures are anchored in 
tradition, and as cultural roots are historical and embedded, this can impinge upon 
change initiatives. Indeed, prior to introducing any changes, there is a need to 
understand the history and traditions of the organisation (Roberts, 1997). It is more 
difficult to introduce culture change programmes in long-established organisations 
with an experienced workforce, than it is in a younger organisation (Alvesson, 2002). 
Similarly, it is easier to change behaviours, rather than core values and deep-seated 
attitudes (Anthony, 1994. Elsmore, 2001). Yet changes at behavioural levels are 
merely cosmetic; to ensure lasting change, Anthony argues that the structures of an 
organisation must also be altered. 
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Whilst it is true that senior managers do have a significant impact upon an 
organisation's culture, this is a negotiated process and other members also have some 
influence (Anthony, 1994. Alvesson, 2002). Indeed, Siehl (1985) warns of the 
difficulties of culture change if workers are against it. Moreover, Elisabeth Wilson 
(1993) argues that coerced culture change is less likely to be successful, with 
modifications only taking place at a superficial level. Rather, for change to be 
effective there needs to be a considerable investment in both time and effort. Several 
theorists argue that culture change is not feasible in the short, or even, medium-term 
(Pollitt, 1990. Elsmore, 2001); with Alvesson (2002: ch. 3) calling for slow, rather 
than quick, fixes. Hence, organisational culture change is a gradual, partial and 
continually negotiated process. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have examined in theoretical depth the indelible 
relationship between New Public Management and organisational culture change. 
This relationship is central to the thesis, and will provide the analytical framework 
for the proceeding empirical chapters. The account of the attempted organisational 
culture change within Durham National Savings must be located in the context of the 
ideas and techniques developed with New Public Management. It is this context that 
gives the case study a wider significance beyond its specific empirical manifestations. 
The challenges and the resistance to the reform of DNS are likely to have resonance 
with attempts to change other public sector organisations. 
Whilst there is some extant literature documenting the changes that have been 
introduced in the Civil Service during the 1980s and 1990s, this typically takes for 
granted that the service has one coherent and homogenous organisational culture. I 
will go on to demonstrate that such notions are inadequate in explaining the 
complexities of organisational cultures and subcultures. Thus, there is a noticeable 
gap in the existing literature on Civil Service culture change, where the experiences 
of those on the shop floor are largely absent. 
The workers that I interviewed at Durham National Savings were miles away, 
both geographically and in terms of career, income, class and status from senior 
Whitehall civil servants. This is exactly why it is dangerous to assume that the Civil 
Service has one culture and to view the changes in the culture of senior civil servants 
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as somehow being similar, comparable and representative with those of 
administrative workers, which is where a lot of the existing literature falls down. 
White-collar work used to be regarded as a skilled middle class profession up until 
the early 1900s, but it is now widely recognised that administrative work has 
suffered a loss of status and prestige (Lockwood, 1966. Crompton and Reid, 1982). 
Whilst there are competing theoretical perspectives of culture change, in the 
following findings chapters I will investigate how in practice numerous government 
directives impacted upon the organisational culture at National Savings. Yet the 
department is steeped in tradition, with a long-serving workforce and embedded 
cultural practices, making lasting change all the more difficult. 
Although there is some coverage of relatively recent Civil Service culture 
change programmes, primarily involving peripheral privatisation and Agency Status, 
there is little academic research on Public-Private Partnerships. The introduction of 
this initiative at National Savings involved the most salient cultural changes, 
whereby the core values and orientations were to be deeply altered now that a 
business 'partner' was delivering the service. The complexities of organisational 
culture change will be examined in the following chapters, together with conflict and 
resistance. 
One of the primary aims of the research is to understand how the changes 
implemented at National Savings were experienced and interpreted by those on the 
shop floor. As I only conducted a limited number of interviews with shop floor 
workers and trade union representatives, I cannot claim to have fully captured the 
transitions that have taken place throughout the organisation in all of their cultural 
depth. However, I feel that this research will contribute to understandings of the 
complexities, contradictions and difficulties of organisational culture change. 
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Chapter Three - The Process of Commercialisation and 
Partial Privatisation of N ationan Savings 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will investigate the commercialisation of National Savings which 
resulted in the introduction of elements of privatisation, prior to the Public-Private 
Partnership. As mentioned in chapter two, there have been a long series of initiatives 
from the 1960s onwards which were introduced by both Conservative and Labour 
governments with the aim of making the Civil Service more business-like. Yet 
profound and lasting cultural change only really took effect from 1979 onwards, and 
the impact of successive Conservative directives on the organisational culture at 
Durham National Savings will be examined. This chapter also sets the background 
for the need to modernise the organisation, which led to the implementation of the 
Public-Private Partnership policy. 
The Context of National Savings - a Civil Service Department in 
Dec nine and the Need to Modernise 
The prelude to the introduction of the PPP at National Savings must be seen in 
context, as it had been a Civil Service department in decline from the mid-1980s up 
until the mid-1990s. This was as a direct result of two inter-related Conservative 
government policies. Firstly, the Conservative's changing economic policy and how 
this impinged on its use of National Savings as a means of funding the National 
Debt.; and secondly, the government's broader reforms of the Civil Service with the 
development ofNew Public Management. 
At the beginning of her tenure, Thatcher used National Savings as a short-term 
means of funding the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) (Hall, 1983: 39 
- 40. Temperton, 1986: 104 - 110. Pawley, 1991a). In September 1980, the 
Conservatives launched the 'National Savings Initiative' and a range of new products 
with attractive interest rates were issued between 1980 and 1985 (Temperton, 1986: 
104 - 110). This created new jobs and opportunities in the department, as the 
government preferred raising finances through National Savings rather than 
borrowing from the banks, as this would have a detrimental effect on inflation 
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(Pawley, 1991 b). This created large-scale recruitment drives throughout the 
organisation during the early 1980s, which was a period when the vast majority of 
the research interviewees started work at DNS. The Conservatives embraced 
monetarist economics with the combined aim of reducing government borrowing and 
cutting public expenditure, which was in direct opposition to the post-war consensus 
of Keynesianism with government intervention and high public spending. Although 
this consensus was effectively broken in the early 1970s by Heath's Conservative 
government, who introduced a huge package of public expenditure cuts (Gowland, 
1982: ch. 9). Further cuts continued under Labour with a general monetarist trend, 
although Smith (1987: ch. 5) argues that Callaghan's government were 'reluctant 
monetarists'. Under Thatcher, the Conservatives were overtly monetarist and 
introduced a series of public expenditure cuts to reduce the PSBR (Smith, 1987: ch. 8. 
Pliatzky, 1989: chs. 12 and 14). Once these monetarist policies took hold, the 
Conservatives reduced their reliance on National Savings as a method of government 
funding and were actively discouraging savings, which resulted in the "managed 
decline" of the organisation, as a senior trade union representative explains below. 
There was a conscious decision taken by the Tories not to invest in National 
Savings because there was a run down. The idea was to drip dry it [National 
Savings], the phrase they used was "managed decline", because you couldn't 
close it down in one go because you'd have to fmd £56 billion to repay all of 
the savers, and the government couldn't do that without destroying public 
finances. Now what they tried to do was gently let it slip, and occasionally 
tum on the tap when they needed money, and keep it there as a vehicle for 
that; but the general trend was downwards. (Steve, union official, interview, 
2002) 
As previously mentioned in chapter two, upon taking office in 1979, the 
Conservatives only had very general aims regarding the management of the Civil 
Service and wider public sector. They set out to reduce the size of the Civil Service 
and cut public expenditure (Farnham and Horton, 1996a. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). 
Although spending restrictions had been introduced in the form of PES limits from 
the 1960s onwards under the Plowden Report (Pyper, 1991: ch. 6. Horton, 1996. 
Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6), the government were determined to make such changes 
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effective and permanent. As the Conservatives were reducing government 
borrowing through National Savings and restricting Civil Service departmental 
spending, this combination led to the steady decline of the organisation. All of the 
research interviewees stated that recruitment and promotion opportunities evaporated 
from the late 1980s until the PPP, and this fact is also documented in the 1996 trade 
union Branch Report (CPSA, 1996). 
National Savings, throughout the 1980s and early '90s, was a declining 
department, mainly due to Conservative government policy on National 
Savings itself, that it had a debt repayment policy rather than a funding policy. 
So we were processing more repayments out ofNational Savings to repay the 
Exchequer, rather than actually funding the government through creating 
savings. It was a conscious policy of the government; it was Thatcher's 
policy to balance the books during the late '80s/ early '90s. This was 
obviously a movement away from Keynesian economics of using the debt 
side. So there was a general run down of the department in terms of 
opportunity, because we weren't creating any extra work or any extra posts. 
(Chris, union official, interview, 2003) 
Therefore, due to Conservative government economic policies, spending restrictions 
and a lack of investment, the union claimed that National Savings had become an 
"outdated and decaying organisation" (quoted in PCS, 2001a). Thus, National 
Savings lacked the new technology and e-commerce channels that all modem 
financial organisations already possessed. 
Yet there had been an attempt to modernise National Savings when it was still 
part of the Civil Service, with the launch of a Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) 
exercise from the mid-1990s onwards. The idea was to introduce a multi-product 
and multi-process Information Technology (IT) transaction system, to provide 
thoroughly modem and ultra-competitive financial services (CPSA, 1996. PCS, 
1998). Hence, with the introduction of telephone banking, internet banking and 
Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) cards National Savings would be more 
competitive and better able to attract new customers, as it is traditionally a savings 
organisation for the older saver. BPR was also introduced in the Contributions 
Agency around the same time, again with the aim of streamlining the organisation 
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and introducing new technology into the Civil Service (Harrington et al, 1998); and 
from my own work experience, this was also the scenario at the Land Registry. 
However, the BPR of National Savings was going to be very costly and the 
Conservatives decided that the most effective way of carrying out this exercise was 
with a private sector 'partner' on board (CPSA, 1996). The PPP policy was later 
adopted and reformulated by 'New' Labour and became part of their 'Third Way' 
political philosophy, where private sector investment would reverse years of 
"denigration and underinvestment" in the public sector (quoted in New Labour, 
2001 ). Proponents claim that private sector expertise and capital investment can be 
effectively used to modernise public services. These deals can also create further 
employment opportunities, whilst enabling the private sector 'partner' to make a 
profitable return (Falconer, 1999. Giddens, 2000). Thus, the private sector works in 
'partnership' with the public sector in delivering modem, high quality public services 
(HM Treasury, 2000). 
In the case of the Public-Private Partnership of National Savings, SBS have to 
implement Business Process Re-engineering, run the three sites and deliver the 
service. This 'partnership' is crucial in reversing years of under-investment, and will 
result in a movement from a largely paper-based labour intensive operation, to a 
streamlined, automated and efficient service, so that the organisation can compete 
more effectively within the UK retail savings market. The planned introduction of a 
single IT platform for all National Savings products, including a customer database 
and a state of the art call centre will give customers easier access to their savings 
with more channels for transactions (NAO, 2003). 
The risk of running the National Savings Account has now been handed over to 
the private sector 'partner', and under the terms of the contract SBS must deliver new 
technology and introduce new working methods. Furthermore, the costs of operating 
the business have been transferred to SBS, they also have to reduce staff numbers 
through redundancy and deliver the service to a specific standard which are 
measured by the use of Key Performance Indicators (KPis) (NAO, 2003). A profit 
margin of 8.7% (before tax) has been written into the account, and SBS can make 
additional savings by making further efficiencies, renting out prime office space, 
reducing staffmg numbers and through the creation of new Third Party Business 
(NAO, 2003). 
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This then sets the context of National Savings being a neglected and stagnating 
Civil Service department for over a decade. As the organisation was in urgent need 
of modernisation, which was going to be a very costly exercise, a private sector 
'partner' was recruited. However, not only are there fundamental issues over a 
private company attempting to make a profit out of the public sector, but there are 
further difficulties of SBS trying to transform long-established workplace cultures. 
Established Workplace Cultures at National Savings and the Widely 
Accepted 'Job for Life' 
Durham National Savings is a 'brownfield site', in that it has its own established 
workplace cultures, traditions, values and public service ethos. As stated in chapter 
one, all of the research interviewees have worked at DNS from between 
approximately 15 and 25 years, and are, therefore, highly knowledgeable having 
experienced both working in the Civil Service and working for SBS. National 
Savings traditionally has a highly unionised workplace culture; departmental trade 
union density currently stands at a massive 92%, with 90% membership at the 
Durham site (PCS, 2001a). All of the workers interviewed became union members 
as soon as they started work in the organisation, which has had an impact upon 
managerial attempts to transform the workplace culture. Durham National Savings 
used to be one of Durham City's major employers; it was a huge bureaucratic 
organisation which contained the largest filing system in Europe - 'Holdings File', 
which several interviewees stated was the size of Wembley football pitch. National 
Savings under the Civil Service was hierarchical, with nationally negotiated pay, 
fixed career paths and an occupational pension. Hence, it was widely regarded as a 
'job for life'. I deliberately employ the past tense here because a range of directives 
have transformed the workplace culture, together with workers' perceptions 
regarding employment security. 
The vast majority of the research interviewees started work at Durham National 
Savings directly from leaving school and were assigned low-level administrative jobs 
in the department; which Hammond (1968) also uncovered in his research when the 
office was originally opened. None of the interviewees consciously and deliberately 
set out to become civil servants, nor did they initially see working at DNS as a 'job 
for life'. Most workers saw it either as a job for a few years, or as a stepping stone to 
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another job, or planned to go on to further/ higher education. Only after working at 
DNS for a few years did workers start to see it as a 'job for life', as many now had 
responsibilities, partners and mortgages and, due to the lack of other secure jobs in 
an economically depressed area, saw it more as a serious occupation. Whilst some 
workers interviewed did not want to stay at DNS for the rest of their careers, others 
enjoyed the security and stability of Civil Service work as they could plan for the 
future. Such notions of a 'job for life' are discussed by Sennett and Cobb (1972) in 
their book The Hidden Injuries of Class, whereby working class people can feel 
trapped in their jobs, yet this is countered through long-term employment security. 
Indeed, Civil Service and public service work can be viewed more widely as part of 
what Roberts (1993: ch. 2) identified as the 'protected sector' in relation to 
shipbuilding in the 1930s, where there were disparities between the wages paid to 
private sector shipyard workers and those employed by Local Authorities. Such 
work was 'protected' in terms of employment and wage security, yet due to market 
fluctuations public sector workers do not always have superior wages to their private 
sector counterparts. 
The two quotes below sum up the views of many of the interviewees, that 
working at DNS used to be seen as a 'good job' and a 'job for life'; and this was also 
the perception of the general public regarding Civil Service employment. 
I think the majority of people working at DNS saw it as a 'job for life'. This 
goes back years, where you'd say to people, "Oh, I've joined National 
Savings." And they'd say, "Hey, you've got a job for life!" So even people 
who didn't work here, used to regard that as the case. (Michael, worker, 
interview, 2004) 
I started work at DNS when I was 16 years old, I was fresh out of school and 
it was December 1978. And I joined because I didn't know what I wanted to 
be when I grew up, I suppose ... and I still don't, 25 years later. I think it was 
just because it was seen as a being a 'good job', you know, you got into the 
Civil Service, and it was classed as a 'good job'. I had no career path as such, 
and I just sort of drifted into it until I decided what I wanted to do. That's sad 
isn't it (laughs)? Considering I get my long service [25 years] award in 
December. (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
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The quote above is typical of the other worker interviews, as none set out to 
purposely become civil servants, it was more a case of applying for what 'good jobs' 
were available at the time. Sennett (1998: ch. 1) also talks of this notion of 'drift' 
and of workers attempting to make the most of the limited opportunities on offer. 
This long-serving workplace culture is also evident in this quote from Julie, of 
workers, only in time, accepting it as a 'job for life'. 
Durham National Savings had been a thriving office from its creation in the late 
1960s, until around the mid-1980s. In a research interview, Alan explained that DNS 
employed up to 3, 500 staff in the 1970s, recruitment was twice a year with 300 staff 
being taken on; yet in those days there was also a large labour turnover. The 
majority of the other interviewees all started work at DNS in the early/ mid-1980s 
and claim that there were approximately 2, 500 staff employed at this time, with 
around 100 workers recruited monthly. Once again the majority of new recruits were 
schoolleavers, yet some new older male employees were taken on who had just been 
made redundant from the local Consett Steelworks. The steelworks closed in 
September 1980 with the loss of 3, 700 jobs after a three month-long national strike 
and a strong campaign by the local community to resist plant closure (Dudley and 
Richardson, 1990: chs. 1, 6 and 7). This is interesting in the context of local 
deindustrialisation with the movement away from heavy industrial work, such as, 
shipbuilding, coal mining and steel making, together with the rising importance of 
public sector employment (Hall, 1983: 71 ). It represents a total change of occupation 
for these men, with the transition from blue-collar work to white-collar clerical 
employment, and it is also significant in terms of age, as they started working in the 
organisation at a much older age than the schoolleavers who were typically recruited. 
Another thing that was quite noticeable as well, it was just when Consett 
Steelworks was closing, and there was a lot of middle aged guys who worked 
in the steelworks, and because they were recruiting and taking people on [at 
DNS], there was at least a good ... probably ten or so guys who'd worked in 
heavy industry. They had come to work here because there was no other 
work going around and they'd just been made redundant. (Kevin, worker, 
interview, 2003) 
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However, as mentioned earlier, from the late 1980s right up until the 
implementation of the PPP, there was no new recruitment and severely restricted 
promotion opportunities. Although very few workers left the organisation due to the 
depressed nature of the local economy. This did create problems at DNS as there 
was now a very unbalanced and stagnant workforce in terms of age which is not 
representative of the wider population, there was no flow in the organisation in terms 
of new recruits, steady promotions within the internal labour market or workers 
leaving to move on to pastures new. What remained was a cohort of workers who 
had all worked at DNS for 15 years plus, who were clearly very experienced and 
skilled, yet had severely restricted opportunities within the organisation which led to 
feelings of being unfulfilled and dissatisfied with their jobs. 
Regarding the positive aspects of working life at DNS, all workers interviewed 
enjoyed the security of Civil Service work, the holidays and flexi-time, and several 
spoke of their desire to move into areas which particularly interested them, most 
notably IT. Many enjoyed the opportunities to develop knowledge, talents and skills; 
which Weber (1968: ch. 11) states come with progress through the bureaucratic 
hierarchy. Several workers spoke of how they enjoyed the more stimulating and 
challenging nature of higher-graded work, as they were now able to complete tasks 
from the beginning to end, with no separation of conception and execution. 
Braverman (1974) associated this fragmentation of work with the deskilling of 
clerical labour. Hence, promotion from the administrative grades brought with it not 
only a financial bonus, but also more control, responsibility and autonomy at work. 
But I actually loved being a Network Technician [in IT]. By then the pay 
was reasonable and the conditions were good, flexi-time, and so on and so 
forth. You could actually fit your life around work and it was quite good, I 
found it very rewarding and satisfying. (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
Civil servants and public sector workers in general do have a poor public image 
of being over-paid, over many, over-protected and under-productive (cited in Hall, 
1983: ch. 7). Management 'gurus' have deliberately painted a picture of such 
workers in a very negative, stereotypical and condescending manner. For instance, 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) claim that workers in bureaucratic organisations are: 
slow, inflexible, inefficient, and resistant to change; yet managers are unable to 
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terminate the employment of these poor performers. Moreover, Kanter (1989) 
claims that under the hierarchy of bureaucracy there are almost automatic promotions. 
The mass media have contributed to this poor public perception of public servants, 
and governments continue to make political capital out of what Serwotka (2004) 
terms "the mythical penpusher". 
I want to argue that these criticisms have been used as a stick into forcing the 
Civil Service to change its organisational culture. None of the workers I interviewed 
at Durham National Savings were in any way like the mythical image of 'typical' 
civil servants, none of them wore bowler hats or pinstriped suits. The vast majority 
of the workers interviewed defined themselves as working class. Although one 
noticeable feature from conducting my research is that the managerial and specialist 
grades, both male and female, all wore suits. Perhaps this 'popular' public 
perception is more applicable to senior career civil servants and the mandarins in 
Whitehall, but not to those on the shop floor at Durham National Savings. 
However, some of the interviewees at Durham National Savings were clearly 
aware of this poor public perception of civil servants, and of how this had been used 
to increase the pressure for organisational change. 
Civil servants do have a public image of being, you know, over-paid and 
under-worked. (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
The Civil Service had a bad image, and I think they [the Conservative 
government] were looking to change the image of the bowler-hatted tea-
drinking civil servant. (David, worker, interview, 2002) 
Whilst these are 'popular' criticisms of bureaucracy made by those with a 
radical agenda of trying to change organisational cultures; there are also criticisms 
made by employees, whose views I would argue are more pertinent and valid as they 
experience working on the frontline in a bureaucracy day in, day out. Although 
employees' experiences of working life at DNS can be very mixed and varied, there 
were common themes to come out ofthe research. I would agree with Brown (1992: 
ch. 5) that many public sector organisations are not run in the interests of the 
workforce. Therefore, many workers find bureaucratic employment stifling as they 
feel that they are under-valued and do not have opportunities to enhance their talents, 
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skills and prospects; as is also evident in other research on the Civil Service 
(Hammond, 1968. Harrington et al, 1998). The main criticisms made by workers at 
DNS about lower-level administrative bureaucratic work are that it is: boring, 
mundane, routine, easy, unchallenging and unsatisfying. 
The job satisfaction level of basic administrative work was virtually zero .. .it 
was just extremely laborious. (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
I was bored out of my mind doing admin work, and I was useless at it 
(laughs). But that's mainly because I was bored by it! (Angela, worker, 
interview, 2001) 
These were the same criticisms made by employees to Hammond (1968) when he 
conducted earlier research at Durham National Savings. 
However, despite the lack of job control and autonomy in lower-level Civil 
Service administrative work, at least working at DNS was safe and secure permanent 
employment. Again, Sennett and Cobb (1972) refer to this trade-off between the 
stability of such working class employment, against the higher wages and/ or 
excitement of more rewarding, but less secure work. Whilst the nature of the work at 
DNS was routine and repetitive, it was good preparation for progressing through the 
bureaucratic organisation as staff were regularly moved between sections within the 
office in order that they could benefit from more job variety and gain valuable work 
experience. 
Most people did start off in the filing areas. It was like a grounding, which 
afterwards when you have worked here, it was a bloody good grounding to 
get in all honesty. Yeah, it was shit boring, but you learned the basic things. 
(Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
Several workers at DNS emphasised the regimented, grade conscious, 
hierarchical and formal culture of the 'old school' Civil Service; yet this did change 
over time as it became more relaxed. The hierarchy at DNS was a generational one, 
with younger workers mainly occupying the administrative posts, whilst older 
employees dominated the managerial grades. This system was maintained as any 
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mixing or fraternisation between the administrative workers and managers was 
frowned upon. 
DNS was very grade conscious back then, you know, your HEO was 'Mr. So-
and-so' and your EO was 'Mr. or Mrs. So-and-so', and then you had your 
AOs and AAs. It was very, very grade conscious. It was very rare that you 
saw that people mixed, and you only spoke to the higher grades if it was a 
work issue and with the utmost respect. (David, worker, interview, 2002) 
Indeed, David goes on to explain how this hierarchy of grades was also mirrored in 
the seating arrangements around the office. 
Again it was very grade conscious, even in the way it was set up, you could 
tell by each section who were deemed as the 'good workers' and who were 
deemed as the 'bad workers', depending upon where you were sat. If you 
were deemed as 'good', you sat at the two tables next to the EO. There'd be 
six AOs on a section, and you would have an EO at the end of the section, 
and his or her two best workers right in front, then the next two, and then the 
two that weren't very good sat next to the window. And every section was 
like that, there was a pecking order in every section, it was amazing, but it 
actually worked like that, you know. (David, worker, interview, 2002) 
As has been mentioned earlier, from the late 1980s onwards, National Savings 
was a Civil Service department in decline due to government under-funding, which is 
best outlined in this example by Jason, an administrative worker at DNS. 
When I first started working in the 'Save As You Earn' department, they 
were still actually putting the numbers onto the forms with a number press. It 
was a bloody big thing you used to stamp the forms with and you used to 
have to change everything manually, you even had to change it with a little 
nail! You had to move the numbers around with a nail! So there was no 
computerisation there when I first started. (Jason, worker, interview, 2003) 
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Furthermore, two of the workers interviewed, Colin and Jason, spent several 
years on spells of temporary promotion where they would deputise, for example, for 
someone on maternity leave, until that person returned to work. However, due to 
spending restrictions such workers had no chance of being permanently promoted, 
and this problem was documented by the trade union (PCS, 2001a). This shows how 
talent, skills and knowledge were wasted in the organisation due to a lack of 
investment in both the employees and new technology. For example, Jason spent 20 
years in the lowest level administrative grade, yet he feels that the managers used 
him as a font of knowledge in that his skills were appreciated at an informal level, 
but were not recognised through formal promotion within the organisation. 
I was more or less classed as, like, a 'trouble-shooter'. I was going around 
just cleaning the mess up, even for the EOs, the things that they didn't want 
to do or couldn't do, they'd say, "You know, he knows what he's doing, 
we'll get him in and he'll sort it out." That's what it seemed to be, at the time. 
(Jason, worker, interview, 2003) 
Recalcitrant Workers at Durham National Savings 
De-subordination and resistance at work are old phenomena (Goodrich, 1975. 
Miliband, 1978), which Carter Goodrich (1975) analysed in the classic The Frontier 
of Control, originally published in 1920, with accounts of workers resisting attempts 
of managerial control. Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) argue that misbehaviour is 
endemic in organisations, yet it is an often neglected area of academic interest. In his 
book Sabotage in the American Workplace, Sprokes defines misbehaviour at work as 
being "anything you do at work that you are not supposed to do" (quoted in Ackroyd 
and Thompson, 1999: 2). Almost the exact phrase is used by the worker quoted 
below to explain what sometimes took place on the shop floor at Durham National 
Savings. 
There were all sorts of things that went on at work that maybe shouldn't have 
done. Most of the time, it was a good working atmosphere [at DNS]. (Julie, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
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Such acts can be seen as strategies that enable workers to survive the rigours, routine 
and ritual of the working day; in much the same way as Cohen and Taylor (1992) 
describe efforts to escape the boredom and monotony of everyday life in Escape 
Attempts. 
Whilst organised and official industrial conflict at National Savings is covered 
in chapter six, in this section I will discuss and analyse the more informal, unplanned, 
spontaneous, sporadic and subtle forms of worker resistance, together with 
subcultural alliances. It must be stressed that although organisational misbehaviour 
is a common feature of all social settings, for the most part, workers do comply and 
co-operate with managers, and complete their daily tasks and responsibilities. Yet 
some workers interviewed at DNS were honest and open enough to describe some 
aspects of misbehaviour and rebellion, which brightened up otherwise dull days. 
Worker resistance can be individual or collective, indeed it can transform from an 
individual act into a collective one (Miliband, 1978). Such acts do not have to be 
directly political, premeditated or organised (Miliband, 1978); yet everyday 
resistance is local and immediate (Gottfried, 1994). Non-compliance is profoundly 
social and can include counter-productive practices that involve a combination of 
resistance, escapism or time wasting (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). Yet Dubois 
(1979: ch. 5) argues that acts of sabotage can also be productive, and help reform and 
relax managerial authority. There are a wide variety of subversive acts that can take 
place in the workplace, ranging from the more dramatic, such as: political protests, 
sabotage and theft (Goodrich, 1975. Miliband, 1978. Dubois, 1979. Gottfried, 1994. 
La Nuez and Jermier, 1994. Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999); to the less direct, 
involving: restriction of output, unauthorised breaks, practical jokes and fun at work 
(Goodrich, 1975. Dubois, 1979. Gottfried, 1994. La Nuez and Jermier, 1994. 
Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). Miliband argues that such worker recalcitrance is 
most evident at the point of production, and is an active attempt by workers to resist 
and transform the conditions of their subordination (Miliband, 1978). I would add 
that there is always scope for misbehaviour at work as management are not 
omnipotent, there cannot possibly be 'Orwellian' surveillance and control of all of 
the workers all of the time. Hence, in the case of DNS such disruptive behaviour 
takes place on the shop floor, and ranges from practical jokes and general messing 
around, to more rebellious attitudes, actions and subcultural formations, which can 
be directed against management and authority figures. Whilst conducting the worker 
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oral history interviews at DNS the issue of employee recalcitrance was not asked 
about directly, but it was raised in a number of interviews and the workers concerned 
thoroughly enjoyed recollecting and reminiscing on such acts, which can range from 
defiance, to survival strategies, to helping facilitate management. 
In certain instances at DNS some managers were all too aware of the mundane 
nature of certain low-level administrative tasks and allowed some scope for mischief 
at work. In the quote below, Julie talks of how management discretion was used in a 
concessionary way to permit some element of fun. Barsoux (1993) argues that such 
acts can be used to facilitate work. This management discretion mirrors police 
discretion, as discussed by Reiner (1997), as those in positions of authority judge 
others and can tum a blind eye to certain misdemeanours. 
You also did a stint, while you were down there filing, on 'weeding', which 
was the absolute pits! You went through all of the old drawers and chucked 
out everything that wasn't necessary. And the atmosphere in there was an 
absolute hoot, because Tony Winter was the EO and I think he did let us get 
away with a lot because he understood it was so boring. (Julie, worker, 
interview, 2003) 
The example below shows how fun and humour can be used at work to break up 
the monotony of the working day, in much the same way as 'Banana Time' was used 
in Roy's (1960) classic study to enable workers to cope and survive hours of routine 
and repetitive work. Barsoux (1993) argues that such acts make working life more 
bearable. Management discretion was used once again in this example of how 
humour and fun can facilitate work. Dubois (1979: ch. 5) describes such acts as 
'productive sabotage', because a more relaxed, understanding and less repressive 
form of management control can be employed to enable and encourage workers to 
have fun whilst getting the job done. 
Me and Margaret paid Anthony 50 pence each if we could stuff a peach 
melba in his face and he let us (laughs)! We did it when we thought nobody 
was looking, of course, when we were laughing, Ruth Peart [the manager] 
just happened to look up. She came in with a reputation for being a bit strict, 
and she looked over and there's Anthony sitting there with peach melba 
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dripping off his face and, of course, it was quite obvious me and Margaret 
were the guilty parties, covered in cream. She just looked, and then she 
started laughing too, and she was great with us after that (laughs)! (Julie, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
However, Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: ch. 5) argue that management 
discretion might not always be a facilitator, as organisational misbehaviour wastes 
time and breaks the rhythms of work and concentration. Below is another example 
of 'clowning' at work, which is commonly used by those with little power in the 
workplace who often have a negative experience of work (La Nuez and Jermier, 
1994. Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: ch. 5). 
I can always remember Johnny; he was one of the lads who worked in the 
files when I did. As I say, we were all kids, and he played a ukulele and sang 
like George Formby. I remember him getting wheeled up and down there on 
one of those barrows that they pushed the work around in, playing his ukulele 
and singing like George Formby (laughs)! (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
Workers can also use humour as a political weapon in opposition to, and also to 
challenge, the hierarchical, formal and serious nature of bureaucratic management 
(Berger, 1996. Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: ch. 5). Moreover, in this case joking 
was used to unite workers and reveal a subculture of resistance against certain 
unpopular managers, which was displayed at the festive time of the year when such 
behaviour is deemed more acceptable. Yet this example shows that some workers 
questioned the authority and legitimacy of particular managers and their methods. 
There was a good working atmosphere in there ... that was tremendous 
working in the files. I mean, that was in the days when we had Christmas 
parties where the lads off the section used to dress up and do a skit on the two 
most hated managers (laughs). We were all young kids, it was great! (Julie, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
Misbehaviour and joking at work arise through employee self-organisation, with 
the establishment of distinctive work-based community identities (Berger, 1996. 
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Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: ch. 3). In the case of DNS, such workplace 
subcultures were created and founded on the basis that many of the newly recruited 
workers had just left school and started their first job. Other factors, such as, age, 
play and fun at work, together with disposable incomes and widespread socialising 
outside of work, were used to compound such allegiances. 
I worked as a Clerical Assistant doing menial clerical tasks for about four or 
five years until about '84/ '85, and to be honest, I had the time ofmy life. I'd 
just left school and was getting paid, I'd joined with kids from school, so it 
was just an extension of school, and it was a real laugh in the big filing areas. 
It was just good fun, with a good social side and we got paid for basically 
having a good time. We were all young at the time, and it was a mixture of 
lads and lasses, and we used to go out and have a drink on lunchtime. In the 
filing areas we'd be playing tricks on each other, having elastic band fights 
(laughs) .. . you can imagine what it was like .. .I mean, we were all 16 - 17 
[years old] and it was just such a laugh every day. I can remember going 
home thinking, I wish I was back at work, because it was just that much fun. 
(Kevin, worker, interview, 2003) 
As discussed in chapter two, subcultural allegiances are typically formed around 
common work experiences (Wright, 1994. Alvesson, 2002), together with similarities 
in terms of age and pay (Trice, 1993. Brown, 1998: ch. 3). Cunnison (1982) also 
found subcultural groupings based around age, class and sex in her research in 
Manchester factories. At Durham National Savings young workers would join 
together to make the most of mundane bureaucratic work. 
However, several of the workers interviewed at Durham National Savings spoke 
of their dismay that once in their first job, they were still regarded and treat as school 
children by their new managers. 
Working in 'Holdings File' was absolutely painstakingly boring (laughs)! 
Most of the people we took on [at DNS] at the time were school-leavers, and 
that's the way we got treat, it was like being back at school. (Dermot, worker, 
interview, 2001) 
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To analyse this condescending and patronising treatment of low-level administrative 
workers at DNS by older managers, I will draw on the work of Alan Fox (1974) in 
his book Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations, with his notions of 
low-trust and high-trust managerial regimes. In high-trust employment relations, 
managers allow workers greater discretion at work through job enlargement and 
enrichment (Fox, 1974: ch. 2). However, low-trust employment regimes are 
commonly associated with the big management of bureaucracy, with high levels of 
workplace control, regulation and surveillance (Fox, 1974: ch. 2). This is exactly 
how some of the administrative workers described their early working life at DNS. I 
agree with both Fox (1974: ch. 2) and also Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) who 
argue that such distrust can create a confrontational response from workers who will, 
therefore, define their interests and identity in opposition to management, as they feel 
that they are not included in shared organisational effort and endeavour. These 
actions by management can be seen to foster two differing responses from workers, 
yet a combination of these tactics can be employed in opposition to managers. The 
first response is what Fox (1974: ch. 1) terms the 'low-discretion syndrome', where 
workers start to behave as they are expected to, like they cannot be trusted by 
management. This results in feelings of resentment towards management, which 
Nichols and Armstrong uncovered in the attitude of "if they play silly buggers with 
me, I'll play silly buggers with them" (worker quoted in Nichols and Armstrong, 
1976: 69). Hence, if young adult workers at DNS were being treat as school children, 
then they would stubbornly act like school children by having elastic band fights and 
generally messing around. Roberts (1993: 134- 136) also describes this behaviour 
in the shipyard setting, where direct management control of enforcing workers of all 
ages to knock-off exactly on time resulted in worker resistance and prankish 
misbehaviour to the point where managers were actually chasing workers around the 
yard. However, for management this can become a self-fulfilling prophecy because, 
as Goffman discussed with the 'looping effect' in Asylums (1991: 41 - 46), such 
misbehaviour can be used to justify further social control. The second response is 
one of resistance in an attempt to reclaim lost freedom at work (Gottfried, 1994). As 
examined in chapter two, subcultures can be formed to oppose and challenge the 
power inequalities inherent in the capitalist workplace (Alvesson, 2002: ch. 3) At 
DNS, subcultural groupings were established against older authoritarian managers in 
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a 'them' and 'us' confrontational manner, where younger administrative workers 
rebelled against menial, repetitive and boring bureaucratic tasks. 
Another distinct memory, and again it is like work being almost an extension 
of school, is a lot of the EOs were almost like the Gods in the area you 
worked in. They used to call you by your surname all the time, which was 
really strange, like ... "Mr. Thompson." So they were like real 'old school' 
civil servants, and most of them had moved up from Manor Gardens in 
London or from the old National Savings office in Harrogate. The lady who 
was my EO was in her late 50s/ early 60s with a blue-rinse hairdo, you know, 
and it was like a 'them' and 'us' atmosphere, trying to get one over them. 
The other thing I remember is, on the clerical side, there's a lot of, like, 
menial tasks. I remember sorting things with a lot of timing involved, almost 
like 'time and motion' studies, as to how long it should take you to do this, 
and how long it should take you to do that. So you used to always try and 
rebel against that. (Kevin, worker, interview, 2003) 
Braverman (1974) argued that clerical work had become proletarianised with the 
routinisation and deskilling of what was once a craft, through the introduction of 
elements of scientific management. Scientific management was invented by 
Frederick Taylor (1911) with his infamous time and motion studies, where jobs were 
timed to the smallest detail to establish the best, quickest and most 'scientific' 
method of completing tasks. However, Fox (1974) argues that scientific 
management was the epitome of 'low-discretion syndrome', as tasks were under 
stringent supervision and surveillance; and Rose (1975) argues that Taylor's methods 
were barbaric. However, Braverman was widely criticised in his analysis as he failed 
to account for workplace resistance to scientific management (Jermier et al, 1994. 
Bradley et al, 2000). Yet resistance clearly occurred at DNS to such low-trust 
relations with attempts to disrupt work routines. 
Resistance can be used by those with little power to reject and deligitimise 
figures of authority (Miliband, 1978. Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). The following 
account exemplifies this via a symbolic gesture in opposition to those whom we are 
supposed to respect. 
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Well there's the story about the Queen Mother (laughs). There was Royalty 
in Durham, and the Queen Mother was going to come past Millburngate 
House, DNS. Of course, with it being the Civil Service everything was really 
strict and even though she wasn't coming to our building, we had to be all 
nice and tidy. So, sure enough we saw the police escorts coming across 
Millburngate Bridge with the Queen Mother in her car, and one of the lads 
just stood up at the window and stuck the "Vs" up (laughs)! It was almost a 
sackable offence! I mean, it was difficult to get sacked from the Civil Service, 
but he came pretty close to it that day. (Colin, worker, interview, 2003) 
In explaining these antics of mischief, misbehaviour and unofficial resistance at 
work, this must be seen in the context that for the majority of workers at DNS this 
was their first job upon leaving school and many were still growing up. Most found 
basic bureaucratic work easy and unchallenging, whilst they enjoyed perks, such as, 
flexi-time and the disposable income, with few responsibilities. However, this 
carefree attitude did change with age, as some of the interviewees pointed out, 
because after a few years of working at DNS, most workers did begin to see it as a 
career and a 'job for life'. Many now had to take working life more seriously as they 
had fresh responsibilities in terms of having partners and children. Rowbotham 
argues that workers are now forced into economic slavery due to the enormous levels 
of personal debt accumulated through home and car ownership. For instance, in 
1998 there was £416 billion outstanding on mortgages in Britain (Rowbotham, 1998). 
Hence, many workers have to keep in line as there is too much in jeopardy through 
overt misbehaviour at work. This form of control was evident in the early Ford 
factories, where workers who had families were deliberately recruited as it was in 
their economic interests to toe the line (Beynon, 1979: 20- 25). Furthermore, now 
that Team Working has been introduced at DNS there is less scope for misbehaviour 
at work, due to the self surveillance of workers within semi-autonomous teams. Yet 
despite the changes that have taken place, the social aspect and camaraderie of work 
remain important as many still socialise together and have formed long-lasting 
friendships. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, many workers spoke of how the workplace 
culture of the Civil Service had changed over the years. National Savings was no 
longer such a stringent and hierarchical bureaucracy, it had become more flexible, 
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relaxed, open and informal; creating a much better working atmosphere. There was 
the introduction of a more open staff reporting system, with more mixing between 
administrative and managerial grades, and the development of in-house computer 
programmes. 
I think there's this view that the Civil Service is some sort of monolithic 
empire that never changes, but if you've worked in the Civil Service - you 
have and I have- there's change all the time. For instance, we had in-house 
IT systems and IT teams who would change programmes and try to be as 
efficient and effective as possible. I think that's a view that is pervaded by 
the private sector, that the Civil Service doesn't move on, but it clearly does. 
(Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
As discussed in chapter two, while integrationists are often criticised for having 
a monolithic and static view of organisational culture (Gregory, 1983. Martin et al, 
1985. Elsmore, 2001); the union representative quoted above confirms the arguments 
of differentiation theorists that culture is fluid and transient. These changes did relax 
workplace relations at National Savings for those on the shop floor, with the 
movement to a more open and accountable form of management/ employee relations. 
However, I will now focus on deliberate attempts to transform and commercialise the 
workplace culture of the Civil Service, the first of which was through the Financial 
Management Initiative. 
The Financial Management Initiative - the First Steps in the 
Transition from a Bureaucratic to a Managerial Civil Service 
The introduction of the Financial Management Initiative in May 1982 by the 
Thatcher Conservative government was significant, as it was the first serious attempt 
at trying to introduce business practices in order to transform the culture of the Civil 
Service (Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). As discussed in chapter two, there 
were previous efforts at transforming the service, but the FMI was clearly the start of 
the process of commercialisation. 
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There's a little bit of a myth going on, and SBS are guilty ofthis, of assuming 
that somehow the public sector wasn't being run along commercial-type lines. 
If you look back to Thatcherism, then Margaret Thatcher tried to introduce a 
business culture into the Civil Service. There is absolutely no doubt that the 
Financial Management Initiative and Agency Status - which separated policy 
from process - the objective was to bring private sector management styles 
into the process parts of the service, if not the policy parts. And what we 
mainly deal with at National Savings, is process. (Steve, union official, 
interview, 2001) 
In keeping with the key principles of New Public Management, the FMI introduced 
clear objectives, Performance Indicators and devolved budgets to make the Civil 
Service more commercially focused (Pyper, 1995: ch. 3. Horton, 1996. Pilkington, 
1999: ch. 6). 
I think the commercialisation of the Civil Service started with the Financial 
Management Initiative. That involved the delegation of budgets to line 
managers, fmancial planning and the introduction of a profit and loss type 
accounting system, which made people aware of cash and how they were 
spending it. And that was a sign of a move towards budget control/ 
rationalisation. Proper commercial sector philosophies came in with Agency 
Status, because a lot of Agencies were set up as Trading Funds and had 
profit/loss accounts, which was definitely setting up a financial regime with a 
commercial attitude. So that was long before outsourcing. (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2001) 
As stated in chapter two, the FMI was a government directive and departments 
were encouraged to develop their own formats (Pyper, 1995: ch. 3. Horton, 1996. 
Pilkington, 1999: ch. 6). There were debates over the reluctance of senior civil 
servants to the FMI, as well as the directive's effectiveness (Likierman, 1984. 
Metcalfe and Richards, 1984). Yet none of the workers interviewed at Durham 
National Savings said that the policy had any direct impact on their daily working 
lives. Indeed hardly any of the workers had even heard of the FMI, let alone knew 
the aims, objectives and outcomes of the initiative. 
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There may have been no fundamental changes for those on the shop floor at 
DNS through the Financial Management Initiative, but it was clearly the start of a 
rolling programme of reform, which was taken a stage further through Agency Status. 
Agency Status - the Changing Structure, Culture and Identity of the 
Civil Service 
As previously detailed in chapter two, Agency Status resulted in the break up of the 
centralised unified national Civil Service into distinct operational areas, as many 
government departments became separate semi-autonomous Agencies. In keeping 
with the principles of New Public Management, this transformed the structure, 
culture and management style of the Civil Service, with the appointment of Chief 
Executives to head Agencies and the widespread adoption of private enterprise 
concepts, such as, Mission Statements and Corporate Plans (Pyper, 1995: 76. 
Pilkington, 1999: chs. 6 and 7). Agency Status was taken a stage further in 1992 
with the passing of the Civil Service (Management Functions) Act, which delegated 
further powers to Agencies to negotiate their own management structures, grading 
systems, pay awards, conditions of employment and recruitment (Pyper, 1991: ch. 7. 
Gagnon, 1996. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 7). Agency Status was a key part of the 
Conservative's rolling programme of Civil Service reform, and around 60% of civil 
servants are employed in 108 Executive Agencies (Flynn, 2002: ch. 1 ). Indeed, 
National Savings was one of the last Agencies to be created, and became an 
Executive Agency of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 1st of July 1996 (NS&I, 
2002), with Peter Bareau, the former General Manager Personnel of Lloyds Bank 
PLC, brought in as Chief Executive (HM Treasury, 1996). An important element of 
New Public Management involves the deliberate importation of private sector 
management methods and managers to change the culture of public sector 
organisations (Hood, 1991). Indeed, the very adoption of the corporate title 'Chief 
Executive' is designed to introduce cultural change (E. Wilson, 1993). One of the 
underlying aims of Agency Status was that due to the fragmentation of the Civil 
Service, workers would now identify with their own particular Agency, rather than 
the wider service (Pilkington, 1999: ch. 7). 
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All of the workers interviewed anticipated massive overnight changes at 
National Savings as a direct result of Agency Status. Yet in reality, it had very little 
direct impact upon staff on the shop floor at first. 
People were so geared up for Agency Status and thought everything's going 
to change now; we're not going to be the safe and secure civil servants. But 
it didn't, there was nothing that really changed at all, you couldn't really tell 
any difference from what had gone before. (David, worker, interview 2002) 
Ironically enough, for the workers the most memorable event associated with 
Agency Status, which every single interviewee mentioned, was the infamous piece of 
commemorative cake that was presented to all National Savings staff to celebrate the 
event. However, this supposed 'gift' to mark the occasion was ridiculed and mocked 
by all research interviewees. Such general employee feelings of irreverence show 
that the management decision to present staff with a slice of Agency Status cake 
obviously failed to have the desired effect. 
I think it [Agency Status cake] was one of those, probably well intentioned 
good ideas at the time, that turned out to be entirely and totally crass (laughs)! 
I'll tell you exactly what it was like, you know if you go into a card shop and 
see these little cakes and they're in a box that you can buy for somebody for a 
the last minute thing, "Oh there you are, I don't know what else to get you, 
have that." That was simply all it was (laughs)! It was very, very surreal, but 
never mind ... (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
We didn't see a hell of a lot of change within our work procedures through 
Agency Status. We got a piece of [Agency Status] fruit cake too ... everyone 
was just laughing! I think I binned it at the time in some sort of protest 
(laughs)! (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
Many of the workers interviewed did acknowledge that Agency Status did signal 
the start of profound transformations. Yet any change in the workplace culture was 
gradual at first. 
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Agency Status meant nothing really; it didn't have any effect day to day ... 
Although obviously it did, but it must have been so slow, as with a lot of 
these things, you didn't really notice it was changing. Do you know what I 
mean? The seeds must have been put there with Agency Status, and we've 
just changed ever so gradually. (Julie, worker, interview with Julie, 2003) 
This quote, again, endorses the arguments of differentiation theorists that 
organisational culture change is a slow and time-consuming process (Anthony, 1994. 
Alvesson, 2002). 
Yet, there is a mixed picture from the workers interviewed regarding the 
implications of Agency Status. The majority of staff were worried and concerned 
about its possible effects, yet Kevin saw this transition in a more positive light. 
I think Agency Status just gave [Civil Service] departments more autonomy 
to manage their own budgets and make decisions. As they weren't tied into 
bigger, sort of, monolithic departments where you had to get everything 
signed in triplicate to get something turned around, with the Treasury looking 
over your shoulder. All of a sudden what you had, which I think in one sense 
is quite refreshing, is that the Treasury would sign-off what your funds were 
for the year as a department, and you had the autonomy to manage them and 
you had to deliver to certain objectives. (Kevin, worker, interview, 2002) 
However, I would argue with du Gay (2002) that the Civil Service cannot be run 
as a quasi-corporate organisation with business aims and objectives, as it is a public 
service and has an entirely different ethos. Indeed, such changes are introduced 
under the illusion of more delegation and autonomy. I agree with Pollitt ( 1990) and 
also with Self (1993: ch. 6), that the aim of the Conservative government was to 
reassert tighter financial control over the Civil Service by limiting the cash being 
distributed to each Agency, so that local managers would then have to make savings 
and drive forward efficiencies. Several of the key principles of New Public 
Management are combined in the Agency Status directives, including target setting, 
cost c()ntrols and the need to make year on year improvements. Therefore, the 
Treasury was still in overall control as it sets performance aims and objectives, yet 
the pressure was now on Agency management and their staff to decide how to 
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achieve these targets. Autonomy was also severely restricted as the Treasury had to 
approve Agency Pay deals, and several commentators argue that workers became 
very sceptical about these organisational culture change initiatives, particularly as 
they were primarily about cutting costs (Pollitt, 1990. Gagnon, 1996. Harrington et al, 
1998). Furthermore, these spending restrictions later resulted in the start of several 
'voluntary' redundancy schemes at National Savings, which will be analysed in 
chapter four. 
The fragmentation of the Civil Service continued as Agency Status developed, 
with pay and grading reviews which meant that career paths, pay rises and re-grading 
systems were introduced which were specific only to particular Agencies (Pyper, 
1991: ch. 7. Pilkington, 1999: ch. 7). At National Savings the old Civil Service 
grades of Administrative Assistant, Administrative Officer, Executive Officer, etc, 
were replaced with a Pay Band system in 1996 (CPSA, 1996). Senior union officials 
argue that this was a mechanism to create movement and promotions between grades, 
as the internal labour market had been stagnant from the late 1980s. The same 
philosophy was used at the Land Registry where the old Civil Service grades were 
replaced by Registration Assistants, Registration Officers, etc, to create promotions, 
as many workers had been in the same grade for years and were vastly qualified and 
experienced (Smith, 200). However, this re-grading exercise was a further cultural 
transition as the positions created were only applicable to that particular Agency, as 
opposed to the wider Civil Service. Hence, such changes made the Civil Service 
even more fragmented and ghettoised, as individual Agencies were now all cut adrift 
from the rest of the Civil Service, and this severely restricted the opportunities for 
staff to transfer between departments (Pyper, 1995: 77). Agencies now had more 
specific cultures and identities, and this made the likelihood of the Civil Service ever 
returning to a unified structure with national pay bargaining all the more difficult. 
However, the movement from a national Civil Service pay and grading system 
to an Agency specific one was not without its problems, as Julie explains below. All 
jobs at National Savings had to be re-graded under a Job Evaluation & Grading 
System, but some old AO jobs were now re-graded at a higher Pay Band than all of 
the other AO tasks (CPSA, 1997), which did create bitterness. The same mistakes 
were to be repeated with the introduction of Team Working and the creation of Team 
Leaders in another internal labour market re-grading exercise, which will be analysed 
in chapter five. 
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With the introduction of the Pay Band system, most of the jobs that were 
previously AO level, stayed at AO level [Pay Band 3]. The only jobs that 
they were going to up to this new level of Pay Band 4, were jobs in the 
Certificate Correspondence Branch (CCB) and Death Claims Branch (DCB). 
You had to apply for promotion, because management said they had to open 
it up to competition to give those who'd recently left the [CCB and DCB] 
sections a chance to gain promotion. It caused an awful, awful lot of ill 
feeling, this Family 306 exercise, it was horrendous. I applied and got a job 
in there ... but people who'd worked in there for years failed to get their own 
jobs, because it didn't create any more jobs and there was more than the 
required number of people able to do those jobs. (Julie, worker, interview, 
2003) 
Agency Status was one of the first really noticeable culture change initiative 
introduced at National Savings, although transitions were slow at first. The 
establishment of devolved pay and grading structures did change workplace 
identities, as workers now automatically had more of an affinity to the National 
Savings Agency, rather than the wider Civil Service. Indeed, several commentators 
argue that each Agency now has its own particular culture and identity (Fairbrother, 
1994. Pyper, 1995: ch. 9. Horton, 1996). Yet these changes did worry staff, and such 
feelings of uncertainty increased with the start of privatisation. 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering and Market Testing - the First 
Elements of Privatisation 
In line with the philosophy of New Public Management, both Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering and Market Testing were introduced into the Civil Service by 
the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, with the aim that opening up 
sections of the public sector to competition would result in cost savings and drive up 
efficiencies (Pirie, 1995. Watson, 1997: chs. 5 and 8). However, as previously 
discussed in chapter two, such claims are hotly contested with critics arguing that 
privatisation was a deliberate political act designed to introduce a more commercial 
managerial attitude and change the culture of the Civil Service (Batkin, 1983. Hall, 
1983. Pollitt, 1990. Self, 1993). Furthermore, this was all done on the pretext of 
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slashing costs, cutting staffing numbers, reducing wages and imposing inferior terms 
and conditions on already marginalised workers, whilst delivering a poorer quality 
service as a result of such cut backs (Batkin, 1983. Hall, 1983: ch. 7. Ascher, 1987). 
Under Compulsory Competitive Tendering, catering, cleaning and security were 
the first sections of National Savings to be outsourced to the private sector in the 
1980s. Indeed, it was mandatory for all Civil Service departments to transfer 
cleaning services to private contractors (Pyper, 1995: 65). Contrary to the claims 
made by those in favour of privatisation, CCT at National Savings did result in cuts 
to employee terms and conditions, which will be analysed in chapter six. 
The possible privatisation of sections of National Savings continued into the 
early 1990s under Market Testing, and senior union reps state that there were 13 
Market Tests in all across the department, which were part of a rolling programme 
carried out after Agency Status. The research interviewees claim that some of the 
areas which were open to Market Testing included: Facilities Management, Internal 
Audit, Computer Services, Reprographics, Stat Processing, Records Branch and the 
Mail Room. Indeed during 1996 - 1997, just prior to the introduction of PPP, the 
following areas were to be re-tested: Training, Typing and the Messengerial Services 
(CPSA 1996. CPSA, 1997). 
At National Savings, private sector management consultants were brought in to 
offer advice on which areas to Market Test. Batkin (1983) states that it was standard 
procedure for Civil Service departments to employ consultants who would identify 
which sectors could feasibly be opened up to competition. After such consultations, 
Agency management then decided which areas to Market Test, and the government's 
Efficiency Unit oversaw the whole process and ensured that a suitable number of 
sections had been identified (Pyper, 1995: 65). 
There were loads of management consultants around at the advent of CCT 
and Market Testing, and they gave recommendations on what areas should go 
out to the private sector. And I think that you'd probably find that in most 
public sector departments, because they haven't got the experience of 
tendering and, prior to identifying an area, they'd probably seek advice from 
various consultancy firms. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
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As mentioned earlier, the aim of Market Testing was to improve efficiencies, 
whilst cutting costs by introducing a more commercial culture to the Civil Service. 
Under Market Testing, the Civil Service was to be benchmarked against the private 
sector and, therefore, had to be just as efficient. This certainly did create a climate of 
fear and trepidation amongst all of the workers interviewed, and this threat of 
privatisation continued throughout the Market Testing period. 
Well, the Conservative government's aim of Market Testing was to save 
money and get the service done cheaper. The union argued that there is only 
one way you can do that, and that is to reduce the wage bill, because it's 90% 
of the cost of any of these services. And you can reduce the wage bill in a 
number of ways, all of which are negative to the workforce. You can cut 
basic wages, you could worsen terms and conditions, you could work with 
less staff, which means putting pressure on existing staff. And those were 
generally what Market Testing did, even to the Civil Service part, we did get 
a more commercial attitude because they thought they were working to a 
contract or Service Level Agreement. And so there was an attempt by 
managers to say to staff, "We're not delivering the contract", as a threat, or, 
"It might be moved in future, so you had better work harder." (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2001) 
Under Market Testing, specifications for contracts were drawn up and in-house 
bids were welcome in most, but not all, Civil Service departments (Pyper, 1995: 65). 
In-House Bid Teams had to go through a process of critical self-appraisal when 
making their bid, and the criteria are detailed in the interview quote below. Hence, 
staff and managers in the areas concerned were under increasing pressure and had to 
put together a bid to effectively save their own jobs from being outsourced to the 
private sector. This signalled a big culture change as areas of the Civil Service had 
to be much more commercially focused than ever before, yet this only affected 
certain staff in particular areas at National Savings. 
In-House Bid Teams included an appointed management team, which isn't 
necessarily a management team from that area, it was people who'd had 
experience of other in-house bids. That would be supplemented with 
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managers and staff from the area, who would put forward various proposals 
on how the work should be done and they would pull together a formal bid 
which would be compared against the private sector proposals. There would 
then be a decision made on whether it would stay in-house or be outsourced. 
In-house bids included: staff numbers, productivity levels, there would be an 
actual cost on the in-house bid itself, almost like a private contractor in any 
bidding process. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
Market Testing tenders had to be thoroughly assessed by Market Testing 
Evaluation Teams, comprising of Treasury and departmental officials, who managed 
the tendering process and had the authority to decide which bidder was to be 
awarded the contract (Pyper, 1995: 65 - 67). However, there had to be strict 
separation between the In-House Bid Team and the Evaluation Team to ensure there 
was fair and open competition (Pyper, 1995: 67). 
There was a Market Testing Evaluation Team, which had appointees from 
different areas of National Savings management. And I think there were 
some external assessors as well, such as, the Treasury, in terms of value for 
money. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
The In-House Bid Teams at National Savings were highly successful in winning 
every single Market Testing bid and not one job was transferred to the private sector. 
However, as mentioned in chapter two, this was certainly not the case in other Civil 
Service departments (Pilkington, 1999: ch. 7). Indeed, the proposed Market Testing 
of the Computer Services Group was scrapped due to efficiencies already made 
under the Civil Service (CPSA, 1996). Therefore, I want to argue that civil servants 
at National Savings proved themselves to be just as efficient as the private sector, 
which goes to show that the public sector is not as outdated, cumbersome and 
ineffective after all. 
However, every worker I interviewed spoke of the worry and uncertainty that 
Market Testing brought with it, and the fear that they could be next. Hence, the trade 
union were able to build a campaign against Market Testing through this pressure 
from below, which is discussed in chapter six. The union reps said that although 
Market Testing only lasted three or four years, it seemed to drag on forever. 
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Employees didn't see anything positive from Market Testing. I think some 
managers did because they made savings in terms of the bids, they cut 
headcount and increased productivity on the back of winning bids, and the 
threat and the fear that was there from staff who felt, "I don't particularly 
want to work for a private contractor, because I've always been in the Civil 
Service." (Chris, union official, interview, 2003) 
Furthermore, there was not only pressure to win the in-house bids, but once that 
hurdle had been overcome, there were continual demands to deliver to certain 
standards, and improve efficiency and value for money, year on year. As discussed 
in chapter two, one of the main features of New Public Management is the need to 
make continual improvements in performance (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002. 
Hughes, 2003: ch. 3). There were systems in place to monitor and assess the 
progress of Market Testing contracts, with penalties for non-compliance and the 
potential to terminate contracts if they were not up to standard (Pyper, 1995: 67). 
Not only did this lead to declining staff morale at DNS, but this was mirrored 
throughout the Civil Service, as many workers thought that privatisation had gone 
too far and were fearful of their own job security (Pilkington, 1999: ch. 7). 
Indeed it is ironic that with the introduction of Market Testing at National 
Savings, rather than cutting bureaucracy and red tape, it actually created its own 
bureaucracy. 
If they win the Market Testing contract, the In-House Bid Team then have to 
have a contractual arrangement with the rest of the business, which were 
called Service Level Agreements. For example, Reprographics won their in-
house contract, but instead of just sending a document to print, you then got a 
form back telling you the price of it. Now no money changed hands, because 
they hadn't set up internal budgets; so you didn't even have 'soft charging', 
far less 'hard charging'. It was just a paper exercise, but it created a 
bureaucracy of its own, it was insane! (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
There was a report by management consultants Ernst and Young, conducted at 
the time of the Market Testing programme, explaining that core areas of National 
Savings could not be outsourced. 
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All of the messages that the union were getting at the time when they did the 
Market Testing analysis, a consultancy company Ernst & Young came in -
the report is probably still around - and they assessed that it would be 
impossible to outsource or privatise the core areas of the National Savings 
business because of the risks involved. And they then just looked at 
peripheral areas to Market Test, which was horrendous for the staff 
concerned. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
However, this is exactly what happened under PPP, with the outsourcing of the 
entire service delivery at National Savings, under what was effectively a huge 
Market Test. Indeed, the proposed new Market Tests of Typing and Training were 
cancelled as the whole organisation faced a much larger and potentially more serious 
privatisation (CPSA, 1997). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have set the context of National Savings being a Civil Service 
department in decline and the need for modernisation, which was to take place under 
PPP. As National Savings has a long-serving workforce with their own established 
cultures and traditions, attempts at changing the organisational culture were always 
going to be difficult and complex. Yet, culture evolves and is constantly 
transforming, and there were transitions at National Savings involving the numbers 
of staff employed, internal labour market restrictions and the evolution to a less 
grade centred working environment. Contrary to the claims made by integration 
theorists, such as, Ouchi (1981) and Peters and Waterman (1982), National Savings 
is very much a multicultural organisation. Subcultural alliances did exist, some of 
which were formed to oppose certain managerial practices. 
Regarding the impact that government directives had on transforming the 
organisational culture, change was slow and negotiated. The Financial Management 
Initiative had no real effect on the day to day working lives of those on the shop floor 
at National Savings. This endorses the argument made by Anthony (1994), that for 
culture change to be effective, it must alter the structures of the organisation. Whilst 
Agency Status did include structural and cultural change, in that it resulted in the 
fragmentation of the national, unified and centralised Civil Service, there were not 
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the immediate transformations that shop floor staff were fearing. On the contrary, 
change was gradual with the development of Agency specific pay and grading 
structures. Both the FMI and Agency Status included elements of New Public 
Management, and this was taken a stage further with the implementation of the first 
elements of privatisation at National Savings. Security, cleaning and catering were 
all privatised under CCT, but with Market Testing every in-house bid was successful. 
Yet this did lead to the development more commercial culture with the emphasis on 
year on year improvements, together with growing job insecurity. Whilst 
differentiation theorists, such as, Anthony (1994), Elsmore (2001) and Alvesson 
(2002) are correct in arguing that culture change is a gradual process, the pressure on 
embracing a more commercial culture was exacerbated under the Public-Private 
Partnership of the organisation. 
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Chapter Four- The Public-Private Partnership of National 
Savings and Early Cultural Transformations 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will be investigating the Public-Private Partnership of National 
Savings, which marked the beginning of the most salient changes in the 
organisation's culture. As discussed in the previous chapter, there had already been 
the commercialisation of National Savings, including the introduction of elements of 
privatisation. Certain earlier change initiatives continued after the PPP, and will be 
assessed in this chapter. However, what is different under the 'partnership' 
programme is that the changes affect all of the operational staff, and it is abundantly 
clear to all employees that SBS are a private company who have to prioritise 
profitability. 
At the start of the chapter, the bidding process and details of the awarding of the 
PPP contract at National Savings are discussed. Whilst there was a short-lived 
'honeymoon period' at the beginning of the contract with some early successes, SBS 
soon faced mounting difficulties on this 'partnership' deal. This resulted in direct 
intervention by Siemens AG, the parent company, and the imposition of a new SBS 
senior management team. The problems encountered by SBS, involving the 
technical modernisation, further outsourcings and escalating costs are all examined in 
detail. It is argued that SBS did not conduct thorough research when tabling their bid 
and naively assumed that there would be a straightforward cultural transfer across to 
their favoured modus operandi. 
The Public-Private Partnership of National Savings 
Workers at DNS had been concerned about all of the Conservative's earlier Civil 
Service reforms, but the proposal of the Public-Private Partnership was different for 
two important reasons. Firstly, it directly affected the entire operational staff in the 
organisation, not just peripheral employees. Secondly, as both PFI and PPP were 
such new policies, workers were unsure as to what the policy actually entailed and 
how it would affect them in their day to day working lives. Many of the workers 
interviewed at Durham National Savings basically saw PPP as wholesale 
privatisation. 
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The staff were worried about PPP because they couldn't distinguish between 
Public-Private Partnership and full privatisation. I mean, to most of the 
people on the shop floor it was one and the same, and obviously they'd seen 
disastrous privatisations, so there was a fear factor there. We were suddenly 
moving from something that was so safe and secure [- the Civil Service], into 
the unknown ... you know, suddenly going to work for a company that had to 
consider how much money they spent and how much they made. And it did 
scare people. (Jim, union official, interview, 2002) 
Indeed, trade union Branch Reports from the time document the fears and 
anxieties of both the union and their members regarding job security, terms, 
conditions, pensions and employment status (CPSA, 1996 and 1997. PCS, 1998). 
This fear factor of workers facing privatisation is a common feature in all 
employment settings. O'Connell Davidson (1994) uncovered this with the 
privatisation of the water industry, as did MacKenzie (2000) regarding the 
deregulation of the telecommunications industry. Even pro-PFI academics, such as 
Hazell and Zubick (1995), acknowledge the uncertainty such changes bring and how 
this can adversely affect staff morale. 
The fear factor of the proposed PPP of National Savings did lead to feelings of 
anger and bitterness, which resulted in industrial action and a concerted campaign in 
opposition to this initiative - these actions will be examined in chapter six. The trade 
union officials and workers believed that the Agency Chief Executive, Peter Bareau, 
was responsible for driving forward the PPP. As discussed earlier in chapter two, 
New Public Management often involves the appointment of senior managers from 
the private sector to drive forward organisational culture change. Whilst some of the 
workers still regard PPP as full-scale privatisation, the union representatives were 
keen to point out the key differences between the two concepts, in that National 
Savings could never be fully privatised, but the delivery of the service could be 
outsourced to a private contractor. 
The fact is, at the end of the day, they [the government] didn't have an asset 
to sell, they had people and I think that's very important. You couldn't fully 
privatise National Savings because it's a debt. You couldn't fully privatise a 
Benefits Agency office, but you can outsource delivery, so like us, every 
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member of Benefits Agency staff could be employed by a private company. 
You could fully privatise a hospital or a school. (Steve, union official, 
interview, 2001) 
When National Savings did become a PPP, the workers interviewed felt that it 
did have serious implications in terms of job security and occupational identity, as it 
clearly marked the end of an era. Alan openly and frankly admitted that the PPP was 
"the worst thing to ever happen to National Savings." Along with everyone else 
interviewed, he felt that it was clear right from the outset of the PPP that the old 
notion of National Savings being a 'job for life' was over. MacKenzie (2000) also 
discovered this ending of long-term job security in his research on the re-
organisation of labour in the telecommunications industry, as did Hebson et al (2003) 
in their two case studies on 'partnerships' in the public sector. Moreover, Brown 
(1997) argues that job insecurity is now a common feature of the labour market; as 
does Klein (2000: chs. 10 and 11 ), as the growth of outsourcing work has resulted in 
an increasingly fragile new employment relationship. 
For many workers at National Savings, their occupational identity and cultural 
values lay in the status of being a civil servant; indeed part of the union's campaign 
was to retain this status (CPSA, 1997). Many workers spoke of this loss of identity 
post-PPP, in that they no longer knew what to classify themselves as. 
For a lot of us, I think it is part of our culture, we would still like to be civil 
servants, that's part of our status. I don't like the fact that I'm no longer a 
civil servant. (Angela, worker, interview, 2001) 
There is always uncertainty and trepidation with major organisational changes, 
yet such fears were exacerbated when the PPP was initially proposed as both the 
unions and workers were unsure as to its possible implications. The union Branch 
Report of 1997 talks of that fear that after the PPP, National Savings could become a 
massive call centre (CPSA, 1997). This was one of a list of fears that the workers 
interviewed expressed, others being that staffing levels could be cut in half, with 
compulsory redundancy programmes, reductions in annual leave and the abolition of 
flexi-time. 
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Just as with privatisations in the past, huge multinational corporations are 
invading and monopolising markets, and this is well documented in the literature 
(O'Connell Davidson, 1994. Anthony and Reed, 1995. Klein, 2000: ch. 9. Grimshaw 
et al, 2002). In the case of Civil Service, these new PPP contracts are dominated by 
two global corporations - Siemens Business Services and Electronic Data Systems 
(EDS). SBS is a division of Siemens AG and, as Siemens are a diversified business, 
they specifically set up this subdivision to penetrate new outsourcing markets. 
Hence, both EDS and SBS were desperate to win the Public-Private Partnership 
contract for National Savings as it was the biggest and, therefore, most prestigious 
Civil Service outsourcing deal. Furthermore, the National Audit Office Report 
clearly states that this deal was a strategic purchase by SBS (NAO, 2003: 13). 
Siemens [AG] have got a wing called Siemens Business Services that has 
been set up specifically to get into the business process and outsourcing 
market. And that's why we [National Savings] were important, because they 
didn't have anything substantial prior to this [PPP] deal. (Steve, union official, 
interview, 2001) 
In the past, multinational corporations have put pressure on governments to 
open up more of the public sector to private competition (Levie, 1983. Whitfield and 
Hall, 1983). This pressure is intensifying under globalisation through the World 
Trade Organisation, as new areas of the public sector are currently being outsourced 
(Pollock and Price, 2000). Indeed, any European outsourcings must now be open to 
tenders through the Office Journal of the European Community (OJEC). 
There's a European Directive which says if public sector contracts are going 
to be open to competition, then they have to be advertised across the whole of 
the European Union. And the OJEC is the Office Journal of the European 
Community, and that is a Journal which carries every public sector contract 
across Europe. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
There were originally four private sector companies bidding for the Public-
Private Partnership contract at National Savings, being: EDS, SBS, ITS and Equip 
(CPSA, 1997). Yet because of the excessive costs involved in being able to bid for 
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such outsourcing work, only a handful of huge companies control the market 
(Grimshaw et al, 2002). The NAO Report states that the two preferred bidders for 
the contract were SBS and EDS. The final bid made by SBS was £158 million less 
than the Public Sector Comparator. SBS pledged to reduce the cost of running the 
business and planned to make their 8.7% financial return from the contract in the 
long-term (NAO, 2003: 10). The bids from the two companies were close in terms 
of overall cost, estimates of staffing numbers required to run the operational service 
and the creation of Third Party Business. The final bid made by SBS was £635 
million, which was £57 million less than the £692 million bid by EDS (NAO, 2003: 
13). SBS were also prepared to reduce staff numbers more quickly than EDS 
through voluntary redundancy (NAO, 2003: 13) and employ less managers to run the 
account (NAO, 2003: 22). Furthermore, SBS accepted more risks in re-engineering 
business processes (NAO, 2003: 2) and were also prepared to take on the added risk 
of the Post Office Counters Automation Project; whereas EDS were to charge an 
extra £60 million for this task (NAO, 2003: 13). All of the risks and the service 
delivery are guaranteed by Siemens AG, the parent company, to the tune of £250 
million (NAO, 2003: 22). 
It is clear from the details in the NAO Report of the awarding of the contract 
that SBS were desperate to move into this new outsourcing market. This was, and 
still is, the biggest business process outsourcing contract that SBS has, not just in the 
UK, but internationally (NAO, 2003: 14 and 22). Hence, the final bidder stage 
became, what one union official described as, a "beauty contest" between SBS and 
EDS, and it got to the point where SBS were prepared to take on more risks to win 
the contract. Yet this soon had dire consequences for the company only a few years 
into the biggest Civil Service outsourcing contract. 
Logan et al (2004) refer to the reputation of outsourcing companies and how this 
can affect worker attitudes to major change programmes. During the 'preferred 
bidder' stage of the PPP process, there were rumours spreading through the office 
grapevine, particularly regarding the reputation of EDS, which further heightened 
worker tension and anxiety. 
We'd heard so many horror stories, especially about EDS! I mean, Siemens 
Business Services were very much the dark horse. Like, the guy who runs 
EDS is that real right-winger from America, Ross Perot... he'd inspect 
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people's socks and anybody that had brightly coloured socks or ties got 
suspended, you know, it was all daft stories like that. (Doreen, worker, 
interview, 2003) 
That was one of the questions we [the union] asked EDS when we met them 
(laughs), "Can we have a beard? Can we have an affair with our 
colleagues?" Because Mr. Perot sacks you for having a beard and having an 
affair with your colleagues. And if you had an affair with a colleague with a 
beard, I presume you'd be shot (laughs)! (Steve, union official, interview, 
2001) 
On a more serious note, the trade union representatives did not have any access to 
information regarding the awarding of the PPP contract at National Savings, this was 
all 'commercial/ in confidence'. However, in their bid, EDS proposed closing the 
Millbumgate site in Durham and moving the whole operation to Peterlee. This 
would have been a very unpopular decision with staff, as it would not only result in 
major upheaval, but many workers base other aspects of their lives around 
commuting to Durham City Centre every day during the working week. 
It got down to a beauty contest between EDS and SBS. I presume their 
[SBS's] proposal was cheaper and seemed to be more effective. I don't know, 
the union wasn't privy to that information, it was 'commercial/ in 
confidence.' I think there may have been some political pressure to go with 
SBS, especially from Gerry Steinberg [MP] from a Durham perspective, 
because EDS had made it plain that they were going to close down the 
operation at Durham and move to Peterlee. (Chris, union official, interview, 
2002) 
Prior to transfer, both EDS and SBS gave presentations to the staff at National 
Savings outlining their plans. Yet as Alan explains, there was a feeling amongst the 
staff of resignation because they had no influence over the key decisions regarding 
the PPP and, as will be analysed in chapter six, the government had ignored the 
union's campaign from the outset. 
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SBS and EDS gave us [the staff] their little presentations about their company 
and future policies. But I didn't see the point because we didn't have any 
choice in what was going to happen or any say in the outcome. (Alan, worker, 
interview, 2003) 
The Start of the Public-Private Partnership - 'The Honeymoon 
Period' 
In April1999, all National Savings workers had their employment transferred over to 
SBS and their existing Civil Service terms and conditions were protected under the 
Transfer of Undertaking (Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE). However, 
there are potential problems as TUPE does not cover pensions and once workers are 
transferred over to a private company, that contractor can then re-negotiate terms and 
conditions at any time. This can lead to complications and the imposition of inferior 
terms and conditions, as other researchers on 'partnerships' have uncovered 
(Grimshaw et al, 2002. Hebson et al, 2003). Therefore, for the unions this can be a 
representational minefield. The 'Siemens Saver Plus Plan' offered by SBS was 
broadly comparable to the Civil Service pension scheme, and staff were free to 
decide which scheme to opt for after receiving financial advice from Siemens and 
representatives from the government's Actuaries Department (PCS, 1998). 
Logan et al (2004) talk of a 'grace period' during the start of outsourcings where 
managers should try to win the support of new employees. Indeed, everyone 
interviewed stated that there had been little noticeable change at the start of the PPP, 
and many referred to this as a 'honeymoon period'. Moreover, this was very much a 
settling in period for SBS as they tried to establish themselves, assess the situation 
and plan their change programme. Furthermore, the pay deal for 1999 of 4.3% was 
rather generous and negotiated much quicker than pay previously had been under 
Agency Status (PCS, 1999a). The union also gained the added concession of SBS 
funding the 25 year long-service awards, which civil servants had been entitled to 
prior to part-privatisation. 
The umon also got SBS to extend the Siemens long-service scheme -
although we'd [National Savings' ex- civil servants] only been in there, 
probably for three months - to cover our members. And they all got 
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hundreds of quid's worth of vouchers for 25 years service at National Savings, 
and Siemens paid for it. (Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
As differentiation theorists argue, attempting to transform the culture of an 
organisation is a difficult, time-consuming and continually negotiated process (Pollitt, 
1990. Elsmore, 2001. Alvesson, 2002). This is particularly the case at National 
Savings, as it is a 'brownfield site' with long-established cultures and traditions. 
Therefore, attempting to change the staffs' deep-rooted norms and values, now that 
the organisation is a PPP where the private 'partner' has differing aims and motives, 
was always going to be fraught with tensions and complications. The trade union 
Branch Report from 1999 discusses the difficulties of both SBS and the staff having 
to adapt to new cultures and ways of working together (PCS, 1999a). These 
problems were compounded as SBS were not used to dealing with trade unions, 
especially such a strong union with 92% membership. Moreover, the union reps 
argue that in some respects National Savings took over SBS, as the company 
quadrupled its total number of employees in one PPP transfer. 
The PPP was quite strange because we [National Savings] were took over by 
SBS, but in one sense we took over SBS as an employee-base, because they 
only had about 800 or 900 staff nationwide and they then took 4, 000 staff on 
from National Savings. I think SBS found this situation difficult because 
they thought it would be cultural transfer straight across, but that didn't really 
happen. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
Once SBS had taken over the running of the National Savings Account, there 
were a series of presentations to staff about how their working lives would change 
for the better under PPP. Again, Logan et al (2004) encourage management to be 
persuasive about the benefits of organisational culture change. SBS stressed that 
there would be more opportunities for staff in terms of Third Party Business and 
more promotions under Open Vacancy Advertising - these policies will be analysed 
in chapter five. As Kevin explains below, many workers began to think that SBS 
could offer them chances to improve their working lives, especially after they had 
become disgruntled with the lack of opportunities in the Civil Service. 
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Staff morale was low at the time of the PPP, but paradoxically when SBS 
came in and gave it the glossy road show and said, "This is what we can do 
and these are the sort of benefits that you might get out of it." There was 
almost an underlying feeling from staff of, "Right the decision's been made, 
let's just get on with it and let's see some change happen." I think a lot of 
staff were getting quite cynical about what had happened in the Civil Service 
anyway, and these were new faces with fresh ideas. (Kevin, worker, interview, 
2002) 
However, as O'Connell Davidson (1994) argues, staff can be sceptical of 
management claims post-privatisation. This soon proved to be the case at National 
Savings after SBS had raised expectations under what one worker describes as "a 
blaze of fire", which later resulted in bitter disappointment when they failed to 
deliver. 
SBS came in with rose-coloured glasses, "We're going to be the best. We're 
going to bring jobs in, we're going to do this, we're going to do that." At 
first you thought, is this going to be a change for National Savings? Is this 
going to be a change for the better? They said they were going to bring in 
Third Party Business from here, there and everywhere. You heard all of these 
things, but nothing ever seemed to materialise. That was probably in April 
[1999] when they came in with a blaze of fire, "We're going to do this, we're 
going to do that, we're going to do the other." And then, in October/ 
November [1999], "Oh, there's going to be voluntary redundancies." And 
that was when I thought, "Yeah, this is my time to make a move." (Jason, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
The Limited Early Successes of the 'Partnership' 
In 20011 2002 SBS saved the tax payer £176 million through cost reductions at 
National Savings, which beat the original target of £150 million (NAO, 2003: 2). 
SBS also increased productivity, as 50 million transactions are still dealt with at 
National Savings per year, but they are now processed by less than 2, 000 staff, as 
opposed to the 4, 100 originally employed at the start of the contract (NAO, 2003: 8). 
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New investment by SBS has resulted in the modernisation and streamlining of the 
organisation with the movement to automated and more consistent processes, which 
will result in a lower cost operation (NAO, 2003: 7- 8). For instance, at the start of 
PPP all three sites were different in that they all administered their own specific 
products and customers could only enquire about products at particular offices. Now 
enquiries on any product can be dealt with much more flexibly by all National 
Savings offices. Also, SBS now have customer profiles so that they can identify the 
holdings of each customer and target sales to further improve cost effectiveness 
(NAO, 2003: 2 and 8). In February 2002, National Savings launched its new 
corporate identity as National Savings and Investments, to mirror the modernisation 
of the business and its new customer focus (NAO, 2003: 10. NS&I, 2003). Despite 
some media criticism, the £3 million cost of this re-branding exercise was absorbed 
by the National Savings budget (NAO, 2003: 10). Both the use of customer profiling 
and the new title and identity of the organisation, signal attempts to move towards a 
corporate culture. SBS have had some successes with the creation of new Third 
Party Business, developing a new benchmarked call centre and increasing production, 
without the need for compulsory redundancies (NAO, 2003: 2); although there have 
been extensive 'voluntary' redundancies both prior to and after the PPP. The details 
of these changes will be analysed later in this chapter, and I want to go on to argue 
that improvements in productivity and cost effectiveness have come at a cost of 
increasing work intensification and pressure throughout the organisation. 
Major Problems with the 'Partnership' - Enter: The New SBS 
Senior Management Team 
Although there were some successes for SBS at the start of the PPP contract at 
National Savings, several of the workers and union officials interviewed all 
emphasised the relentless change programmes introduced by SBS; this is also 
documented in successive union Branch Reports (PCS, 1999a, 2000 and 2001a). 
However, such changes were not as effective as the contract stipulated, as SBS did 
not reduce the costs of running National Savings as quickly as planned (NAO, 2003: 
2), and were spending more on the maintenance of the three sites than originally 
anticipated due to health and safety regulations (NAO, 2003: 3 and 14). Moreover, 
SBS failed to create the new Third Party Business they had predicted in their original 
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bid, and this had a subsequent knock on effect because they were then unable to 
reduce the headcount by transferring staff to new work (NAO, 2003: 3). Hence, due 
to the escalating costs incurred during the first 2 - 3 years of the contract, a new SBS 
senior management team were appointed (NAO, 2003: 2 and 23). However, a more 
fundamental problem lies at the heart of the PPP philosophy when dealing with 
organisational culture change, and that is the inherently ideologically opposed 
agendas of the two 'partners'. 
The PPP of National Savings involves a profound cultural transformation, and 
although the organisation had been subject to commercialisation with peripheral 
areas privatised, it was still regarded by the staff as a public sector institution, as 
opposed to a business. 
To be honest with you, in the past I don't think anybody would have ever 
thought of National Savings as 'a business'. We were civil servants, and we 
did what civil servants do. (David, worker, interview, 2002) 
During the 'honeymoon period' at the start of the PPP, nearly all of the 
interviewees spoke of how SBS had employed numerous management consultants to 
help develop their agenda of change. As mentioned in chapter three, management 
consultants were used at National Savings when the organisation was part of the 
Civil Service. However, what is new is the increasing use of consultants by SBS in 
order to transform the organisational culture and make a profitable return on the deal. 
SBS have had thousands of management consultants in to assess their change 
programme. Well then, so did the Civil Service, there's nothing new in that, 
it's just the scale of it, it's gone up massively. (Steve, union official, 
interview, 2001) 
Right at the start of the contract SBS brought in their own management team to 
run the NS&I Account, all of whom were from a range of outside industries and, as 
is the norm in the private sector, were employed on individual contracts. Several of 
the interviewees, both union officials and workers, felt that this was a deliberate and 
conscious decision to change the organisational culture, as even though these new 
SBS managers were more costly to employ, they could be used to culturally cleanse 
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the old Civil Service traditions. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the vast 
majority of former Civil Service managers left Durham National Savings on 
'voluntary' redundancy, but they differed to new SBS managers in that they were 
career civil servants on standard terms and conditions of employment. The 
introduction of SBS managers and specialists from the private sector, working 
alongside ex-civil servants who remained on standard terms and conditions, resulted 
in the creation of a two-tier workforce, which will be analysed in chapter five. 
The imposition of a new private sector management team to run NS&I was 
always going to create friction, particularly with the organisation having a long-
established culture where workers used to regard themselves as having a 'job for life'. 
As has previously been mentioned, all employees have worked at Durham National 
Savings for a minimum of 15 years and this is exemplified in the 2000 PCS Branch 
Report, where 1 in 1 0 trade union members received their 25 year union membership 
awards (PCS, 2000). In the quote below, David talks of this friction between new 
SBS employees and ex-civil servants, who are having difficulty coping with SBS's 
rapid programme of change. 
What workers [at National Savings] are now getting used to, which was a real 
shock at first, was how quickly it changes [post-PPP]. You spoke to people 
who would say, "Oh, I've worked for SBS for ages and ages" and it turned 
out it was three years, because SBS, as a company, expect that type of 
turnover. Whereas, I speak to people who are consultants and want to have a 
look at the new 'Imaging Kit', and they'll say, "How long have you worked 
here?'' And I'll say, "Oh, 18 years." And they look at you like you're crazy! 
I'll say, "Go and talk to him over there, he's got 35 years in!" And they can't 
believe that people have worked here that long. (David, worker, interview, 
2002) 
The NAO Report states that there are a series of problems facing Siemens 
Business Services on this Public-Private Partnership deal. One of which is that they 
did not understand the challenge and scale of the business transformation, 
particularly in the case of IT - which will be discussed later in this chapter - where 
National Savings' processes are detailed and complex (NAO, 2003: 3 and 14). 
Moreover, senior union officials claim that during contract negotiations SBS tried to 
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gain control of National Savings' business policy, product design and pricing -
which the Treasury remain in charge of - as they misunderstood the nature of the 
organisation and thought that it was a typical High Street bank, rather than the a 
public service. Therefore, through the acquisition of these controls, SBS assumed 
that they would then be able to significantly increase their profit margin by 
encouraging more NS&I business. 
SBS is like any private organisation and doesn't understand what National 
Savings is about. They think it is a bank, they think that if they can convince 
government to produce more [NS&I] products, they can get more transactions 
and get more money. The problem is National Savings is not a bank, 
National Savings is a borrowing organisation for the government and, 
therefore, the government do not want to borrow their own products. (Steve, 
union official, interview, 2002) 
The National Audit Report emphasises that the contract is more challenging than 
SBS originally anticipated (NAO, 2003: 3). This certainly appears to be true if SBS 
did not understand the nature of the organisation and simply thought that it would be 
easy pickings. Logan et al (2004) argue that in the private sector, outsourcings can 
be used to off-load problematic areas. This also appears to be the case in the public 
sector, where due to a lack of long-term government investment National Savings 
had become a stagnating public sector organisation. Indeed, 'New' Labour do stress 
that there are no easy PPP/ PFI deals and that the risk is completely transferred over 
to the private sector 'partner' (HM Treasury, 2000: 11 - 12). The NAO Report goes 
onto criticise SBS's initial running of the account in detail, stating that they 
underestimated the scale and complexity of the overall task, together with the 
management resources required to transform the organisation (NAO, 2003: 22). 
Again it is important to note that during the bidding stage, SBS proposed to run the 
account with fewer managers than EDS. Grimshaw et al (2002) argue that in PPP/ 
PFI deals, private sector managers are at an advantage as they are more likely to have 
greater experience of market-based contracting. However, this is not the case at 
National Savings as this is an entirely different operation, and senior union officials 
claim that all private companies would fail to understand the nature and ethos of the 
organisation. Indeed, the NAO Report states that instead of SBS employing a large 
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number of expensive management consultants at the start of the contract, they should 
have made better use of existing National Savings staff and their tacit knowledge 
(NAO, 2003: 22); a point which is reiterated in the worker interview quote below. 
I really think a lot of things were underestimated by SBS, such as, the cost of 
changing over IT systems and the redundancy schemes. A lot of money was 
wasted on accountants and drafting people in from outside, without saying, "I 
told you so!", we had people who could have come up with exactly the same 
answer who were already working here. So, basically there was an awful lot 
of waste. I would say that the main reason for SBS's failures is just 
downright bad management. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
As mentioned earlier, SBS brought in their own external managers to run the 
account from the outset, but they were not experienced in managing an organisation 
such as National Savings (NAO, 2003: 22). Furthermore, the union rep quoted below 
claims that SBS do not understand the nature, nor do they appreciate the culture, of 
the organisation. 
Well, it's quite clear that the SBS management team don't know what they're 
dealing with. There have been a lot of mistakes made in this [PPP] transition 
programme. SBS don't understand the organisation and they certainly don't 
understand the culture ofthe staff. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
It appears that SBS did not fully understand the history and traditions of National 
Savings. Instead, they planned their modernisation programme without fully taking 
on board the difficulties and complexities involved in organisational culture change. 
SBS have invested heavily in the modernisation of National Savings with the 
aim of achieving their financial return in the long-term. However, the National Audit 
Report states that Siemens AG senior management were not informed by SBS of the 
escalating costs at an early stage of the PPP project (NAO, 2003: 20). From this 
information it appears that there were major financial problems from the beginning 
of the deal, and SBS presumably did not want to alert the parep.t company and hoped 
to ride out the storm. However, from as early as February 2001, only 22 months into 
this 10 year PPP contract, NS&I were aware of the spiralling costs incurred by SBS. 
102 
Yet, SBS continued to forecast a profit by hoping to make efficiency savings (NAO, 
2003: 20). By April 2001 Siemens AG became actively involved at NS&I and sent 
in their own Internal Audit Team to assess the situation, as they were concerned 
about the continual fall in profits predicted by SBS (NAO, 2003: 22). The National 
Audit Report states that Siemens AG had to take action, otherwise SBS were going 
to make potentially significant losses on the contract. Siemens AG then took a much 
more hands-on role; they changed their management practices with tighter financial 
sign-off procedures, together with set monetary targets for SBS to achieve for each 
year of the PPP deal (NAO, 2003: 22). At the end of2001 Siemens AG attempted to 
tum the situation around and brought in a new senior management team, 
predominantly from within their own organisation, to run the PPP contract at 
National Savings who were "known deliverers of change" (quoted in NAO, 2003: 3) 
and "Siemens people" (quoted in NAO, 2003: 22). 
This change of management teams so early into the PPP contract indicates a 
different attitude on the part of private sector management, as they can be much more 
ruthless in their quest for efficiencies and profitability. I can recall a telephone 
conversation I had towards the end of 2001 with one of the union reps, who told me 
that "heads had rolled" and that SBS had informed staff that they were facing 
financial difficulties on this outsourcing. Indeed in the quote below, a union rep 
explains that it had become obvious to both the union and members that SBS were 
encountering financial problems, as Siemens AG had deployed auditors to check the 
accounts and then replaced the original SBS management team with Siemens 
'troubleshooters'. 
If you take the view that management changes tell you something, and if you 
see everybody from the Managing Director down to the Account Director and 
the Human Resources Director taken out in a six month period and replaced 
by people who have been used to troubleshoot other Siemens businesses that 
are in trouble, then you draw the conclusion they've been brought in for a 
reason. If you see German accountants crawling all over the place, from 
[Siemens AG] Munich Headquarters, and big changes taking place after 
they've been in, then you draw the conclusion that something is not quite 
right. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
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It soon became public knowledge at Durham National Savings that there had 
been major managerial changes at an early stage in the PPP contract; this fact also 
received substantial coverage in the PCS Branch Annual Report of 2001 (PCS, 
2001a). Moreover, some of the union officials and workers interviewed claimed that 
SBS changed managers on a frequent basis. Many spoke of their concerns that SBS 
were bringing in managers to run National Savings who did not have a background 
in finance or accounting. However, this practice was also evident in the Civil 
Service under New Public Management, where senior managers from various private 
sector backgrounds were appointed as Chief Executives of newly established 
Agencies to help facilitate culture change (Fairbrother, 1994: ch. 3. Pilkington, 1999: 
ch. 7). The drafting in of external managers as executors of rapid change 
programmes also has parallels with other industries, for instance, in British Leyland 
(Willman and Winch, 1985), in British Rail prior to privatisation (Gourvish, 2002: ch. 
8), and most notably, with the appointment of Ian MacGregor to run the National 
Coal Board, whose background was of 'macho management' in the steel industry 
(Beynon, 1985. Beynon and McMylor, 1985). In the quote below, Kevin mentions 
this arrival of new SBS managers from different sectors of industry; and their plans 
on the use of 'leaner' working methods will be analysed in chapter five. 
It is common knowledge that the PPP contract is not going according to plan. 
The original SBS management team were replaced by a new team of 
managers who were brought in to tum the contact around. They came from 
the Siemens Automotive side, so they're trying to put production line 
techniques into the office environment. (Kevin, worker, interview, 2003) 
This arrival of the new SBS management team signalled an abrupt end to the 
'honeymoon period'. The veneer of SBS keeping everyone on board was soon 
removed and workers were only too aware of this. In the quote below, Angela 
speaks of the worries and anxieties of many concerning these recent changes and the 
fear that there would be increasing stress and pressure on all employees at NS&I. 
I thought working life would get a lot harder after PPP. Although there was 
this settling in period and you really couldn't tell any difference at first. I 
think SBS wanted to take the workforce with them with the 'Mr. Nice Guy' 
104 
approach, but now you've got the feeling that the 'bad guys' are coming in 
and really taking over. (Angela, worker, interview, 2001) 
The National Audit Report outlines a number of 'lessons learned', one of which 
is that private sector 'partners' must recognise the challenges they face when taking 
on complex PFI/ PPP contracts where they have to deliver to tight timescales (NAO, 
2003: 5). Not only have Siemens AG had to intervene to assist SBS, but NS&I have 
also had to "take remedial action" in order that this 'partnership' can achieve its 
original aims and objectives (quoted in NAO, 2003: 23). This resulted in the re-
alignment of the contract in December 2001, where NS&I, Siemens AG and SBS all 
agreed to enhance the clarity of the contract, with the aim of running a low cost 
operation at National Savings (NAO, 2003: 26). However, this was not a re-
negotiation of the deal, and the risk of running the operation remains with SBS 
(NAO, 2003: 23 and 26). Despite these difficulties, NS&I have not increased the 
unitary fee paid to SBS, which was agreed in the original PPP deal (NAO, 2003: 4 
and 23). 
The National Audit Report states that due to SBS being unable to transform the 
NS&I business as quickly as planned, they are failing to meet target deadlines and 
incurring more capital expenditure. Therefore, SBS are unlikely to make the 
financial returns they originally anticipated (NAO, 2003: 3). Indeed, by May 2002, 
due to rising costs, employing more staff, creating less Third Party Business and 
spending more money on site maintenance, the report states that the cumulative 
effect has "had a significant impact on SBS's ability to make its projected return of 
8.7%, and it is more likely to make a loss" (quoted in NAO, 2003: 13). The report 
goes on to say that the only way that SBS are likely to make any profit at all is 
through the option to extend the contract from 10 to 15 years (NAO, 2003: 22 and 
27). Hence, "the onus is on SBS to improve its loss making position" (quoted in 
NAO, 2003: 27); and I will go on to argue that this has placed huge pressure on staff 
in a desperate attempt to turn the contract around. 
It is apparent that SBS did not do their homework thoroughly before tabling 
their PPP bid. Yet the pressure now falls on those on the shop floor to make this a 
profitable venture, even though the majority were against PP.P from the outset. 
Hebson et al (2003) in their research on similar 'partnerships' found that there is a 
distinct lack of ex-public sector worker identity with private contractors, because 
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workers did not want to be outsourced, even though they were disenchanted with 
working life in the public sector. This is the same scenario at DNS&I, where 
dissatisfied civil servants did not want to be contracted out and cannot identify with a 
private sector organisation who have entirely different aims and objectives. 
SBS have brought in a new management team partly because of the mistakes 
they've made on the contract and partly because of the financial pressures 
that they're now facing. Although one has contributed to the other, because if 
you make an arse of it, it costs you more money, so they've added to their 
problems. The new SBS management team appear to be remote because they 
are different, their agenda is different, their culture is different, their attitude 
is different and their understanding is little. They are remote to the staff and, 
in fact, the staff see them as an enemy, they don't relate to them at all. (Steve, 
union official, interview, 2002) 
Under PPP, it was inevitable that there were going to be tensions and contradictions 
now that a private sector 'partner' was running operations and attempting to 
transform the organisational culture. 
With the imposition of a new management team by Siemens AG to run the 
account, there was a shift in focus to introduce more widespread changes with a 
renewed stress on running the organisation as a business. Workers interviewed at 
DNS&I did notice a distinct shift in management styles, with the emphasis being 
very much on profitability. 
These days SBS management don't seem to be staff orientated, you know, 
they're driven by profit. For the first couple of years they never mentioned 
profit, but lately they've started introducing that into their reasoning. (Colin, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
Hebson et al (2003) write about the tensions and contradictions over new lines 
of accountability in PPP/ PFI deals, as private sector company loyalties are first and 
foremost to their shareholders. Workers intervieweq also raised this issue of no:w 
being accountable to Siemens AG shareholders, especially after SBS had changed 
management teams. This is radically different to how National Savings operated 
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under the Civil Service and many workers were cynical of SBS's emphasis on 
improving profitability and cost cutting. 
You're made very much aware now that you are answerable to [Siemens] 
shareholders and that it's money-driven, you know, it is all 'business-needs' 
these days. (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
SBS now emphasise profits all of the time, in management directives 
spending is reduced, budgets are reduced, training is reduced, travel budgets, 
you know ... there's a squeeze on everything. (Doreen, worker, interview, 
2003) 
In their research on outsourcing between private sector organisations, Logan et 
al (2004) talk of the problems for managers in gaining the loyalty of new employees. 
This is particularly problematic in PPP deals between two distinctive sectors, as SBS 
are now under huge financial pressure to deliver change and become profitable. The 
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road shows to staff entitled 'Building Tomorrow Today' (PCS, 2001a). As discussed 
in chapter two, Salaman (1997) and Kunda (2003) argue that such events involve 
cultural engineering and are aimed at winning the hearts and minds of employees. In 
these seminars SBS announced that the NS&I Account was not meeting the financial 
targets they had originally anticipated and that as a consequence, there was the 
possibility that there could be a pay freeze in areas of the Siemens business which 
were not profitable (PCS, 2001a). Obviously the union raised concerns about this 
proposal, but this also has serious implications for SBS in their quest to gain the 
loyalty and trust of the workforce, particularly as the majority of staff were opposed 
to PPP from the outset and are now told that they may not receive a pay rise because 
SBS made major errors when tabling their bid. Workers felt even more disappointed 
after the initial promises SBS made regarding new opportunities in terms of quality 
Third Party Business and personal development, only to be told four years into the 
PPP deal that SBS were facing severe problems (PCS, 2001a). 
In the quote below, a worker talks of the demoralising effect that these SBS road 
shows have had on staff morale. He claims that the efforts of staff are not fully 
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appreciated by SBS managers, and that mounting workplace pressure on productivity 
and efficiencies is reaching intolerable levels. 
Over the last few years we've had account road shows, where senior SBS 
managers have actually visited the Glasgow, Blackpool and Durham sites. 
They have actually stood up in front of an audience and talked people through 
how the account has progressed, why it lost so much money to start off with 
and where they hope to be in a year or so's time. They have gone into quite a 
lot of detail on that. But the problem is that SBS haven't inspired a lot of 
confidence in the fact that people already know that they're worked hard and 
there's very much a feeling that we're going to have to work even harder, as 
SBS keep talking about wanting more efficiencies and more savings. That is 
the undermining effect that this has on staff morale, you can tell the staff 
they're doing a great job, you can tell them, "Well done, you've done really 
well to get us where we are now." And they then turn around and say, "But, 
we want even more off you." And a lot of people can't give any more than 
they do now. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
In the interview quote below, a union rep also talks of how SBS came into 
National Savings with, to use Jason's quote "a blaze of fire", making numerous 
promises, but then failed to deliver. He goes on to discuss how the new SBS 
management team are attempting to impose an American 'macho management' 
culture at NS&I, which is different to the European, more co-operative, management 
style of Siemens AG. 
SBS came in here telling everybody what a wonderful world they would 
bring in, the job opportunities, the career plans and what better managers they 
were. But they didn't realise that they were taking on office-factories and 
they've never run factories before. The average length of service here is 17 
years, you know, these are people who are set in their ways. SBS think they 
can bring that gung-ho culture of the American board room in here and ... you 
know, it isn't even German Siemens [AG] culture, beC(lUSe when our union 
reps go to meetings in Germany, people are totally different ... they're more 
relaxed. Whereas this lot [SBS] have actually got more of an American 
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management culture, which they're trying to bring into the workplace, but 
you can't treat it like that. Just think about what the word 'culture' means, it 
grows, you can't impose it, and you certainly can't impose it reluctantly. 
(Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
Similarly, differentiation theorists argue that organisational culture change cannot be 
imposed on a workforce. Culture is historical and continually evolving, and 
managerial attempts at enforcing change are less likely to be successful at a deeper 
level (Siehl, 1985. E. Wilson, 1993). Moreover, as there is a long-established 
workforce at National Savings, attempts to change embedded cultural practices were 
always going to take a significant amount of time and effort. 
The fear and uncertainty that were a direct result of numerous culture change 
initiatives, led to many workers opting to leave the organisation via 'voluntary' 
redundancy. I will now examine the redundancy exercises that have taken place at 
National Savings. 
'Voluntary' Redundancy Exercises both Before and After the 
Public-Private Partnership 
A core theme of the thesis is the ending of the notion of National Savings being a 
'job for life', and it is widely documented that over the last 20 years the world of 
work has undergone huge transitions with constant change initiatives, widespread job 
insecurity and redundancy programmes (Fowler, 1993. Burke and Cooper, 2000. 
Turnbull and Wass, 2000). Moreover, Heery and Salmon (2000) in their 'Insecurity 
Thesis' argue that there is growing job insecurity for those who work in occupations 
which were previously regarded as protected sectors, for example, the public services 
and Civil Service. Furthermore, those relatively high up the hierarchy, such as, 
middle managers who used to have safe and secure jobs, are now in precarious 
positions of employment. The 'voluntary' redundancy (VR) programmes at National 
Savings, together with restructuring initiatives, have effectively resulted in the 
delayering of several managerial grades. 
Business Process Re-engineering began at National Savings in the mid-1990s, to 
rationalise and modernise the organisation through investment in new IT systems 
(CPSA, 1996 and 1997). Proponents claim that BPR poses a set of radical questions 
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to re-evaluate the entire role of organisations (Johansson et al, 1993: ch. 2. Hammer 
and Champy, 1995). IT plays a crucial role in conjunction with BPR in the re-design 
of jobs, which will eliminate waste, reduce costs and increase profits (Johansson et al, 
1993: ch. 1. Hammer and Champy, 1995. Peppard and Rowland, 1995: ch. 1). 
Advocates of BPR argue that it can also be applied to the public sector (Hammer and 
Champy, 1995. Peppard and Rowland, 1995: ch. 2), and that by cutting out 
unnecessary processes, it results in worker empowerment and job enlargement 
(Hammer and Champy, 1995: ch. 4. Peppard and Rowland, 1995: ch. 4). Hammer 
and Champy (1995) argue that BPR is about re-organising, not eliminating, jobs; but 
do acknowledge that it can result in job delayering, particularly amongst middle 
management grades. 
The trade union expressed concerns over the implications that the BPR 
programme could have on both the number and quality of jobs at National Savings 
(CPSA, 1996 and 1997). Indeed, Grey and Mitev (1995) have attacked the 
fundamental claims of BPR, arguing that far from it starting from a radical and fresh 
standpoint with no assumptions, it is in fact highly ideological as it is a top - down 
management philosophy which completely embraces capitalist values of increasing 
production through the use of IT. They argue that it is inevitable that BPR will 
create redundancies through the delayering of jobs, resulting in an intensification of 
work for those who survive such programmes. Furthermore, Grey and Mitev cite the 
example of the banking industry where the implementation of BPR directly resulted 
in mass redundancies, despite the banks already making healthy profits. Harrington 
et al ( 1998) conducted research on the introduction of BPR in the Contributions 
Agency with the development of new IT processes, and found that BPR also led to 
big staff reductions. 
Prior to the start of the 'voluntary' redundancy programmes at National Savings, 
there were efforts to cut staff numbers through natural wastage, due to the 
Conservative's attempts to reduce the overall size of the Civil Service and its 
decreasing use of the organisation for government funding. It is well documented in 
the redundancy literature that the use of natural wastage through recruitment freezes 
and allowing staff to leave via retirement or on health grounds, and purposively not 
replacing those who depart, is a painless and cheap method of cutting staffmg levels, 
which is widely accepted by managers, trade unions and workers (Kemp et al, 1981. 
Wood and Dey, 1983. Martin and Wallace, 1984. Fowler, 1993). This policy was 
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used throughout National Savings as there had been no recruitment from the late 
1980s onwards and this recruitment freeze had to have time to take effect to reduce 
staff numbers. Other methods to cut the staff surplus were a ban on overtime and the 
introduction of part-time working, and the vast majority of part-time employees at 
National Savings are women with child care responsibilities. The interview quote 
below contextualises the employment situation at Durham National Savings prior to 
the 'voluntary' redundancy initiatives, in light of the wider regional economy. 
People just didn't leave [Durham National Savings] before the voluntary 
redundancy programmes started. It was perceived to be a good secure job, 
especially in this area, you know, with all the unemployment. (Angela, 
worker, interview, 2001) 
It is also documented in the literature that rumours of redundancies can start on 
the workplace grapevine (Kemp et al, 1981. Wood and Dey, 1983: ch. 3). This also 
occurred at Durham National Savings and it became apparent to workers that the 
organisation was stagnating, with the possibility of major repercussions. 
Management just weren't promoting anybody at the time ... it was the start of 
the run down of the staff. It was probably the mid- '90s when you started 
hearing the rumours on the office grapevine of, "There's going to be 
redundancies" or, "We're going to be privatised." People were just retiring, 
they weren't bringing anybody new in, so obviously you could see that the 
staff numbers were starting to drift off. (Jason, worker, interview, 2003) 
The 'voluntary' redundancy programmes at National Savings started before the 
PPP, after an extensive period of labour retrenchment. Redundancies took place 
through BPR with the movement from labour intensive work systems towards 
computerisation, creating a staffing surplus. Senior union officials claimed that 
redundancies also started as a direct result of government spending restrictions in the 
Civil Service. 
Redundancies started before privatisation and were due to the government's 
financial controls, because National Savings management came to the unions 
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and absolutely honestly admitted that their cash limit would not allow them to 
pay their wage bill. (Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
There were four 'voluntary' redundancy exercises throughout the organisation 
when it was part of the Civil Service. The first tranche was in 1995 with over 300 
staff leaving Durham National Savings. In 1996 several of the executive grades took 
'voluntary' redundancy and at the start of 1997 there was yet another VR exercise, as 
there was a staff surplus especially amongst the administrative grades (CPSA, 1996). 
Just before the PPP, in early 1999, there were plans for another 150 employees to 
leave Durham under these arrangements (PCS, 1999a). 
There is an inherent difficulty for trade unions in relation to both their influence 
and stance on the issue of redundancy. Firstly, the judicial interpretations of 
redundancy always favours management and by law managers only have to formally 
consult unions, rather than negotiate with them over redundancies (Fowler, 1993. 
Turnbull and Wass, 2000). Furthermore, as redundancy is under the control of 
management, this places unions in a weak position when trying to challenge the 
managerial prerogative, as managers can legally hire and fire at will (Wood and Dey, 
1983: ch. 5. Turnbull and Wass, 2000. Rose, 2001). Hence, there are huge disparities 
of power as management decide when redundancy programmes begin and end, so 
there is no free and open consultation on such initiatives (Fox, 1973. Wood and Dey, 
1983). Secondly, there can be a clash between the ideology of trade union officials 
who want to protect jobs and oppose redundancy, whilst union members may be 
more than willing to accept redundancies (Wood and Dey, 1983). This was indeed 
the scenario with all 'voluntary' redundancies at National Savings and this dilemma 
is well documented in successive trade union Annual Branch Reports (CPSA, 1996 
and 1997. PCS, 1999a). 
That's the anathema as a union rep- when you're arguing against redundancy 
and trying to look at the bigger picture, in terms of DNS&I being one of the 
biggest employers in the city and they're not our jobs, they're jobs for the 
community - is that the membership, because the redundancy arrangements 
are so attractive, were knocking on your door saying, "Why can't you 
negotiate for me to get my redundancy?" So, we almost had 2: 1 applications 
for redundancy. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
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Wood and Dey (1983) discuss this dilemma in their research into redundancies, 
where the trade unionists, with their socialist commitment to full employment, 
wanted to retain jobs on the principle that jobs lost through redundancy were 
community jobs that would be lost forever, which also makes the labour market 
worse for others ( chs. 5 and 6). 
The union Branch Reports from Durham National Savings also document what 
was a thankless task for the unions, where on the one hand they wanted to retain 
good quality public sector jobs with opportunities for members, yet they also have to 
negotiate the best possible deal for those who opt for VR (CPSA, 1996 and 1997. 
PCS, 1999a). I will now analyse the notion and nature of 'voluntary' redundancies, 
and then assess why workers were so willing to leave National Savings. 
Critics argue that all methods of redundancy, whether voluntary or compulsory, 
are forms of controlling labour mobility both inside and outside of organisations, 
which are ideologically loaded concepts imposed by management in their own 
interests (Wood and Dey, 1983. Turnbull and Wass, 2000). However, it can be 
argued that voluntary redundancy is a lesser of two evils as it does give workers 
some choice via self-selection, albeit within constraints pre-set by management 
(Wood and Dey, 1983: chs. 5 and 6). Yet there is a compulsory element to all 
voluntary redundancies, as if there were insufficient 'volunteers' then management 
would be forced to cut staffing levels anyway, hence, this is all done under the 
illusion of choice (Wood and Dey, 1983: chs. 3, 4, 5 and 6. Turnbull and Wass, 
2000). Thus, critics argue that any 'voluntary' schemes can be used by management 
to legitimise redundancies, and some union militants prefer the compulsory form as it 
reveals the true nature of capitalist accumulation and forced labour mobility (cited in 
Wood and Dey, 1983: ch. 6). 'Voluntary' redundancy is a way of workers doing 
management's dirty work for them, as they are helping to cut their own numbers 
(Wood and Dey, 1983: ch. 5). However, the fmal decision in the 'voluntary' 
redundancy process rests with management, as they decide which workers are 
allowed to leave and when, along with who will be refused 'voluntary' redundancy 
(Wood and Dey, 1983: chs. 3 and 4. Turnbull and Wass, 2000). As will be examined 
later, this procedure can be a very divisive process. 
The trade union's fears over BPR soon became reality, as the exercise resulted 
in job losses. Indeed, critics such as Grey and Mitev (1995) have argued that BPR 
will inevitably lead to redundancies, constant changes and an intensification of work. 
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Throughout industry there are examples of programmes of rationalisation and mass 
redundancies both before and after privatisation. Roberts (1993) researched this in 
relation to the shipbuilding in Sunderland, as did Dudley and Richardson (1990) with 
British Steel. The same occurred during the privatisation of British Telecom and 
British Gas (Elsmore, 2001: ch. 4), along with British Rail and the water industry 
(Flynn, 2002: ch. 1). This is not the only similarity between large privatisation 
programmes and the PPP of National Savings, another is the willingness of workers 
to leave on 'voluntary' redundancy terms. Roberts (1993) found that many of the 
shipyard workers took redundancy because of growing management control, the 
intensification of work and the looming threat of privatisation. This was the same 
scenario at National Savings where workers had become disenchanted with working 
in the Civil Service, but there was also a widespread fear that under PPP the situation 
would become worse. Also, through trade union negotiations, there was a very 
attractive redundancy package available, which particularly favoured the over 50s 
who received early payment of their pension, plus a compensation payment. Hence, 
employee acceptance of 'voluntary' redundancy is a rational decision and personal 
solution to a deteriorating situation. 
The big pay off was definitely one of the main reasons for workers taking VR. 
Also, the fear of the future, of how harsh a private sector employer would be; 
even though there's this myth that we've had it easy in the Civil Service. 
(Tracy, union official, interview, 2001) 
There have been a series of extensive 'voluntary' redundancy exercises carried 
out by SBS since the start of the Public-Private Partnership, the final one being in 
March 2003, which has seen the headcount at NS&I reduced from 4, 100 employees 
to 2, 000 (NAO, 2003: 2). So the initial concerns of workers that staff numbers 
would be cut in half after the PPP have actually become the reality. Hence, there has 
been a huge downsizing exercise throughout National Savings, which has resulted in 
staff numbers at the Durham site being reduced from approximately 2, 000 to 500, in 
less than a decade. Yet those remaining are still having to deal with the same amount 
of work (NAO, 2003: 2); and under-staffing througl1 VR will be discussed later in 
this section. It was stipulated in the contract that SBS had to reduce staffing levels as 
part of Business Process Re-engineering and rationalisation (NAO, 2003: 8). Similar 
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redundancy measures have been included in other PPP/ PFI contracts (Grimshaw et 
al, 2002. Hebson et al, 2003). Moreover, job loses after privatisation are a common 
theme in the extant literature, either through early retirement (Thomason, 1995) or 
through mass redundancies, as in the case of the sale of the telecom, gas and 
electricity (Allington, 1995). Of the 2, 100 who have left the organisation since PPP, 
the vast majority, some 1, 200 took 'voluntary' redundancy, 250 left through natural 
wastage and 650 were redeployed on Third Party Business (NAO, 2003:2). As 
redundancy payments are protected under TUPE law (Rose, 2001: 640), VR costs at 
National Savings are potentially huge. Therefore, another aim of the PPP is to create 
new Third Party Business to save on redundancy payments. However, as SBS are 
motivated by profit, they have been more ruthless in cutting staffing levels at 
National Savings, because the main costs of running the operation come in the form 
of wages. This method of conducting an often over-zealous redundancy programme 
in order to reduce wage costs is common in the private sector (Morgan, 1995. Burke 
and Cooper, 2000. Worrall et al, 2000). 
Turnbull and Wass (2000) argue that management often announce large-scale 
restructuring programmes whilst simultaneously offering redundancy, knowing full 
well that such changes will persuade a number of workers to 'volunteer' for 
redundancy. Furthermore, Fowler (1993) claims that organisations frequently 
underestimate the number of employees who want to leave. This was certainly the 
case at National Savings where there was no shortage of workers 'volunteering' for 
redundancy, particularly post-PPP (PCS, 2001a). The two major reasons for the vast 
number of workers wanting to leave on VR tem1s were, firstly, dissatisfaction with 
the commercial direction the organisation was taking after PPP, and here yet again 
the fear factor of employment insecurity is prominent; and secondly, the generous 
payments on offer. 
What's had a big impact [at DNS&I] is the voluntary redundancy 
programmes and, to be perfectly honest, people have walked out under Civil 
Service terms with massive amounts of money. It's just so SBS can get the 
staffing numbers down. So people who wanted out, people who didn't like 
the changes, have made a small fortune. (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
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Redundancies affected all grades at National Savings, particularly the 
managerial grades where there was large-scale delayering. This was part of on-going 
attempts by SBS to change the workplace culture, which was further transformed by 
the introduction of Team Working and Open Vacancy Advertising - this will be 
addressed in chapter five. Several of the workers interviewed spoke of this 
delayering and how many of the ex-Civil Service managers had decided to 'take the 
money and run'. 
There was a delayering of management and you kept hearing people say, 
"The managers are starting to jump ship." And obviously you were 
wondering, what's going to happen next? The redundancy packages were 
good, you know, there were no 'ifs' or 'buts' about it. (Jason, worker, 
interview, 2003) 
However, under 'voluntary' redundancy arrangements, management retain the 
power to make the final decision as to who is allowed to leave the organisation and 
they can refuse VR under the management prerogative (Wood and Dey, 1983. 
Turnbull and Wass, 2000). In the case ofNational Savings this refusal was down to 
'business need'. In the quote below, a union rep talks of the problems for the unions 
over VR and the criteria laid down by management. 
VR was a difficult issue for the unions. As long as everyone got the actual 
package and there wasn't any overt cherry picking in terms of, "You have to 
go and you have to go", within the framework of selection, then that was fine. 
Now there were a whole range of things they looked at, such as, age and 
financial impact, because you could have one member of staff who was worth 
£100 grand, and you could have lost five others who were going to get £10/ 
12/ 15/ 20 grand. So, obviously those actual figures and the money that was 
available for redundancy was part of that formula. The other thing was 
specialism, those with key skills, such as, accountancy or IT were required in 
the business and ineligible for VR. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
However, as the key decision over who was accepted for VR was down the 
prerogative of management, and seeing as many more workers wanted to leave 
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National Savings than stay, the process was divisive. Alan attempted to leave earlier, 
but was refused due to 'business need', as the skills he had were required at that time, 
and also due to cost, because he had worked there for over 25 years. However, he 
did leave in the next 'voluntary' redundancy tranche. 
There was definitely a change of attitude from some workers regarding 
'voluntary' redundancy after part-privatisation, indicating a lack of identification 
with SBS and a view that they had skills and experience which were marketable 
outside of the organisation. 
At first, I would have been devastated if I'd been made redundant. God, I 
would have filled my pants! But now I just think, "So what?" I'll walk out 
of here with £50, 000 in my back pocket and I know I'll get another job. And 
I think most people feel the same way now. (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
I want to argue that workers were active and pragmatic in assessing the situation 
regarding redundancies at National Savings, as they had to weigh up the 
opportunities on offer and decide what appeared to be best option available to them 
at the time. Wood and Dey also claim that workers interests vary over time and 
depend on particular circumstances as workers do have choices, even though such 
opportunities are restricted (1983: ch. 6). One of the main advantages for older 
workers accepting 'voluntary' redundancy were the generous payments on offer. For 
those who had worked there for the vast majority, or all, of their working lives, it 
meant that they did not have to work again as their financial worries were now over. 
For younger workers, the good VR pay-off gave them the opportunity to restart their 
careers. Obviously those who left Durham National Savings on VR terms went on to 
take up a wide variety of opportunities. Regarding two of the three research 
interviewees who left via VR, one started his own business and one went on to do 
voluntary work. One worker interviewed told me about a manager at Durham 
National Savings who left the organisation on a Friday afternoon under VR, only to 
be re-employed the following Monday morning by SBS as a short-term consultancy 
specialist. This links in with criticisms made in the NAO Report of SBS not making 
effective use of existing managerial skills and knowledge, as this person was now 
employed on a much enhanced rate of pay. 
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The third research interviewee who left on 'voluntary' redundancy was Jason, 
who spoke at length of his reasons for leaving and the career path he took afterwards. 
Jason felt that his time was up after the PPP, with the run down of staffing numbers 
and the lack of new Third Party Business arriving. At the time, he was either re-
deployed to the Passport Office in Millburngate House to help clear the backlog of 
work, or he was put on 'weeding', which was one of the most demeaning tasks, and 
was basically waiting until he could leave on 'voluntary' redundancy. 
Everybody said, "Once you're on 'weeding', that's it, you're finished!" They 
just had odd tasks they wanted completing that hadn't been done for years; 
we were ripping up old files that had been there from the year dot! They 
supplied you with gloves and bibs to wear, because the job was filthy. (Jason, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
Jason spoke as to why he took the key decision to leave Durham National 
Savings on 'voluntary' redundancy. The various reasons why workers choose this 
option are discussed in the literature on redundancy, involving: major upheaval, 
dissatisfaction with one's current employment situation and uncertainty of the future, 
particularly when workers have families to support (Kemp et al, 1981. Martin and 
Wallace, 1984. Roberts, 1993). 
I was 36 years old, I'd been working there since I was 16 and I had 20 years 
service in. I was stuck in the same AA grade and I was, more or less, doing 
the same type of job as I was when I started. I thought, "Well, I need to move 
on. I need a new challenge." People said, "You're married with a family, 
you've got a mortgage and three kids. Do you think it's a good idea?" And I 
said, "Look, ifl don't go now, I never will. I'm going to be here until I retire, 
which could be another 20 years." So, in the end, I filled my VR form in and 
was successful. (Jason, worker, interview, 2003) 
Jason was one of a cohort of 112 who left Durham National Savings on 
'voluntary' redundancy that day. He was out of work for exactly twelve weeks and 
applied for a job in another Civil Service department. He went for the interview, was 
successful and ironically started work again as an Administrative Assistant; only this 
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time he was determined to be more successful in this Civil Service department. 
Moreover, in his first two years in this new job Jason has been promoted twice, and 
is currently working in a managerial grade. Hence, he feels that leaving DNS&I has 
been the best thing career-wise that he has ever done, and it just shows how talent 
and potential were wasted at National Savings. 
Ironically, I've gone back to work in the Civil Service. I was lucky really, I 
got my VR payments and then I've gone back in [to the Civil Service], started 
off as an AA and, more or less, doubled my wage in 3 years, from what I 
actually started on, because of my double promotion. I've been able to better 
myself through that and the chances I've had in this new department. (Jason, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
However, there is a major contradiction at play here, despite the claim that 
redundancies at National Savings are made in the interests of greater efficiency. 
After the PPP, all workers who opted for 'voluntary' redundancy were made 
redundant by SBS, a private company, and they can then obtain new Civil Service 
jobs and retain their redundancy payments. However, prior to PPP all workers who 
left National Savings and went to work for another Civil Service department would 
have transferred directly over with no cost to the tax payer. This system of 
redundancy after PPP is highly inefficient and Jason is not the only worker to have 
left National Savings and gone back to working for the Civil Service. In the quote 
below, a union rep talks of ex-GNS&I staff joining the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
in Glasgow and ex-DNS&I workers joining the United Kingdom Passport Service 
(UKPS) in Durham. Hence, some workers are certainly doing well out of this new 
arrangement. 
Some workers who have taken VR from National Savings have actually gone 
back into Civil Service jobs, after they've been privatised. There are now 
people from here [DNS&I] working in UKPS, who walked out with 
redundancy takings, which is very inefficient for the government. In 
Glasgow they're going to the MoD, as there's a big recruitment drive going 
on now. So, the taxpayer is paying for these redundancies and they're then 
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going back to work for the taxpayer again. (Steve, union official, interview, 
2001) 
All of the workers interviewed who had left Durham National Savings under 
'voluntary' redundancy said that they no regrets about leaving, as they all had 
growing fears concerning their employment status and security after the PPP. The 
only thing they missed about working at Durham National Savings was the social 
aspects of work, especially the long-term friends that they had made over the years; 
Wood and Dey (1983) also uncovered this in their research on redundancies. Alan 
claimed that if National Savings had not become a PPP, then he would still be 
working there now, which shows both his identity and attachment to the Civil 
Service. All of those who left Durham National Savings went on to take up fresh 
opportunities and challenges, from a previously deteriorating situation. Burke and 
Cooper (2000) argue that those who leave organisations through redundancy can 
actually be in a far better position than those who remain. 
The recent literature on redundancy addresses the problem of 'survivor 
syndrome', where redundancy can damage the culture of an organisation as it 
actually compounds job insecurity, rather than alleviates it (Turnbull and Wass, 2000. 
Worrall et al, 2000). This is indeed the case at National Savings, as workers are 
moving from the safety and sanctuary of a 'job for life' to the uncertainty of a PPP, 
whilst seeing vast numbers of their colleagues leave via 'voluntary' redundancy. 
These changes can also create a response of mistrust amongst workers, who are then 
forced to work even harder due to competitive pressures through redundancy (Burke 
and Cooper, 2000. Turnbull and Wass, 2000). All of the workers and union officials 
interviewed spoke of how SBS had carried out an over-ambitious redundancy policy 
of allowing too many staff to leave in order to reduce costs, whilst simultaneously 
increasing pressure on those workers remaining. 
Obviously being a private company, what SBS wanted to do was try and 
balance the books, as the biggest bill is the wage bill. One of the simplest 
solutions was to get rid of people through voluntary redundancy programmes; 
for which I applied, but I wasn't successful, so I'm still here. There were a 
lot of people who wanted to leave, so over the first two or three years of 
Siemens reign people did take that opportunity and, if they were lucky 
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enough, they got their redundancy and moved on. But for those of us who are 
left, obviously we're seeing the other side of the coin which is where far too 
many people were released and the problem is now that there is more of a 
reliance on agency staff. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
The PCS Branch Annual Report of 2001 refers to union concerns over correct 
staffing levels at DNS&I in order cope with training and annual leave requirements, 
and the fact that there is now too much work being handled by too few staff (PCS, 
2001a). This is best exemplified by SBS's reliance on overtime and the greater 
employee costs associated with it, particularly in the correspondence and computer 
areas. There is also the employment of private sector agency staff by SBS, who are 
cheaper to hire and easily disposable, and this two-tier workforce will be analysed in 
chapter five. This issue of under-staffing and subsequent work intensification is not 
unique to this PPP. Hebson et al (2003) also uncovered similar examples in their 
research on other 'partnership' deals, and O'Connell Davidson (1994) also found 
inadequate staffing levels and sweeping organisational changes after the privatisation 
of the water industry. 
The Problems Associated with Technological Modernisation 
As stated earlier in the chapter, modernisation started under Business Process Re-
engineering when National Savings was still part of the Civil Service. The aim was 
that the organisation would be able to offer a broader range of services, in line with 
other modem financial institutions, and consequently better able to attract a younger 
and more dynamic customer base. Yet, National Savings was sadly lagging behind 
the pack. Automatic Teller Machines had been widely used in commercial banks 
from the 1980s onwards (Banks, 2001: ch. 2). Similarly, telephone banking was 
introduced in the mid-1980s (Wright, 1991: 168. Banks, 2001: ch. 2), which led to 
the creation of the call centre banking industry, which progressed on to web banking 
in the mid-1990s (Banks, 2001: ch. 2). Another technological development was the 
start of sales tracking, where financial institutions would target the needs of 
customers (Wright, 1991: 168). Several of these modem banking methods were to 
be introduced into National Savings under BPR, namely: the call centre, telephone 
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banking, the data warehouse, the launch of the NS&I website, the creation of web 
banking and, in the near future, the use of Automatic Teller Machines. 
The computerisation of National Savings started in the mid-1990s with the 
conversion of all manual records. At the time, all computer work was done in-house 
by National Savings IT teams and in the second worker quote below, Doreen argues 
that with regards to IT security, National Savings were the leaders of the pack. 
We built all of the IT systems in-house at National Savings. We created it 
with our own staff, they maintained, developed it, enhanced it and it was no 
problem at all. It was a big change from manually authorising things to doing 
things on-line, and I thought we did it quite well. (Colin, worker, interview, 
2003) 
Basically, National Savings were leaders in the game in terms of IT security. 
Now virtually every company, including Siemens corporately, are making a 
big issue about IT security, they're really pushing security issues. We've 
been there and done that. (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
Under BPR, the long-term plan was to move away from the old 'Legacy' 
mainframe computer system, where each National Savings product was on a separate 
customised software package, to all products being on one IT platform (CPSA, 1997). 
However, there were technical problems with the migration of the first product onto 
a new IT platform and everything was subsequently put on hold during PPP 
negotiations (PCS, 1998). One of the main aims of PPP was that a private sector 
'partner' would provide the required capital investment, new technology and 
expertise to successfully carry out this BPR exercise. The use of private sector skills 
and innovation are the foundation of other 'partnerships' programmes (see Grimshaw 
et al, 2002. Hebson et al, 2003). After the Public-Private Partnership was agreed, 
SBS argued that the current IT system would be unable to deliver re-engineering, so 
they replaced the 'Legacy' system with 'Tahler', a commercially available banking 
IT platform (NAO, 2003: 2 and 15). The plan was that this new 'Tahler' system 
would be able to manage: sales, repayments, accounting, customer management and 
central administration (NAO, 2003: 9). Moreover, through this new system National 
Savings would be able to develop a data warehouse (NAO, 2003: 10). 
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Whilst the introduction of this new 'Tabler' system at National Savings sounded 
fine in theory, there were a series of practical problems which plagued its 
development. Some of the research interviewees spent part of their careers working 
in the IT department and stated that the 'Tabler' system was an off-the-shelf Belgian 
IT package, which had to be adapted to meet the needs of National Savings. SBS 
decided to bring in Tabler's developers from Belgium as external IT consultants to 
assist in this process (NAO, 2003: 15), yet there were problems with communication 
and linguistics, as the interviewees below explain. 
SBS said, "We have the IT package that'll help you [NS&I] modernise." 
Unfortunately 'Tabler' was a package designed in Belgium, it wasn't exactly 
what we wanted, so it had to be manipulated to fit our needs. There just 
seemed to be communications problems because the consultants were Belgian 
and we had a lot of them over in England. (Alan, worker, interview, 2003) 
Since the PPP we've had a lot of IT consultants in; in fact I'm working with 
about 30 consultants from Belgium now. There are language problems 
because all of their IT code was initially written either in French or Flemish. 
So when our staff tried to take over the work, obviously all the codes were 
written in a foreign language. (Colin, worker, interview, 2003) 
SBS's a1m was to migrate all of the currently available National Savings 
products from the old 'Legacy' system over onto 'Tabler' (NAO, 2003: 15). It was 
imperative that this new 'Tabler' system was both efficient and effective, because 
'Legacy' was clearly not up to the task in hand as it was rapidly running out of 
application numbers to issue (NAO, 2003: 16). Under the PPP agreement, the 
migration of products onto 'Tabler' had to be carried out to a strict timetable (NAO, 
2003: 2). However, there were continual problems with the migration of products 
(NAO, 2003: 16). Yet despite the re-assurances from SBS management and the 
claims made in the NS&I Product Account Report of 2002 that steps have been taken 
to rectify the problems with the 'Tabler' system (NS&I, 2002), these IT difficulties 
continued (NAO, 2003: 16). 
The National Audit Report makes it clear that SBS "significantly 
underestimated the challenge of transforming the old business" (quoted in NAO, 
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2003: 15), and did not thoroughly conduct their groundwork before tabling their bid. 
It is clear that SBS failed to appreciate the complexity of National Savings' products 
and processes, and the difficulties associated with transferring products onto the new 
'Tahler' system (NAO, 2003: 3 and 15). National Savings offer a range of products 
including prize draws and savings accounts, which vary in terms of: accessibility, 
interest rates, maturity, etc, and are, therefore, housed in around 60 separate bank 
accounts. Indeed, the National Audit Report is damning in its assessment of SBS's 
attempted solutions, stating that "tracing the precise cause of problems was slow and 
rectification of problems even slower" (quoted in NAO, 2003: 16). All of the 
research interviewees were well aware of the IT problems that SBS were 
experiencing and they also reiterated the points made in the National Audit Report. 
Well, products are migrating across onto 'Tahler' as we speak, they're not all 
fully there, but it is happening. What SBS didn't realise is the scale ofthe job, 
they thought all products were the same and you just moved them across onto 
a common platform. But we've got Premium Bonds which isn't an interest-
based product, it's a prize draw product; there's a whole different range of 
products. I don't think SBS really did their research to understand our 
business. (Chris, union official, interview, 2003) 
Due to Siemens Business Services failing to meet the required IT targets and 
falling behind schedule, there was even more pressure placed upon IT consultants to 
migrate NS&I products onto 'Tahler' as quickly as possible (NAO, 2003: 16). There 
was also a frequent reliance on overtime in the IT areas. This led to SBS 
implementing IT system fixes without thorough testing (NAO, 2003: 16), which only 
compounded the existing problems. 
If the government had done this, they'd have tested it, ironed out the blips 
and the people issues, and then launched BPR. SBS launched and then tried 
to iron out, because they want it done quickly. They want everything done 
yesterday. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
The National Audit Report also criticises SBS's poor management because they 
failed to carry out an IT strategy review, which would have identified the problems 
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and weaknesses associated with the transferring of NS&I products onto the 'Tahler' 
system (NAO, 2003: 20). 
Despite the problems documented above, SBS have been able to successfully 
transfer a number of products onto the 'Tahler' system. The NS&I Product Account 
Report of 2002 states that 4 out of the 11 products available were now on 'Tahler' 
(NS&I, 2002); and the National Audit Office reports that this had increased to 6 
products by 2003 (NAO, 2003: 35). However, this migration of products onto one IT 
platform was a massive exercise as NS&I have 30 million customer accounts to deal 
with (NAO, 2003: 15). The migration of products onto 'Tahler' is continuing, yet a 
significant number of accounts are still on 'Legacy', or even processed manually 
(NAO, 2003: 35). 
However, this does not get away from the fact that Siemens Business Services 
failed to achieve full business transformation under BPR by the agreed target date of 
December 2000 (NAO, 2003: 13 and 17). As this was a clear breach of obligation, 
SBS incurred a substantial fine (NAO, 2003: 17 and 33). Moreover, SBS have also 
failed to complete the migration of other products onto the 'Tahler' system by the 
deadlines set in the PPP contract (NAO, 2003: 3 and 16). Such fatal errors have led 
to escalating costs on the account (NAO, 2003: 10), which subsequently has had a 
negative effect on profitability (NAO, 2003: 13); all of which contributed to the 
change of management teams by SBS. In a similar study on 'partnerships' carried 
out by Grimshaw et al (2002), there were also contractual deadlines for IT 
improvements with the imposition of fmancial penalties for failure to comply, yet in 
their study the public sector bore the brunt of rising IT costs. However, this is not 
the case at National Savings as the risk of delivering BPR is clearly outlined in the 
contract and the private sector must comply with tight contractual specifications, or 
pay the penalty. 
The new NS&I website was launched in July 2002 with a new feature, as 
products can now be purchased on-line (NAO, 2003: 9). Furthermore, SBS have 
invested heavily in new 'Imaging' technology (NAO, 2003: 20), whereby the aim is 
to cut costs and simplify operations by reducing the number of manual processes 
through automation (NAO, 2003: 14). 
SBS are bringing in an awful lot of new machinery. We've got four 
Enveloping Machines, two are running and two are currently being built, and 
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they are worth a shade over £500, 000 each! I think in total there's about £6 
million worth of machinery coming in, which will increase our capacity and it 
gives us the chance to look for other Third Party Business. (David, worker, 
interview, 2002) 
As the interviewee above states, SBS's plan is that through the introduction of 
'Imaging', they can now bid for more Third Party Business and re-deploy surplus 
staff. However, due to problems in attracting Third Party Business - which will be 
analysed later in this chapter - SBS decided to further reduce the headcount through 
redundancy. 
The main way SBS have tried to reduce staff numbers is by investment in 
technology. And some of the things that come to mind are the 'Imaging 
Systems', whereby rather than key in every application with all of the 
customer transaction details on, it's all captured via 'Image' and 
automatically updated. So there have definitely been improvements in 
technology and that's led to staff going on redundancy. (Kevin, worker, 
interview, 2003) 
The National Audit Report states that the new technology introduced by SBS 
compares favourably when benchmarked against other leading organisations (NAO, 
2003: 2). However, due to a lack of investment when it was part of the public sector, 
National Savings has fewer automated processes than their outside financial 
competitors (NAO, 2003: 31 ). Yet the report criticises the quality of the scans from 
the 'Imaging' technology as this has led to errors; although SBS are addressing this 
problem (NAO, 2003: 14). Indeed, the report criticises SBS management for their 
over-reliance on 'Imaging', arguing that it would have been better to develop more 
cost effective sales channels, such as, the internet and telephone banking (NAO, 
2003: 20). 
There were already plans to develop a call centre when National Savings was 
still part of the Civil Service (CPSA, 1996), but this only really took effect after the 
Public-Private Partnership when SBS started to re-engineer the business (PCS, 
1999a). The aim was that the call centre would change the organisational culture and 
help attract a more diverse customer base. Indeed, it is widely documented that the 
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first call centres were developed in the banking, insurance and financial services 
industries (Taylor, 1997. Taylor and Bain, 2001. Belt et al, 2002). As these 
companies were the pace setters, their competitors, including NS&I, were soon 
forced to followed suit. 
NS&I have two Customer Contact Centres, at their Blackpool and Durham 
offices, employing around 60 and 40 members of staff respectively. There is a 
mixture of male and female staff, working full-time and part-time in the call centres. 
The majority of NS&I call centre employees are women; in keeping with the general 
nature of such employment settings (Belt et al, 2002). The Customer Contact 
Centres are seen by SBS as an area of growth at National Savings. Yet due to a lack 
of volunteers, outside agency staff have been drafted in to work in these sections. 
Regarding their development, the NS&I call centres were originally contact and 
service centres. In January 2002 they also became sales centres, where customers 
could buy products over the phone through a NS&I debit card (NAO, 2003: 9). The 
NS&I Customer Contact Centres dealt with 1. 7 million calls in the year 20011 2002, 
which was a 57% increase on the previous year and 10% of calls resulted in sales 
(NAO, 2003: 9). By 2001 the call centres were open 24 hours per day, 7 days per 
week (PCS, 2001a. NAO, 2003: 9); in line with other banking organisations, with 
mixed patterns of shift working (Rebouillon, 1998). In the Customer Contact 
Centres there are performance targets which are tied to Key Performance Indicators, 
which are also commonly used in other call centres (Carteret al, 1992: ch. 5. Taylor 
and Bain, 2001). SBS's plan is that through the development of the Customer 
Contact Centres, they will be able to bid for more Third Party Business (NAO, 2003: 
23). The Customer Contact Centres have been benchmarked and compare well with 
similar organisations, but there are plans to make improvements in the monitoring of 
calls (NAO, 2003: 8 and 31). 
When SBS proposed the introduction of the Customer Contact Centres at NS&I, 
the trade union immediately registered concerns over the reputations of call centres 
for being modem day sweatshops with poor health and safety provisions (PCS, 2000). 
As Taylor and Bain (2001) discovered in their research, unions have been able to 
exert their influence to escape the more oppressive aspects of call centre work. The 
union at NS&I were able to negotiate a compensation package for workers who 
volunteered to move into the Customer Contact Centre, as due to shift working they 
would have to give up their current flexi-time arrangements. 
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There is a flexi buy-out for those workers moving to the call centre, you get 
either a £2, 500 lump sum or you get £500 and 5% on your pay. So, 
obviously the 5% option is what the union advise members to take because 
it's there forever. (Paul, union official, interview, 2003) 
The PCS union had originally argued that opening the Customer Contact Centre on a 
24/ 7 basis was unnecessary, and after a trial period SBS conceded the point and calls 
are now taken from 7am until midnight, 7 days a week. The PCS union have 
negotiated that calls can be monitored for training purposes only. Whilst there is also 
a union agreement on staff having rest breaks, union reps argue that managers are not 
encouraging staff to take their breaks and the union are concerned that the Customer 
Contact Centre is starting to head the way of other call centres. 
The poor public perception of call centre work has led to the development of a 
two-tier workforce at NS&I. Various social researchers have found call centre work 
to be pressurised, repetitive, routine and relentless, with a lack of worker control 
(Taylor, 1997. Taylor and Bain, 2001. Belt et al, 2002). This generally held view of 
such employment resulted in too few NS&I staff volunteering to move into the 
Customer Contact Centres. SBS decided to draft in around 20 agency staff on lesser 
terms and conditions, and these peripheral employees are required to work the 
unsociable hours that core staff were unwilling to do. This two-tier workforce would 
not have happened under the Civil Service and is a clear break from the past. Staff at 
National Savings were also fearful that SBS's plans to court more Third Party 
Business could result in more workers being forced into call centre work. 
Unfortunately I did not have the opportunity to interview any workers from the 
Customer Contact Centre at DNS&I, but other workers said that there was pressure 
to deal with as many calls as quickly as possible, as is common in most call centres 
(Taylor, 1997. Taylor and Bain, 2001. Belt et al, 2002). Again, as with other call 
centres, staff at NS&I have to follow scripts and prompts with each type of call they 
deal with (NAO, 2003: 37) and there are also tight wrap-up procedures, being the 
time between the end of one call and the start of another. However, many of the 
research interviewees claimed that this type of pressurised approach to banking was 
inappropriate to the culture and ethos of National Savings, as it traditionally has an 
older customer base. Hence, many customers are ill at ease with the imposition of 
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strictly scripted and timed calls, and preferred to chat on the phone in a more relaxed 
and friendly manner. 
As mentioned earlier, the performance of the Customer Contact Centres are tied 
in with Key Performance Indicators and also team targets, which have recently been 
introduced. SBS are paid a fee by NS&I on the number of calls dealt with per year, 
but at the beginning of the contract SBS had workers from Customer Contact Centres 
phoning up customers to boost their call ratings, hence, they were cream skimming 
certain KPis. Whilst this has now been rectified, other researchers have questioned 
whether call centre work is really about delivering a quality customer service or more 
about enhanced performance statistics (Belt et al, 2002); which is exactly the same 
point made by the worker quoted below. 
Under SBS there is now more emphasis on KPis and team targets. The call 
centre is very much targeted with regards to the number of calls answered, 
not calls resolved! Working in the call centre involves more pressure, more 
stress and obviously, as people get older, more health-related issues as well. 
(Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
This evidence seems to reassert the arguments made by Taylor and Bain (2001), 
that call centre workers are opposed to the pressure of targets, the timing of calls and 
the lack of adequate rest breaks. 
The Emerging Complex Web of Third Party Business and Further 
Outsourcings 
Thousands upon thousands of workers across the globe have been affected by the 
outsourcing of work and this is a practice which has predominantly been carried out 
by multinational corporations (Elger and Smith, 1994a. Klein, 2000. Logan et al, 
2004). However, this is not a new phenomenon, as the outsourcing of work through 
subcontractors was developed in Japan from as far back as the 1920s (Elger and 
Smith, 1994b), and rapidly spread throughout Japan from the 1970s (Jarillo, 1993: ch. 
5. Elger and Smith, 1994a). Moreover, from the 1980s there has been a huge growth 
in the worldwide outsourcing market (Lacity, 1993: ch. 2). Proponents argue that the 
main advantages are strategic, as once peripheral work is outsourced, organisations 
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can then focus on core competences and branch out into new markets (Milgate, 2001: 
ch. 1 ). Hence, through outsourcing, organisations can reduce their costs, whilst 
simultaneously increasing their overall competitiveness (Jarillo, 1993: ch. 4. Lacity, 
1993. Watson, 1997. Milgate, 2001: ch. 4). However, all of these claims are hotly 
debated and contested. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, outsourcing in the Civil Service began with 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering and Market Testing in the 1980s and 1990s with 
the main aim of reducing costs. The process continued under the Public-Private 
Partnership programme, where at National Savings the whole service delivery was 
outsourced to SBS. Yet what is new and different under this PPP arrangement is that 
SBS can now bid for Third Party Business (TPB), being external contract work 
carried out using existing staff and resources. The fact that SBS can now acquire 
Third Party Business is one of the advantages of the PPP deal as, rather than making 
staff redundant, SBS can now re-deploy employees to new insourced work; although 
the union argue that there is no reason why this could not have happened under the 
Civil Service. In the interview quote below, a union rep explains that during the 
bidding process both SBS and EDS had to demonstrate how they were going to 
create new Third Party Business; as neither NS&I management nor the union wanted 
the organisation to go down the same road as the UK banking and financial services 
industries, where 75, 000 jobs were lost between 1990 and 1992 due to 
modernisation (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997: ch. 6). 
The case for Third Party Business was that if we go with this modernisation 
programme, the 4, 100 jobs that exist at the moment will be reduced to 2, 500 
or even 1, 500 - as happened in the financial services industry in the 1990s -
this could happen to National Savings, the absolute gutting of the industry by 
technology. But a private company could use the existing skills and 
resources to court new work. SBS and EDS in the bidding stage had to show 
how they were going to create new Third Party Business. (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2001) 
Hence, 'New' Labour claim that one of the advantages of PPP is the commercial 
dynamism and innovation of private sector 'partners' who can bid for Third Party 
Business (HM Treasury, 2000). The union also support this notion as a realistic 
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alternative to redundancy, where workers have new opportunities and can develop 
new skills (PCS, 1999a). Whilst in theory both SBS and the union are in favour of 
Third Party Business; in practice, tensions soon arose regarding the quality of such 
new work and employee terms and conditions, as a more complicated picture of 
insourcing and outsourcing emerged. 
Once they were successful in winning the PPP contract, SBS informed staff of 
their plans of attracting a variety of quality Third Party Business contracts to 
National Savings. Together with the new investments SBS have made with IT 
technology via 'Imaging' and the Customer Contact Centre, they hoped to be even 
more competitive in this new insourcing market (NAO, 2003: 23). Furthermore, due 
to the restructuring and redundancies that have taken place at NS&I, large areas of 
office space are now available for third parties to rent out (NAO, 2003: 14). From 
January 2004 there were huge adverts placed outside DNS&I offering prime office 
accommodation in Millbumgate House, ranging from 5, 000 to 27, 000 square feet, 
and NS&I and SBS share the proceeds from any new renting arrangements. SBS 
also created a 'Development Bank' where there would be a pool of workers who 
would be trained up and ready to be re-deployed onto new Third Party Business 
(PCS, 1999a). 
Despite the predictions made by SBS regarding the Third Party Business they 
would be able attract and the new employment opportunities they would bring into 
NS&I, for the most part, this failed to materialise. A number of worker interviewees 
mentioned how demoralised they felt quite early on into the PPP deal, particularly 
after SBS had built up their hopes regarding Third Party Business; and this is also 
documented in the trade union Branch Report of 2001 (PCS, 2001a). The National 
Audit Report states that SBS originally planned to create 1, 200 third party jobs at 
National Savings, but by 2003 they had only managed to create 650, just over half of 
their original prediction (NAO, 2003: 2 and 3). The union's fears of the 
'Development Bank' soon came to fruition, as SBS did not to invest in adequate 
training and resources (PCS, 1999a), and due to their failure to attract sufficient 
Third Party Business, the 'Development Bank' was soon abandoned. 
[Over the issue of Third Party Business] SBS were mucking staff about left, 
right and centre. For example, we had thousands and thousands of pounds 
spent on consultants. One idea they came up with was to move a lot of staff 
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out of the 'ISA' account, including myself, and we were moved into what 
they called, in inverted commas, a 'Development Bank', or should I say, a 
dumping ground! But seeing as any Third Party Business was slow to arrive, 
I was moved back to National Savings work. So, on the one hand I was told, 
"You're no longer needed on the 'ISA' account, goodbye." Then a week 
later, "Come back, we need you on 'Savings Certificates'." (Michael, worker, 
interview, 2004) 
There are Third Party Business contracts at both the Glasgow and Durham sites, 
but not at the Blackpool office (NAO, 2003: 14). GNS&I deals solely with SBS's 
biggest Third Party Business contract, where 550 workers have been re-deployed on 
back office work involving computerisation and data input for Barclays Bank (NAO, 
2003: 9). SBS also have a Third Party Business contract with UKPS involving 50 
workers (NAO, 2003: 9), again dealing with computerisation and basic 
administrative work of opening mail and scanning documentation, and this contract 
was won quite early on in the PPP deal (PCS, 1999a). Another TPB contract that 
was acquired at the start of the 'partnership' deal is the contract with [Siemens] 
Shared Accountancy Services Centre (SASC) (PCS, 1999a), again involving the 
transfer of 50 workers (NAO, 2003: 9), who deal with accountancy and expenses 
matters for SBS. A recently acquired Third Party Business contract at DNS&I 
involves the transfer of 15 workers to the Vehicle Operations Services Agency 
(VOSA), who are dealing with the automation of Ministry of Transport (MOT) test 
certificates. The TPB contract with the Immigration and Nationality Directorate 
(IND) is also relatively new, but this only involves 5 staff and is currently up for re-
bid. SBS did also have another small Third Party Business contract with Coventry 
City Council, again involving back office work, but this only involved 3 workers and 
SBS have just lost the re-bid. The Treasury's PPPs. The Government's Approach 
published in 2000, cites National Savings as a fine example where a new private 
sector 'partner' has been able to create new opportunities and skills for staff by 
expanding the business (HM Treasury, 2000); however, none of the examples are 
detailed, nor are any of the difficulties and complications associated with this new 
insourcing of work. 
Of the new Third Party Business that SBS have won at National Savings, all of 
it is basic administrative/ back office work and not one contract involves the 
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insourcing of highly skilled specialist work. Hence, this market is a race to the 
bottom where other organisations are farming out what they define as peripheral 
activities with the predominant aim of having tasks completed at a much cheaper 
price (Kamada, 1994. Klein, 2000: ch. 9); hence, the recent mass outsourcings of 
work to the Far East (Jarillo, 1993). Herein lies the problem for SBS, as due to 
National Savings staff having their old Civil Service terms and conditions protected 
under TUPE and a strong and organised trade union, they are expensive labour when 
compared to other outsourcing companies who are bidding for basic administrative 
work. 
I think there's a number of driving factors as to why SBS cannot attract 
sufficient Third Party Business, and these are my assumptions. I think the 
outsourcing market is becoming much more competitive. I think because of 
TUPE, our workforce is out-pricing the outsourcing market- there's cheaper 
labour elsewhere. As most of the outsourced contracts will involve TUPE, 
there's not the same opportunity to re-deploy, it's not 'greenfield' business, 
most of it. And, therefore, all of those driving factors tell Siemens that this 
outsourcing game is not what they thought it was when they first took it on. 
(Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
One of the ways in which SBS management can get around what they see as 'the 
problem' of the high wages of NS&I staff, is to attempt to change terms and 
conditions through transferring staff to new work. This has not only led to union and 
worker resistance against a two-tier, and in some cases a multi-tier, workforce, but 
also creates a more complicated picture of the new Third Party Business being 
completed at NS&I. The union wanted NS&I staff to have the opportunity to move 
onto new Third Party Business and transfer over with their existing terms and 
conditions, and the union believed that SBS gave them this commitment at the start 
of the 'partnership' deal (PCS, 1999a). However, due to the financial pressures on 
the contract and SBS's inability to attract enough quality Third Party Business, they 
now want to be able to change workers' terms and conditions, and this has created a 
number of problems. Whilst some NS&I staff have volunteered to transfer over to 
certain Third Party Business contracts, the majority of workers have been transferred 
against their will. In 1999 this led to the union recommending that no workers 
133 
should volunteer to transfer over to new Third Party Business until the union were 
sure that the new terms and conditions offered by SBS were no worse than existing 
ones (PCS, 1999a). A number of other researchers have argued that outsourcing can 
lead to pressure to reduce wages and introduce a two-tier workforce which is divisive, 
adds to job insecurity and makes it all the more difficult to establish effective trade 
union bargaining (Elger and Smith, 1994b. Kamada, 1994. MacKenzie, 2000). The 
workers at NS&I are acutely aware of these dangers, they already feel that their 
employment security is under threat and are now faced with the possibility of being 
compelled to move to new Third Party Business. 
On the Barclays Account, SBS insisted on setting up a different bargaining unit 
to the rest of the NS&V SBS Account. Hence, staff were unwilling to transfer over 
to this new work without their existing terms and conditions, coupled with the fact 
that much of the work is fast keying back office work. Due to a lack of volunteers, 
SBS management then decided to forcibly promote workers from Pay Band 1 to Pay 
Band 2 and then transfer them over to the new Barclays Account. In addition, 
because of the size of this new account, SBS have also drafted in a number of agency 
staff on lesser terms and conditions, creating a multi-tier workforce. The union are 
currently negotiating with SBS management to try to make these agency workers 
permanent members of staff, as PCS believe that they are a necessary part of the 
long-term viability of this insourcing contract. 
There is a similar scenario at the UKPS, where the majority of the staff are civil 
servants employed by the Home Office. Those workers from National Savings who 
have moved over to UKPS through the Third Party Business contract are employed 
by SBS; hence there is a two-tier workforce in operation. Although some National 
Savings staff did originally volunteer to transfer over to UKPS, due to a lack of 
volunteers staff are now compelled to move, but all workers remain on NS&V SBS 
terms and conditions. 
The VOSA Third Party Business contract also has a two-tier workforce in 
operation. The majority of staff at VOSA are civil servants, but the 15 workers 
transferred over from National Savings are employed by SBS. These workers remain 
on NS&V SBS terms and conditions, but there is a flexi-time buy-out as there is shift 
work in operation on this contract. Most workers on this new account volunteered to 
transfer over, including some from UKPS who did not enjoy working there and saw 
this as an opportunity to jump ship. 
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The IND contract is also new Third Party Business won by SBS, although it 
only involves 5 workers. Again, there is a two-tier workforce as all other employees 
are civil servants. Staff on this new contract were, yet again, forcibly transferred 
over; but they remain on the same NS&I/ SBS terms and conditions. 
Whilst the Coventry City Council TPB contract only involved 3 workers, SBS 
lost the re-bid and the workers were subsequently offered redundancy; and the union 
reps state that the workers involved were satisfied with this arrangement. 
Due to the financial pressures on the Public-Private Partnership contract, SBS 
have been able to cut the headcount at NS&I through transferring staff to new Third 
Party Business, together with several 'voluntary' redundancy exercises and by 
proposing secondary TUPE transfers of staff. Hence, SBS can also outsource jobs, 
in what they now deem to be peripheral areas of employment, to other private sector 
contractors. In 2001 SBS proposed two secondary TUPEs, the first was to transfer 
15 accountancy jobs to SASC, and the second involved the outsourcing of 400 jobs 
in the Document Management Unit (DMU). In both instances the union and their 
members were fundamentally opposed to these secondary outsourcings, as they saw 
this as an attempt by SBS to break up the NS&I Account (PCS, 2001a). There was a 
trade union campaign in opposition to the proposed outsourcing of the DMU to 
another private sector company ~ which will be analysed in chapter six - yet the in-
house bid won so the work remains part of the NS&I/ SBS Account. However, the 
proposed transfer of 15 accountancy staff over to SASC, which is another branch of 
Siemens AG, went ahead. There were already around 50 employees from National 
Savings working in SASC, who transferred over as part of the original PPP deal. 
These workers are employed on different terms and conditions to NS&I/ SBS staff, 
and have had to establish a new trade union branch and bargaining unit which places 
these few workers in more precarious negotiating position. 
The development of Third Party Business and the outsourcing of work are 
redefining the boundaries of the Civil Service, creating a much more complex and 
convoluted picture of multi-layered contract employment. Whilst advocates of PPP 
argue that by taking on new Third Party Business, staff now have the chance to 
transfer across to more interesting and diverse work, such opportunities at NS&I are 
much more limited than they previously had been under the Civil Service. Prior to 
the PPP, workers at National Savings could transfer over to any other Civil Service 
department on broadly the same terms and conditions, although this was changing 
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after Agency Status. Yet there were no two-tier workforces, as staff were still part of 
the same bargaining unit and represented by the one trade union. SBS have been 
able to win Third Party Business contracts at: UKPS, VOSA and IND; all of which 
are Civil Service departments who have outsourced work. Hence, ex-civil servants 
at National Savings are now completing work for other existing Civil Service 
departments. Although these TPB contracts involve relatively small numbers of staff, 
there is now a snowballing of outsourcings within the Civil Service, whereas 
previously areas, such as, catering and cleaning were the only sections to be farmed 
out to the private sector. Civil Service departments are now under increasing 
pressure to cut costs and introduce further elements of privatisation, in keeping with 
the central themes of New Public Management. Again this creates further ethical 
problems, as private sector outsourcing companies are attempting to make profits out 
of sections of the Civil Service which were set up with an entirely different ethos of 
providing a service to the public. The outsourcing of work creates a dog eat dog 
culture and a race to the bottom where departments are attempting to cut costs and 
off-load unprofitable sectors of work. There are, therefore, inherent dangers in both 
outsourcing work and taking on new Third Party Business, due to the 
unpredictability of markets and the fact that this creates more losers than winners. 
Firstly, there is the problem of defining what is 'core' and 'periphery' work, and 
what employment to outsource and what to keep in-house (Milgate, 2001: ch. 2). 
There are dangers of losing key markets and also difficulties of moving into key 
markets (Milgate, 2001: ch. 4). The outsourcing oftoo much work could lead to the 
hollowing out the organisation, where core competences may be lost (Jarillo, 1993: 
ch. 4. Milgate, 2001: ch. 2). This was the main argument made by the PCS union at 
National Savings regarding the outsourcing of the Document Management Unit to a 
private contractor, in that they argued it was core business and if this area was 
outsourced then it would severely limit SBS' s capacity to bid for more Third Party 
Business. 
This newly developed and complex web of Civil Service and private sector 
subcontractors and suppliers, mirrors the multi-layered employment structures of 
Japan (Elger and Smith, 1994b. Kamada, 1994. MacKenzie, 2000). In Japan, work is 
firstly subcontracted to private companies, who then further subcontract other 
elements of work, and this process can involve layers and layers of subcontracting 
relationships (Kamada, 1994). This is starting to take place at National Savings, 
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where 90% of the work was originally outsourced to SBS, who then outsource 
sections of work to SASC and then insource elements of work from other Civil 
Service departments. SBS also employ the Japanese practice of 'shukkoh' ofloaning 
out workers (Kamada, 1994), where workers from the NS&V SBS Account are 
loaned to, for instance, UKPS for the duration of the contract, and then return to core 
National Savings work. 
However, there are a number of inherent dangers and complications with these 
new outsourcing and Third Party Business relationships. Firstly, as much of this is 
short-term contract work, it is insecure and fragile, and there are questions over the 
sustainability of such employment; especially as SBS have just lost the re-bid for the 
Coventry City Council work, and the IND contract will soon be up for re-bid. There 
are also problems of managing such a complex web of contractual relationships 
(Klein, 2000. MacKenzie, 2000). At NS&I the union who now have to deal with a 
number of separate Human Resources managers, due to the fragmentation of the 
account. Moreover, outsourcing work may not necessarily mean that it is now more 
cost effective, indeed it was arguably more effective to have Civil Service 
departments completing their own tasks which workers were fully trained up on, 
rather than outsourcing peripheral sections of UKPS, IND and VOSA work to 
National Savings. 
Proponents of the outsourcing of work also fail to address the problems of 
cultural transfer and worker identity. As is already clear, the vast majority of 
National Savings staff did not want to be transferred over to SBS in the first instance 
and there have been a series of problems in their attempts at changing the 
organisational culture. This is further compounded via both the acquisition of new 
Third Party Business and the outsourcing of other work to private contractors, where 
some workers have been forcibly transferred over, and even some instances where 
they have also been forcibly promoted just prior to transfer. Kamada (1994) argues 
that in Japan many workers feel very negatively about being transferred out to other 
companies. This is also the case at NS&I where workers can feel unwanted and 
disposable, as was the case with the failed 'Development Bank'. This can have 
severe problems for management in winning over worker loyalty and can, therefore, 
have a detrimental effect on staff morale. It can also have complications relating to 
worker identity to the new organisation, particularly with short-term Third Party 
Business contracts, where workers do not feel any affinity to their new contractors 
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and similarly do not feel a part of the NS&U SBS Account, resulting in a state of 
anomie. 
One of the major difficulties SBS face when bidding for Third Party Business is 
that National Savings administrative staff are expensive labour, yet this 'market rate' 
of pay is neither natural nor fair. However, NS&I also employ a number of highly 
skilled workers, such as, accountants, auditors and IT specialists, whose pay in this 
once protected sector is well below this 'market rate', so maybe it would have been 
more advantageous for SBS to bid for higher quality Third Party Business. 
The main fear and concern of some of the staff at DNS&I is that Millburngate 
House could soon be used solely for Third Party Business. Of course, this can have 
serious repercussions involving the further fragmentation of work into various 
accounts with staff on differing pay, terms and conditions, which can also lead to 
problems of trade union representation and organisation. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the implementation of the Public-Private Partnership 
at National Savings and the early attempts by SBS at changing the organisational 
culture. Whilst National Savings had already undergone a process of 
commercialisation and partial privatisation when it was part of the Civil Service, the 
PPP was different as it directly affected all of the operational staff and signalled the 
beginning of the most profound organisational transformations. 
There was little immediate change during the early stages of the PPP contract, 
under what several interviewees termed a 'honeymoon period'. Indeed there were 
some successes for SBS as they reduced staff numbers, began modernising 
operations and attracted new Third Party Business. However, SBS soon faced 
mounting difficulties as they failed to deliver Business Process Re-engineering to 
schedule and were unable to insource the amount of new work they had originally 
budgeted for, therefore, they were soon in a potentially loss making situation. This 
led to direct intervention by Siemens AG and the appointment of a new SBS senior 
management team to run the contract. This clearly signalled a turning point, with 
constant change initiatives aimed at reducing costs in an attempt to achieve 
profitability on this 'partnership' deal. 
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Several of the research interviewees, both union officials and employees, claim 
that SBS did not conduct thorough research prior to tabling their PPP bid. Indeed, 
the National Audit Report verifies this, clearly stating that SBS underestimated what 
the modernisation of National Savings involved. It appears that SBS did not 
understand the role of National Savings as a public sector financial organisation. 
Furthermore, they did not attempt to understand the organisation's existing cultures 
and traditions; and Alvesson (2002: ch. 8) and Roberts (1997) argue that this is 
essential when attempting to introduce change programmes. Yet attempting to 
radically transform the organisational culture at National Savings was always going 
to be problematic, as it has a long-serving workforce with embedded traditions and 
cultural practices. This was particularly difficult in the case of the Public-Private 
Partnership, where deep-rooted norms and values were to be changed now that the 
private sector 'partner' is attempting to make a profit on the contract. 
Due to a lack of government investment, National Savings was in urgent need of 
modernisation. Whilst Business Process Re-engineering was started when the 
organisation was part of the Civil Service, it was believed that a private sector 
'partner' would have the finance, skills and expertise to successfully install a modem 
IT system. However, SBS failed to appreciate the complexity of National Savings' 
products, which led to a series of difficulties in migrating products over onto the new 
'Tabler' IT platform. SBS did not make best use of existing staff knowledge and 
instead relied on costly external consultants. Whilst SBS did open a state of the art 
call centre, this style of pressurised customer contact is inappropriate to the 
organisation's traditionally older customer base. 
Another theme of continuity is that there have been a senes of extensive 
'voluntary' redundancy exercises both before and after the PPP. This has seen the 
workforce more than halved since the Public-Private Partnership, with no shortage of 
'volunteers' willing to leave the organisation. Yet workers and union reps 
interviewed feel that National Savings is now under-staffed, as SBS attempt to 
reduce labour costs in order to make a profit. 
Despite SBS's enthusiastic promises of bringing in quality Third Party Business, 
they only managed to create half of the insourced work they originally planned. This 
led to SBS having to forcibly transfer reluctant staff over to new insourced work, 
whilst attempting to outsource elements of National Savings work to other private 
sector contractors in order to reduce staff numbers. This led to the development of a 
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multi-tier workforce together with increasingly complex insource/ outsource 
relationships, which did not previously exist in the Civil Service. 
It was clear to all interviewees that the PPP was a watershed and marked the 
ending of the long-accepted 'job for life'. Whilst SBS held road shows and 
presentations in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of employees, this resulted in 
disappointment when they failed to live up to expectations. Staff were certainly 
worried about the PPP of the organisation, and such anxieties were exacerbated with 
the appointment of a new SBS senior management team to run the account so early 
into the contract. The changes introduced by this second SBS management team 
have clearly changed the culture of the organisation, which have resulted in an 
intensification of work as SBS attempt to tum a potentially loss making venture into 
a profitable one. 
In the following chapter I will analyse how SBS are attempting to further 
transform the organisational culture at National Savings, through the adoption of 
'leaner' working methods together with various employee involvement initiatives. 
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Chapter Five - Fu.rther Organisational Culture Changes 
and the Imposition of Leaner Working Methods at National 
Savings and Investments 
Introduction 
In this third research findings chapter I will be critically examining later policy 
initiatives, which have been introduced by SBS to further change the organisational 
culture at National Savings and Investments. Many of these new management 
techniques have been directly imported from the private sector and initiatives, such 
as, Team Working and Lean have their origins in the auto industry. However, some 
of the changes discussed in this chapter were once again introduced when National 
Savings was still part of the Civil Service. Hence, organisational culture change has 
been a continuous process, which has accelerated since the Public-Private 
Partnership. Yet, what SBS view as 'the problems' of changing a long-established 
organisational culture have continued and, in some cases, been exacerbated through 
the adoption of Team Working, Lean and various other new initiatives which are 
inherently contradictory. 
One of the main ways in which SBS have attempted to change the organisational 
culture at National Savings is via the introduction of Team Working. As has been 
discussed in the previous chapter, there had already been a widespread delayering of 
management through numerous 'voluntary' redundancy programmes and once staff 
numbers were cut to what SBS deemed an adequate level, they then implemented a 
re-grading exercise through Open Vacancy Advertising. I will demonstrate how SBS 
were able to install a new cohort of managers to replace the old Civil Service 
managers, in an attempt to culturally cleanse the workplace and impose a new set of 
norms and values. Yet such moves did result in friction between the newly 
appointed SBS managers and the 'old school' civil servants. I will go on to argue 
that Team Working has resulted in an intensification of work for those on the shop 
floor at NS&I, and this has increased with the introduction of Lean, which SBS view 
as a natural progression of Team Working. 
SBS have attempted to further transform the organisational culture at NS&I by 
introducing a range of employee involvement initiatives, including: an Employee 
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Bonus Scheme, the Siemens Share Scheme, Staff Surveys and performance incentive 
payments. Whilst the latter two policies were used when the National Savings was 
part of the Civil Service, the former two schemes are new and supposedly increase 
staff identity to the company. However, I will demonstrate that, on the whole, staff 
are sceptical of such initiatives, as they are divisive and underhand attempts by SBS 
to cut the trade union out of the equation. 
In light of the plethora of literature on quality improvement programmes, it is 
surprising that SBS have not spearheaded any new initiatives. However, there are 
tensions and contradictions over this issue, where workers want to retain the public 
service ethos of doing everything possible for savers, whilst SBS's over-riding 
priorities are reducing costs and achieving profitability. 
I shall demonstrate how these new culture change initiatives implemented by 
SBS have the net result of increasing pressure and stress on all workers throughout 
the organisation, particularly those on the front line who have little power and 
autonomy. I will argue that the policies which SBS have introduced at National 
Savings have directly resulted in feelings of resentment and demotivation, leaving 
staff feeling over-worked, under-appreciated and increasingly uncertain of their 
futures. 
'fhe Implementation of 'feam Working 
In this section I will discuss the management theory behind how Team Working can 
apparently be used to radically transform workplace cultures to create dynamic semi-
autonomous teams. I will go on to argue that the concept of team work has always 
existed as an essential part of the shop floor culture of National Savings, albeit in an 
informal sense. However, under the SBS imposed version of Team Working, there is 
a clear gap between the rhetoric and the reality. The managerially prescribed and 
ordained ideology of Team Working is both idyllic and uncritical, as it does not 
address the complexity of a number of key issues. There is very little 
acknowledgement from such integration theorists of any of the difficulties in the 
transition from an old workplace culture to a new Team Working environment. 
Furthermore, many of the management theorists in favour of Team Working do not 
address power struggles which can emerge when staff move to semi-autonomous 
status, as some mangers are intent on retaining their authority. Such theorists are all 
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accepting of the management prerogative, as they simply take for granted that Team 
Working is for the mutual benefit of all and free of any problems or contradictions. 
Moreover, they singularly fail to address the influence and impact workers can have 
in this process. 
Advocates argue that Team Working is the first building block in the re-
organisation of work, where managers and employees now work together side by 
side in teams, as unnecessary hierarchical layers are swept away under a fundamental 
culture change (Peters and Waterman, 1982: ch. 8. Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: ch. 9. 
Champy, 1995). The philosophy of Team Working originated in the auto industry 
(Womack et al, 1990), and proponents, such as, Peters (1992: 243) argue that it can 
be used to culturally transform both new 'greenfield' sites, as well as established 
'brownfield' workplaces. Teams are semi-autonomous with devolved 
responsibilities, whereby multi-skilled workers actively participate in the decision 
making process (Wickens, 1987. Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). During regular Team 
Meetings workers and managers share ideas on how to complete and improve tasks, 
creating an innovative working environment (Kanter, 1989. Peters, 1989). Hence, 
proponents of Team Working argue that it is a democratic system, which empowers 
workers and creates meaningful jobs within a harmonious working arena (Wickens, 
1987). 
Team Working was introduced to National Savings in April2000 after SBS had 
carried out a pay and grading review (PCS, 1999a). This saw a further transition in 
the organisation's culture as promotions were now based on Open Vacancy 
Advertising (OVA), as opposed to seniority and merit under the Civil Service. There 
had already been a widespread delayering of middle management grades under 
several 'voluntary' redundancy exercises, and the introduction ofTeam Working saw 
the transition to a much flatter organisational structure. Whilst the NS&I Pay Band 
structure remains in place, the old Civil Service administrative graded workers 
became Team Members and the managerial grades followed in order from: Team 
Leaders, to Resource Co-ordinators and then onto Service Delivery Managers. 
Teams within departments are numbered from 1 to 8, and each team is comprised of 
approximately fifteen Team Members, headed by one Team Leader. Whilst some 
teams work on the same processes, others complete a range of different tasks. It is 
difficult to compare the new team grades with the old Civil Service ones, and SBS 
claim that these new grades are necessary as they represent new roles, 
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responsibilities and ways of working. However, this new Team Working culture was 
imposed on the workforce by SBS, and has led to problems and complications. 
It is widely documented that elements of the Team Working philosophy are used 
in both the private and public sectors (Parker and Slaughter, 1988: 4. Coyne and 
Williamson, 1991. Moody, 1997: ch. 5). Yet mangers usually adopt a 'pick and mix' 
approach to Team Working, rather than introducing a concise and coherent package 
(Warhurst and Thompson, 1998. Bradley et al, 2000: ch. 2). Indeed, despite the 
claims of management 'gurus' that Team Working is new and revolutionary, 
numerous research interviewees argue that team working has always existed at 
National Savings, although in an informal manner. Hence, team working had been a 
part of the shop floor culture, and this spirit of workplace co-operation helped 
workers both complete tasks and mutually support one another. Stephenson and 
Stewart (2001) term this 'workplace collectivism', which is the self-organisation of 
employees outside of management control and, although it may not directly 
challenge management, it is autonomous, collective and altruistic. In the interview 
quote below, a worker talks of how this informal spirit of workplace collectivism has 
survived, despite SBS's attempts to impose their new culture of Team Working; and 
I will demonstrate later in the chapter how this notion has continued. 
I think, on the whole, Team Working still does work well; mainly because of 
what was in-built from the Civil Service days, because we had a very, very 
good team spirit. So, it's not happened because of SBS coming in and 
changing anything. If anything, the co-operation, I would say, is now more 
grudging, rather than done in the spirit of true team working. (Michael, 
worker, interview, 2004) 
Similarly, flexibility and multi-skilling always existed at National Savings prior to 
the advent of Team Working. Workers were regularly rotated between departments 
and cross-trained on different processes, which added to their personal development, 
provided good quality cover for staff absences and created a highly skilled and 
experienced workforce. 
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The Imposition of a New Promotion Culture through Team 
Working 
SBS consulted with the union and their members at National Savings prior to the 
introduction of Team Working and Open Vacancy Advertising (PCS, 1999a). SBS 
also held staff road shows to sell the advantages of changing the organisation's 
culture. The transition from a long-established Civil Service promotion system to 
OVA resulted in tensions and contradictions, as it benefited some workers, but not 
others. 
The first thing that SBS did [when they came into National Savings] was to 
run road shows and say, "Tell us what the problems are." And people said, 
"It's the hierarchal structure of the Civil Service and the fact that there are no 
opportunities, there was no promotion, you know, it's not happening. We 
have people who are sitting in the same grades who got there because they 
were in the right place at the right time and knew the right person." And a lot 
of people were saying, "Give us the opportunity, we could do just as good, if 
not a better job." In fairness to SBS they did, they brought in- some people 
do, some people don't like- Open Vacancy Advertising. I personally think 
it's one of the best things they did, but then again it worked for me, so I 
would say that. And SBS said, "Right, well you reckon you can do it, put 
your money where your mouth is. Come on." (David, worker, interview, 
2002) 
Under OVA, workers of any grade can now apply for any permanent posts 
advertised at National Savings, irrespective of their current Pay Band, and 
promotions are now competence-based. The PCS union issued a questionnaire to 
members regarding SBS's proposals to move to a new system of Team Working with 
OVA promotions; and there was a unanimous vote in favour of these new changes 
(PCS, 1999a). SBS then introduced Team Working creating a new grading structure, 
which resulted in a series of promotions early in the life of the PPP. 
Although it is perfectly understandable that workers at NS&I were initially 
enthusiastic over what seemed to be fresh faces with fresh ideas offering new 
opportunities, I would argue that this attempt at cultural re-engineering did have 
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positive implications for some workers, but certainly not for all. It is true that there 
were severely restricted opportunities of upward mobility at National Savings for 
over a decade, but SBS seized on this need for change to introduce a new promotion 
and Team Working culture on their terms. 
Whilst the administrative grades simply transferred over to become Team 
Members under the new Team Working arrangements, SBS then stated that EOs had 
to re-apply to become Team Leaders. SBS argued that this was necessary as the job 
of Team Leader comprised a new coaching role and signalled a move away from the 
alleged rigid Civil Service hierarchy. Although some EOs did successfully become 
Team Leaders, under OVA workers from any Pay Bands could now apply for these 
advertised positions and this resulted in a new cohort of Team Leaders. 
The PCS union were fundamentally opposed to the Team Leader selection 
exercise. They argued that it was unnecessary as the role of EO and Team Leader 
were similar and, as the vast majority of EOs were long-standing, they already had 
the core competences for the job (PCS, 2000). However, SBS would not change 
their decision on the Team Leader selection procedure, so PCS sought legal advice 
over this issue. 
Some of the EOs refused to re-apply to become Team Leaders, some of them 
said, "Right, that's it!", and a lot of them left on VR. One or two got 
downgraded ... not very nice, but legally to downgrade by one grade is 
acceptable in the eyes of the law, so there's not much the union could do 
about it. So, we've had some former EOs/ Pay Band 5s who've been 
downgraded to Pay Band 4s and are now basically Team Members. (Paul, 
union officer, interview, 2003) 
As the union rep mentions in the quote above, some EOs were downgraded which 
must have been a humiliating and demoralising experience. Rothman argues that 
such instances of demotion can lead to those workers criticising both the new 
organisational culture and its creators (1998: 289). Yet some EOs refused to re-
apply to become Team Leaders and used VR as a 'get out' clause, especially seeing 
as the selection procedure involved the controversial use of psychometric testing 
(PCS, 2001a). One Team Member described the Team Leader selection exercise as 
"absolutely horrendous", as it created such bitterness and ill-feeling. Indeed, at 
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Glasgow National Savings so few EOs re-applied, that SBS management were forced 
to externally recruit around 30 new Team Leaders. Thus, the mistakes made in the 
Pay Band re-grading exercise, as discussed in chapter three, were repeated. 
Hence, what appears on the surface to be a positive move by SBS in creating 
promotions in a previously stagnating organisation, I would argue is a divisive 
attempt at cultural re-engineering. Firstly, SBS did not initially state that all EOs had 
to re-apply to become Team Leaders. Secondly, delayering had already started under 
'voluntary' redundancy and was exacerbated under Team Working. Thirdly, whilst 
there were a spate ofOVA promotions early on in the 'partnership', these soon dried 
up once the foundations of the new SBS Team Working regime were in place and a 
new cohort of managers had been appointed. Indeed, integration theorists, such as, 
Peters and Waterman (1982), Schein (1991) and Kotter and Heskett (1992) advocate 
the replacement of those members of staff who do not adhere to the new 
organisational culture. This clearly was achieved once National Savings became a 
PPP, as those who were unhappy with the transition to a more commercial culture 
'volunteered' to leave via redundancy. 
However, the use of Team Working as a form of organisational culture change 
is not unique to ex-Civil Service departments; it has also been used in the Civil 
Service, with the Benefits Agency (Foster and Hoggett, 1999) and the Land Registry 
(Smith, 2000) being two examples. In contrast to National Savings, Team Working 
was introduced at the Land Registry progressively over a trial period. Land Registry 
managers also went to visit the Nissan car plant in Washington to see how Team 
Working operated in a different work environment (Smith, 2000); just as other 
management teams have done in the past (Roberts and Strangleman, 1998). Hence, 
there was not the 'big bang' management inspired culture change of NS&I, which 
gave all parties - managers, unions and workers at the Land Registry - time and space 
to discuss any difficulties. In addition, Land Registry management did not deem is 
necessary that EOs re-apply to become Team Leaders (Smith, 2000); thus saving 
much of the animosity of the changes at National Savings. 
The promotion structure of an organisation is always delineated under the 
umbrella that is the management prerogative. There had been a long-established and 
widely accepted promotion culture at National Savings under the Civil Service, yet 
there had been no fluidity within the internal labour market for around a decade. 
Whilst there were promotions at the beginning of the PPP contract under the Open 
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Vacancy Advertising, there were clearly tensions and contradictions, and during my 
research I was fortunate enough to interview two workers coming from different 
positions regarding this issue. 
Whilst the new OVA system was advantageous for some workers, others of the 
'old school' Civil Service traditions felt a loss of status, in that their experience was 
under-valued. Similar feelings were discovered by Roberts and Strangleman (1998) 
in their study on the movement to a new competence-based organisational culture. 
In the interview quote below, Alan talks of the feelings of indignation from the 'old 
school' civil servants towards this new promotion system and, together with the PPP, 
this was one of the main reasons why he decided to leave the organisation via 
'voluntary' redundancy. 
I know this may sound dreadful, but there was a lot of grade jumping 
[through OVA], you could find a Pay Band 1 [employee] going for a Pay 
Band 9 job. I'm not saying they couldn't do the job, but it led to a lot of 
resentment. Some workers were going for much higher posts and you often 
wondered if the interview board just gave them interviews so they could say 
they weren't stopping lower grades going for higher jobs, you know .. .it was 
strange. I'm sure it would be fine for some people, but it just didn't work all 
the time. (Alan, worker, interview, 2003) 
The decision over which employees are promoted and which ones are not, rests 
with management, and as it is competition-based and subjective, it can never satisfy 
everyone. As workers naturally evaluate themselves in relation to their peers over 
such sensitive issues as promotion, it can lead to feelings of frustration and 
discontent for those who are over-looked (Rothman, 1998: ch. 15). There are 
feelings of employee dissatisfaction with both promotion systems at National 
Savings. David claims that those promoted under the Civil Service were merely "in 
the right place at the right time"; whilst Alan asserts that there was "grade jumping" 
under OVA, although he does acknowledge that such backbiting must "sound awful". 
Hence, both David and Alan represent differing schools of thought regarding the best 
promotion system at National Savings. Rothman argues that such feelings of 
frustration can lead to workers seeing the selection procedure as unjust (1998: ch. 15). 
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Whilst some of the 'old school' civil servants at NS&I felt that their status had 
diminished under Team Working, other workers gained from OVA. Most of the 
specialists interviewed had gained promotions under SBS and some workers were 
able to leap grades in a short space of time, in particular, David rapidly progressed to 
become a Resource Co-ordinator. Although some workers have been able to make 
the most of the opportunities offered by SBS, this has been to the detriment of others, 
and some of those who were unhappy with the new Team Working culture left via 
'voluntary' redundancy. 
The change to Team Working was a culture shock to a lot of the older civil 
servants. But I have to say that when we went through the Team Leader 
exercise an awful lot of existing EOs were displaced because they just did 
not cut it. Whereas, we had people coming through who had some really 
fresh ideas. So we ended up with a mix .. .I wouldn't say 50- 50, but a good 
mix of old style and new style Team Leaders. (David, worker, interview, 
2002) 
In the quote above, David claims that the quick transition to Team Working was "a 
culture shock" for many of the 'old school' and he does acknowledge that the 
majority of Team Leaders were newly promoted under OVA. Yet I want to go on to 
argue that such workplace culture transitions are not immediate, it is a negotiated 
process of change, therefore, management are never as fully in control of the 
situation as they would like to be. 
In the interview quote below, a umon rep talks of how SBS attempted to 
culturally cleanse the workplace by appointing a new cohort of Team Leaders. 
The reason for the OVA promotions was that SBS wanted to bring in new 
people who they could mould into their idea of what a Team Leader should 
be. They didn't want EOs who had been here for 15 years and knew what all 
the crack [craie] was. And it's been an absolute bloody nightmare for the 
union because the new Team Leaders haven't got a clue how to deal with the 
union, they don't know about the rules and agreements we've got in place. 
(Paul, union official, interview, 2003) 
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The fact that these new Team Leaders do not seem to be aware of existing workplace 
agreements can be seen as an underhand attempt to move away from the old style 
industrial relations culture of discussion and negotiation, and another attempt to 
marginalise the trade union. 
However, because the new Team Leaders lack expenence and are newly 
appointed, they do not have the full respect of their fellow workers and can be seen 
as simply toeing the company line. 
The problem is that because these Team Leaders are newly in, they haven't 
got the respect of the staff yet. The staff are sitting there thinking they've got 
a new Team Leader telling them all this company rhetoric, and they're saying, 
"Well hang on a second, just a year ago you were sat where I am sitting 
saying the same things I'm saying about you. Now you're sitting there 
saying, "Oh, SBS values", and all this." (Paul, union official, interview, 2003) 
Alan Fox talks of the legitimacy of authority and the acceptance of norms by the 
majority of the workforce (1971: ch. 2). Under the old organisational culture EOs 
were long-standing and highly experienced; hence, they were generally accepted and 
respected. However, other workers interviewed have made the same point that Paul 
makes above, and because the cultural changes introduced by SBS are so new, there 
are problems over management legitimacy, as the old informal team working culture 
is still the very much in existence. 
The Two Differing Experiences of Team Working at Durham 
National Savings and Investments 
It is evident that at DNS&I there are clearly two distinct types of Team Working in 
operation, and despite the claims that this re-organisation of work is new and 
participative, for the most part working life remains much the same as it always has 
done. For the specialist grades, being those who work in the IT, accountancy and 
finance sections, Team Working is closer to the ideal-type, and as these specialists 
are already quite high up the organisational hierarchy, they have always enjoyed 
more job control, autonomy and responsibility. For those who work in the large 
operational branches on the shop floor, although there is new SBS rhetoric about 
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Team Working, for the most part these workers have not enjoyed more employee 
participation. Moreover, both sets of workers are very aware of these key differences 
in the operation of Team Working and know that this does not herald a new dawn. 
Advocates of the Team Working philosophy argue that it generates a true team 
spirit as mangers are now actively involved on the shop floor working side by side 
with Team Members (Peters and Waterman, 1982: ch. 8). Thus, under Team 
Working, responsibilities are devolved giving Team Members more autonomy and 
control over their work (Peters, 1989: 297 - 300. Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: ch. 9). 
Whilst there are variations in how all teams operate at National Savings, I want to 
argue that such notions of employee participation and democracy are, on the whole, 
limited. Yet the Resource Co-ordinator interviewed during my research was 
particularly keen to emphasise such positive notions of Team Working, claiming that 
workers now have more responsibility at work. 
The idea of self-managed teams a year ago/ 18 months ago [at DNS&I] was 
laughed at. What we've tried to do, I think, is introduce self-managed teams 
subconsciously, people are now part of a self-managed team and don't realise 
it. (David, worker, interview, 2002) 
In the quote above, David claims that workers are not actually aware that they are 
now part of a semi-autonomous team. Similarly, Rose (1999) argues that 
psychologically the Team Working philosophy taps into the soul of workers and they 
are governed and self-fulfilled in this way. I want to argue that contrary to these 
claims of Team Working operating at a subliminal level, workers at DNS&I are 
acutely aware that they are Team Members and of the additional work pressures 
which this brings with it. 
At NS&I Team Working is not participatory, Team Leaders are not prepared to 
devolve responsibility to their Team Members, and I will go on to demonstrate how 
this is emblematic of what Fox (1974) calls low-trust employment relations. The 
shop floor workers interviewed argued that as a direct result of Team Working and 
SBS's quest for profitability, there was now a relentless pace of work with added 
pressure and stress for those on the front line. Foster and Hoggett (1999) uncovered 
this in their research on the effects of Team Working in the Benefits Agency. Indeed 
in sharp contrast with the claims made by the newly appointed Resource Co-
151 
ordinator, the quote from the worker below, shows that those on the shop floor are 
very aware of the pressures involved in Team Working and the role that the newly 
appointed SBS managers have in this new regime. 
The new SBS managers are wankers. A lot of them have no people 
management skills. They forget people are human beings, and you're not 
treat with any respect or dignity. It's the mushroom syndrome, you know, 
kept in the dark and fed full of shit! (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
Despite the rhetoric of worker empowerment through semi-autonomous teams, 
there is little change in the traditional structures and forms of management control. 
As many Team Leaders are experiencing the taste of managerial power for the first 
time, they want to maintain their new-found authority and refuse to relinquish control 
to the rest of their team. Also, as some Team Leaders are more established managers 
and used to the old hierarchical order, there is a power struggle between these older 
managers and the new Team Leaders over who is in over all charge. One worker 
described this as "a dog eat dog atmosphere" where Team Leaders play out this 
battle, while the Team Members actually get on with the job in hand. There was a 
similar scenario at the Land Registry, where older established Team Leaders fought 
between themselves as to who was the ruler of the roost (Smith, 2000). Some of the 
extant literature discusses how middle managers attempt to suppress empowerment 
so that they can maintain their power and authority (Moody, 1997: ch. 1. Milkman, 
1998); such low-trust employment relations run counter to the spirit of Team 
Working, and also Team Meetings, which will be analysed next. 
The philosophy behind Team Meetings is that it is a democratic and open forum 
where workers' opinions and ideas are respected and acted upon by Team Leaders 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: ch. 9. Champy, 1995: ch. 6). Hence, through regular 
Team Meetings there is both improved communication and a tangible spirit of co-
operation between all team players (Kanter, 1989: 207 - 208. Peters, 1989: 215 -
216). However, there is a disparity between the rhetoric and reality of Team 
Meetings. Hales (2000) argues that there is an inherent contradiction as management 
want Team Members to have some form of active participation, yet do not want this 
to threaten the prerogative of management. In the case of NS&I, such empowerment 
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IS severely restricted which can create disheartened, disillusioned and cynical 
workers. 
Along with concepts such as team working and worker flexibility, team 
meetings existed at National Savings prior to SBS's imposed philosophy of Team 
Working. There were regular management feedback meetings at National Savings, 
where information cascaded down from the top managers to the executives, and then 
to the administrative staff. Typically there were feedback meetings every month 
detailing: news, production statistics, work flow, stock intakes, work priorities and 
staffing levels. Team Meetings at NS&I take the same form and involve direct 
communication from management to workers, the only difference is in frequency, as 
Team Meetings are now on a daily basis. Team Meetings for those on the shop floor 
usually take place at around 10 - llam, once the previous day's productivity 
statistics are available, and are very much orientated around production targets and 
Key Performance Indicators. Just as other theorists have argued (Garrahan and 
Stewart, 1992. Beale, 1994: ch. 4), Team Meetings at NS&I are under the strict 
control of management and involve direct communication from the managers to the 
Team Members. 
There's a lot of downward communication in Team Meetings. It's very much 
a case of stressing the targets, telling you each day how you're doing on the 
KPis, how much work is in, what has to be cleared. A lot of it is done 
without any problem on a regular basis, but you're more likely to hear of the 
failures rather than the successes, which I think is a big problem. (Michael, 
worker, interview, 2004) 
Once again such low-trust employment relations involve 'the stick' approach, as 
rather than trying to encourage staff and win their loyalty, SBS dwell on the 
negatives, which also mirrors the fact that KPis are penalty based. 
As mentioned earlier, the experience of Team Working varies from team to team, 
but in Michael's team there was an attempt by managers to foster a team spirit by 
encouraging Team Members to conduct Team Meetings. 
In some sections they [Team Leaders] will expect the Team Members to take 
a tum and conduct a Team Meeting. Not everybody is happy about standing 
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in front of a board and presenting a meeting, which strictly speaking as a Pay 
Band 3, you don't have to do. But there again, if push came to shove, I think 
people would be able to use that as a 'get out' clause. (Michael, worker, 
interview, 2004) 
This perceived unnecessary pressure placed on Team Members to conduct meetings 
made staff not only uncomfortable, but it is hardly a form of empowerment as 
workers would be trapped within a strict Team Meeting agenda already pre-set by 
management. 
The Resource Co-ordinator claims that workers were now free to express more 
of an opinion through Team Meetings. However, this is in direct contrast to the 
experiences ofthe Team Members interviewed. 
Ifyou have very strong characters, then it's usually the strong characters that 
are going to speak up in Team Meetings. But sometimes you get a Team 
Leader who says that this isn't the time or place to ask these types of 
questions. And then again you do question that, because obviously if you 
have a query that is specifically work-related or something of relevance, then 
even if they [Team Leaders] don't want to talk about it or answer that 
question at the time, then what they should do is say, "Right, we'll go away 
and come back with an answer and inform the rest of the team at the next 
meeting." (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
As Michael states, Team Leaders do seem to get hot under the collar when asked 
what they deem to be awkward questions by Team Members, and are not keen to 
open up any form of discussion or debate. This echoes Beale's argument that Team 
Meetings are undemocratic (1994: ch. 4). 
Workers are aware that the Team Meeting scenario engenders a false spirit of 
workplace co-operation and that increasing productivity is the primary agenda of 
Team Meetings. This can lead to workers becoming recalcitrant and cynical, as they 
feel that such discussions are highly restrictive and that their opinions are neither 
sought nor valued. 
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Oh, every day you gather around your whiteboard (said in a patronising 
voice), and you have a Team Meeting. And we just take the piss! 
They [the Team Leaders] say, "There's the figures." What else can you say? 
Like I say, we take the piss. You're supposed to stand around and talk for ten 
minutes, but about what?! (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
Regarding the alleged democratic nature of Team Meetings, one Team Member 
summed up the views of the others when asked how Team Meeting decisions were 
made, with the curt reply of "they're not!" Meaning that the Team Meetings are a 
cosmetic exercise; and as critics argue, management maintain the right to veto all 
decisions (Beale, 1994: ch. 4. Moody, 1997). However, it is interesting to note that 
workers from the shop floor feel that SBS's main failure is that they do not genuinely 
listen to the views of the staff. 
All of the specialists and professionals interviewed at DNS&I claimed that their 
experiences of Team Working were very different to those of the workers on the 
shop floor. These professionals worked in small specialist areas and enjoyed more 
job autonomy and control as they were able to see tasks through from the beginning 
to the end, with no separation of conception and execution. Hence, these specialists 
always had workplace flexibility and worked together as a team in a more dynamic 
and genuine sense; rather than Team Working being a form of management 
prescription. 
We do not particularly have Team Working where I work. We work as a 
team and it is a team environment, but it is quite a unique area because most 
people are professionally qualified. There's not really that hierarchical 
structure as such ... we've got quite a flat structure within our office. (Kevin, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
Along with specialists enjoying a more active and participative form of team 
working, this sense of freedom is also replicated with regards to Team Meetings. 
We often have 'get things off your chest' sessions, whereas if anybody's got 
any gripes or isn't happy, our managers like to know about them, and that's 
quite open. In our team that's very good, I'm not saying that permeates 
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through the whole organisation though. But these Team Meetings are not 
democratic, what our big boss says goes at the end ofthe day. But ajob isn't 
a democracy; a job is an autocracy. Although he will listen to your views, so 
there is some room for expression. (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
However, it is important to note that despite these specialists benefiting from a more 
open and inclusive team environment, the power and authority to make key decisions 
rests, as it always has done, with management. 
Together with team working, team meetings and job flexibility, there have 
always been staff suggestion schemes at National Savings. In the past workers could 
make suggestions on how to improve work processes, their ideas would be passed up 
the hierarchy to a management panel, who would then assess the viability of such 
proposals and if they were implemented, workers would receive a financial reward. 
However, under the new Team Working arrangements, staff suggestions operate at 
the level of supposedly improving the team culture and spirit, as rather than offering 
cash prizes, the reward is in benefiting your team. 
We don't offer an incentive to someone and say, "Come up with a good idea 
and we'll give you £50." We say, "Well, at the end of the day you're doing 
the job, if you think you can do it better by doing it a different way, tell us 
what you are going to do and let's try it." But if it goes wrong, then nobody's 
going to come to you and say, "Well, you're an idiot!" You know, there are 
no wrong ideas basically and, certainly in my area, we've tried to adopt that 
culture. (David, worker, interview, 2002) 
Obviously the main difference between the schemes is financial, and a similar system 
was adopted at the Land Registry under the 'Quest For Quality' banner; yet workers 
did complain to the union as they felt that management were implementing their 
ideas and offering nothing in return (Smith, 2000). I want to argue that rather than 
benefiting the team, such staff suggestions result in the intensification of work as 
management decide which ideas to implement, and these proposals must fit in with 
their agenda of increasing productivity and reducing costs (Parker and Slaughter, 
1988. Garrahan and Stewart, 1992. Beale, 1994: ch. 4). 
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Team working, team meetings, flexibility and staff suggestions all existed at 
National Savings prior to SBS taking the reins of power. Despite the rhetoric of 
empowerment, the same top-down power structures remain unchanged. Yet the main 
difference now is that these notions are under even tighter management control. 
Such concepts have been taken a stage further under Lean, and in the next section I 
will analyse how this new initiative has created further workplace pressure. 
From Team Working to Lean 
In the spring of 2003 SBS launched their new Lean initiative and all teams had to 
attend Lean training workshops, as this new philosophy permeates through the whole 
National Savings organisation. Lean is supposed to build on the foundations already 
laid down through Team Working and offer more worker involvement, whilst 
simultaneously reducing waste and improving productivity. This Lean philosophy 
operates along the lines of lean production, which originated in Japanese auto plants, 
and seeing as this is the world's largest industry, it is the pace setter regarding the 
organisation of work (Womack et al, 1990. Moody, 1997: ch. 5. Stewart, 1998). 
Womack et al (1990) coined the term 'lean production' and claim that it is superior 
to all other methods of working as it uses less effort, time and space. They go on to 
argue that the principles of lean production can be applied to all employment settings 
with similarly impressive results and that organisations must become 'lean' in order 
to survive. 
The introduction of this new Lean initiative is linked with the change in 
management teams on the 'partnership' deal, with SBS bringing in new managers 
from different sectors, including Siemens automotive side, which is normally 
associated with lean production. Womack et al (1990) boldly claim that all 
organisations must become 'lean' or face financial ruin. Yet this is not the first time 
that management theorists have made such claims about new working methods, the 
same sentiments have been made in relation to Team Working and Business Process 
Re-engineering. However, critics argue that far from organisations completely 
abandoning established practices and introducing a whole new lean production 
package, the vast majority opt for a 'pick and mix' approach, adapting some 
components to suit their needs (Moody, 1997. Bradley et al, 2000: ch. 2). SBS 
certainly have tried to employ such methods by adopting the concept of 'just in time' 
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stores. Again this comes from auto plants, with the idea of reducing stocks and 
inventory (Beale, 1994: ch. 2). There are also Lean brainstorming sessions at NS&I, 
so workers' knowledge and fresh ideas can be used to improve work processes. 
Beale argues that such shape-up sessions are an attempt by managers to gain workers 
sympathy, by winning over hearts and minds in order to change the organisational 
culture (1994: ch. 4). However, shop floor workers at DNS&I are highly sceptical of 
this new Lean initiative, as Team Working did not result in any more worker 
empowerment. Hence, for those on the frontline, there is a crisis of confidence in the 
claims made by SBS management. Yet I want to go on to argue that Lean does 
involve some team responsibility, but this is constrained within management's 
agenda of control. However, I will demonstrate how workers see through the fa9ade 
of Lean and use their influence to limit the more harmful aspects of this new 
initiative. 
Critics argue that despite the empowerment rhetoric, lean production is 
primarily concerned with reducing costs, increasing productivity, eliminating jobs 
and bypassing trade unions (Moody, 1997: ch. 5. Bradley et al, 2000: ch. 2). The 
interview quotes below, show that workers on the shop floor at DNS&I are acutely 
aware of this, in that not only does the phrase 'lean' give the game away, but it is 
seen as yet another way to reduce the headcount on the NS&V SBS Account. 
Lean is one of these initiatives that has come in simply to save money, no 
other reason. I always think that it's a bit ironic, because if you look at the 
name, it actually tells you what you're doing, you're leaning the business. 
OK, you do get waste, you do get instances where you can look at things and 
say, "Can we do that better?" But you don't need Lean to do that. Basically, 
Lean is seen by a lot of staff as a way of doing yourself out of a job, or being 
moved onto a job that you don't particularly want to do i.e. call centre work. 
We have a situation where a lot of money has obviously been saved through 
Lean, but my question would be that there's a lot of things that have been 
done, which had Lean not been there, we could have still done anyway 
without having to spend a lot of money on indoctrinating the staff. (Michael, 
worker, interview, 2004) 
158 
In my opinion, Lean is designed to sideline the trade union and to get workers 
to come up with ideas, which will lead to them doing themselves out of a job. 
(Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
Lean does claim to offer more worker participation than existed previously 
under Team Working, and in Lean brainstorming sessions workers are encouraged to 
come up with ideas on how to improve their working lives. However, once again 
such empowerment must fit within pre-determined SBS management parameters to 
increase productivity and cut costs, due to the increasing financial pressures on the 
contract. Milkman (1998) argues that such participation schemes can led to worker 
disillusionment, when the rhetoric does not match the reality. These views are 
echoed in the quote below, by a worker who questions the logic of the alleged 'win-
win' scenario. 
In some areas the Lean driver hasn't been about improving the staffs' work; 
it's been about improving productivity and reducing the headcount. The 
main driver has been about getting the work done quicker and losing staff 
numbers. And I think that the staff might go into it open-eyed and think, "Oh, 
Lean is a chance for us to change the way we work." But then if all the 
pressure is just about increasing productivity, I think staff will soon 
understand that and ask, "Where's the 'win-win' for us?" (Kevin, worker, 
interview, 2003) 
Whilst employee participation is restricted under Lean, as all staff proposals 
must be sanctioned by management, workers do have some scope of influence and 
control. The quote below is an excellent example of how workers have been able to 
use their power within semi-autonomous teams to resist the more damaging aspects 
of Lean and protect jobs, thereby avoiding a potentially precarious situation. 
The problem with Lean is that a lot of people do see it as a way of getting 
staff to do one thing, and that is to try and save a lot of money. But when 
Lean first started, SBS wanted the savings to be in relation to labour. Most 
staff have actually been pretty good and they've done it with regard to 
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resources rather than staff, which I'm pleased to see because we could have 
been in a very, very dangerous situation. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
Once again, what Stephenson and Stewart (2001) term 'workplace collectivism' is 
evident, with workers protecting each others' jobs. Foster and Hoggett (1999) also 
argue that an informal team spirit can be employed by workers as part of collective 
'survival strategies'. 
Another negative side to Lean is that productivity targets are pre-set by 
managers, and 'empowered' Team Members then must meet these expectations. 
Thus, the peer pressure from self-policed teams can result in 'horizontal antagonism' 
where workers blame each other for the rising stress of meeting targets, rather than 
management who set such targets in the first place (Bradley et al, 2000: ch. 2). Yet, 
in the quote below, a union official talks ofhow the union were already aware of the 
dangers of peer pressure inherent in Lean, and how this is having a detrimental effect 
in terms of increasing productivity and restrictions on holidays. 
When SBS brought Lean in they said, "This is what we expect it to do and 
it's not about cutting jobs." The union said, "If that's what it's to do, fine, 
we'll support it." But we're already hearing nightmare stories, like we 
expected to hear, about people saying, "Right, we can't get enough leave so 
what we'll do in our team, we'll all agree to come in half an hour early and 
then somebody can have a half day off on Friday. Or, we'll all agree to do 10 
extra cases today and then someone can have a half day off on Friday." The 
danger being, of course, your manager looks and says, "Oh, you all did 10 
extra cases today, well, why can't you do that everyday?" So, then any target 
they've got automatically goes up by 10 cases. (Paul, union official, interview, 
2003) 
However, far from Lean creating 'horizontal antagonism', workers do blame the 
increasing intensity and pressure of work on SBS, together with the problems 
associated with annual leave and sick leave. 
A problem which many workers mentioned throughout the research was that of 
leave, with requests for annual, casual and special leave often being refused by SBS 
on the grounds of 'business need'. Rather than granting special leave for medical 
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appointments, as happened in certain Civil Service departments, SBS prefer staff to 
use their own time. Whilst casual leave places additional strain on teams, refusal has 
had a detrimental effect on staff morale. Yet what has created further problems has 
been the inability of SBS to accommodate worker requests for annual leave, 
particularly during school holidays as the workforce at DNS&I is made up of many 
working mothers. 
Something that would please a lot of people would be better access to leave. 
It's a big problem. I mean everyone's under pressure to get the work done, 
but SBS tend not to let people have casual leave which causes a lot of 
problems. Special leave has also been affected since PPP. About 70% of the 
workers [at DNS&I] are women and many are part-time workers who have 
caring responsibilities, and they've seen that their option for special paid 
leave or unpaid leave has been threatened. (Colin, worker, interview, 2003) 
There is a whole range of literature theorising and analysing the increasing numbers 
of working mothers and the daily struggles they face in juggling the combined 
demands of work and family. This 'double shift' places an enormous burden on dual 
earner couples, and in particular single parent families, and can result in overwork 
and exhaustion (Hochschild, 1990. Schor, 1991. Jacobs and Gerson, 2001. Gornick 
and Meyers, 2003). In the past the Civil Service has shown commitment and 
understanding to the needs of their employees, especially working mothers, by 
offering flexible working arrangements and, for the most part, accommodating all 
summer leave requirements. The union at National Savings have emphasised how 
they would like workers to take an active part in their children's upbringing through 
SBS adopting 'family friendly' employment policies, rather than simply emphasising 
profits (PCS, 1999a and 2001b). Nationally the PCS union have also been 
campaigning for a more realistic 'work- life' balance to avoid rising stress levels and 
employee bum out (PCS, 2004a). 
Successive trade union Branch Reports express concerns over the adverse 
effects that increasing workloads are having on National Savings staff (CPSA, 1996. 
PCS, 1998, 1999a, 2000 and 2001a). All ofthe research interviewees claimed that 
there was relentless pressure at work since the PPP, and the union argue that the 
continual workplace changes under SBS have resulted in rising stress levels (PCS, 
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2001 b). Several critics argue that the intensity of the pace of work in organisations 
today places huge pressure on workers (Schor, 1991. Moody, 1997); and those with 
high job demand and low job control suffer from maximum levels of stress (Parker 
and Slaughter, 1988). Foster and Hoggett (1999) found highly stressed Benefits 
Agency staff due to additional workloads. Furthermore, the PCS union reports that 
60% of all absences in the UK are caused by stress (2004a). However, rather than 
actually dealing with the causes of rising workplace stress, it is more common for 
modem managers to clampdown on sick absence (Schor, 1991. Beynon, 1997). 
Indeed, Sargent goes as far to claim that sick absence is one of the 'British diseases' 
and that a 'common sense' approach is needed to tackle this issue (1990: ch. 1). This 
involves managers recording and documenting all sick absences, then comparing and 
scrutinising the results via the use of trigger points (Sargent, 1990: chs. 3 and 5). 
This management monitoring of sick absence was employed at National Savings 
when the organisation was still part of the Civil Service (CPSA, 1996. PCS, 1998 
and 1999a). This was also the case in the Benefits Agency (Foster and Hoggett, 
1999). Yet this surveillance of sick absence has increased under SBS. The National 
Audit Report states that sick absence under SBS is benchmarked and has fallen from 
8% to 3.1%, which is close to the national average (NAO, 2003: 2, 9 and 31); and 
there will no doubt be pressure for this figure to be reduced year on year. However, 
the use of an increasingly tougher and unsympathetic management stance could 
result in workers feeling compelled to attend work when they are physically and 
psychologically unwell, which could actually compound such problems. 
Under the Civil Service there was a fully trained Welfare Officer to deal with 
any personal issues, including the problem of workplace stress. However, after part-
privatisation the existing Welfare Officer left DNS&I under 'voluntary' redundancy. 
However, SBS did not seek a replacement; instead one of the union reps temporarily 
took up such matters. Recently SBS have decided to introduce an Employee 
Assistance Programme, whereby workers now have to call a helpline. 
Understandably, both staff and the union were unhappy with this new arrangement, 
as this is clearly inappropriate when dealing with confidential and personal matters 
(PCS, 2000). 
Another staffing issue is that in the Civil Service we always had a Welfare 
Officer and a good Personnel Department, but since the PPP that's been 
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whittled down. All of the responsibilities that Personnel used to handle have 
been delegated down to the Line Managers. So we don't have a Welfare 
Officer on site anymore. Instead, what we have is a counseling service at the 
end of a phone line; it's called the Employee Assistance Programme. But 
people don't want to pick up the phone, they want to come face to face with a 
trained professional and discuss their problems. (Colin, worker, interview, 
2003) 
Whilst both the Glasgow and Blackpool sites have retained their Welfare Officers, 
Durham have been without such provision since 2000, and the union officials claim 
that SBS are not prepared to seriously tackle the issue of workplace stress. 
SBS have not brought any health initiatives in. I know someone who has got 
an alternative medicine practice, and Orange [the mobile phone network and 
service provider] at Peterlee bring them in and they'll pay a bit towards the 
fees. They just do absolutely nothing here. We did have a commitment that 
within a year after privatisation SBS were going to look at our stress policy, 
but they're just dithering with it still and you can see they've got no intention. 
They make remarks like, "How can you really identify what is the cause in 
stress? You can't put it down to the workplace, it could be anything." You 
know, they use that as the 'get out' clause. (Tracy, union official, interview, 
2001) 
From the interviews with workers at DNS&I, it is quite clear what they perceive 
to be the main causes of workplace stress, namely: the relentless change programmes 
and uncertain future, together with increasing targets and pressures, so that SBS can 
make the contract profitable. Indeed, this situation is summed up very concisely in 
the following interview quote. 
Basically what SBS want to be able to do is, they want as few as staff as 
possible, as cheaply as possible, doing as much work as possible. For that 
reason, nobody can regard their job as ever being 100% safe. (Michael, 
worker, interview, 2004) 
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Another factor which has added to this workplace stress is the use of Key 
Performance Indicators on the PPP contract, and it is this issue which will be 
analysed next. 
Key Performance Indicators and the Problems of Measuring 
Organisational Effectiveness 
Key Performance Indicators are used in a wide variety of workplace settings, and are 
now commonly used throughout both the public and private sectors. KPis are found 
in areas as diverse as: hospitals, schools, universities, police forces, courts, local 
authorities, prisons, supermarkets, banks and building societies (Jowett and Rothwell, 
1988. Pollitt, 1990. Carteret al, 1992). Generally, Performance Indicators or KPis 
are used to target job completion times and measure effectiveness, accountability and 
financial performance (Carter et al, 1992. Hiles, 1993). However, the use of such 
forms of assessment can be controversial, with the publication of league tables in the 
populist contexts of health and education (Jowett and Rothwell, 1988: chs. 2 and 5. 
Carteret al, 1992: 4). 
As previously mentioned in chapter two, Performance Indicators were first 
introduced into the Civil Service through the Financial Management Initiative in the 
early 1980s. Carter et al argue that this started the Whitehall love affair with KPis 
(1992: 165). This is significant as it is the starting point for a cultural transition, as 
Performance Indicators are an integral part of New Public Management with the aim 
of organisations making year on year improvements. The foundations laid down by 
the FMI were built upon through Agency Status, as Agency Framework Documents 
set out performance targets and delivery objectives which were measured by KPis 
(Carteret al, 1992. Fairbrother, 1994. Jackson, 1994. Pilkington, 1999). The use of 
KPis was aimed at creating a more commercial culture in the Civil Service 
(Fairbrother, 1994. Jackson, 1994). Indeed by 1987, there were in excess of 1, 800 
Performance Indicators used throughout the service (Pollitt, 1990: 53). Agency-wide 
targets cascade down to individual offices, then they are devolved to the sections 
within offices and on to individual workers. These targets are often tied in with 
Performance-Related Pay, in order to further change organisational culture (Carteret 
al, 1992: ch. 2) - and the problems of this will be analysed later in the chapter. 
Contracting out also goes hand in hand with devolved budgets and KPis, as services 
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are benchmarked to certain standards and have to be delivered to assessed objectives 
related to time, cost and accuracy (Hiles, 1993). This happened with both 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering and Market Testing at National Savings. 
Although Performance Indicators appear to be neutral, there is a political 
process in operation which is financial, social and historical (Pollitt, 1990. Carter et 
al, 1992). The performance of the public sector was monitored prior to 1979, but it 
was only under the first Thatcher Conservative government that serious attempts 
were made at driving forward an agenda of commercialisation and privatisation. 
Hence, the use of Performance Indicators is a profoundly political act aimed at 
increasing productivity, whilst placing public expenditure under stricter government 
control (Jowett and Rothwell, 1988). KPis in the Civil Service operate entirely on 
the prerogative of management, in that targets are defined and set from the top and 
run down through organisations; and these goals consistently increase year on year. 
Hence, there are debates over what are acceptable targets and how services are to be 
measured, quantified and compared (Jowett and Rothwell, 1988. Carter et al, 1992). 
Pollitt (1990) argues that Performance Indicators are primarily concerned with 
measuring efficiencies and cutting costs, rather than delivering effectiveness. Indeed, 
KPis create a bureaucracy all of their own via the collecting, collating and 
monitoring of statistics. Moreover, the imposition of such indicators from above can 
be more about meeting set criteria, rather than actually improving the service 
delivery. Furthermore, KPis may not give the true picture as only certain aspects of 
work may be assessed, plus some work can take priority over other tasks in order to 
make the statistics look impressive. 
Although KPis are used throughout all Civil Service Agencies (Gagnon, 1996), 
very few staff I interviewed at Durham National Savings knew of their existence 
prior to the Public-Private Partnership. This is completely different to the 
organisational culture at Durham Land Registry where all workers were made very 
aware of the use of KPis, which were tied in with Business Plans and 'team targets'. 
Through the achievement of these objectives, all members of staff were rewarded 
with an annual 'Corporate Bonus'. However, this is cultural manipulation as the 
Land Registry is neither a business nor a corporation, and Kevin Kelly, the union 
Branch Secretary argues that the use of KPis did create additional pressure for staff 
(Smith, 2000). 
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The use of KPis at National Savings is much more explicit now that the 
organisation is a 'partnership'. There has been a major change in the organisational 
culture as all workers are now acutely aware of the importance of KPis, and the 
pressure and stress that they bring. Carter et al ( 1992) recognise three types of KPis, 
the first are prescriptive KPis, which set out organisational objectives and targets. 
Secondly, there are descriptive KPis, these are used to record change, for example, 
improvements in error rates, which are then compared year on year. Finally, there 
are proscriptive KPis, which are negative indicators to penalise mistakes which 
should not happen in well run organisations. Carter et al argue that most 
organisations have a mixture of all three types of KPis (1992: 49 - 50). The KPis at 
National Savings are set by the Treasury and NS&I, and detail the standards of 
performance that SBS must achieve on the contract. In addition, the performance of 
SBS is benchmarked against the market by comparing the time and costs of 
operations against other organisations which are the best in the field (NAO, 2003: 1 
and 28). There are numerous KPis at National Savings, which are aimed at 
improving service levels, speed of response and accuracy levels (NAO, 2003: 9). 
For example, 'KPI Eleven' stipulates that all cheques received must be banked the 
same day, and there are Platinum, Gold and Silver KPis, indicating their level of 
importance. However, all of these indicators are set negatively as they are penalty 
based, in that SBS are fined if they fail to hit KPI targets, but they are not rewarded if 
they meet or exceed them. For instance, if SBS achieve 99% of all KPis then they 
are fined, yet if they surpass all KPI targets by 150% then they do not receive any 
financial bonuses. This is again emblematic of low-trust employment relations, yet 
this time it is between NS&I and the Treasury on one hand, and SBS on the other. 
As previously outlined in chapter two, upon taking office in May 1997 'New' 
Labour set about an extensive overhaul of the existing PPP and PFI systems, as 
'partnerships' would now be tied to rigorous performance targets with measured 
outcomes (Blair, 1998: ch. 5. HM Treasury, 2000). The public sector specifies what 
is expected of the private 'partner' in terms of levels of service and performance. 
The responsibilities and risks involved are then transferred over to the private sector, 
with serious implications if they fail to deliver (HM Treasury, 2000). 
Regarding the use of KPis at National Savings, in the first three years of the 
contract, SBS achieved 98% of the targets set, but were fined a total of £2.1 million 
(NAO, 2003: 3). In the first year SBS were fined £0.1 million, in the second it was 
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£0.7 million, this went up to a record £1.3 million in the third year and by the fourth 
SBS incurred £454, 000 in KPI fines (NAO, 2003: 17). The main reason for the 
sharp rise in financial penalties is that SBS failed to complete the business 
transformation as stipulated in the PPP contract by December 2000 (NAO, 2003: 26 
and 33). However, as SBS did not complete this programme by the required date, 
there is a snowball effect as KPI targets continue to mount up and SBS must improve 
their performance even though they are already falling behind schedule in this deal 
(NAO, 2003: 33). 
All of the workers and union reps interviewed at DNS&I spoke of how the use 
of KPis had increased pressure on staff throughout the organisation. Workers were 
very aware of the negative fine inducing element of KPis, as SBS emphasised that 
they did not want to incur KPI fines and aimed to make a profit on this PPP deal. In 
similar studies on PPP/ PFI contracts, both Grimshaw et al (2002) and Hebson et al 
(2003) argue that penalty based KPis impose intense pressure on workers. Moreover, 
Hebson et al (2003) found that this is exacerbated through under-staffing. This is the 
same scenario at NS&I, where due to an over-ambitious redundancy policy the same 
amount of work is being completed by half of the number of staff. This places 
considerable pressure on those workers remaining and SBS management frequently 
use overtime to achieve KPI goals (PCS, 200la). Carter et al (1992) talk of the 
importance of changing the organisational culture by making Performance Indicators 
meaningful to staff. However, the use of KPis after the Public-Private Partnership 
seems to have just induced fear at National Savings. In the account below, Alan 
talks of the 'ridiculous pressure' placed on workers through the use of KPis and of 
SBS 'management paranoia' of incurring fines. 
The pressure was ridiculous after the PPP. You were still doing the same job, 
basically in the same way, but under National Savings if you did make a 
mistake you had leeway to put it right. But under SBS, and I think this was 
part of the government's fault when they assigned them the contract, they 
wrote that many tight rules and regulations in through Key Performance 
Indicators. KPis were the bane of our life. In our section we had the only 
two Gold KPis in the building and you had to balance the accounts to the 
exact penny every day, and you got fined every day until you put it right. 
With these Gold KPis you're talking£ mid-6 figures per day, which is a lot 
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of money. So, SBS were quite paranoid, they seemed paranoid to us [the 
staff] and it got to the point where you were triple checking everything before 
you actually did it. And SBS managers used to come running down the room 
shouting, "You got this wrong!" You know, that didn't instil any confidence. 
(Alan, worker, interview, 2003) 
There have been some successes for SBS regarding KPis, the target time for 
responding to customer requests at National Savings used to be 9 days, this was 
reduced to 7 days and now stands at 3 days (NAO, 2003: 9). Also, customer 
satisfaction increased by 9% in 2002, standing at 94%, which is above the major 
competitors in the field and customer complaints are 0.2%, with 0.1% being upheld 
(NAO, 2003: 18). However, there were initial problems and debates over KPI 
assessment through customer surveys, which led to SBS designing a new postal 
survey and employing another company to conduct telephone surveys to more 
accurately measure customer satisfaction (NAO, 2003: 17 -18). 
As KPis are measured by time scales, for instance, the number of days it takes to 
issue documents, correspondence or payments; Pollitt (1990) argues that such 
assessments are based on Taylorism and managerial control. In the case of quality at 
National Savings, many workers interviewed felt that SBS were more concerned 
about meeting the criteria required, rather than delivering a true quality service to 
customers. Moreover, the emphasis on hitting certain KPI targets has led to the 
prioritising of particular types of work to the detriment of other tasks, which goes 
against the ethos of bureaucracy. Indeed, Hebson et al (2003) also found aspects of 
KPI 'cherry picking' in their study of 'partnerships'. 
As mentioned earlier, there are problems over the definition, collection and 
assessments of KPis. This is also the case at National Savings, as during October 
2002 SBS were officially contesting a number of KPI fines (NAO, 2003: 17). This 
led to NS&I agreeing to cut the number of KPis on the account from 42 to 23, 
through merging some indicators and also reducing the performance deductions in 
order to modify the PPP deal (NAO, 2003: 4 and 26). Due to these adjustments SBS 
are now delivering services to the required KPI standards (NAO, 2003: 4). Carteret 
al (1992) criticise the use of KPis and argue that it can lead to an over-production of 
statistics. Furthermore, the situation at National Savings is not unique, as Hebson et 
al (2003) also found in their study of 'partnerships' that KPis had to be redefined. 
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In the next section I will analyse how Key Performance Indicators have been 
delegated down to measure individual and team performance at NS&I, as an ever 
more complicated and contested picture of pay and financial rewards develops. 
Performance-Related Pay and Team-Based Performance Pay- Ever 
More Complex and Controversial Rewards Systems 
The increasing use of Performance-Related Pay (PRP) from the 1980s onwards has 
been widely documented, as it spread from the private sector to the public sector and, 
simultaneously, from senior managers to the majority of the workforce (Connell and 
Wood, 1992: ch. 4. Smith, 1992. Hume, 1995. Heery and Salmon, 2000). The use of 
incentive pay is not a new phenomenon, its foundations were in scientific 
management as Taylor believed that workers were motivated by economic rewards, 
which led to the piece-rate system ofpayment on results (Connell and Wood, 1992: 
ch. 2. Smith, 1992. Beale, 1994). PRP operates on a similar premise as it ties 
payment in with individual employee performance, and it is closely linked with New 
Public Management, together with Performance Management (Connell and Wood, 
1992: ch. 5. Hume, 1995. Gagnon, 1996) and Human Resource Management (Smith, 
1992. Torrington et al, 2002: ch. 36). Managers have used PRP as a tool to change 
organisational cultures and move away from the standard pay for the grade model to 
individual merit pay (Smith, 1992. Gagnon, 1996). This individualises the 
employment relationship with the notion that workers are now enterprising and in 
business for themselves (du Gay, 1996). As KPI objectives are set for organisations, 
they are tied in with Performance-Related Pay, hence workers are now increasingly 
accountable for their activities. 
Advocates of PRP argue that it is a motivational tool and rewards the best 
achievers, whereas hierarchical pay was based on rank rather than contribution 
(Connell and Wood, 1992: ch. 4). Thus, employees have more control over their pay 
as it is dependant upon their annual performance, which means that pay is now not 
only more flexible, but a more cost effective scheme (Torrington et al, 2002: ch. 36). 
Such PRP assessments improve not only individual, but overall organisational 
performance, and are an essential ingredient to personal development (Hume, 1995). 
However, these claims are hotly contested, and I will go on to demonstrate that PRP 
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demotivates staff and is a method of cutting the wage bill through the imposition of 
quotas. 
Performance-Related Pay was introduced to National Savings when the 
organisation was still part of the Civil Service (CPSA, 1996), which is further 
evidence ofthe process of culture change before part-privatisation. PRP was initially 
introduced for senior managers in the Civil Service under the Financial Management 
Initiative (Fairbrother, 1994). This scheme was extended with Agency Status, where 
a market-rate remuneration package was on offer to attract Chief Executives from the 
private sector (Pilkington, 1999: ch. 8), in order to transform the culture of the Civil 
Service under New Public Management. After the restructuring of the Civil Service 
and the devolution to Agency Status, from the mid-1990s onwards all Agency Pay 
negotiations now included an element of PRP added on to the overall pay settlement 
(Gagnon, 1996). The dissemination of PRP is a political act and the Conservative 
governments of Thatcher and Major were keen to cultivate an enterprising spirit in 
the public sector (Pollitt, 1990: ch. 3. Smith, 1992. Fairbrother, 1994); and 'New' 
Labour also encourage the use of such flexible pay arrangements (Pilkington, 1999: 
ch. 8. Morgan et al, 2000). 
The Treasury set KPI targets for National Savings, both when it was a 
government Agency and now that it is a Public-Private Partnership. These targets 
cascade down to each office and then to departments within offices, and managers 
then assess the performance of each worker, which is the basis for their annual PRP 
award. The introduction of PRP signalled the end of the traditional Civil Service pay 
for the grade system, with the imposition of pay ladders for each grade and 
progression was dependent upon annual report box markings (Pyper, 1995). 
Employee annual reports are graded from 'Box 1' being excellent to 'Box 5' which 
is poor, obviously the highest proportion of PRP goes to those workers who receive 
the best marking, and this is steadily reduced if workers are awarded a 'Box 2' and a 
'Box 3'. For those workers who are deemed not to have performed to the standard 
required and receive annual report markings of 'Box 4' or 'Box 5', then they receive 
no PRP, only the basic pay award. Hence, not only does the introduction of pay 
scales based on PRP make pay a much more complex issue, it can also create 
animosity and resentment. 
Civil Service and public sector trade umons have been consistently and 
fundamentally opposed to the principle of PRP (Pollitt, 1990: ch. 5. Pyper, 1995. 
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Gagnon, 1996. Morgan et al, 2000). The PCS union (1999b) argues that 
Performance-Related Pay is divisive, counter-productive, subjective and inherently 
unfair. 
Performance-Related Pay creates a division of the workforce, it is ineffective 
and it doesn't do what management say it's going to do. It alienates the 
majority of the workforce and only incentivises the minority. (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2002) 
Although PRP remains at National Savings, the union were successfully able to 
negotiate a reduction in the proportion of the pay award which is performance-
related. Hence, the majority of the annual pay settlement remains under collective 
bargaining, as it always has done. Indeed, Connell and Wood (1992: ch. 5) argue 
that some public sector managers were sceptical as to whether PRP was appropriate 
outside of the private sector. Moreover, Gagnon (1996) claims that many Civil 
Service managers thought that PRP was counter-productive and divisive, but this 
directive was forced upon Agencies by the Conservative government. 
All of the workers interviewed felt that as PRP awards were based on their 
managers' opinions, it was not only subjective, but placed undue pressure on staff 
and, in many cases, this was divisive and actually demotivated workers. Foster and 
Hoggett (1999) also found this in their research in the Benefits Agency, and some 
managers did acknowledge that PRP did cause hostility and resentment amongst staff. 
Performance-Related Pay is unfair and divisive. No matter how they say it's 
monitored, personal bias always comes into it. Performance-Related Pay 
caused a lot of bad feeling amongst staff ... you know. I think, in the 
beginning, the thought of it motivated a certain number of staff, but it 
demotivated a lot more. I think it has no effect now. (Angela, worker, 
interview, 2001) 
In the interview quote above, Angela argues that initially PRP did motivate some of 
the staff at DNS&I. Yet through union negotiations, PRP is such a small proportion 
of the pay deal, its impact now is minimal. Connell and Wood (1992: ch. 4), and 
also Smith (1992), argue that the proportion of PRP bonuses should be high in order 
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to motivate staff. Yet Performance-Related Pay was deeply unpopular with staff at 
DNS&I, and rather than being a motivational tool, it was counter-productive. Even 
those workers who benefited financially from it, were also critical of the principle of 
PRP and could see how divisive it was. 
Well, I always had good annual reports, so I always did alright out of 
Performance-Related Pay. But I could see how unfair it was for some people, 
due to the subjective reporting of managers. I always argued against 
Performance-Related Pay. (Colin, worker, interview, 2003) 
Performance-Related Pay was a big issue at National Savings. It created a lot 
of ill-feeling between people that you were working with. I was always 
alright with it [PRP], you know, I always got a decent box marking in my 
annual report, so I gained from it; whereas some of the people who probably 
did as good a job as me, didn't. I was one of the lucky ones that probably got 
a higher box marking. (Jason, worker, interview, 2003) 
The contradiction whereby the individualistic nature of PRP runs counter to the 
collective spirit of organisations has been widely documented (Smith, 1992. Gagnon, 
1996. Foster and Hoggett, 1999). Yet this clash is exacerbated with the introduction 
of Team Working by SBS. 
Connell and Wood (1992: ch. 4) claim that PRP improves staff communication 
and development. However, the PCS union argue the opposite, as workers would be 
more inclined to cover up their weaknesses because any admittance could well have 
a negative impact on their annual report box marking and, consequently, their pay 
rise (PCS, 2000). 
I believe performance-Related Pay meant that there wasn't an open 
discussion about personal development i.e. if you knew your pay rise was on 
the back of your staff appraisal system, the likelihood is if your manager says, 
"Right, let's identify your strengths and your weaknesses, so we can put you 
through a development course for your weaknesses and have a better overall 
employee out of you." The likelihood is that you would start arguing about 
your weaknesses, because you knew it might affect your pay at the end of the 
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day. Now a refreshing approach to that would be a frank discussion where 
you'd say, "Oh well, I need to develop in my customer telephone handling 
techniques." But in the back of your mind, through the Performance-Related 
Pay system you're thinking, "Oh, I'm not going to get a pay rise if I start 
saying this is where I need to develop." And I think that's what undermines 
the individual in terms of how the appraisal should work, and also it 
undermines the PRP system. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
The use of PRP was further undermined when it was revealed that there were 
financial quotas set by the Treasury, thus restricting the amount of PRP which could 
be paid out for each reporting year (CPSA, 1996. PCS, 1998, 1999b and 2000). 
Indeed Foster and Hoggett (1999), and also Connell and Wood (1992: ch. 5), have 
reported the use of PRP quotas in the Civil Service. Whilst Gagnon (1996) argues 
that PRP can result in 'collective kindness' with the generous awarding of bonuses to 
staff, a point which Torrington et al (2002: ch. 36) also reiterate; I will show how it 
was just the opposite at National Savings, as quotas were used to reduce the overall 
pay bill. 
Due to the imposed spending restrictions through quotas, all annual reports and 
projected PRP increases had to be approved by senior management, so that they met 
the statistical expectations of departments. This not only made all managers more 
conscious of labour costs, but it led to the suppressing of annual report box markings 
so that offices could remain in budget (Foster and Hoggett, 1999. PCS, 1999b). For 
instance, if there was an excellent team of workers, the manager could not reward all 
employees with 'Box 1' grades as this would not only completely distort the year's 
statistical expectation, but there would not be the finances available to distribute such 
awards. Therefore, 'Box 3' became the standard award so that management could 
meet the required statistical expectation and remain in budget. 
Let's be honest, Performance-Related Pay was an absolute nonsense. 
Management didn't call them quotas, but you can call them what you like, 
they're quotas. There were experts telling us that with the statistical 
expectations for this Agency, you would have X% as a 'Box 1 ',X% would 
be 'Box 2' and X% would be 'Box 3'. But you could have a table of 10 
people, now they've all done that same job for 10 years, all at the same 
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standard, but you weren't able to give them all the same box marking because 
it knocked out your statistical expectations. (Jim, union official, interview, 
2002) 
The use of quotas due to statistical expectations demotivated and disheartened staff, 
particularly as many were vastly qualified, experienced and skilled, and felt that this 
should have been reflected with rising PRP bonuses. 
Furthermore, PRP quotas increasingly placed middle managers in a difficult 
position as they had to write their staffs' annual reports to meet these departmental 
statistical expectations; this is a point which the trade union also acknowledges (PCS, 
1999b). One of the research interviewees, Alan, was a reporting officer at DNS&I 
and he offers a unique perspective, as not only was he under pressure as the report 
markings he awarded his staff influenced their annual pay, but these box markings 
had to meet departmental quotas. In the quote below, Alan explains how all of the 
staffs' annual reports markings were collated across the National Savings department 
for approval, and reports would be returned to reporting officers to be re-marked if 
they did not meet the pre-set statistical expectations. 
Performance-Related Pay did cause a lot of resentment, definitely. It also 
made writing staff annual reports more difficult, particularly when they came 
out with this ratio. The statistical expectation was that you could only have a 
certain number of staff on each particular box mark in one branch. Our 
managers used to take the report markings away and they would go to the 
board room in Durham, and then the other National Savings divisions would 
have video conferencing. There was this statistical expectation that you can 
only have 'X' number of 'Box ls', '2s' and '3s' and possibly a '4' -but don't 
mention 'Box 4s'! And report marks got sent back if the statistical 
expectation wasn't correct, you would get them again to re-visit the marks. 
(Alan, worker, interview, 2003) 
Alan states that PRP did create division and bitterness amongst staff, particularly 
regarding the awarding of 'Box 4s', as such workers would receive no Performance-
Related Pay. 
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Due to the divisive nature of Performance-Related Pay and the proven use of 
quotas, the trade union representatives at DNS&I had more and more disputed annual 
reports to deal with (CPSA, 1996. PCS, 1999b and 2000). In 1997 there were 70 
members' personal cases due to the alleged down-marking of reports (CPSA, 1997). 
Unsurprisingly, trade union members consistently voted for the abolition of 
Performance-Related Pay (PCS, 1999b and 2001c). Almost all of the research 
interviewees were highly disillusioned with PRP; although two of the specialists 
wanted to see a small element of remuneration to reward good performers, but they 
emphasised that this must be additional money and not tied to quotas. Yet this does 
not get away from the fact that all PRP awards are subjective, and there is very little 
hard evidence to prove that such reward systems actually motivate workers (Smith, 
1992). 
Moreover, PCS research shows that Performance-Related Pay discriminates 
against part-time, disabled and ethnic minority staff (PCS, 2001 c). Analysis of PRP 
in the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions shows that white 
workers were three times more likely than their black and Asian counterparts to 
receive higher awards (PCS, 1999b ). In addition, as PRP is percentage-based, those 
on higher rates of pay receive more PRP; hence it discriminates against the low-paid 
(PCS, 1999b ). There is also concern from the union about the general lack of female 
progression up the pay scales (PCS, 200la). 
Connell and Wood (1992) have noted the frustration that under PRP few public 
sector workers manage to make it to the top of their respective pay scales. This was 
already an issue at National Savings due to the imposition of quotas, but the problem 
has been compounded under Open Vacancy Advertising, because those who have 
been recently promoted have, in a number of cases, jumped several Pay Bands in one 
go and have entered their new grade at the pay scale minimum. Yet those members 
of staff who are long-established in the hierarchy have been able to steadily progress 
up the pay scales. This creates huge disparities in pay between workers who are 
doing exactly the same job (PCS, 2001 c), and as David explains, this pay system 
creates divisions amongst staff and can be counter productive, rather than a 
motivational tool. 
If I was going to do one thing to increase job satisfaction here, I would 
harmonise the pay rates. Obviously when we moved to Performance-Related 
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Pay we created Pay Bands and pay ranges, and this led to the situation where 
there are people who are thousands and thousands and thousands of pounds 
apart, but are doing exactly the same job. But because they haven't done that 
job for so long or they haven't been here as long as the other person, they're 
way, way behind. For example, in my office there are two Team Leaders, 
one is on £14, 400 [per annum] and one is on £22 grand, but this is because 
one has been an EO for 15 years. In my grade there's £12, 000 difference 
between what I get [as a Resource Co-ordinator] and what somebody who 
was a Pay Band 6 longer than me earns, because I went from Pay Band 3 to 
Pay Band 6, so I started on the minimum. What it does, is it creates 
somebody saying, "Well, why the hell should I bother?" (David, worker, 
interview, 2002) 
Yet despite all of the criticisms of PRP, the use of quotas and often huge pay 
differentials; managers, the 'New' Labour government and the Conservatives remain 
undeterred and continue to endorse this system of remuneration. 
If the remuneration system at National Savings based on PRP was not unpopular 
and complicated enough, SBS then mooted a plan to individually monitor all staff so 
that PRP would play an even greater role. However, there had previously been a 
system to individually reward typists with bonus payments based on typing speeds, 
but this was later abandoned as many typists began to suffer from Repetitive Strain 
Injury, with the union successfully winning numerous compensation claims (CPSA, 
1997. PCS, 1998). Nationally and locally the PCS union are fundamentally opposed 
to the principle of Performance-Related Pay (PCS, 2001c). Hence, SBS and the 
union were poles apart on this issue and negotiations continued to drag on for over 
two years. Finally, the two sides went to the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (ACAS) in 2003 where a compromise was reached, with an agreement to 
introduce Team-Based Performance Pay- the details of the negotiations at ACAS 
are analysed in chapter six. It was the union who proposed the introduction of Team-
Based Performance Pay as they saw it as the lesser of two evils, as it takes out some 
of the individuality of the pay scheme. All teams at NS&I are equalised in that there 
is a mix of both grades and experience, and there are assurances that there is no 
competition between teams. Group-based bonus payments are not a new idea, they 
were originally used in the textile industry (Connell and Wood, 1992: ch. 2), and 
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they work under the premise that as everyone within a team is paid the same rate, it 
builds collectivism (Greenhill, 1990: ch. 9). 
Whilst the trade union reps believe that Team-Based Performance Pay is a fairer 
system in comparison to PRP, they are also aware of the potentially divisive nature 
of this system. The achievement of daily team targets results in all Team Members 
receiving financial rewards. However, the setting of team-based targets is all down 
to the prerogative of management. Whilst Team-Based Performance Pay is still very 
new at NS&I, there could be problems of peer pressure with strong Team Members 
blaming other workers for not sufficiently helping the team reach their targets and 
subsequent bonus payments. 
I think one of the main problems of Team-Based Performance Pay is peer 
pressure. Obviously you can get somebody who can kick out an amazing 
amount of work. Whereas, you might get somebody who isn't quite so 
competent, but they can still do a decent day's work. But then because 
they're not doing quite so much, the pressure will be put on them to put out 
even more. As in any situation, you will get people who very much want to 
look after number one, they want to be the ones who stand out and if there's 
an extra 10 quid to get, it doesn't matter what needs to be done, they will 
want that full 10 quid. It's very much a situation of, "If I don't get that 10 
quid, it's your fault!", and they will point the finger. Managers are having a 
very good time of it, because they're saving a lot of money because they've 
got people doing their job for them. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
As the worker quoted above states, Team-Based Performance Pay can run counter to 
the team spirit through creating horizontal antagonism, whereby Team Members 
police each other and blame their fellow workers for not achieving targets, rather 
than blaming managers who set such targets in the first instance. This can result in 
workers being even more pressurised to achieve targets and sacrificing casual leave 
for fear of letting the team down. 
The employee remuneration system at National Savings has become 
increasingly more complex. Under the Civil Service there was national standard pay 
for the grade, which was covered under collective bargaining, but this was devolved 
after Agency Status with the introduction of Agency Pay. PRP was then introduced 
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into the Civil Service, whereby part of the annual pay rise was covered by collective 
bargaining, with a proportion being performance-related with the introduction of pay 
scales. Yet due to the use of quotas, progression up the pay scales was severely 
restricted. After SBS took over National Savings, a new system was implemented 
whereby there was to be an annual pay rise under collective bargaining, where an 
element of PRP remains, together with Team-Based Performance Pay. Such 
complicated and convoluted pay systems are a bureaucratic nightmare and could 
create further complications with staff movement between teams. The situation has 
become even more complex with the formation of a multi-tier workforce under SBS. 
The Creation of a Multi-tier Workforce 
The emerging web of Third Party Business was analysed in chapter four, together 
with the complex new employment relationships with SBS moving staff onto new 
work under differing terms and conditions. In this section I will examine the new 
multi-tier workforce created by SBS since part-privatisation. At the core of this new 
relationship are ex-civil servants who had their employment transferred over to SBS 
under TUPE legislation, and these employees continue to make up the majority of 
the workforce. Meanwhile, on the periphery are two sets of workers who differ from 
core employees in that their employment is not as permanent or secure, who are on 
alternative terms and conditions. Yet the experiences of these two sets of peripheral 
employees differ considerably as they consist of SBS employed managers and 
specialists, and temporary workers employed by a private sector employment agency. 
SBS managers and specialists are on far higher rates of pay than the rest of the NS&I 
workforce. However, agency workers are on inferior terms and conditions, with 
severely restricted opportunities and are not allowed to join the trade union. They 
are on lower wages than core NS&I staff, plus the private sector employment agency 
takes a cut of their pay. I will analyse and explain the complexities and problems of 
SBS importing a private sector multi-tier organisational culture to National Savings. 
Under the Civil Service it was common for government Agencies to employ 
casual workers. Indeed, Fairbrother (1994) analysed the use of such flexible forms 
of employment in both the Benefits Agency and the Inland Revenue ( chs. 5 and 7). 
Casual workers were drafted in as a short-term measure to help departments deal 
with heavy work periods, yet this could also be a route to permanent Civil Service 
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employment (ch. 7). This was also the case at National Savings when it was still part 
of the Civil Service. 
Now that National Savings has been partially-privatised, rather than employing 
casual short-term staff, SBS prefer to bring in temporary workers through a private 
sector employment agency. The rise of temporary employment in Britain is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, which has increased considerably from the early 
1990s and is now a common feature of the public services (Morgan et al, 2000. 
Robinson, 2000). SBS employ approximately 400 agency workers (PCS, 2004b) and 
they are mainly employed either on Third Party Business contracts - particularly the 
Barclays Account in Glasgow - or in the call centre. Agency workers are usually 
deployed to cover work that core NS&I employees are reluctant to volunteer for, due 
to concerns over changing terms and conditions or the unsociable hours involved. 
There are similarities between casual and agency employment in that such work is 
routine, low-paid and insecure; but there are key differences as the interviewee below 
explains. 
Under the Civil Service most workers were on fixed contracts, but you also 
used to occasionally have casual staff. Now the casual staff are slightly 
different to the agency staff, in that with the casual staff it was very much on 
the understanding that you may only be in here for maybe five or six weeks, 
during a particular peak period and then you were on your way. But the thing 
is, the use of agency staff is endemic in the private sector, the main reason for 
that is that they can employ them on lesser contracts and they don't have to 
give them the same terms and conditions. So at the end of the day, it is a 
much, much cheaper package for them. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
Temporary employment at National Savings shares some of the features of the 
'McJob', in that it is low waged, low status, entry level work, with very limited 
opportunities for personal development (Ritzer, 2002. Lindsay and McQuaid, 2004). 
In keeping with the market norm, the majority of the agency workers at NS&I are 
young (PCS, 2004b ). Moreover, in their research on the service sector Lindsay and 
McQuaid (2004) found that older men were increasingly reluctant to take temporary 
call centre work. Whilst casual work was short term, a growing trend is for 
temporary agency workers to be no longer temporary, in that their contracts can be 
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extended from year to year (Klein, 2000: ch. 10). This is also the case at NS&I, with 
some agency employees being in post for up to three years (PCS, 2004b ). Thus, SBS 
have a two-tier workforce in operation made up of core NS&I employees and 
peripheral agency workers on lesser terms and conditions, who are on lower rates of 
pay and have very limited opportunities of being made permanent members of staff. 
Well, harking back to when SBS first took over [National Savings], and 
something which they have repeated on numerous occasions, is that they say 
they're not a cheap labour company. But, of course, what happened was, in 
our particular area, because they let so many permanent staff go on voluntary 
redundancy and the work is too much for those left, they've had to draft in 
agency staff. And the thing is, because the agency staff are on short-term 
contracts, it means that SBS can finish them at any time, they don't need to 
be employed for more than six months ahead, because obviously they then 
get into the realms of having to make people full-time members of staff, 
which they don't want to do. But the simple reason is that without the agency 
staff we would be in an even worse state than we are now. But SBS will not 
recruit permanent staff and this totally goes against the image of not being a 
cheap labour company. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
As temporary workers legally have less employment protection, they are easily 
disposable. At the end of my research SBS were given the green light to offshore 
work to India, which resulted in the bulk of the agency workers losing their jobs. 
There was a campaign by the union to oppose this move, which was the first ever 
offshoring of government work, and this will be analysed in chapter six. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those specialists and managers who SBS 
have brought in from the private sector, and these employees are on substantially 
higher remuneration packages than core former civil servants. 
In terms of comparisons between people who do the same and similar 
specialist jobs in the private sector, our [ex-Civil Service] pay is appallingly 
low. We certainly don't get the bonuses and we don't get any of the perks, 
such as, company cars and so on, that SBS specialists and managers receive. 
(Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
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Whilst these new SBS employees may be paid more and receive far higher bonus 
payments, they are on individual SBS contracts and do not have the collective 
bargaining arrangements of the former civil servants. 
I have noticed that we're the poor relations of SBS managers and specialists, 
in terms of pay in particular. Probably external direct recruits with 
professional qualifications are coming in and earning, maybe, £8 to 10 K 
more than us a year and they're on a bonus package on top of that. Having 
said that, they haven't got flexi-time and they haven't got our security in 
terms of redundancy rights. But three years at £10 K extra would give me 
my redundancy payment, you know ... (Kevin, worker, interview, 2003) 
Whilst the worker quoted above claims that SBS specialists and managers can make 
substantially more in a few years to cover his redundancy payment, these new SBS 
employees do not enjoy TUPE protection or employment security. Hence, along 
with agency workers, SBS managers and specialists are in a precarious employment 
position and are under pressure to deliver, as has been seen with SBS terminating the 
contracts of senior managers early on in the PPP deal. 
Of all of the workers interviewed at DNS&I, it was the specialists who 
identified most with the company, as they were working side by side with SBS 
specialists and managers; unlike the majority of the shop floor staff. Yet there was a 
sense of injustice from core NS&I workers as agency staff were paid much less, 
whilst SBS specialists and managers were paid much more, to complete similar types 
of work for the same company. Hence, there are tensions and contradictions with the 
transition to a new culture, with workers wanting to return to the old Civil Service 
system of pay parity across the grades. In the next section I will analyse further 
attempts to move towards a business culture with the introduction of employee bonus 
and share schemes. 
The Siemens Share Scheme and the Employee Bonus Scheme -
Further Attempts at Moulding Company Identity 
The recent introduction of both the employee share and bonus schemes by SBS are 
part of on-going attempts at changing the organisational culture at National Savings. 
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These new forms of financial employee involvement are aimed at motivating and 
rewarding workers as their efforts result in organisational success for all parties. 
However, I want to go on to argue that these initiatives are another method of 
increasing the pressure on staff, they do not equally reward all organisational actors, 
and in the case of the employee bonus, it is both divisive and discriminatory. 
Just as with Performance-Related Pay, both share and bonus schemes are old 
initiatives which used to exclusively cover senior managers in the private sector 
(Greenhill, 1990, ch. 11. Connell and Wood, 1992. Smith, 1992: ch. 11). However, 
there has been renewed management interest in such participative schemes from the 
1980s onwards as they have spread throughout workplaces (Connell and Wood, 1992. 
Beale, 1994: ch. 4). The underpinning notion behind these schemes is to reward 
employees for achieving targets as everyone within the organisation will benefit from 
its long-term prosperity (Greenhill, 1990, ch. 11. Connell and Wood, 1992). The 
employee share offer has its roots in that Thatcherite notion of a share owning 
democracy (Greenhill, 1990, ch. 12); and 'New' Labour want to build on this and 
double the number of companies offering shares to their employees to promote active 
'partnership' by giving them a stake in the business (HM Treasury, 2000). 
In 2001 the Siemens Share Scheme was launched at National Savings with SBS 
offering shares to core employees in Siemens AG, being the Siemens global 
corporation. SBS had a special deal on offer whereby if employees bought £1, 000 
worth of Siemens shares, then the company would match this commitment, hence 
there was a 'two for the price of one' package. Indeed, companies often subsidise 
employee share schemes to make the deal more attractive (Smith, 1992: ch. 11. 
Hume, 1995: ch. 11). Although the union do not agree with the share holding 
philosophy, they did arrange a loan scheme to help lower-waged staff purchase 
shares if they so wished. Around 70% of National Savings staff bought shares in 
Siemens AG. However, SBS did issue a questionnaire to those National Savings 
workers who did not purchase shares to ask why they did not take the company up on 
the offer, which is intrusive. All shares purchased were under the pre-condition that 
they were part of a long-term commitment to the company and could not be sold 
within three years. 
All of the workers and some union reps interviewed took SBS up on the share 
offer due to the 'two for one' deal; the only workers not to do so had left the 
organisation via redundancy before the shares were on offer. Some workers saw the 
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shares as a perk of working in the private sector, which they did not have under the 
Civil Service. However, others were more cynical and saw the special offer as a 
form of manipulation and control, with managerial emphasis on share prices and 
company profits being related directly to individual work performance. 
My manager said, "The staff should be concerned about their share 
dividends." And they have put a sign on the door of the Personnel 
Department with the latest share price advertised. SBS want you to buy into 
it so they can manipulate you more, because really that's quite clever putting 
the share price on there. You can see they are trying to get you to buy into 
the company in more ways than one. (Angela, worker, interview, 2001) 
Yet, for the most part, staff were sceptical of SBS 's motives behind the Siemens 
Share Scheme, and they primarily purchased shares due to the special offer. This did 
not result in employees feeling any more involved in the 'partnership', indeed the 
bureaucratic ethos of serving the public remains, as the following worker explains. 
Well, I've bought some shares, I don't believe in them in all honesty, but I 
only bought them because whatever you bought Siemens would buy the same 
amount for you. The Siemens Share Scheme means absolutely bugger all to 
me. I simply come in and do my work to the best of my ability day in day out, 
just as I always have done. (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
Indeed, once the three year 'no sell' clause had expired some of the interviewees 
had sold all or part of their shares, and even though the shares had depreciated in 
value, workers could still make a quick profit. 
I did buy some shares, not because it helps Siemens, but because it seemed to 
be a good idea at the time. I've actually sold the ones that I bought and made 
a profit on them, now I'm simply playing with the free shares. So, from the 
point of view of personal gain I'm rubbing my hands saying, "Yeah, I've 
made some money out of it." If you have a true employee ownership scheme, 
you can get a feeling of ownership. Whereas this didn't really do that, 
because staff saw it as a purely detached financial incentive. At the end of 
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the day, Siemens are a very, very large company, and obviously they have 
some very, very large share holders ... we're not talking about £900 or £1200 
worth of shares, and they're the ones who will truly benefit along the line 
from all of our hard work, not us. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
In the quote above, Michael explains that he does not feel that the share scheme was 
particularly participative as Siemens AG is a huge multi-national corporation with 
much wealthier share holders who consequently play a much larger role in the 
company. Most workers do not identify with SBS as they did not want to be part-
privatised in the first instance, and many of the decisions involved in changing the 
organisational culture at NS&I have been unpopular and divisive. Hence, there is a 
lack of employee loyalty to SBS and this is why some workers were prepared to cash 
in their shares at the first available opportunity. A similar situation was also 
uncovered in Roberts and Wilkinson's research, where employees at the Co-op bank 
simply saw the share scheme as "extra dosh", rather than as a positive organisational 
commitment (1991). 
As with the share scheme, the Employee Bonus Scheme is a new initiative 
which SBS introduced to National Savings in 2002. Again, it is a participatory 
scheme where employees share in organisational successes and profits. However, 
the trade union were not consulted over the introduction of this Employee Bonus 
Scheme (PCS, 2002a). Instead, SBS chose a select number of staff to present their 
new proposals to and all were in favour of a bonus scheme. However, this is an 
attempt to by-pass the trade union and elected representatives of the workforce. 
Furthermore, the Employee Bonus Scheme is a one-off payment which does not form 
part of general terms and conditions and is not consolidated. 
With the Employee Bonus Scheme there was no negotiation or discussion 
with the union, SBS just said, "We're going to introduce this bonus scheme", 
and that was that. I mean, we're [the union] not against the bonus scheme per 
se, I'm sure something that gives more back to the staff is fine, but what we 
were frightened of is whether this is going to come out of the overall pay bill? 
If so, then we've got no control over it, which is not right. (Paul, union 
official, interview, 2003) 
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Whilst the Employee Bonus Scheme looks attractive at first sight, the PCS union 
is concerned that this will further increase pressure on staff to hit productivity targets 
and reduce costs, which could ultimately lead to job losses (PCS, 2002a). As a union 
rep explains below, there are certain caveats attached which could reduce the over all 
size of the bonus pot. 
With the Employee Bonus Scheme I think people at first just thought, "Oh 
champion, they're [SBS] giving us some extra money." But what SBS have 
said, is that any KPI failures and fmes will come out of this bonus pot, 
together with overtime payments. (Paul, union official, interview, 2003) 
Indeed there are other strings attached, relating to which employees are eligible to 
receive the full bonus. Staff who have been absent from work for over 10 days 
throughout the year due to sick absence or special leave receive a reduced bonus 
under pro-rata arrangements, as do women who have been on maternity leave (PCS, 
2002a). Hence, this bonus system is discriminatory and divisive. 
The Employee Bonus Scheme encourages presenteeism. If you're off work 
for more than 10 days per year your share of the bonus pot is reduced. If 
you're off sick for whatever reason, you lose out. It is divisive and it affects 
people who have no control over being off, such as, time off to be a Justice of 
the Peace or a School Governor. I don't like this Employee Bonus Scheme at 
all. I think workers are skeptical about it, but no one's going to tum down the 
chance of a few hundred quid at the end of the year, you know ... (Colin, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
Moreover, those workers who have left on 'voluntary' redundancy or have been 
transferred over to new Third Party Business that year receive no employee bonus at 
all, even though they have played a role in contributing to the organisation (PCS, 
2002a). Agency staff are also ineligible for the bonus, even though they may have 
worked all year at National Savings, and such workers are already marginalised (PCS, 
2002a). 
Furthermore, the bonus scheme is divisive as IT staff did not receive any bonus 
due to KPI failures (PCS, 2002a). Yet in the example below, a worker explains that 
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there is a fine dividing line between which workers SBS deemed worthy of the bonus 
and those who were ineligible. 
I think the employee bonus was just over £500 at the end of last year before 
tax, which most people got as a one-off bonus. Where the problems are, is 
that this bonus was rather divisive because it didn't apply to everybody, there 
were some people, especially in the IT grades or even agency staff, who 
never got a penny of that. It was basically aimed at people who worked on 
the operations area, where you're actually delivering results with regard to 
KPis. But there were people that worked maybe just outside these boundaries, 
who although they do NS&I related work, were considered by Siemens 
[Business Services] to be ineligible. So, they actually had an office where 
Tony, one of my mates, worked with someone doing basically the same work, 
he got a bonus, but his colleague didn't. So, it's very, very divisive. (Michael, 
worker, interview, 2004) 
Also, one of the specialists interviewed felt that the Employee Bonus Scheme 
was unfair in comparison to the bonuses offered to newly appointed SBS managers 
and specialists who were to receive an extra 10% of their salary, which is 
considerably more than the £500 offered to most of the ex-Civil Service staff. Critics 
argue that such bonus schemes do not necessarily motivate workers (Smith, 1992: ch. 
11. Beale, 1994: ch. 4). Indeed this appears to be the case at NS&I, due to the highly 
divisive nature over which employees were deemed eligible to receive the bonus. 
However, it appears that SBS have learned from their mistakes and have stated that 
the next employee bonus will be negotiated with the union and will be awarded to all 
staff. There was a similar bonus scheme at the Land Registry which was also related 
to the achievement of KPI targets, and this 'Corporate Bonus' was fairer as it was a 
flat-rate award that went out to all staff, but again it was not consolidated (Smith, 
2000). However, this bonus was soon incorporated into the organisational culture 
and workers automatically expected this bonus as part of their annual pay rise. 
Moreover, the union claimed that this led to some 'creative accounting' in order for 
the bonus to be awarded during some difficult years. 
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Staff Surveys and Low-Trust Employment Relations 
Workplace staff surveys are a form of participatory management where employees 
are presented with the opportunity to brief managers on a range of issues, such as, 
current terms and conditions, working environment, workplace morale and recent 
change programmes (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: ch. 9). Again, this is part of a 
broader culture change programme of employee involvement, which started before 
National Savings was a PPP. Indeed, Staff Surveys were also used at the Land 
Registry with private management consultants brought in to design questionnaires 
and analyse the results (Smith, 2000). 
The first SBS Staff Survey at National Savings was conducted during 2000, 
early in the 'partnership' deal. However, several research interviewees stated that 
SBS were reluctant to release the results, which were not published until 2001. The 
worker quoted below, argues that the reason for this was the negative feedback 
regarding the culture change programmes introduced by SBS. 
We have had a SBS Staff Survey. Basically what we needed to say was how 
wonderful we thought they [SBS] were. I wouldn't exactly say the results 
were announced in a blaze of glory. It went very quiet for a while, and then 
the results were pretty much touched upon, rather than published in any great 
detail. And the main reason for that was because I don't think they got told 
what they wanted to hear. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
Osborne and Gaebler argue that through staff surveys management listen to workers 
opinions and then take steps to iron out any problems that arise (1992: ch. 9). The 
workers interviewed at DNS&I did not feel that this was the case and were generally 
cynical of such surveys, which they believed to be just another management fad. 
In 2003 SBS launched two new Staff Surveys, one relating to SBS as a whole 
and the other being specifically on Lean. However, some workers were unwilling to 
complete the surveys as they believed that their views would not be seriously taken 
on board by SBS management, which is emblematic of low-trust employment 
relations which have developed at DNS&I since the part-privatisation. 
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I didn't bother filling the SBS Staff Survey in. I had more important things to 
do and I don't think they [SBS] would listen to what you said anyway. They 
would fiddle the figures, as such, to make it read what they wanted it to read. 
(Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
Indeed, Beale also argues that there can be simplistic and selective presentation of 
staff survey results by management (1994: ch. 4). 
There was also a general feeling amongst workers that Staff Survey questions 
were biased in favour of SBS. Critics such as Beale agree that employee survey 
questions can be loaded to provide certain answers (1994: ch. 4). Moreover, 
quantitative research questions can be closed with pre-coded standardised answers 
(Bryman, 2001: chs. 6 and 7); and are deliberately employed by management to give 
restrictive and constrained responses. 
I have filled Staff Surveys in - I'm not saying I've filled every one of them in 
- but it's difficult to find out what the results are. I also think some of the 
questions are loaded to give the answers that SBS want to hear. (Colin, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
I don't place a lot of stock in SBS Staff Surveys; because it's how you phrase 
the question and basically you can get the survey to say what you want it to 
say. (Dermot, worker, interview, 2003) 
At the Land Registry, the Staff Survey was also largely quantitative in nature with 
pre-coded answers throughout, but on the back page there was a space for workers to 
add their own comments. However, this page was later scrapped due to the amount 
of negative statements made against management (Smith, 2000). Roberts also states 
that the more open-ended questions used in surveys of shipyard workers resulted in 
the most stinging attacks on management culture change initiatives (1993: 192 -
193). 
Of those who did complete the SBS Staff Surveys, the worker below states that 
whilst he thought he was as open and frank about working life after the PPP as he 
could be, others were much more critical. 
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I did complete the SBS Staff Survey last time and I was quite honest about it. 
But when I heard how honest other people were I thought, dear me, perhaps 
I've been a bit too lenient (chuckles)! (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
This indicates that there is a shop floor subculture of dissatisfaction and dissent 
amongst some of the staff towards SBS. I want to argue that this is particularly 
prevalent amongst the administrative grades who have borne the brunt of much of the 
increased workplace pressure since part-privatisation. Yet, the National Audit 
Report claims that SBS have managed the staff well at NS&I and workplace morale 
is good (NAO, 2003: 9); yet it is important to note that their researchers only 
interviewed managers from the three sites, but none of the front line staff. 
The administrative workers from the shop floor felt that the major failing of SBS 
is that, despite the rhetoric, they do not value the opinions of their staff; again 
echoing low-trust employment relations. Hence, workers felt that Staff Surveys, 
particularly relating to Lean, had their own set agendas and were not participative. 
Instead there had to be a fresh approach from management, where they not only 
listen to the opinions of workers but also take positive action. 
I think there's a lot of apathy on the shop floor regarding Staff Surveys, 
people will say, "Well, it'll make no difference, they [SBS] always do what 
they want anyway." It's quite ironic, because all of the staff recently had an 
e-mail from a senior SBS manager and he is actually quoted as saying, "We 
don't want people to have to come to work. We want them to want to 
come to work." In other words, he wants people to be happy. At first I 
thought, is this another SBS propaganda exercise, or does he truly want this 
to happen? But somewhere down the line the communication is lost between 
the managers immediately above the staff, because we very much feel that 
what happens on the ground floor and what happens with relation to the 
managers on site, by the time it gets up to senior [SBS] managers way up the 
line, it's a totally different story. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
In the quote above, Michael states that there is a breakdown in communication 
between management grades as to the genuine feelings of staff on the shop floor. 
This has not been the first time there have been communication problems relating to 
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difficulties on the account, indeed it occurred early on in the deal when SBS were 
informing Siemens AG and the Treasury that everything was still on track, when all 
was not well. There are also communications issues relating to customer quality 
since the Public-Private Partnership, which will be analysed next. 
Customer Service - the Resilience of the Embedded Public Service 
Culture 
I will now analyse the tensions that have arisen on this 'partnership' contract over the 
issue of customer service at NS&I. Several of the interviewees stressed that National 
Savings was renowned for its excellent customer service. However, now that the 
service delivery is operated by a private sector 'partner' there is pressure from SBS 
to make profits, and as a consequence, a questioning of previous quality 
improvement measures. Although SBS have modernised the organisation through 
investment in new technology, they have not introduced any new quality initiatives at 
the level of the shop floor. I want to go on to argue that rather than seeing customer 
service suffer, workers on the shop floor have informally reverted back to the 
embedded public service culture of delivering excellent quality products to NS&I 
customers. 
Many of the workers and union officials interviewed emphasised that in the past 
National Savings was renowned for delivering excellent quality products to its 
investors. This is in keeping with the public service ethos, and staff at National 
Savings took a great pride in both their work and the reputation of the organisation. 
National Savings have always gtven tremendous customer service, the 
highest calibre of customer service. (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
National Savings used to be renowned for its customer service. That is what 
its reputation was built on. (Angela, worker, interview, 2001) 
Indeed, part of the trade union's campaign against the PPP was that under the private 
sector this tradition of delivering an excellent customer service could be under threat 
in the quest for profitability (PCS, 2001a). 
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SBS have modernised National Savings through the development of the call 
centre and web banking, to give customers more choice and easier access to products. 
They have also appointed a 'Customer Champion' (NAO, 2003: 9) and signed up to 
the Banking Code in 2003, which is voluntary and sets out minimum standards of 
good service (NAO, 2003: 10). However, given the mass of literature from 
management 'gurus' relating to the 'quality revolution' (see Peters and Waterman, 
1982. Peters, 1989), it is interesting to note that SBS have not initiated any new 
quality programmes relating to work organisation on the shop floor. Moreover, it 
appears that SBS management are stressing Key Performance Indicator targets, speed 
of response and profitability, all at the expense of quality. 
Traditional and long-established notions of quality at National Savings have 
been redefined in relation to the achievement of KPI targets. Fitzgerald et al (1996) 
argue that at the heart of renewed management definitions of quality are the goals of 
increasing productivity and profitability. Indeed, Foster and Hoggett (1999) have 
noted how in the public sector there is a movement from service quality to economy. 
Under SBS this is also the case with the emphasis being on speed of service, output 
and efficiency. This has resulted in SBS challenging established quality measures 
and questioning whether they are really beneficial to their business interests. 
SBS want to make a profit out of the contract, which they're not particularly 
doing at the minute, and National Savings want to keep the same levels of 
customer service that they've always enjoyed. So, I think the difficulty that 
we see as employees, is that in the past we've moved from a Civil Service 
customer focused background where 'the customer is always right/ do 
everything you can to support the customer', to an employer who says, "Well, 
do we really need to do that for the customer? Other banks don't do that and 
it costs us money." For instance, sending out statements whenever a 
customer requests one, other banks would say, "Well, no, you'll get your 
statement every quarter, or when we send it out, or you'll have to pay for it." 
So, it's those sorts of issues where, as a supplier, SBS is saying, "Well, that's 
an additional cost to provide that service", but National Savings is saying, 
"Well, we've always done that, so we should carry on doing it." (Kevin, 
worker, interview, 2003) 
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Evident here are tensions over the established public sector ethos of customer care 
and the agenda of the private sector partner, which is ultimately based on cost and 
profits. 
Those workers interviewed from the shop floor all stressed that the customer 
service had declined, despite the empty rhetoric of SBS. 
The main problem is that, despite the fact that quality has gone downhill, SBS 
seem to have this very big emphasis on 'customer service'. It's almost like 
you can preach customer service, say you're going to do this, you're going to 
do that, but the reality is somewhat different. And I just feel that the quality 
of service we are giving is totally being eroded. (Michael, worker, interview, 
2004) 
Moreover, through the emphasis on hitting KPI targets to avert fines, some work 
takes priority which means that other work is consequently delayed, which goes 
against the impartial nature of the public sector ethos. As the workforce at DNS&I 
is long-standing, vastly experienced and used to the old customer service traditions 
of the Civil Service, any deterioration in standards is instantly noticeable. 
Under SBS as long as you give an effective customer service, they're not 
bothered. And, to be fair, the staff do take a pride in their work. But now 
you're not particularly encouraged to give such a good customer service, 
which we take quite badly, because we've all worked here for 15 years plus 
and you are used to giving a tremendous customer service, and now that's not 
quite as good. (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
In the interview quote below, a worker talks of the difficulty of changing deeply 
embedded and established quality procedures, particularly when staff take pride in 
their work and feel that such quality assurances are in danger. In their research on 
'partnerships', Hebson et al (2003) noted how workers still identified very strongly 
with the public service ethos and remained committed to the customer. 
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It is very hard for people to get out of the way of, if you like, dotting every 'i' 
and crossing every 't', and making sure that everything is spot on before it 
goes out to the customer. (Michael, worker, interview, 2004) 
Hence, the traditional and ingrained cultural practices, together with bureaucratic 
procedures, survive due to the self organisation of employees. This pride in one's 
work is similar to the occupational culture of craft workers, with their internalised 
standards and moral legitimacy of ensuring excellent quality work (Roberts, 1997). 
There is pressure from SBS to increase productivity, yet workers on the shop 
floor have managed to carve out a space where they can revert back to the old 
customer service that National Savings has always offered. In the quote below, 
Michael explains how quality was always a major part of the organisational culture 
and workers are now carry out a balancing act between meeting targets, whilst also 
feeling personally responsible for providing a quality service. 
Deep down, the majority of staff do try and give 100% to the customer, 
because it's just in-built. And I think this is why a lot of frustration creeps in 
because people really, really want to give the best they can to the customer; 
but at the same time they want to keep themselves in a job, and go home and 
feel that they've done a good day's work, they've got a little bit out of it and 
they've actually earned a living at the same time. (Michael, worker, interview, 
2004) 
Foster and Hoggett ( 1999) term this the 'good will of workers', whilst Stephenson 
and Stewart (2001) offer a deeper analysis of 'workplace collectivism' through 
autonomous employee self-organisation. The union officials agree and claim that the 
informal intervention of frontline staff has allowed National Savings to maintain its 
high standards of service delivery. 
I think the customer service has probably stayed the same, but I think that's 
down to the staff really, because they've been doing the job for the last 20 
years - most of them - and they're not about to let that suffer. (Paul, union 
official, interview, 2003) 
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However, some interviewees added that due to this extra work being carried out 
voluntarily and altruistically by shop floor employees, the Treasury were, therefore, 
unaware of any friction over the new quality agenda of SBS. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed further changes in the organisational culture at 
National Savings, some of which began under the Civil Service, together with a 
number of new initiatives which build upon earlier SBS programmes. The pace of 
change has clearly accelerated under the second SBS management team, in a decisive 
effort to tum the contract around into a profitable venture. A range of new 
management initiatives have been introduced including: Team Working, Lean, Open 
Vacancy Advertising and the creation of a multi-tier workforce, all of which have 
transformed the organisational culture. Additional initiatives, such as, the Siemens 
Share Scheme, the Employee Bonus Scheme and Team-Based Performance Pay are 
aimed at increasing worker identity to the company, and are directly related to the 
achievement of KPI targets and profitability. However, the relentless change 
programmes implemented by SBS have had the combined effect of intensifying the 
pace of work for all staff, particularly those on the front line. 
However, SBS have faced constant problems and difficulties in attempting to 
change the organisational culture at National Savings. Integration theorists, such as, 
Ouchi (1981), Peters and Waterman (1982) and Deal and Kennedy (2000), do not 
seriously address the complexities of changing the cultures of long-established 
'brownfield' sites. SBS attempted to culturally cleanse the organisation by 
introducing a Team Working philosophy. Indeed, several notable integration 
theorists argue that those who are not prepared to embrace the new cultural norms 
and values should be released (Peters and Waterman, 1982. Schein, 1991. Kotter and 
Heskett, 1992). As has been discussed in this chapter, as well as the previous one, 
many workers at National Savings who were unhappy with the direction of the 
organisation chose to 'volunteer' for redundancy. Yet, team working had always 
existed on an informal level at National Savings, which again indicates that SBS did 
not attempt to understand the existing shop floor cultures and traditions. Hence, 
theoretically this informal version of team working is partly, what Roberts (1997) 
claims as being, the emergent property of the workforce. Similarly, Stephenson and 
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Stewart (200 1) also identify this as being 'workplace collectivism', where a shared 
team spirit can aid management in achieving organisational goals. Yet this new 
version of Team Working is managerially imposed by SBS, with the aim of 
transforming the organisational culture. However, despite the managerial rhetoric of 
Team Working empowering employees, little has fundamentally changed in the 
labour process as the traditional power structures remain. Team Members do not 
enjoy more job autonomy, and there are two different experiences of Team Working 
based on grade and authority. Far from Team Meetings being an open forum, they 
operate under strict managerial control with daily emphasis on productivity targets 
and profitability, which is different to management feedback meetings in the Civil 
Service. 
SBS also introduced a new competence-based promotion system of Open 
Vacancy Advertising, to move to a flatter organisational structure. Anthony (1994) 
argues that for cultural transformations to be effective they must also change the 
structure of the organisation; yet he warns that this can involve difficulties and 
complications. As there had been very little upward mobility at National Savings for 
a decade, SBS promoted a new set of managers in an attempt to transform the 
organisational culture. As the majority of the old Civil Service managers 
'volunteered' for redundancy, SBS planned to install a new cohort of Team Leaders 
who would embrace their new cultural norms and values. Once this new 
management regime was in place, OVA promotions ground to an immediate halt. 
However, there were tensions and power struggles between the long-established and 
new managers, and there are additional difficulties as many of the new appointees 
are unaware of union agreements and do not have the full respect of the shop floor 
staff. 
Despite attempts to change the organisational culture at National Savings, 
workers on the shop floor have found some space to avoid the more damaging 
aspects of the SBS agenda. Lean is seen by SBS as being the natural progression of 
Team Working, with the aim of eliminating waste and inefficiency. Yet Lean does 
offer workers some scope for decision making, even within such a constrained 
agenda, and they have used this in regard to resources rather than staffing numbers. 
Furthermore, SBS have challenged existing bureaucratic quality control measures on 
the grounds of cost and profitability. As National Savings is renowned for its 
excellent customer service, shop floor workers have informally reverted back to the 
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embedded cultural practices to ensure that customers continue to receive the highest 
quality of service. Hence the ingrained culture and public service ethic survives, 
which endorses the claims of Stephenson and Stewart (2001) that such 'workplace 
collectivism' can aid the organisation, and is both voluntary and altruistic. 
Some of the change initiatives examined in this chapter were originally 
implemented when National Savings was part of the Civil Service, such as, the use of 
Key Performance Indicators and Performance-Related Pay. Whilst KPis were 
introduced under the Financial Management Initiative, shop floor staff were unaware 
of their existence prior to the Public-Private Partnership. There has certainly been a 
change in the culture of the organisation as all interviewees were acutely aware of 
the fine-inducing nature of KPis and their negative impact on profitability. The use 
of KPis runs counter to the ethos of public administration, as certain work takes 
priority in an effort to achieve targets. In contrast, all workers were very aware of 
the use of PRP in the Civil Service, and this policy was deeply unpopular on the shop 
floor. This individualises the employment relationship, and introduced pay ladders 
with progression based on annual assessments. Staff interviewed felt that this system 
was divisive and contradictory, as it goes against the spirit of team working. 
However, the union had successfully been able to reduce the proportion of PRP after 
proving that quotas were imposed to cut the overall pay bill. SBS then proposed to 
individually monitor staff, which again shows that they did not conduct thorough 
research or seek the opinions' of staff. Needless to say, this proposal was 
controversial and resulted in ACAS intervention. This is notable as prior to the PPP 
industrial relations were generally co-operative, and there had never been any input 
from ACAS before. Finally, through ACAS negotiations, an agreement was reached 
with the implementation of Team-Based Performance Pay. Thus, the culture of 
National Savings has changed further, with the movement from standard national 
Civil Service pay to an increasingly more complex pay system. 
Another new development since the Public-Private Partnership is the creation of 
a multi-tier workforce, which did not previously exist at National Savings. This 
comprises agency staff who are on inferior terms and conditions to core staff, whilst 
SBS specialists and managers are on far superior remuneration packages. This 
movement to a more commercial culture is unpopular with staff who want to return 
to pay parity across the grades and end the multi-tier workforce. 
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SBS have further attempted to generate a commercial culture with the Siemens 
Share Scheme. Whilst some workers saw this as a perk, others simply regarded this 
as extra cash and sold their shares at the first opportunity for personal financial gain. 
Whilst the Employee Bonus Scheme is grounded on the integration theorists' view 
that everyone is part of the organisation, this scheme failed to have the desired effect 
as it was divisive and discriminatory. 
Many of the initiatives introduced by SBS have resulted in a relentless pace of 
work. Furthermore, staff have also been frustrated by the lack of availability of leave, 
together with what they see as SBS management's reluctance to tackle the issue of 
rising workplace stress and their refusal to appoint a new Welfare Officer at DNS&I. 
Regarding Staff Surveys, many workers feel that their views are not listened to, 
let alone acted upon, and their efforts are not fully appreciated as targets and 
workplace pressures continually rise. Moreover, many workers were prepared to be 
openly critical in these surveys of the SBS regime and of the changes they have 
introduced at National Savings. Several differentiation theorists argue that complex 
organisations are multicultural, and are made up of competing subcultures (Wright, 
1994. Brown, 1998: ch. 3. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). Indeed, there appear to be new 
subcultural formations developing at National Savings with many shop floor workers 
being critical of the SBS regime, particularly in Staff Surveys. Whilst ex-civil 
service specialists interviewed were more able to identify with SBS managers, as 
they are working alongside their counterparts, tensions remained over pay and 
conditions. In the next chapter, the most prominent of all organisational subcultures 
will be examined, that of trade unions and their members. 
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Chapter Six - Conflict and Resistance to Organisational 
Culture Change at National Savings and Investments 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will analyse conflict and resistance to the culture change initiatives 
that were introduced at National Savings. This opposition operates on two levels, the 
formal and informal. Formal resistance involves the trade unions and their members, 
which were collective, conscious and calculative defensive actions. There has also 
been informal resistance from shop floor workers to many of the initiatives 
implemented by SBS, involving cynicism and desubordination. 
As examined in the previous chapters, it was only from the election of the first 
Thatcher Conservative government onwards, and the development of New Public 
Management, that a range of policies were introduced with the aim of changing the 
culture of the Civil Service. I will examine trade union opposition to the 
commercialisation of the Civil Service, and how the union at both national and group 
level were able to mobilise strike action against Market Testing. However, there 
were intra-union tensions between the 'moderate' National Executive Committee and 
the more militant National Savings Group Executive Committee over which 
direction the unions campaign against the commercialisation and partial privatisation 
of the Civil Service should take. Yet there were also divisions within the ranks of 
management, with reluctance on the part of the Treasury at introducing some of the 
Conservative's directives at National Savings. This did change in the run up to the 
Public-Private Partnership as the Conservatives deliberately recruited a Chief 
Executive from the private sector to drive forward organisational culture change. 
However, the PPP ofNational Savings did result in the first strike action to be taken 
against 'New' Labour. Despite there being a 'partnership' between SBS and the 
union implicit in the Public-Private Partnership agreement, I will go on to 
demonstrate that industrial relations have become increasingly fraught. 
Whilst most of the chapter focuses on formal opposition, there has also been 
informal resistance to SBS's attempts to change the organisational culture at National 
Savings. As the majority of staff were opposed to the PPP from the outset, SBS tried 
to win the hearts and minds of employees by emphasising the new opportunities they 
would create. Whilst some staff have gained with promotions, the majority of 
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workers are placed under increasing pressure with less job security. Although there 
has been the pragmatic acceptance of financial bonuses offered by SBS, this does not 
mean that workers are embracing new managerially defined core values. I will also 
go on to demonstrate how staff have been able to exert their influence to limit the 
potentially damaging aspects of the SBS agenda. 
Organisational Culture Change: Homogenisation and Colonisation? 
This research is centred around attempts to change the organisational culture at 
National Savings, in the context of New Public Management. The Public-Private 
Partnership involves the most profound changes, in that SBS are attempting to 
transform core values, norms and beliefs, as it is imperative that they make a 
profitable return on this venture. Integrationists argue that it is essential that senior 
managers win the battle for hearts and minds, as with one shared and agreed 
homogenous culture, all members can enjoy organisational prosperity and success. 
However, critics argue that this is a managerial attempt at colonising the culture of an 
organisation, which has possible totalitarian implications. 
Integration theorists claim that senior managers have the power and ability to 
control and transform the culture of their organisations. By persuading employees to 
intemalise new values, norms, attitudes and beliefs, this will generate a homogenous, 
consistent and coherent organisational culture that all members subscribe to. Not 
only will this improve both productivity and employee commitment, but it will 
determine organisational success for the mutual benefit of all (Ouchi, 1981. Peters 
and Waterman, 1982. Deal and Kennedy, 2000). 
Critics argue that this is an insidious managerial attempt to control and 
manipulate the culture of an organisation. Salaman (1997) and Kunda (2003) claim 
that the use of presentations, road shows and incentive schemes are all designed to 
gain employee loyalty and trust. These attempts to win hearts and minds by 
encouraging employees to embrace managerially defined goals and objectives are 
tantamount to cultural colonialism. Hence, culture now becomes a tool of 
managerial control, in an effort to side-step the contradictions that are inherent in the 
capitalist employment relationship (Willmott, 1993. Wright, 1994. Kunda, 2003). 
However, I want to go on to argue that workers are not mere objects in this 
process who are to be culturally programmed. Rather, there has been conflict and 
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resistance to many of the initiatives implemented at National Savings, including 
informal efforts on the part of shop floor workers to limit and resist change. It is 
these instances of formal and informal resistance that will be the focus ofthis chapter, 
as culture change is continually negotiated and contested. 
Subcultures of Resistance 
In contrast to the claims of integrationists that all organisational members adhere to 
one homogenous culture that is defined and controlled by senior management, I will 
go on to demonstrate that National Savings is made up of a plurality of subcultures. 
This subcultural resistance operates on two levels. Firstly, this involves formal 
resistance, with opposition from the trade unions and their members to governmental 
and managerial attempts to impose culture change. The second form of resistance 
takes place on the shop floor and is informal, with attempts by workers to limit and 
resist change, involving cynicism and desubordination. 
Integration theorists have been criticised for failing to adequately account for 
any conflict or resistance in the workplace. In assuming that there is one coherent 
organisational culture, they do not address the power differentials that are inherent in 
the capitalist employment relationship (Gregory, 1983. Martinet al, 1985. Salaman, 
1997). As the daily experiences of managerial grades and shop floor workers are 
different in terms of power, prestige, status and pay, differentiation theorists 
challenge the claims of there being one homogenous culture with mutual gains 
(Alvesson, 2002: ch. 3). Moreover, differentiation theorists argue that complex 
organisations are multicultural and consist of an array of subcultural groupings that 
are transient, dynamic and fluid (Pollitt, 1990. Anthony, 1994: ch. 5. Alvesson, 2002: 
ch. 7). As subcultures are nested, layered and overlapping, there are varying levels 
of subcultural belonging and actors can be members of more than one subculture at 
any one time (Gregory, 1983. Brown, 1998: ch. 3. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). 
Organisational subcultures are continually created and re-created, as they are actively 
produced by their members and can be formed in opposition to senior management 
(Trice, 1993. Meek, 1995). 
Foremost amongst organisational subcultures are trade unions (Turner, 1971. 
Brown, 1998: ch. 3. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). This chapter analyses formal resistance 
taken by the trade unions and their members in opposition to attempts to impose 
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organisational culture change. Whilst differentiation theorists address the competing 
interest groupings within organisations, integrationists fail to account for any dissent 
or resistance. Hampden-Turner (1990) and Schein (1991) simply urge managers to 
pacify trade unions. Moreover, both Schein (1991) and Morgan (1995: ch. 5) regard 
trade unions as countercultural, and as will be discussed in the following section, this 
is a misunderstanding of the capitalist employment relationship. 
Whilst there has been overt conflict and resistance at National Savings, there has 
also been informal resistance at shop floor level. This desubordination is not 
necessarily political, organised or ideological (Miliband, 1978); and involves 
cynicism, suspicion and an element of pragmatic acceptance on the part of workers. 
Informal resistance is different to the misbehaviour at work which was analysed in 
chapter three. These actions have been discussed in the preceding empirical findings 
chapters, and will be analysed in the later sections of this chapter. Occupational and 
shop floor subcultures are formed around common work experiences, values and 
beliefs, and are the autonomous property of the inhabitants (VanMaanen and Barley, 
1985. Anthony, 1994. Wright, 1994. Meek, 1995). 
Both Siehl (1985) and Elisabeth Wilson (1993) warn of the complications of 
imposed organisational culture change. Throughout this chapter I will analyse how 
subcultural groupings were able to impinge upon change at both the formal and 
informal levels. 
The Great Contradiction - Worker Conflict and Co-operation 
within the Capitalist Employment Relationship 
In the preceding two sections I will examine key theories to the study of industrial 
relations. In this section, I will relate the theories of organisational culture change to 
the capitalist employment relationship. I will explain how formal trade union 
resistance is constrained due to the inherent power differentials in capitalism. I will 
also discuss the competing debates over trade union renewal through 'partnership' 
agreements, as there is an informal 'partnership' between SBS and the PCS union 
written into this Public-Private Partnership contract. 
Within the capitalist employment relationship the interests of capital and labour 
are contradictory, and whilst for the most part there is co-operation, there is always 
the potential for conflict, which simmers below the surface (Kelly, 1998: ch. 3). This 
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relationship is unequal and based on the control and compliance of labour in order to 
increase productivity and ultimately profits in favour of capital; hence, one side's 
gain is another's loss (Hyman, 1979). This conflict is deep-rooted and not only 
found in the workplace, it is also evident in wider economic, social and political life 
(Mcilroy, 1988: ch. 1. Moody, 1997: ch. 1. Kelly, 1998). However, there is co-
operation as each side is mutually dependent upon the other for survival, as 
employers rely on workers to produce and deliver goods and services, whilst workers 
are dependent upon employers for jobs in order to earn a living. Hence, it is in the 
mutual interests of both parties that there is organisational survival, stability and 
success. 
Integration theorists view organisations as possessing one homogenous culture 
which is shared and agreed by all, although some do acknowledge the existence of 
subcultural and countercultural elements. Indeed, Schein (1991: ch. 13) and Morgan 
(1995: ch. 5) claim that trade unions are the primary countercultural grouping in 
organisations. However, this is clearly a misunderstanding of the employment 
relationship, as trade unions are subcultural in that there can be differences with 
management, but both sides strive for organisational success. Therefore, a major 
criticism levelled at integration theorists is that they fail to seriously account for any 
conflict or resistance in the workplace (Gregory, 1983. Martinet al, 1985. Salaman, 
1997). Differentiation theorists see complex organisations as being multicultural and 
made up of competing subcultural groupings, most notably trade unions (Turner, 
1971. Brown, 1998: ch. 3. Alvesson, 2001: ch. 7). This offers a more thorough 
account of the differing group interests and power disparities that exist within the 
workplace, together with the potential for both formal and informal resistance. 
Conflict, protest and resistance, along with other forms of de-subordination, 
occur at the point of production and are attempts by workers to transform the 
conditions of their control and inequality (Miliband, 1978). Organised formal 
resistance at work is an established phenomenon and includes: strikes, overtime bans, 
go-slows, working to rule, sit-ins/ occupations, political protests, petitions and 
sabotage (Miliband, 1978. Dubois, 1979: ch. 1. Hyman, 1979: ch. 4. Edwards and 
Scullion, 1982: ch. 1. Hyman, 1989: ch. 1. Kelly, 1998). Strikes and the threat to 
strike are the most common, overt, demonstrative and direct forms of industrial 
conflict (Clegg, 1980: ch. 7. Hyman, 1989). Strikes are temporary stoppages ofwork 
by employees in a calculative attempt to exert pressure to express a grievance or 
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enforce a demand (Hyman, 1979 and 1989). There are many forms that strike action 
can take: being official or unofficial, involving all union members or selective action, 
and varying in duration (Eldridge, 1973. Hyman, 1989: ch. 1). 
As will be analysed later in this chapter, the formal collective actions of the 
workers at National Savings resulted in three strikes. The first two industrial 
disputes were against the Conservative government's Market Testing programme, 
the first was confined to the National Savings department, with the second being a 
nationwide Civil Service strike. There was also a later strike against the PPP of 
National Savings, which also involved political protests including: a postcard 
campaign to Members of Parliament, the lobbying of Parliament, a press campaign 
and support from other trade unions (CPSA, 1997). It is these forms of formal 
political protest and resistance which Kelly (1998) argues are largely unexplored; 
and I will go on to investigate how these actions were used by trade union activists to 
build up a political campaign of protest and resistance against part-privatisation. 
As capital and labour have differing aims, yet are dependent upon one another, 
there will always be antagonistic co-operation and unsatisfactory compromise 
(Hyman, 1979: chs. 1 and 4). Under collective bargaining, negotiations between 
employers and trade unions are highly constrained, as managers have the power to 
set and re-set the agenda and decide which matters are open for discussion (Fox, 
1973. Hyman, 1979: ch. 4). Hence, unions can only debate within this pre-set 
structure, so they can attempt to deal with the symptoms of capitalism but not its root 
causes (Hyman, 1979: ch. 4). Therefore, Fox (1973) argues that trade unions are 
bargaining under duress. This institutionalises industrial relations, as unions work 
within this restricted terrain in the hope that compromises and constraints will result 
in marginal improvements in terms, conditions and remuneration (Hyman, 1979: chs. 
3 and 4). Hence, this is a form of social control where trade union officials moderate 
members' demands and manage discontent by urging workers to accept what is 
'realistic' (Miliband, 1969: ch. 6 and 1978. Hawkins, 1982: ch. 4. Kelly, 1988). Yet, 
such reform and restraint are a precarious affair and can result in not only intra-union 
conflict, but wildcat unofficial strikes instigated by dissatisfied union members 
(Gouldner, 1955. Eldridge, 1973. Beynon, 1979. Hawkins, 1982: ch. 4). 
It is widely documented that there has been a drastic decline in trade union 
membership, power and influence throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Ackers et al, 
1996. Bradley et al, 2000. Rose, 2001). From 1979 onwards, the Conservatives 
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passed a series of anti-trade union laws restricting industrial action. They further 
undermined the legitimacy of trade unions by encouraging derecognition and the 
fragmentation of national collective bargaining (Mcilroy, 1988. Bradley et al, 2000). 
Major structural changes in employment also weakened trade unions, with the 
decline of heavily unionised manufacturing industry and the rise of the traditionally 
non-unionised private sector, combined with privatisation programmes and rising 
unemployment (Ackers et al, 1996. Bradley et al, 2000). The trade union movement 
was divided with heated debates over which way to tum in order to regain lost 
ground. The mainstream trade union movement urged for moderation and a more 
co-operative approach with management (Ackers et al, 1996). Whilst under the 
banner of 'New Realism', Bassett (1986) went further and advocated 'no strike' 
agreements with employers, as he argued that strikes were now ineffective and 
outdated. He claimed that in order to survive, trade unions had to reposition 
themselves to become non-political and concentrate on providing services for their 
'customer base'. Hence, Bassett argued that the class war was over, and the only 
struggle that mattered now was the one for new markets. 
The 'social partnership' approach of 'New' Labour is also grounded in the 
philosophy of co-operation and consensus. Industrial relations are supposedly now 
de-politicised with 'partnerships' between managers, workers and trade unions -
although 'partnership' agreements do not necessarily have to include unions. Under 
such 'partnerships' there is apparent shared agreement on business goals and 
organisational success, creating a new culture at work. Whilst this view is contested 
by numerous theorists, Ackers and Payne (1998) have the most positive take on 
'social partnership' seeing it as more proactive than 'New Realism'. They argue that 
as 'New' Labour's use of the phrase 'partnership' is vague, this gives unions the 
opportunity to redefine the term in their interests. However, Terry (2003) argues that 
although 'partnerships' may benefit the workplace status of trade unions, it denies 
the legitimacy of strike action as there is now compulsory arbitration. Moreover, as 
most Conservative anti-union legislation remains on the statute books, Britain still 
has the most restrictive trade union laws of all Western economically developed 
countries (Rose, 2001: ch. 1. Howell, 2004 ). Kelly (1998) is the most critical and 
argues that 'partnerships' based on apparent worker/ management co-operation with 
claims that militancy is 'outdated' are not new, they have consistently been made 
throughout trade union history. Furthermore, such 'partnerships' centre around the 
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agenda of management, which will result in weak and ineffective trade unionism. 
Kelly (1998 and 2004) argues that 'partnership' approaches will not revitalise the 
trade union movement, and that the way forward is through traditional union 
militancy as the fundamental conflicts inherent within the capitalist employment 
relationship remain. 
Whilst there is an informal 'partnership' agreement between the PCS union and 
SBS written into the Public-Private Partnership contract at National Savings, I will 
go on to analyse how the union have been prepared to defend their members' 
interests through strike action and the threat of it, proving that conflict is far from 
outdated and irrelevant. I will also demonstrate how nationally the PCS have been 
able to use 'partnership' agreements and the limited legislation introduced by 'New' 
Labour in relation to union recognition and representation, to recruit new members, 
particularly in the private sector by transposing their unionised culture to new sectors 
of employment. 
Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Relations Unitarism, 
Pluralism and Radicalism 
Alan Fox with his 'frames of reference' made the theoretical distinction between 
unitarism and pluralism (1973 and 1974: ch. 6). However, both theoretical 
perspectives are ideal-types and managers often alternate between the two models 
(Mcilroy, 1988). In his early work, Fox advocated the pluralist approach to 
industrial relations (1971: ch. 5), but he later moved to a more radical standpoint 
(1973 and 1974: ch. 6). It is this radical approach that I will adopt in investigating 
industrial relations at National Savings and in the wider Civil Service. 
The unitarist approach to industrial relations sees that management's right to 
manage is legitimate, paramount and unproblematic. This is based on the principle 
of simple authority where management are logical, rational and in complete control. 
The objectives and aims of the organisation are taken for granted, presented by 
management and passively accepted by the workers concerned. Hence, there is no 
real need for independent trade unions within this system, as management knows 
best in the pursuit of common interests. Whilst trade unions may be endured, 
unitarists do not recognise any conflict in the workplace and any questioning of 
managerial authority is deemed misguided, disloyal, illogical, irrational, illegitimate, 
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and must be suppressed (Fox, 1973. Fox, 1974: ch. 6). Historically, unitarist thought 
lies in the nineteenth century conservative philosophy of the right of the master over 
the servant, and in traditional authority and loyalty structures of family firms (Fox, 
1973). There was a revival of the unitarist approach under the Conservatives, first 
with Margaret Thatcher and then John Major, with the mantra of 'management's 
right to manage' and the introduction of the anti-trade union laws (Rose, 2001: ch. 1 ). 
This view shares some of the key claims made by integration theorists (see Ouchi, 
1981. Peters and Waterman, 1982), namely in assuming that there is one over-
arching organisational culture that is accepted by all. Management are firmly in 
control of the organisation's culture, and there is no place for any dissent or 
subcultural groupings. 
Whilst unitarists argue that there is no legitimate authority but management, 
pluralists are more realistic and tolerant of other interest groups within the workplace 
who have differing aims and objectives. Hence, pluralists do accept that there will 
be workplace conflict and that trade unions can legitimately influence management 
decisions. As there is some parity in the competing claims of different interest 
groups, there must be established procedures for collective negotiation and 
compromise. Trade union leaders play a vital role in 'managing' conflict, as it is in 
the interest of all parties concerned that there is organisational survival and growth. 
This model is influenced by the Durkheimian notion of structural-functionalism, 
where there must be discussion, collaboration, compromise and agreement between 
management, unions and their members, based on tolerance and moderation. 
Therefore, this model does go some way to redressing the power imbalance inherent 
in unitarism as unions do have an important role to play, which is based on 
workplace consent and compromise, rather than conflict and resistance (Fox, 1973. 
Fox, 1974: ch. 6). Pluralistic industrial relations were very much evident in post-war 
consensus Britain, where there was collective bargaining, state regulation and 
Keynesian economic intervention to institutionalise conflict (Mcilroy, 1988: ch. 1). 
Up until 1979 both Labour and Conservative governments accepted corporatism, 
whereby government, management and trade unions all had a role in determining the 
way forward for industry and in reaching a broad compromise on terms, conditions 
and remuneration (Mcilroy and Campbell, 1999. Fairbrother, 2002). However, this 
changed after 1979 as the Conservatives rejected such politics of accommodation 
(Fairbrother, 2002). Again, this vision relates to some of the claims made by 
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integration theorists, who recognise the existence of subcultures and countercultures 
in large organisations. Similarly, Hampden-Turner (1990) and Schein (1991: ch. 13) 
call for senior managers to tame trade union demands, as all parties will gain from 
organisational success. 
However, both unitarism and pluralism have been criticised from a radical 
standpoint, as both perspectives accept and endorse capitalism, and neither 
adequately account for the power inequalities within the workplace which always 
favour management (Fox, 1973. Eldridge, 1973. Fox, 1974: ch. 6. Brown, 1992, ch. 5. 
Kelly, 1998). Whilst unitarists dismiss trade union opposition and resistance out of 
hand, pluralists do acknowledge their presence but institutionalise workplace conflict 
within a strict framework for negotiations. Hence, there is an illusion of a balance of 
power and shared decision making. Fox (1973) argues that a pluralistic partnership 
is managerially more effective than state domination, where the use of power is more 
obvious and blatant. Therefore, pluralists are also defenders of the status quo as 
there continues to be the domination of capital over labour. Hence, Fox argues that 
industrial conflict is inevitable and continual. 
In contrast to the claims of integrationists, differentiation theorists do account 
for the competing interest groups and power inequalities that exist in complex 
organisations. Rather than viewing organisations as possessing one homogenous 
culture, they see a more complex and fractured picture in looking at the reasons for 
subcultural formations (see Turner, 1971. Brown, 1998: ch. 3. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). 
In the following two sections, I will examine changes in industrial relations in 
the Civil Service and trade unionism at National Savings, and discuss subcultural 
groupings within trade unions. 
'fhe Changing Nature of Industrial Relations in the Civil Service 
I will now discuss the traditional nature of trade unionism in the Civil Service, which 
under Whitleyism resembled pluralistic industrial relations. However, this 
moderation did change as Civil Service Staff Associations were transformed into 
independent and active trade unions. This saw the development of subcultural 
groupings within trade unions, along with rising militancy. This will be used to 
theoretically inform the rest of the chapter, relating to the analysis of the formal 
industrial struggles that have taken place at National Savings. 
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From the end of World War Two up until 1979, the industrial relations 
landscape of the public sector in Britain was characterised by corporatism. There 
was legislative support for trade unionism from successive Labour and Conservative 
governments based on consensus, negotiation and compromise with national 
collective bargaining (Jenkins and Sherman, 1979. Bailey, 1996. Mcilroy and 
Campbell, 1999). There were high levels ofunionisation across the public sector and 
the Civil Service, as management actively encouraged all staff to join their relevant 
trade union (Drewery and Butcher, 1991: 121 - 123. Beaumont, 1992: ch. 3). This 
was mirrored at National Savings where, prior to the PPP, the majority of managers 
were also union members. Moreover, with the feminisation of the public sector, 
there were also a growing number of women trade union members (Fairbrother, 1994: 
7). This created a traditionally unionised culture in the Civil Service with standard 
terms and conditions of employment, which were all covered under the Whitley 
structure (Beaumont, 1992: ch. 3). 
The Whitley structure of industrial relations in the Civil Service was established 
in 1919. This involved joint consultation and negotiation between management and 
trade unions over pay, terms and conditions; and this worked at national, group and 
local levels (Kelly, 1980: ch. 7. Pyper, 1991: 77- 78. Bailey, 1996). Indeed union 
officials at both Durham National Savings and Durham Land Registry state that Civil 
Service Whitley meetings were of a pluralist nature, based on the exchange of 
information, together with discussion and negotiation. However, the Whitley 
Committee meetings at National Savings were later abandoned after the Public-
Private Partnership. Yet due to the pragmatic nature of the Whitley framework, there 
were decades of stability and consistency throughout the public sector with joint 
cooperation and minimal industrial conflict (Bailey, 1996). 
For the most part the Whitley structure worked effectively with formal 
negotiation, consultation and consensus between Civil Service management and 
union leaders. However, the criticisms of such pluralistic procedures outlined earlier, 
were reflected in practice. Industrial relations became highly restricted and 
institutionalised, because the Civil Service unions up until the late 1960s were very 
hierarchical with a centralised leadership, which were often distant and remote from 
the membership (Fairbrother, 1994: 7). Hence, Rose argues that under 'popular 
bossdom' some trade union leaders became accepted into the status quo, as they 
policed the rank and file membership (200 1: 132 - 133). 
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However, from the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s there was a notable shift 
in the internal politics of the Civil Service trade unions, which were transformed 
from Staff Associations into independent and active trade unions that now identified 
more with the wider trade union movement (Fairbrother, 1994: 9). The Civil Service 
Clerical Association removed the 'no strike' clause from its constitution in 1969, and 
the early 1970s saw the first official strikes by civil servants against government 
intervention in collective bargaining (Kelly, 1980: 107- 109. Beaumont, 1992: ch. 
3). Throughout the 1970s there was rising militancy within Civil Service unions, as 
left-wing activists were prepared to challenge the more 'moderate' national 
leadership (Heery, 1996. Mcilroy and Campbell, 1999). Hence, there were power 
struggles between distinctive subcultures within trade unions. Such sectionalism and 
rivalry played an important role in changing both the culture and nature of trade 
unionism at National Savings. 
Sectionalism is one of the oldest traditions of the British labour movement; it is 
widespread and significant, as there are factions within the majority of trade unions 
(Hawkins, 1982: 118- 125. Mcilroy and Campbell, 1999). There have been fierce 
debates and intense power struggles within trade unions for decades, between 
activists and groups both on the left and the right of the political spectrum (Kelly, 
1998). Hawkins noted in the late 1970s/ early 1980s that several trade unions, 
including the Civil Service administrative union, effectively resembled a two party 
system comprising 'the establishment' who followed orthodox Labour Party policy, 
and 'the opposition' made up of left-wing militants. Both political groups were 
highly organised and ideologically opposed to one another (1982: 118 - 125). 
Fairbrother argues that there is a long history of political division within the Civil 
Service unions dating from the 1960s onwards, involving the 'Broad Left', being a 
coalition of socialist groups, and the 'Moderates', who are more conservative (1994: 
93 - 94). However, there are debates and divisions within factions, particularly 
between left-wing alliances, with battles in the past amongst the Socialist Workers' 
Party and Militant Tendency (Mcilroy, 1988: ch. 5 and 1999). There have been 
regular, and sometimes dramatic, swings of power between the left-wing and right-
wing factions regarding overall democratic control of Civil Service trade unions 
(Mcilroy, 1988: ch. 5). Indeed, it is not untypical for there to be major divisions 
between the left-wing activists who dominate union conferences and the 'Moderate' 
National Executive Committee (Fairbrother, 1994: 93- 94). 
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Sectionalism is still very evident in the Public and Commercial Services union, 
which represents the vast majority of civil servants. The Branch Secretary at 
Durham Land Registry, Kevin Kelly, is currently a 'Left Unity' activist and on the 
newly elected left-led National Executive Committee. Kevin states that 'Left Unity' 
is made up of the following diverse left-wing groupings: The Socialist Party, The 
Socialist Workers' Party, The Socialist Alliance, The Scottish Socialist Party, 
Workers' Liberty and the Communist Party. Yet interestingly, most members of 
'Left Unity' are independents and not aligned to any particular grouping. In 
opposition are a faction calling themselves 'PCS Democrats', whose politics are 
more middle-of-the-road; together with the 'Moderates', who are a mix of 'non-
political' trade unionists and Blairites, who in the past have included Conservatives 
in their ranks. The transformations and power struggles between subcultural 
groupings within trade unions is interesting in not only changing the culture of the 
union, but also in its impact on the changing culture of the workplace. 
I will now examine the traditionally unionised culture of National Savings. 
Following on from this section, I will then analyse the intra-union conflict of the 
Civil Service unions and how this impinged upon attempts at opposing the 
Conservative government's policies of commercialisation and privatisation. Later in 
this chapter, I will demonstrate that affirmative action taken by the unions at 
National Savings resulted in active and participative trade unionism, and the 
development of a highly unionised culture which workers still strongly identify with 
post-PPP. 
The Extent of Trade Unionisation at National Savings 
Trade union density at National Savings is traditionally one of the highest in the 
Civil Service (CPSA, 1997), particularly in the traditionally 'Old' Labour heartlands 
of Glasgow and Durham. As stated in the earlier chapters, union membership for the 
whole of NS&I currently stands at a massive 92%, and is 90% at the Durham site. 
This is interesting as there has been a considerable decline in general trade union 
membership throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Bradley et al, 2000: ch. 5). However, 
the extent of unionisation in the public sector is traditionally stronger than that of the 
private sector. Yet given this trend, the union membership at NS&I is still very 
impressive, as in 1999 the average membership density of public sector unions stood 
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at 60% (cited in Fairbrother, 2002: 68). Indeed, the unions at National Savings have 
not only consolidated, but they have actually grown, as in 1996 trade union density 
stood at 82% (CPSA, 1996), this increased to 85% in 1998 with the union recruiting 
new members every week (PCS, 1998), and by 2000 union membership reached 90% 
(PCS, 2000). These statistics on union density are all the more remarkable given the 
huge decreases in staffing levels due to several 'voluntary' redundancy exercises. 
The union representatives claimed that the steady rise in membership was due to fear, 
concern and trepidation over the commercialisation and part-privatisation of National 
Savings. In his research on trade unionism in the Civil Service, Fairbrother 
uncovered similar motives with staff seeing unions as offering protection against 
such changes and uncertainties (1994: 9). As stated in chapter one, all of the 
interviewees joined their respective trade unions as soon as they started work at 
Durham National Savings, reflecting the highly unionised culture of the department. 
At the start of the commercialisation and partial-privatisation of National Savings 
there were three separate Civil Service trade unions representing workers. The Civil 
and Public Services Association (CPSA) was the administrative workers' union, 
whilst both the National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS) and the Public 
(Service) Tax and Commerce Union (PTC) represented the executive and support 
grades. All of these unions merged in 1998, just prior to the Public-Private 
Partnership ofNational Savings, to form the Public and Commercial Services Union; 
and this move will be examined later in the chapter. 
I will now analyse trade union activism at National Savings, and how the 
transformation of subcultural groupings led to orchestrated and sustained industrial 
action against government initiatives. 
Trade Union Activism and Mobilisation Theory 
In this section, I will examine how union members became activists, and how this 
political activism led to the 'Broad Left'/ 'Left Unity' trade union faction becoming 
the dominant subcultural grouping in the branch. This is significant, as these trade 
union activists helped transform the culture of the branch, and were instrumental in 
mobilising member support for action. 
There is a noticeable gap in the extant literature addressing why trade union 
members decide to become involved in unions and how this participation develops 
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into union activism. These issues were addressed in my research with the trade 
union representatives at National Savings, and I will analyse how these activists 
launched campaigns and were able to mobilise member support against the 
commercialisation and part-privatisation of the department. 
Two of the senior trade union officers interviewed said that they initially 
became involved in the CPSA union due to their family background, as their fathers 
had been miners and the 1984/ 1985 miners' strike had a huge impact in influencing 
and developing their own personal political views. 
A major factor in my trade union involvement was my family background, in 
terms of my upbringing, and socialist beliefs that my father had, in particular. 
I also think the polarisation of society during the '80s under Thatcher was a 
watershed, where you either went one way or the other, and I think I chose 
the right way. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
I got involved in the union because of my family background, you know, my 
dad was a miner and he was always telling me about the union. So it was just 
my upbringing and it's been a big belief in my family for as long as I can 
remember, to join a union. That's been installed in me since I was a nipper. 
(Paul, union official, interview, 2001) 
Indeed other union representatives also stated that they too held socialist/ left-wing 
political views, together with a principal belief in the vital role of independent trade 
unions in defending their fellow members' terms and conditions of employment. 
Moreover, Brown (1998: ch. 3) states that union members typically embrace the 
cultural values of collectivism and the right to strike. 
Another senior representative first became involved in the CPSA union after a 
local official helped him through a difficult situation at work. 
I nearly got sacked [from National Savings] for my sick leave and the union 
rep who saved my job suggested to me that I get involved in the union. So I 
thought, well I'll do something because other people need the protection that 
I got, so I got involved as a local rep. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
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It was this altruistic notion of helping others which Clegg et al uncovered as one of 
the motivational reasons as to why workers become actively involved in trade unions 
(1961: ch. 5). In the quote below, the same union rep claims that defending the 
interests of your fellow workers is a highly satisfYing job. 
I don't think there's a better job in the world than representing your work 
mates; of taking on the employer when they are wrong and convincing them 
at other times that they can do things better. (Steve, union official, interview, 
2002) 
Tracy, one of the female union reps, states that trade unionism is central to her 
fundamental beliefs and values. Indeed the importance ofthe Women's Committees, 
firstly in the CPSA and their continuation in the merged PCS, must be noted as they 
have encouraged more female union participation. 
Trade unionism is part of my core values (laughs)! It's just part of what I've 
always believed in, because what you can't achieve individually, you can 
achieve collectively. I'd always wanted to be a union rep, but I was a single 
parent and I had childcare problems, which I think affects a lot of women's 
participation. It was at the point where I didn't have those childcare 
responsibilities that I became active. I would have done it a long time before 
that. I think I would have been able to do it today with the help you get now. 
(Tracy, union official, interview, 2001) 
All of the union representatives said that they became more and more involved 
in the union as they were interested in helping their fellow members, emphasising the 
collectivism and camaraderie of the work. Many decided to take their union work as 
far as they could, as what they failed to gain from bureaucratic and hierarchical 
administrative employment, they attained through being union representatives, such 
as, autonomy, variety and control at work, together with the chance to develop skills 
involving public speaking and negotiating. 
I also got involved as a union rep due to a lack of opportunity within the 
workplace, a lack of promotion and other opportunities. I was sitting 
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thinking I had things to offer, but was just filing all day. I got more heavily 
involved in the union and liked the work. It developed me as an individual, it 
brought on skills that I would never have used without coming into the job: 
public speaking, negotiation skills and counselling skills. Helping people in 
particular, in personal case situations, I gained immense satisfaction out of 
that, and delivering for members. It was a satisfying and motivating job. 
(Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
Similarly, another union official also talks of the challenges and opportunities for 
personal development open to trade union activists. 
I was a senior rep, I did the National CPSA Conference a number of times, I 
was involved with the pay negotiating teams, the Market Testing teams and I 
was also involved in the Public-Private Partnership. I did all of this as an 
administrative worker. There's nowhere else that'll give you that opportunity, 
where you'd be speaking to managers on a level playing field, where you'd 
get an opportunity to speak on the television and do radio interviews. You 
really get a chance to take it as far as you want and it gives you a buzz, if 
you've got that type of nature. (Jim, union official, interview, 2002) 
Regarding the issue of trade union sectionalism, the union at Glasgow National 
Savings has traditionally always been militant. However, this was not the case at the 
Durham site and one of the union officials discusses the intra-union conflict which 
took place prior to the 'Broad Left' (now known as 'Left Unity') eventually taking 
control of the CPSA branch. 
There was a big polarisation within the CPSA union at the time, between the 
left-wing and right-wing, and I was quite young and idealistic - I probably 
still am idealistic, not so young now (laughs) - and there was a massive split 
between the left and the right. I was in the 'Broad Left' side, and it was quite 
acrimonious within the branch between the two big factions. (Chris, union 
official, interview, 2003) 
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Hawkins (1982) and also Kelly (1998) state that trade umon factions are 
ideologically opposed and well organised. This was also the case during the 1980s in 
the CPSA union branch at Durham National Savings, with election campaigns and 
hustings. There was also a social side to this factionalism and some of the union reps 
played in a band doing political fundraising gigs, inspired by the political punk rock 
of The Clash, The Jam and The Ruts. 
We [the 'Broad Left'] used to put out bulletins at [branch, group and national] 
election time and hand them out on the doors to staff coming into the office. 
We used to organise social events, I was playing in a band at the time with 
others who were involved in the 'Broad Left', and we used to play at these 
social events, it was really good, it was at that time in the mid-' 80s where we 
had 'Red Wedge' with Billy Bragg and Paul Weller. (Chris, union official, 
interview, 2003) 
The divisions between the different union factions which Mcilroy analysed in 
relation to Civil Service unions more broadly (1988: ch. 5 and 1999), also existed 
within the Durham CPSA branch. This resulted in an unlikely tactical amalgamation 
between the 'Moderates' and Communists, to try to prevent the 'Broad Left' 
subcultural faction from taking overall control of the branch. 
There was the Communist and Trotskyist wing within the 'Broad Left' ... we 
were all in the 'Broad Left' to start with, and the old Communist wing broke 
away into another faction and joined forces with the 'Moderates' to try and 
keep out the young bucks, as it were. (Chris, union official, interview, 2003) 
As the Durham office has a long-standing workforce, it is worthy of note that the 
activists involved in the 'Broad Left' were much younger than those of other union 
factions. After years of heated debate, these 'Broad Left' activists eventually 
became the majority subcultural grouping on the Branch Executive Committee (BEC) 
at Durham National Savings. This act is significant in that it resulted in these young 
representatives being able to change the union culture of the branch, to influence and 
mobilise support for action against the commercialisation and privatisation policies 
of the Conservative governments. 
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It was just an on-going battle, eventually the 'Moderates' did get voted off 
the BEC and we [the 'Broad Left'] took over the branch. I think that had a 
lot to do with changing the membership as we definitely generated a 
discussion and, almost an under-current of, "something's happening". I know 
there were some issues with the management as well, I think they were 
looking over their shoulder and thinking, where have all these young lefties 
come from? (Chris, union official, interview, 2003) 
From the early 1990s onwards, Durham National Savings has continued to be a 
'Broad Left'/ 'Left Unity' branch, although there have been a number of changes in 
the elected personnel in positions of prominence. 
In explaining collective formal conflict and resistance at National Savings, I 
shall use mobilisation theory to demonstrate how the union activists were able to 
generate and organise support for industrial action against government directives. 
John Kelly (1998) draws on and develops mobilisation theory, which was originally 
analysed by Charles Tilly, particularly in his 1978 book From Mobilization to 
Revolution. Tilly explains how political campaigns are generated and can develop 
towards wider social change (cited in Kelly, 1998). In the case of the workplace, 
worker interests have to be defined in opposition to management (Kelly, 1998). At 
National Savings member interests were more specifically against Conservative and 
'New' Labour policies, yet there was reluctance to introduce several governmental 
directives on the part of National Savings management. Trade union organisations 
mobilise campaigns around a sense of illegitimacy, injustice or wrong doing (Tilly, 
1981. Kelly, 1998). Such as, government plans to privatise areas ofNational Savings; 
and in response, unions then plan collective action. Kelly emphasises the key role 
that left-wing union activists have in building and sustaining support for the 
campaign (1998). The way in which the 'Broad Left' activists were able to be 
democratically elected on to the Branch Executive Committee and transform the 
culture of the branch has just been discussed. Yet I will go on to argue that there was 
also pressure from below, with the Civil Service rank and file in opposition to both 
Market Testing and the Public-Private Partnership. Hence, union activists worked 
together with the grassroots membership. Finally, Kelly argues that unions have to 
be organised and attack counter-mobilisations by management ( 1998). In the case of 
National Savings, there were government assurances that the PPP was a 'win- win' 
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situation for all parties concerned; yet, as will be discussed later, there was 
widespread scepticism to these claims, and the union were able to build a campaign 
of opposition. 
I shall now analyse the government directives that have been introduced at 
National Savings from the early 1980s onwards, together with organised formal 
resistance to these organisational culture change initiatives on the part of the unions 
and their members. 
The Financial Management Initiative - the First Tentative Signs of 
Formal Opposition to the Commercialisation of the Civil Service 
The Financial Management Initiative was the first step in the Conservative's 
concerted quest for a more business-like Civil Service. Whilst the unions voiced 
opposition, they were unable to mobilise support for industrial action as they had 
recently been defeated in a long-running pay dispute. 
As has been discussed in previous chapters, the introduction of the FMI in 1982 
was the initial stage in the commercialisation of the Civil Service. This policy 
encompassed some of the early features of New Public Management, with the 
imposition of strict budgetary controls and clear performance objectives (Pollitt, 
1990. Drewry and Butcher, 1991: 204- 206. Ferlie et al, 1996: ch. 2). The Civil 
Service unions were critical of the FMI, and claimed that the policy was primarily 
about cutting public expenditure and reducing staffing levels (Hall, 1983. Beaumont, 
1992: ch. 3). However, as the Civil Service unions had just been defeated by the 
Thatcher government in 1981 after a 21 week pay dispute over fair comparability 
with outside industry (Fairbrother, 1994: 94. Horton, 1996. Rose, 2001: 336), they 
were not in a position to mount a serious challenge to the FMI. Yet they were not the 
first trade union to be defeated at the hands of the first Thatcher government, the 
steel workers also met a similar fate in 1980 (Dudley and Richardson, 1990). Again, 
this is a key characteristic of New Public Management, where governments directly 
confront independent trade unions in order to reassert management's right to manage 
(Hood, 1991 ). A senior trade union representative argues that the unions only 
mouthed opposition to the FMI, as the union leaders did not believe they could 
mobilise support for strike action. Also, as has already been covered in chapter three, 
the policy had very little direct impact on the working lives of frontline civil servants. 
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The unions' campaigned against FMI at the time, but not very seriously to be 
honest. It was political rather than any other type of opposition; it didn't 
involve the membership, other than write to your MP. We'd just been 
defeated in a big pay campaign and, therefore, I don't think the union 
leadership felt the confidence was there to take on what was an esoteric 
struggle in the eyes of members, because it's not something that affected 
them directly at their desks. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
Yet, as covered in chapter two, there was management reluctance from some 
senior civil servants to the FMI, who saw such private sector management principles 
as alien to the culture of the Civil Service, which limited the impact of the policy 
(Likierman, 1984. Metcalfe and Richards, 1984. Pyper, 1995: ch. 3). 
Agency Status - Formal Opposition to the Fragmentation of a 
Centralised Unified National Civil Service 
The introduction of Agency Status from the late 1980s through to the mid-1990s 
resulted in the break up of a centralised and unified Civil Service with nationally 
negotiated collective bargaining, as has been analysed in chapter three. Although 
some Civil Service managers were reluctant to implement this Conservative directive, 
intra-union divisions neutered any effective action against Agency Status. Yet, I will 
go on to show that the more militant National Savings Group were able to negotiate 
better pay deals than the then 'Moderate' National Executive Committee (NEC). As 
the NEC is now dominated by 'Left Unity', more affirmative action has been taken 
to return to national pay bargaining, culminating in recent strike activity. 
Agency Status was a Conservative government directive aimed at changing the 
culture of the Civil Service via decentralisation, with the separation of policy from 
service delivery (Hood, 1991. Pilkington, 1999). However, the Treasury voiced 
concerns as they did not want their control over Civil Service expenditure devolved 
and subsequently weakened (Pyper, 1991: ch. 6 and 1995: ch. 3). Indeed, a senior 
union official argues that this was the case at National Savings, as management were 
coerced into introducing Agency Status by the Conservative government, which 
resulted in the department being one of the last government Agencies to be created in 
1996. 
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We [National Savings] were one of the last Agencies to be created, because 
the Treasury opposed Agency Status. They were forced to make their sub-
departments - National Savings is a sub-department of the Treasury -
Agencies at the end of the process, in the mid- '90s. And to be honest, we 
didn't even call ourselves 'The National Savings Agency', we just called 
ourselves 'National Savings', we didn't even use the title. And if you look at, 
for instance, Customs and Excise, which are related to the Treasury, they 
created Executive Units, not Executive Agencies. The Treasury doesn't want 
to lose financial control from the centre, by definition Agencies are exactly 
that, policies are made at the centre and the delivery is done under the 
Agency. The Treasury didn't like that, so Treasury departments and sub-
departments were created as Agencies late in the day, under political duress 
from the government. (Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
The same was also true of the Land Registry, which is part of the Vice Chancellor's 
Department, as those in charge did not welcome or enthusiastically embrace Agency 
Status (Smith, 2000). Hence, there is a management power struggle, where those 
heading Civil Service departments did not want to decentralise power, control and 
authority. 
The Civil Service unions opposed Agency Status, fearing that it would lead to 
the devolvement of national pay and the introduction of Performance-Related Pay, 
together with increased workloads for staff (CPSA, 1990). Regarding trade union 
action against Agency Status, intra-union politics came into play where there was 
division between the 'Broad Left', who wanted nationally organised collective action 
against Agency Status, and the 'Moderate' NEC, who were less inclined to take a 
stand. This resulted in an unofficial conference being arranged by 'Broad Left' 
activists. 
There was a half-hearted national campaign set up against the introduction of 
Agency Status, because those at the top of the union didn't share the views of 
the active layer. There was division between the ['Moderate'] National 
Executive and conference/ the activists [of the 'Broad Left']. The National 
Executive generally mouthed opposition, but did nothing, and the conference 
wanted to do more. In fact, we [the 'Broad Left'] had an unofficial 
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conference in Birmingham in 1989 to orgamse opposition because the 
national union wouldn't do so, but the wheels of power were not ours, and in 
the end that delivered awareness rather than activity. (Steve, union official, 
interview, 2001) 
Fairbrother argues that one of the aims of Agency Status was to break the power 
of the national Civil Service unions, so that they could be redefined along the 'New 
Realist' agenda of pursuing enterprise goals. Agency Status did, as the unions' 
feared, result in the end of national pay negotiations, although collective bargaining 
and Whitley Committees remained intact on an Agency level (Fairbrother, 1994: 46 
- 47. Bailey, 1996). However, Fairbrother views such changes in a positive light, 
arguing that Agency Status brings with it new opportunities of more active and 
participative trade unionism (1994 and 2002). As Agency Status ends the centralised 
stranglehold of moderate and remote national trade union leaders, it opens the door 
to a broader platform for more union reps to become actively involved, including 
more women and part-time workers (Fairbrother, 1994). Indeed, from Fairbrother's 
research on the Civil Service he found that active and committed union reps on a 
group level were able to negotiate better pay awards then had been made under the 
'Moderate' national union leadership (1994). Indeed the union reps state that this 
was also the case at National Savings; and this fact is documented in the 1998 branch 
report (PCS, 1998). 
Although I will go on to argue that Fairbrother (1994) is correct in his analysis 
that Agency Status has been beneficial for active grassroots trade unionism; I must 
offer qualified support as this change has only been beneficial for some unions 
within government Agencies, certainly not all. The fact that the union at National 
Savings has fared so well is down to their organisation and strength. In other 
Agencies, weaker unions have suffered with some administrative grade civil servants 
being paid up to £4, 000 a year less than their counterparts in other departments, 
which can extend to as much as £10, 000 per annum for executive grades (PCS, 
2004c). Therefore, I have to agree with Bailey (1996) that Agency Status has suited 
the stronger unions. Whilst there has been Treasury control over Agency pay 
structures and wage bills (Bailey, 1996); pay differentials have expanded over time 
with huge disparities across Agencies, to the extent that some administrative workers 
in the Benefits Agency are paid less than £10, 000 a year and are actually on benefits 
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themselves (Happold, 2004). Hence, there is now a PCS campaign to return to 
nationally negotiated standard pay settlements (PCS, 2004c). This has involved 
recent strike action in three government Agencies by around 90, 000 civil servants in 
April 2004 against low pay and the imposition of pay rises by 'New' Labour (PCS, 
2004c. Hall, 2004); indeed such direct government intervention is unitaristic in 
nature. 
Although Fairbrother (1994 and 2002) argues that Agency Status does open 
opportunities for participative trade unionism at a local level, he overlooks the 
principle that national unions can also be strong, organised, democratic, active and 
militant, and therefore, have substantial bargaining power to protect members' 
interests. The widespread decentralisation of pay under New Public Management did 
not just affect the Civil Service, it generally diluted public sector trade union power 
and collective strength (Heery, 1996). As indicated below, the union representatives 
at National Savings are all too aware of these implications. 
Agency Status changed the attitude of management to terms and conditions, 
and it changed the attitude to bargaining in the workplace. It certainly made 
it more difficult for unions to defend [members'] terms and conditions, 
because the pressures on managers were much more focused. (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2001) 
Through the introduction of some of the key principles of New Public Management, 
including strict Agency performance targets and pay parameters, the manoeuvrability 
for unions to take effective and national action was restricted. 
The introduction of Agency Status at National Savings resulted in growing 
unease from union members as Civil Service jobs had previously been regarded as 
'jobs for life'. Indeed, the views of Doreen are typical ofthe workers I interviewed. 
I think we were all very nervous of what the next step was going to be after 
Agency Status, when we were under Thatcher, you know. We were just 
praying that nothing else would happen, that our jobs would be secure, and 
that we would just go on as before, really. I think everybody was terrified of 
the future. (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
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In 1993 the Conservative government conducted the Prior Options Review, 
which revealed that Agencies were now a transitionary step towards the possible 
contracting out of certain services to the private sector and could even result in full-
scale privatisations (Pilkington, 1999: ch. 7. Rose, 2001: 337). Katz (1993) argues 
that the widespread global decentralisation of pay and conditions led to an overall 
reduction in wages and enabled management to introduce further organisational 
changes. Indeed, a senior union official agrees that Agency Status did pave the way 
for a movement from commercialisation to privatisation at National Savings; and this 
will be investigated in the following two sections. 
Agency Status opened the way for the likes of outsourcing and it opened the 
way for Market Testing in particular, which was the big fear of staff at the 
time. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering - the Thin :End of the 
Privatisation Wedge 
The introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering at National Savings in the 
1980s was the first element of peripheral privatisation in the organisation, with the 
outsourcing of security, cleaning and catering. However, as certain groups of 
workers were represented by different trade unions it was difficult to mobilise any 
form of organised and collective formal action against this government directive. 
Moreover, although CCT only directly affected a small number of marginalised 
workers, it was viewed by the unions as the thin end of the privatisation wedge, 
creating widespread concern over the future of the Civil Service. 
As discussed in chapter two, CCT was part of a wider Conservative policy of 
contracting out areas of the public sector and Civil Service to the private sector, to 
supposedly improve efficiency and reduce costs under New Public Management 
(Hood, 1991. Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002. Hughes, 2003: ch. 3). Another aim of 
this strategy was to curb, what the government saw as, the excessive powers of 
public sector trade unions (Ascher, 1987: ch. 4. Beaumont, 1992: 62). CCT was 
mandatory in the Civil Service and National Health Service, as the government made 
it clear that there was no opportunity to retain work in-house (Beaumont, 1992: 62). 
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Trade union arguments against CCT were that private sector contractors would 
reduce staffmg levels and then subsequently increase workloads, together with 
cutting wages, terms and conditions in order to maximise profits (Batkin, 1983. 
Ascher, 1987: ch. 4. Beaumont, 1992: 63). However, existing employee terms and 
conditions are now protected under TUPE legislation. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that service delivery actually improves through privatisation. Indeed, 
critics argue that quality often deteriorates and the private sector proves to be a more 
costly option (Batkin, 1983. Morgan, 1995). 
Staff working in the areas which were outsourced under CCT at National 
Savings, particularly catering and cleaning, are typically female part-time workers 
who are already low-paid (Fevre, 1991. Morris, 1991). As these workers are part of 
a traditionally changing workforce and marginalised, they were prime targets for 
privatisation. Yet, it was very difficult for the trade unions to effectively respond to 
CCT, as the government stated that there was no alternative to the policy. Moreover, 
as CCT only affects a minority of employees, it is often difficult to mobilise other 
workers into defensive action (Whitfield and Hall, 1983. Ascher, 1987: ch. 4). 
Furthermore, as these employees were represented by the NUCPS union, there was 
little that the main union on site, the CPSA, could do as any secondary action was 
now illegal under the 1984 Trade Union Act. There was widespread sympathy from 
other workers at National Savings to the plight of those who were now privatised, 
particularly once it emerged that the unions' fears became reality, as terms, 
conditions, wages and staffing levels were cut by private sector contractors. 
It was difficult to challenge CCT .. .I mean, you really needed to mobilise the 
rest of the workforce to support them. Although there was general support as 
other workers thought they were getting a rough end of the deal, especially 
when they found out that, on certain contracts, wages were being cut, or 
wages were remaining the same and staff numbers were being cut, so they're 
doing twice the amount of work. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
Moreover, during the CCT of catering at the Land Registry, workers had to re-apply 
for their jobs at substantially reduced wage levels, which led to similar feelings of 
empathy from other employees within the organisation (Smith, 2000). 
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Indeed, as the trade unions had argued, the privatisation of catering at National 
Savings proved to be consistently problematic, and by 1996 the fourth private sector 
contractor had withdrawn from the contract (CPSA, 1996). 
Those areas that were subject to CCT are traditionally risky areas for 
employees. Catering went through about four different employers since 
privatisation. The cleaning contract has had about five or six different 
employers, and each time the private sector contractors have had a look at 
terms and conditions. The cleaning contract, in particular, has been notorious. 
(Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
There was a similar scenario relating to both the CCT of catering and cleaning at the 
Land Registry, where each went through a series of different private sector 
contractors (Smith, 2000). 
Whilst the Civil Service was only marginally affected by CCT (Pyper, 1995: 65); 
the introduction of Market Testing increased the threat of privatisation throughout 
the service, and this will be analysed next. 
Market Testing- the Start of the Fight Back Against Privatisation. 
in the Civil Service 
The same aims and objectives of Compulsory Competitive Tendering were used with 
the Conservative government's plan to Market Test areas of the Civil Service, 
namely to dismantle the public sector and open it up to further private competition. 
There was a rolling programme of Market Tests at National Savings which began in 
the early 1990s, details of which were discussed in chapter three. The introduction 
of Market Testing resulted in the first industrial action taken by the National Savings 
Group Executive Committee (GEC) against the privatisation programme of the 
Conservatives, together with another nationally co-ordinated day of action. Yet once 
again, there was management reluctance at implementing this initiative. 
Market Testing was more wide-ranging than CCT, and potentially any civil 
servants' job could be re-assessed and privatised. Critics argue that the threat of 
privatisation has a negative impact upon the workforce (Batkin, 1983. Hastings, 
224 
1983). In keeping with these claims, the trade union officials interviewed also stated 
that Market Testing resulted in a decline in workplace morale at National Savings. 
Workplace morale plummeted when Market Testing was introduced. There 
is nothing worse than your employer saying, "We're going to test to see if 
you are worth it." It de-values people. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
As stated in chapter three, although none of the workers I interviewed at DNS were 
directly affected by Market Testing, many spoke of their concern for fellow workers 
in areas being tested, and the fear that they could be next. 
Well, I hate Market Testing, because I think the Civil Service should remain 
within the public domain. People were fearful for their futures, they really 
were. It was an awful time! (Julie, worker, interview, 2003) 
Market Testing was totally stressful, people were totally demoralised, they 
were demotivated, they didn't know what was going to happen, everything 
was so uncertain. All of a sudden, people who'd had what they thought was a 
secure job for life were thrown into major confusion about whether they were 
even going to have a job at all! (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
However, in several Agencies there was reluctance on the part of Chief 
Executives at introducing Market Testing, as they felt that the pressure to meet quota 
targets went against their authority under devolved responsibility (Pyper, 1995: ch. 3). 
Some management teams favoured in-house bids; as did those heading National 
Savings, and after 13 departmental Market Tests, all work was retained in the public 
sector. Indeed, a senior union official states that National Savings management put 
catering, cleaning and security - which had already been outsourced under CCT - on 
the Market Testing list to meet the government's Efficiency Unit targets. 
Market Testing was a government policy, and again, the Treasury weren't 
very keen on it. So, I have to be honest and say that the Treasury Department 
did not embrace Market Testing particularly brilliantly. They carried it out 
because they had to. Also, in National Savings with 90 odd per cent union 
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membership, the last thing the management wanted was a fight with us on 
Market Testing. So Market Testing was quite minimal and we did not 
transfer one Civil Service job to the private sector; and I have to say that's 
true of Customs and other Treasury Agencies as well. I think we were 
working with a management who were pretending to be opposed to our point 
ofview. (Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
Moreover, one of the workers interviewed states that she felt that there was 
reluctance on the part of National Savings management to outsource areas to the 
private sector. 
I think we had a very sympathetic group of managers who were making the 
decisions regarding Market Testing at National Savings. I also think they 
probably felt that staff experience and how the organisation worked was 
worth a lot as well. (Angela, worker, interview, 2001) 
Regarding mobilisation theory (see Tilly, 1981. Kelly, 1998), the CPSA union at 
National Savings were able to mobilise members and generate support for collective 
strike actions over the sense of injustice at government proposals for Market Testing. 
There was an Agency-wide strike when the announcement of the first Market Test of 
Typing was made, and the union officials stated that the vast majority of members 
came out in sympathy and solidarity with the Typists. 
The members were fantastic during the Market Testing campaign. We had 
sympathy strikes for people when the first Market Test of Typing was 
announced in October '92. All three [National Savings] offices walked out 
on a Friday afternoon when the decision was announced. The members were 
great, absolutely great, and that was a good factor in telling the employer, 
"Don't get involved with us." (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
Fairbrother also notes that there were similar strike actions against Market Testing in 
the Benefits Agency (1994: 103 - 4). Moreover, a senior union rep states that 
National Savings management were well aware of trade union strength and member 
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feeling over Market Testing. In the quote below, he claims that there was even 
management empathy for their actions. 
We had a strike actually, which shows management's attitude to Market 
Testing. We had a Departmental Whitley Council meeting in Glasgow 
[National Savings] on the day that they were formally announcing the first 
Market Test, which was Typing. And we had warned them [NS management] 
that we would be having industrial action on the day, even though it would be 
illegal, because we were going to hold a car park meeting, have a show of 
hands and walk off the job when the announcement was made. And the 
Director of Savings, the most senior civil servant at National Savings, sat 
across the table, and we said to him, "This meeting will have to finish at 
11[a.m] because we have a mass meeting in the car park." And he said, 
"That's fine." He was on the site, we were holding an unofficial strike and he 
helped us do it, he didn't object, he registered no protest. So the CPSA reps 
walked out of the meeting, the PTC and NUCPS reps - as was - stayed there 
because they were not holding similar strikes, and they got hell off their 
members because their members came to our meeting and walked off as well. 
We had a mass meeting in the car park, held a show of hands and we all went 
home. The fact that it was a Friday and pay day helped as well! (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2001) 
This strike shows unofficial inter-union loyalty over Market Testing, as other union 
members walked out in support of the action taken by the CPSA; even though the 
strike was actually illegal under the 1984 Trade Union Act, as there was no secret 
ballot prior to the industrial action. It also demonstrates how trade unions have to be 
pragmatic in mobilising support for industrial action by tactically playing to their 
strengths and calling for a half-day strike on a Friday afternoon, which coincided 
with pay day. 
There was a second strike at National Savings over the issue of Market Testing, 
this was a national strike on 5th of November 1993 involving all of the Civil Service 
unions, where over one-quarter of a million civil servants took industrial action 
(Pyper, 1995: 16). A senior union official argues that the widespread activist and 
member support to challenge Conservative government policy meant that there was 
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grassroots pressure, which forced the 'Moderate' dominated NEC of the CPSA union 
into mobilising industrial action. 
There was a national November 51h strike in1993, when the whole ofthe Civil 
Service came out and it was an absolutely massive day of action. I have to 
give them credit, because I was on the National Executive Committee at the 
time- in a ['Broad Left'] minority- but they [the NEC] did work for that one, 
and they delivered a huge day of action across all the Civil Service unions. 
We reckon that 300, 000 members were on strike that day. It was the big 
issue of those couple of years to people, and I suspect that - this is my 
opinion - that the national union leaderships, who in the past have not been 
very supportive of fighting, felt the pressure from below on this one. (Steve, 
union official, interview, 2001) 
As was discussed in chapter three, workplace morale did improve at National 
Savings as more and more in-house bids were successful. However, there were 
tensions over in-house bids between managers and the unions, as a senior union 
officer explains below, because some managers were unnecessarily pressurising staff 
into giving up terms and conditions which were now protected under TUPE law. 
Therefore, if work was outsourced to a private sector employer, then existing terms 
and conditions would automatically be protected on transfer, so there was no need to 
give up certain rights in the hope that this would help retain work in the public sector. 
The worry for the unions though, at the time, was that hard won terms and 
conditions were being questioned by [Market Testing] In-house Bid Teams. I 
remember a number of instances where leaders of In-house Bid Teams were 
almost blackmailing staff by saying, "If you don't give up this, this and this, 
we'll not win this contract and you'll be transferred out to a private sector 
employer." I stood up as a senior rep at a couple of In-House Bid Team 
meetings and told staff to hold tight and not to give up anything. The union 
advised them to pull their bid together around existing procedures, not on 
giving up flexi-time, or special leave, or hospital rights; on the premise that if 
you were transferred out, your terms and conditions on a TUPE transfer 
would have to transfer over to the private sector. So if anyone was assessing 
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a bid, terms and conditions are on a like-for-like basis, the private sector had 
to meet those terms and conditions because it was a TUPE transfer. So why 
should you give them up with an in-house bid? (Chris, union official, 
interview, 2002) 
Despite successfully retaining all work in-house, the unions and their members 
now faced a much larger outsourcing involving the whole of the service delivery 
under the Public-Private Partnership programme. Prior to the implementation of this 
policy, the main Civil Service unions merged, and I will now examine this strategic 
move. 
Trade Union Merger in the Prelude to the Public-Private 
Partnership 
In this section I will discuss and analyse the merger of the main Civil Service unions 
in forming the PCS, Britain's largest and most influential Civil Service trade union. 
I will go on to argue that this was a pragmatic and strategic exercise to offer broader 
membership protection and security, at both a national and group level. This was 
particularly relevant at National Savings as the unions merged in 1998, just after the 
announcement of the PPP was made, and such unity and solidarity were vital when 
dealing with the major changes that were on the horizon. 
Trade union mergers are not a new phenomenon, indeed several industrial 
relations theorists argue that they are cyclical and generated for a number of reasons, 
some of which are fundamental, whilst others are more historically specific (Undy et 
al, 1981: ch. 6. Buchanan, 1985. Towers, 1997: ch. 6. Kelly, 1998: 94- 95). Earlier 
merger waves were identified as being between 1917- 1922 and 1961 - 1975, and 
the common reasons for amalgamation were the introduction of new technology, 
inter-union disputes over demarcation and competition for new members (Undy et al, 
1981: ch. 6. Buchanan, 1985). The most recent spate of union mergers took place 
during the 1980s and 1990s with the formation of 'super unions', such as, UNISON 
and the GMB who represent a wide diversity of members in general areas of 
employment (Towers, 1997: ch. 6). Indeed this is such a common occurrence, that 
Griffin and Fairbrother (2002) go so far to talk of a 'merger frenzy'. Traditionally 
union mergers are usually defensive, as due to a decline in member numbers it is 
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essential for unions to amalgamate in order to survive and to gain more effective 
financial control (Undy et al, 1981: ch. 6. Towers, 1997: ch. 6. Griffin and 
Fairbrother, 2002). Yet, union mergers can also consolidate bargaining power and 
offer greater security with a broader membership base (Undy et al, 1981: ch. 6. 
Hawkins, 1982: 92- 93. Buchanan, 1985). I want to go on to argue that these are 
some of the reasons as to why the Civil Service unions decided to merge. 
On the 1st of January 1998 the CPSA, NUCPS and PTC unions officially 
merged to form the PCS, Britain's largest Civil Service trade union (PCS, 1998). 
Nationally, members voted 2:1 in favour of merger on the grounds that a broad Civil 
Service membership base would enhance collective unity and strength (CPSA, 1997). 
Yet at National Savings, because several executive grade union officials had left the 
organisation through 'voluntary' redundancy, the CPSA branch were effectively 
operating as a merged union prior to the official merger taking place. 
The reason the unions merged was because some of the PTC and NUCPS 
reps took voluntary redundancy and we [the CPSA officials] ended up 
actually representing higher grades, despite the fact that we didn't have 
recognition for them prior to the merger. So it seemed a natural progression 
for the unions to merge. (Chris, union official, interview, 2002) 
However, one of the initial barriers to the union merger was the hierarchical 
nature of the Civil Service. Due to the CPSA representing administrative grades, and 
NUCPS being the executive/ managerial grades' union, there could be inter-union 
conflict with a 'us' and 'them' attitude between the grades. Fairbrother also noted 
such perceived class differences in the Civil Service unions (1994: 109). 
I've always argued that it would be the best for the unions to merge. The 
problem we [the union reps] had was the memberships didn't believe that, 
because the nature of the old union, being grade unions, meant that every 
victory CPSA got, individual managers took that personally, and didn't want 
to be represented by the people who had given them, what they saw as, a 
kicking. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
230 
However, those in favour of a merged Civil Service union state that any possible in-
fighting can be solved through clearer structures of representation so that all opinions 
are heard. 
There are difficulties in it [a merged union], but what you have to try and do 
is make sure that your representative structures take account of that and that 
the voices of any minorities, whether they're grade, gender, race or other 
types of minorities, actually come through. The grade minorities are no 
different in that sense, and some areas are management heavy with small 
admin staffs, and other areas, like ours, are huge admin areas with small 
management staffs. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
However, in the case of the National Savings Group more specifically, it was 
vital that the unions put aside their differences and merged, once the announcement 
ofthe Public-Private Partnership was made in 1997 (PCS, 1998). 
The issues that we are facing [through the PPP] mean people have no choice 
but to merge. What drove these two groups ofworkers [from the CPSA and 
NUCPS/ PTC unions] together was the privatisation, because the issues are 
so big and all encompassing that people saw more in common than they saw 
dividing them. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
There are critics who are sceptical of trade union mergers, with Fairbrother and 
Griffin (2002) claiming that results are at best neutral, and Towers (1997: ch. 6) 
arguing that mergers do not halt member decline. However, in Bacon and Storey's 
research (1996), the merger of UNISON was strategic, rather than solely defensive, 
with the aim of creating a broader membership base in order to increase bargaining 
strength. The merger of PCS nationally was similar, in that it was pragmatic and 
strategic to challenge the threats civil servants faced in terms of continuing 
commercialisation and possible privatisation or part-privatisation through PPP and 
PFI deals. 
The PCS union is currently the fastest growing trade union in the UK, in 2002 
there were over 270, 000 members (PCS, 2002b ), and this has expanded to currently 
stand at 310, 000 members, making it the country's sixth largest trade union (PCS, 
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2004d). In 1998 the Commercial Sector of PCS was established, where members 
who were privatised would continue to be represented by the PCS. Most 
interestingly the Commercial Sector is the fastest growing section of PCS, it started 
off with 10, 000 members, which increased to 25, 000 by 2002 (PCS, 2002b ), and is 
currently around 40, 000. Due to 'New' Labour changing the law on trade union 
recognition and representation, the PCS have been able to transfer their unionised 
culture to the private sector, mainly through PPP and PFI deals, but they have also 
been able to pick up members from previously unchartered territories by way of 
'partnership' agreements (PCS, 2004e). This is a new and interesting development 
of trade union renewal and growth, which counters recent trends 
In the following sections of the chapter, I will demonstrate why the union 
merger at National Savings was essential in both the run up to the PPP and in 
challenging many of the new initiatives that were to follow. 
The Trade Unions' Campaign against the Public-Private 
Partnership 
The appointment of a Chief Executive from the private sector to head the newly 
established National Savings Agency signalled a change in management style, with 
the endorsement of the, then Conservative government's, policy ofPPP. I will go on 
to analyse the trade unions' campaign which resulted in the first ever industrial 
action to be taken against 'New' Labour, but was blunted by inter and intra-union 
conflicts. I shall go on to argue that 'New' Labour's decision to drive forward the 
PPP has resulted in more disharmony and conflict at National Savings, despite the 
claims of a new 'partnership' at work. 
The prelude to the introduction of the PPP at National Savings signals a change 
in management direction and industrial relations style, from the old Civil Service 
conciliatory approach, to a more confrontational style with the arrival of a new Chief 
Executive. In July 1996, Peter Bareau was appointed as the first Chief Executive of 
the National Savings Agency; he had previously been the General Manager 
Personnel of Lloyds Bank PLC (HM Treasury, 1996). One of the primary aims of 
New Public Management is to transform the cultures of public sector organisations 
through the adoption of private sector management techniques and the employment 
of senior managers from the business sector (Hood, 1991. E. Wilson, 1993). 
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Furthermore, Isaac-Henry (1993) argues that the Conservative government believed 
that many public sector managers lacked the determination and will to implement 
organisational culture change. Hence, private sector managers were deliberately 
recruited for this purpose and offered lucrative salaries that reflected the market 
norm. Indeed, the CPSA union officials reiterate this point and claim that Peter 
Bareau was brought in to drive forward the PPP of National Savings, and as the 
previous management team had been reluctant to implement many of the 
Conservative's initiatives, they were unlikely to favour PPP. 
Peter Bareau was not a civil servant; he was working for Lloyds Bank in the 
private sector. He was brought in by the Tory government for a purpose, to 
lead the privatisation ofNational Savings. As the Treasury/ Civil Service had 
been opposed to Market Testing, they weren't going to sell the whole lot off 
[via PPP] were they? (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
Hence, this was a political appointment, aimed at facilitating culture change via the 
implementation of the Conservative's new Public-Private Partnership policy. This is 
a major break with tradition, as previously career civil servants managed departments, 
and the conscious selection of a Chief Executive to endorse government policy is the 
antithesis of the foundational and democratic values of public administration (Hood, 
1991. du Gay, 2000). 
We got a new Chief Executive at the time - Peter Bareau - who was just 
really pro-PPP. He believed that PPP was the way forward and that he should 
just be managing the core policy makers at National Savings Headquarters, 
and a private sector partner could run the business. I think he drove the PPP 
of National Savings more than anyone else. (Chris, union official, interview, 
2002) 
In the quote below, a senior union official claims that the reputation of Peter Bareau 
as an executor of radical change went before him. 
Peter Bareau had been working for Lloyds Bank and he'd gone in and gutted 
it, basically. So, it was no surprise when he was named as 'the man' [the 
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Chief Executive of National Savings]. As you'd imagine, as soon as he was 
in the frame, the union went and did their homework and found out what he 
was all about and, you know, it wasn't hard to find his reputation. (Paul, 
union official, interview, 2003) 
The appointment of Peter Bareau as head of the newly established National Savings 
Agency marked a major change in the direction of the organisation. 
In 1996 the Conservative government proposed the Public-Private Partnership of 
National Savings. All of the trade unions at National Savings were fundamentally 
opposed to this policy, especially after the successful retention of all work in-house 
which had recently been the subject of Market Testing (CPSA, 1996 and 1997). Just 
as in the Market Testing campaign, the unions were able to successfully mobilise 
member support around a defensive campaign to keep National Savings a public 
sector organisation and to retain its Civil Service status. In the quote below, a senior 
union official outlines the unions' main arguments against the PPP of National 
Savings. 
Basically we [the trade unions] thought that PPP was more expensive than 
traditional government funding. It was a massive blow for the staff and it 
took away their career status as civil servants. It threatened their terms and 
conditions, and still may do down the line. It would not necessarily deliver a 
better service for customers; SBS have no history in financial services. (Steve, 
union official, interview, 2001) 
Moreover, the following quotes below are typical of the sentiments from all of the 
workers I interviewed at Durham National Savings as to why they supported the 
trade unions' stance against part-privatisation. 
I supported the campaign against the PPP because I didn't want to be 
privatised. I didn't want to work for an organisation ... you know, all the 
classic stuff, it was profit before customer service. People in National 
Savings were very proud of what they gave to their customers, and we didn't 
believe that that was going to continue in the private sector. (Doreen, worker, 
interview, 2003) 
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Not only were both the trade union officials and workers in agreement that the PPP 
could threaten National Savings' renowned customer service, but there was also a 
questioning of the inherent contradiction of a private sector company attempting to 
make a profit out of a public sector organisation. Moreover, workers were also 
doubtful of the claims made by both the government and the private sector 
contractors that the PPP would benefit all parties concerned. 
Being a bit of a socialist, I was opposed to the privatisation of public sector 
work. We were sold the line that the PPP would bring more opportunities for 
staff, but staff were skeptical of the promises made by the government or the 
company. I think that's why the union got such big support for the campaign 
that they ran. (Colin, worker, interview, 2003) 
Also as mentioned in chapter four, as the PPP was such a new initiative, workers 
believed that they were entering into unknown territory which led to an increasing 
identity with the trade unions to ensure employment protection. 
With reference to mobilisation theory (see Tilly, 1981. Kelly, 1998), the unions 
were able to build a campaign of opposition against the PPP as this policy was 
unpopular from the outset as it was a clear continuation of the New Public 
Management agenda. Staff saw this policy as a threat to their employment status and 
job security. There were also concerns that the customer service ofNational Savings 
would suffer, as a private sector 'partner' would primarily be motivated by profit. 
Whilst the union activists did launch the campaign against the PPP, there was also 
strong rank and file support. Moreover, the unions and their members were aware of, 
what Kelly (1998) terms counter mobilisations, and unconvinced of the assurances 
made by both the government and the companies bidding for the contract. 
The unions at National Savings started a campaign against the Public-Private 
Partnership as soon as plans were announced by the then Conservative government. 
They received support from all of the relevant constituency MPs, particularly the 
Durham Labour MP Gerry Steinberg (CPSA, 1996). In the run up to the 1997 
General Election, 'New' Labour stated that there would be a moratorium on Market 
Testing and a halt to privatisation in the Civil Service (CPSA, 1997). Moreover, the 
CPSA union at National Savings received a letter from the then Labour Shadow Civil 
Service Minister, Derek Foster, in April 1997 stating that the threat of partial-
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privatisation would be removed on the election of a 'New' Labour government 
(CPSA, 1997). Understandably, the unions urged members to support 'New' Labour 
in the forthcoming General Election so that National Savings could retain its 
threatened Civil Service status. However, upon 'New' Labour coming to office the 
trade unions and their members were to be bitterly disappointed, as a senior union 
official explains. 
The PPP of National Savings was launched by the Tories in 1996. We [the 
unions] ran a campaign against that and got a letter of support from New 
Labour dated April '97 saying they would never allow the privatisation of 
National Savings, which I've still got, signed by Derek Foster MP, who to his 
credit left the Shadow Cabinet over issues like this and didn't get a job in the 
Cabinet. After the 1997 General Election we met Mrs. Helen Liddell, our 
Minister at the Treasury, and she told us she was going ahead with the PPP, 
the process had been started, it was in the budget plan and had to go ahead. 
So, they lied to us! (Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
Helen Liddell, the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, agreed with the 
recommendations made by National Savings management, under the leadership of 
Peter Bareau, to proceed to the next stage of the PPP process where the short listed 
companies were invited to negotiate their final proposals (CPSA, 1997. PCS, 1998). 
There was a 2 year trade union campaign against the PPP of National Savings 
involving: a petition signed by staff to the Agency Chief Executive - Peter Bareau, 
over 2, 500 postcards from union members to the Minister responsible, letters to MPs, 
support from other Civil Service trade unions, a constant stream of press releases and 
a lobby of Parliament (CPSA, 1997). This culminated in a one hour strike staged by 
all of the trade unions on lOth of October 1997 at lla.m. At Durham, this walk out 
was followed by a lunchtime public meeting in the Town Hall with Gerry Steinberg 
MP being the guest speaker, with over 500 DNS union members in attendance 
(CPSA, 1997). 
Although the unions' strike action against the PPP at National Savings only 
lasted one hour, it is significant for a number of reasons. It was the first strike action 
taken by any trade union against Tony Blair's 'New' Labour government, which is 
important when seen in the context at the time. Mcilroy (1998) argues that many in 
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the trade union movement felt pressurised to comply with government policy, even if 
they disagreed with it, for fear of a right-wing backlash. This action also took place 
at a time when relations between 'New' Labour and the unions were more relaxed, 
with Waddington (2003) claiming that the unions were hopeful of a more 
progressive/ socialist agenda. It is also noteworthy that the strike proved to be highly 
effective in creating solidarity and in attracting new members, as the CPSA picked 
up 50 non-members at the Durham site alone in the run up to the strike (CPSA, 1997), 
and the union continued recruiting members throughout the campaign (PCS, 1998). 
This endorses the claims made by Kelly ( 1996 and 1998) that union militancy can 
pay off in terms ofbolstering membership numbers. 
The campaign against the PPP of National Savings involved the first 
industrial action against New Labour by anybody, in October '97, when we 
were on strike for a whole one hour. I scoffed at that, but we couldn't take 
the PTC [union] and the executive grades unions to any more than that, they 
would only go for a one hour stoppage. So we had a one hour stoppage in 
October '97 and we got fantastic media coverage, because it's theatre in the 
making, an office emptying at 11 o'clock. What television never gets, is 
when people go on strike, they get a picket line the next morning with six 
people there. What they got this time was people walking out of the 
buildings, it was fantastic. So if anybody's ever going to do that, I'd say go 
for it, because you get more media coverage out of that than you do from a 
one day strike. We were on telly all day. (Steve, union official, interview, 
2001) 
Thus, the one hour strike was visually highly effective with television cameras 
capturing hundreds of National Savings staff pouring out of offices, which helped aid 
the impact of the protest action and raise the profile of the union (CPSA, 1997). Yet, 
as the walk out only lasted one hour, it does not meet the official criteria for a strike 
as its duration was less than one day (Hyman, 1989: 17). 
The decision by the 'New' Labour government to proceed with the PPP of 
National Savings also brought division within the party's ranks, with Gerry Steinberg 
MP openly criticising government policy at the Durham Town Hall rally (CPSA, 
1997). 
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On transfer across to Siemens Business Services, we [the CPSA] had really 
good parliamentary support from the local MPs, Gerry Steinberg in particular. 
We had a day of action when the PPP announcement was made [on 1 01h of 
October 1997] and we had a mass meeting in the Town Hall in Durham with 
Gerry Steinberg as the guest speaker. And despite the fact that Labour in 
opposition a week prior to the General Election of 1997 had given a letter in 
writing saying they would stop the privatisation of National Savings; a year 
later they reneged on that pledge and went ahead with it. So Gerry Steinberg 
knew it was Labour government policy, he knew what the implications might 
be for the staff who were working at this site and he put his head above the 
parapet and attacked the Labour government. (Chris, union official, interview, 
2002) 
However, there were both intra and inter-trade union divisions over the question 
of taking further industrial action against 'New' Labour's plans to carry out the PPP 
of National Savings. Whilst the then 'Moderate' National Executive of the CPSA 
union approved the one hour strike on lOth October 1997, there were intra-union 
divisions as they resisted calls from the National Savings GEC to endorse further 
industrial action. A senior union officer claims that this was because the NEC, at the 
time, were ardent supporters of 'New' Labour. Furthermore, there were also inter-
union divisions as both the PTC and NUCPS were not prepared to take further action, 
and the National Executive of the CPSA felt that any divisions could jeopardise the 
imminent merger of the unions. 
But we [the National Savings GEC] were blocked from taking further 
industrial action even if we wanted to, when the [PPP] contract was 
announced in December '97/ January '98, by the National Executive 
Committee who have friends in high places with the election ofNew Labour. 
But I have to say, the PTC were not going to come with us, so the CPSA 
National Executive were not prepared to go alone, because at that time we 
were discussing the merger with PTC and we wouldn't want to be seen as 
different. (Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
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However, some of the senior union officials argued that had the national leadership 
of the CPSA supported the Group Executive with nationally co-ordinated action, 
then they could have won their campaign to halt the Public-Private Partnership of 
National Savings. Instead, as the NEC and the other unions involved decided to take 
no further action, it was now impossible for the Group Executive to oppose the 
'New' Labour government over this policy. 
The biggest disappointment I've ever had is the privatisation [PPP], and I 
know that had the national union organised a national campaign against 
privatisation we could have seen this off. That was disappointing, that the 
national leadership didn't want to do that, they were too close to the New 
Labour government in its honeymoon period. So they left us [the GEC] on 
our own, and we couldn't fight a government on our own. (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2002) 
Yet the protest actions were positive, in that they sent out a message to the 
private sector bidders for the PPP contract that they would be dealing with a strong 
and organised merged union who would vigorously defend their members' terms and 
conditions of employment (PCS, 1998 and 1999). 
The campaign against the PPP definitely raised awareness and made the 
union strong, which was very, very helpful. Actually, one of our aims was 
that if we were going to be defeated in the privatisation campaign, we wanted 
to show SBS or EDS that they were dealing with a very strong union that had 
masses of support from the membership. In fact, we did that, they both 
quoted us actually, rather than trying to keep us at a distance. (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2001) 
As mentioned earlier, the trade unions at National Savings and their members 
hoped that the election of a 'New' Labour government would see the removal of the 
PPP threat (CPSA, 1996). However, once in power, 'New' Labour decided to carry 
out the PPP, and writing in the 1997 Branch Report, a senior union official speaks of 
feeling betrayed both as a voter and a member of the Labour Party (CPSA, 1997). 
Another senior union official agrees and claims that members were "devastated" 
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after 'New' Labour went back on their election pledge and decided to implement the 
Conservative Policy of the part-privatisation ofNational Savings. 
Our members were absolutely devastated after New Labour carried out the 
PPP. Many of our Durham members come from Sedgefield, Tony Blair's 
own constituency, and made it clear to him what they thought. In Glasgow, 
another strong Labour heartland, we never thought we'd see Labour privatise 
anything, far less ourselves. Members were absolutely gutted by it! In 
Blackpool it was particularly devastating, because Blackpool had never had 
Labour MPs until 1997, and I know there was a general swing to Labour 
across the country, but what happened in Blackpool was a lot about the work 
that we [the unions] did locally about the Tories privatising us [National 
Savings], people had voted Labour on the back of it. There was absolutely no 
doubt that as the biggest single employer in Blackpool, the fact that the 
[National Savings] Premium Bond Office meant something, we had an 
impact on that election. And people were gutted, absolutely gutted, 
probably more so than the other two sites; because here they'd been Tory all 
their life, they change allegiance because they think it'll save them from PPP, 
and the buggers still do it to them! (Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
The quote below is representative of the feelings of the workers I interviewed at 
Durham National Savings to 'New' Labour's decision to complete the 
Conservative's PPP process. 
We knew that the Tories were going to do that [carry out the PPP ofNational 
Savings], all we thought we had to do was keep out heads below the parapet 
and a Labour government would come in and it would be OK. Instead we 
faced the biggest outsourcing of, not just a Civil Service department, but a 
government financial organisation, in the history of this country. So we were 
all extremely pissed off about that, you know, we were all devastated, and 
everybody was frightened. (Doreen, worker, interview, 2003) 
Whilst the unions' campaign against the PPP was essentially a defensive one, 
they were open and pragmatic in offering several alternatives so that National 
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Savings could remain in the public sector. When the unions met with Helen Liddell 
MP they argued that modernisation could be delivered under the Public Sector 
Comparator, rather than through a 'partnership' with the private sector (CPSA, 1997). 
They also suggested, as a senior union official explains below, that National Savings 
could be able to trade by taking on additional Third Party Business by utilising 
existing staff and processes as a public sector organisation; as discussed in chapter 
four, this did actually happen under the PPP. 
The government could have given us [National Savings] the status that 
they've given the Post Office, and the unions suggested it, of being able to 
trade. The Post Office got that status last year [in 2000]. The unions asked 
for that as an alternative to PPP, the right to go out and take on contract work 
ourselves. The government said that wasn't possible, and yet the Post Office 
have already got exactly what we asked for. (Steve, union official, interview, 
2001) 
Furthermore, a senior union official states that the unions also suggested that the 
government could issue new National Savings products to the public and, therefore, 
fund its own modernisation programme. However, all of these alternatives were 
rejected by the government as they were adhering to the Conservative's budget plan. 
Moreover, 'New' Labour's favoured method of public sector modernisation is 
through 'partnership' with the private sector (Blair, 1998). 
Whilst the current 'New' Labour government favour a 'partnership' approach to 
industrial relations, with negotiation and consensus between both sides of industry; 
there was no such compromise over the introduction of this PPP at National Savings. 
'New' Labour dismissed the legitimate protest actions of the trade unions and their 
members out ofhand, and forced through the Public-Private Partnership. 
However, since the implementation of the PPP at National Savings there have 
been some significant changes in personnel on both the trade union and management 
sides. After a bitter intra-union battle, the High Court ruled that attempts by the 
'Moderate' PCS General Secretary Barry Reamsbottom to extend his reign from May 
2002 until April 2004, when he retires, and overturn the democratic election result of 
a new General Secretary, were illegal. Therefore, from June 2002 a new PCS 
General Secretary was elected, being Mark Serwotka, the 'Left Unity' candidate 
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(PCS, 2002j and 2002k). Since then there has been the democratic election of a 'Left 
Unity' led NEC which has seen a shift in union stance, which a senior union rep at 
National Savings was predicting more generally, over the future of PPP and PFI 
projects. 
The government are signalling that there will be more PPPs, but I think 
equally the Labour movement are signalling that enough is enough. So I 
think that the national campaign that the Group Executive wanted might 
materialise. There's a lot of water that's fallen under the bridge. A lot of 
trade union leaders are making noises now that have done in the past but not 
delivered. Certainly there's a pressure from below, similar to the pressure we 
were putting on in the Civil Service that led to the Market Testing strikes, 
corning about from the government's announcements on PPP. It's just a 
shame for us that it's four or five years too late. (Steve, union official, 
interview, 2001) 
The National Executive of the PCS union are now running a 'Protect Our Public 
Services' campaign which, subject to the decision of the members directly affected, 
will support actions against privatisations. The union also offers protection to those 
members' whose employment has already been contracted out to the private sector 
(PCS, 2004f). 
There was also a change on the management side in 2003, with the appointment 
of a new Agency Chief Executive, Alan Cook (NS&I, 2003). He replaced Peter 
Bareau who left to become the Chairman of Surrey and Sussex Strategic Health 
Authority (SSSHA, 2003), only after collecting his CBE (Commander of the (Order 
of the) British Empire) in 2001 for his work at National Savings (BBC, 2001). 
There were generally good industrial relations in the Civil Service, under the 
Whitley framework. However, at an early stage in the Public-Private Partnership the 
Whitley structure was dissolved, and despite there being a 'partnership' between 
SBS and the PCS union, industrial relations have continually been tense. Yet there 
has also been informal resistance by shop floor workers to many of the initiatives 
that SBS have implemented at National Savings. 
' 
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Informal Resistance to SBS's Culture Change Initiatives 
Whilst there has been formal opposition from the trade unions and their members to 
many of the government directives implemented at National Savings, there has also 
been informal resistance to SBS's attempts at culture change. SBS have tried to win 
the battle for hearts and minds by persuading staff to embrace new values, norms and 
beliefs. Yet there has been informal resistance from the shop floor to many ofSBS's 
policies, involving cynicism and desubordination. 
It must be noted that there was never cultural cohesion when National Savings 
was part of the Civil Service. Shop floor staff were disenchanted with the routine 
and repetitive nature of low-level administrative work, and disgruntled with the lack 
of promotions and other opportunities. However, at least working at National 
Savings was a safe and stable 'job for life'. The PPP was viewed by staff as an 
immediate threat to their employment security. SBS attempted to persuade staff to 
accept and internalise new organisational goals and values by running road shows 
highlighting the new opportunities they would create. The pay offer for the first year 
of the PPP was relatively generous and promptly agreed, and SBS offered to honour 
the Civil Service long-service award scheme. Salaman (1997) and Kunda (2003) 
claim that road shows and concessions are an attempt to win the hearts and minds of 
employees, to generate a homogenous organisational culture. I want to argue that 
some of the changes introduced by SBS did benefit sections of the workforce, but not 
all, and there was growing dissatisfaction when SBS failed to live up to expectations. 
SBS held seminars and attempted to persuade staff that the PPP would have 
positive implications as the company would be able to generate Third Party Business 
and create new opportunities for shop floor workers. SBS did have some limited 
success in winning Third Party Business contracts and some workers did volunteer to 
transfer over to this new contract work. However, shop floor workers became 
disillusioned when SBS only managed to create just over half of the insourced work 
they had originally predicted. Staff were further demoralised when SBS compelled a 
number of workers to transfer over to Third Party Business contracts. This only 
heightened complications regarding staff loyalty, as workers were opposed to the 
PPP from the outset, and now some were forcibly transferred over to new contract 
work. Kamada (1994) stresses the negative implications that forced transfers can 
have on employee identity. 
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In a further attempt to transform the organisational culture, SBS introduced a 
new grading structure under Team Working and a new promotion system of Open 
Vacancy Advertising. By offering new promotion opportunities, SBS hoped to win 
over hearts and minds as many workers were frustrated with the lack of progression 
in the Civil Service. Whilst some staff were promoted by SBS at an early stage in 
the Public-Private Partnership, the majority of shop floor workers did not gain from 
these opportunities. Furthermore, there were tensions with the movement to a new 
promotion culture, and some of the executive grades who were dissatisfied with this 
new system opted to 'volunteer' for redundancy. Once a new cohort of Team 
Leaders were in place, promotions immediately ground to a halt. Indeed, some shop 
floor staff felt that the new Team Leaders were merely reciting company rhetoric and 
toeing the line. Frontline workers did not feel any more empowered under Team 
Working. As discussed in chapter five, workers were well aware that the Team 
Meeting agenda was highly constrained, and there was clearly recalcitrance with 
Julie stating that "we just take the piss." Team Members were disillusioned with this 
new system and felt that their views were not actively listened to by SBS 
management. 
Informal resistance to many of the changes at National Savings has also been 
evident in the number of workers willing to 'volunteer' for redundancy. Whilst there 
were 'voluntary' redundancy exercises before the Public-Private Partnership, SBS 
have further reduced the workforce from 4, 100 to 2, 000 employees; this was partly 
down to their inability to create the insourced work they originally planned to attract. 
Several integration theorists advise releasing those who do not adhere to the new 
culture (see Peters and Waterman, 1982. Schein, 1991. Kotter and Heskett, 1992). 
Indeed, SBS used redundancy to release established managers and drafted in their 
own external management team to cleanse the organisation of Civil Service traditions. 
However, one of the failings of SBS was that they did not make best use of existing 
staff, their wealth of experience and tacit knowledge. Moreover, Turnbull and Wass 
(2000) and also Worrall et al (2000) talk of the problem of 'survivor syndrome', as 
redundancy can compound feelings of job insecurity, with those who remain being 
placed under increasing workplace pressure. This is indeed the scenario at National 
Savings, and many of the shop floor workers do not feel part of the new SBS culture. 
SBS have created a multi-tier workforce, which did not previously exist at 
National Savings. This is bifurcated, with temporary workers on inferior terms and 
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conditions to core ex-civil servants, and SBS managers on far higher remuneration 
packages. Those interviewed felt that there was a deliberate reliance by SBS on 
temporary staff, due to allowing too many core staff to leave via redundancy. Once 
again, staff were cynical of SBS 's motives for generating a multi-tier workforce, and 
they did not welcome the new norms and values of this culture. 
Another cause of discontent amongst shop floor staff were the difficulties of 
obtaining summer leave, particularly as the workforce consists of many working 
mothers who would prefer leave during the school holidays. Staff were also 
dissatisfied with SBS's unwillingness to appoint a new Welfare Officer, and many 
interviewed felt that the company did not take the issue of workplace stress seriously. 
SBS soon faced mounting difficulties on the Public-Private Partnership contract 
when they failed to deliver Business Process Re-engineering to the agreed timetable. 
This resulted in direct intervention from Siemens AG, with the appointment of a new 
SBS senior management team. SBS held staff road shows entitled 'Building 
Tomorrow Today', where senior managers explained the difficulties they had 
encountered and outlined their plan of action (PCS, 2001a). Salaman (1997) and 
Kunda (2003) state that carefully orchestrated presentations are an attempt to win the 
sympathy of employees and colonise the culture of an organisation. However, staff 
interviewed felt that these road shows had a demoralising effect, as their efforts were 
not fully appreciated and they now faced escalating pressure to make more 
efficiencies and cost savings. In a further effort to make a profitable return on the 
deal, SBS planned to outsource sections of National Savings to other private sector 
contractors, but this was met with formal resistance and will be analysed in the 
following section. 
SBS Proposals for Further Outsourcings and the Threat of 
Industrial Action. 
As SBS were not achieving their projected profitable return on the PPP deal, radical 
action was taken with the appointment of a new SBS senior management team to run 
the National Savings Account. One of their first proposals, during the winter of 
200 II 2002, was to outsource, what they now defined as, two peripheral areas of 
National Savings to other private contractors. As examined in chapter four, the first 
proposed TUPE transfer of 15 accountancy workers to SASC at Durham National 
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Savings went ahead, despite formal opposition from the union and the staff involved. 
The second proposed TUPE involved the transfer of 390 staff across all three sites 
from the Document Management Unit to Astron, a private contractor. Astron were 
formerly known as Tactica, who ironically prior to that used to be Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, a Civil Service department (PCS, 2002c). In this section I will 
analyse the reasons behind the decision to outsource the DMU, and the campaign by 
the union and the membership to defend the status of National Savings as a 
homogenous account. 
As the new SBS management team had to take drastic measures in order to turn 
the contract around, they decided to cut the headcount on the National Savings 
Account by outsourcing the Document Management Unit, claiming that it now 
constituted peripheral business. However, critics argue that there are dangers in 
defining what is core and peripheral business, as if key areas are contracted out then 
this can lead to the hollowing out of the organisation (Jarillo, 1993: ch. 3. Milgate, 
2001: ch. 2). These were the same concerns put forward by the union, stating that as 
SBS were already encountering problems attracting Third Party Business, without 
the Document Management Unit the chances of insourcing work to National Savings 
would be further diminished (PCS, 2002c ). 
SBS's argument [to outsource the DMU] is not a very sound one from our 
[the union's] point of view. They say this work is no longer a part of our core 
business. The work is mail opening, mail sorting, scanning of documentation 
and preparing the electronic document. It also cuts across their argument that 
they wanted to take on National Savings work to give them an end to end 
business processing platform, so that they could then win other Third Party 
Business contracts. If they take away the beginning and the end of the 
process - the mail opening and mail sorting, as well as the despatch area -
then all they are left with is the middle, and they ain't going to win many 
outsourcing contracts with the middle. (Steve, union official, interview, 2002) 
Moreover, the union were given assurances at the start of the PPP contract by the 
government that National Savings was a homogenous account (PCS, 2002c). Hence, 
the fear of the union and their members is that this is a potential threat to all staff and 
could lead to the fragmentation of the account (PCS, 2002c). Also, the union felt 
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that it was unfair to put 390 workers through a second TUPE in three years, which 
could threaten job security, terms, conditions and pensions. 
The PCS union set out a four pronged campaign strategy to oppose the planned 
secondary TUPE of the Document Management Unit to Astron. 
Firstly, we're obviously engagmg the employer to put forward the case 
against outsourcing to try and convince them not to do it. 
The second arm of the strategy is to put political pressure on the government. 
We reckon we've got two cards, we've got the card of, "You gave us 
assurances, are you as good as your word?", and local MPs got the same 
assurances. The other arm of the political strategy is that the government are 
currently involved in a debate on whether PPP is a good idea for the entire 
workforce: the health service, London Underground and local government. 
They're giving these workers the same assurances they gave us. Well what 
are those assurances worth if we come along and say publicly, "Hold on a 
minute, you're getting the same assurances that we got. Let me tell you, they 
ain't worth a jot!" The other card is to say, "Do you want a mini-Railtrack?", 
with contractual relationships within a homogeneous unit that make it 
ineffective. You cannot solve problems because what you have is a blame 
culture of two sides trying to get out of their contractual arrangements to each 
other, rather than solving problems. 
Thirdly, there's a publicity wing, now if we were to create a fuss around this 
secondary TUPE, we would embarrass the government and SBS in public, 
because they've had fall downs in the IND, the Passport Agency and they'd 
be having a fall down in the National Savings contract. 
And fourthly, there is an industrial action strategy, which we obviously aren't 
talking about because that will be used as and when we need it with as little 
notice to the employer as we can give, but it is substantial. (Steve, union 
official, interview, 2002) 
The union received unanimous backing from members across all of the National 
Savings sites to oppose this mooted secondary TUPE transfer (PCS, 2002d). Once 
again, regarding mobilisation theory (see Tilly, 1981. Kelly, 1998), the union were 
able to mobilise member support for action against an unpopular SBS management 
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proposal. Moreover, there was also pressure from below, with staff fully supporting 
the PCS campaign. Furthermore, since the launch of the campaign another 20 union 
members were recruited (PCS, 2002e). This endorses Kelly's claim that union 
militancy can be positive in generating solidarity (1996 and 1998). The union also 
built up a political campaign and received support from the relevant local Labour 
MPs against the proposed outsourcing (PCS, 2002f), and gained widespread national 
and regional media coverage during their campaign (PCS, 2002g). A petition was 
also started, to be signed by all union members who were against the TUPE transfer, 
and to be presented to Ruth Kelly MP, the government minister responsible for 
National Savings, NS&I management and senior SBS management (PCS, 2002h). 
Meanwhile, an in-house bid was tabled and the union supported the main 
principle of retaining the Document Management Unit within the homogenous NS&I 
Account (PCS, 2002h). After some deliberation, SBS management decided to opt 
for the in-house bid, rather than outsource the DMU to Astron (PCS, 2002i). The 
union immediately welcomed this decision and the removal of the threat to 390 
workers across the three sites (PCS, 2002i). Senior union officials claimed that they 
were not surprised that the in-house bid was successful, as the current workers in the 
DMU are vastly experienced at their duties. Once the decision was made to retain 
the work in-house, the PCS union subsequently wound down their campaign (PCS, 
2002i). However, as with successful Market Testing in-house bids, the pressure 
remains on workers to deliver to set targets. 
Increasingly Acrimonious Industrial Relations at National Savings 
and ACAS Intervention 
There were increasingly drawn out negotiations in 2003 between SBS management 
and the PCS union over the pay review and pay deal, particularly over the issue of 
the individual monitoring of staff. As discussed in chapter five, SBS management 
were especially keen to introduce individual monitoring, claiming that it incentivises 
staff and rewards the best performers. However, the trade union and their members 
have consistently opposed any form of Performance-Related Pay arguing that it is 
inherently unfair because it is subjective, divisive and fails to motivate the majority 
of staff. I will now analyse how this deadlocked situation resulted in intervention 
from the conciliation service ACAS for the first time ever at National Savings. 
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During the 'honeymoon period' at the start of the PPP deal, pay negotiations 
were negotiated quickly and effectively at National Savings. This was not the case in 
the Civil Service under Agency Status, as pay deals were consistently delayed as 
Agency managers and the unions had to wait for Treasury approval (Gagnon, 1996) 
However, pay negotiations under SBS soon became protracted with more hard-edged 
bargaining due to the financial difficulties the company were encountering on the 
PPP contract. 
In 2003 the pay deal was supposed to be finalised in January, yet by May 
intensive negotiations were continuing with no compromise in sight. SBS were 
determined to individually monitor staff, whilst the union and members were 
unanimously opposed to this measure (PCS, 2003a). The company proposed that the 
on-going dispute be taken to ACAS and the union agreed, under the condition that 
any settlement must be approved by a ballot of the membership (PCS, 2003b ). In the 
quote below, a senior union official states that ACAS did help both sides reach a 
negotiated settlement, with the union suggesting Team-Based Performance Pay as an 
alternative to individual monitoring. 
We [the PCS union and SBS] went to ACAS, they locked us in separate 
rooms for three days ... that's basically what it was like, they wheeled our 
lunch in, you couldn't get out. At the time I thought there's no point, it's not 
going to help, but I must admit ACAS were extremely helpful. It was the 
union, actually, that came up with the idea of Team-Based Performance Pay. 
So, instead of Joe Bloggs filling in his sheet and saying, "I've done this many 
cases." Your whole team says, "This is our new weekly total." It's not 
individualised. (Paul, union official, interview, 2003) 
SBS agreed to this compromise, involving Team-Based Performance Pay. The new 
pay review with an offer of 3.89% were recommended by the GEC and put to the 
membership (PCS, 2003c ), who unanimously accepted the deal. However, due to 
such lengthy negotiations members eventually received their 2003 pay rise in August, 
eight months later than originally planned. 
Whilst the union is fundamentally opposed to any element of Performance-
Related Pay, they did have to compromise through the introduction of Team-Based 
Performance Pay, as they saw it as the lesser of two evils. However, as discussed in 
249 
chapter five, there are still dangers in this bonus system relating to peer pressure, not 
to mention the controversial use of financial quotas. Yet the fear of the union is that 
a year down the line SBS will come back with fresh proposals to introduce individual 
monitoring. Hence, the trade union claim that these conflicts over individual 
monitoring and remuneration packages will continue. This is indicative of the 
increasingly fraught culture of industrial relations at National Savings, particularly 
given the financial pressures on this 'partnership' contract. Yet there has also been 
resistance on the level of the shop floor to the incentive schemes introduced by SBS, 
as will be analysed in the following section. 
Informal Resistance - the Pragmatic Acceptance of Financial 
Benefits by Shop Floor Workers 
I will now examine the use of financial incentive schemes by SBS in an effort to 
persuade staff to embrace new organisational goals, values and norms. Whilst critics 
claim that such schemes represent managerial attempts at colonising the 
organisational culture, I will go on to demonstrate that there is a pragmatic 
acceptance by workers of financial benefits, which does not necessarily mean that 
they are subscribing to a new culture. 
Proponents argue that Performance-Related Pay incentivises staff and rewards 
the best performers (Connell and Wood, 1992: ch. 4). PRP was introduced when 
National Savings was part of the Civil Service, but the unions were fundamentally 
opposed to PRP and members consistently voted for its abolition (PCS, 1999b and 
2001c). At the informal level, all of those interviewed were critical of PRP, even 
managerial grades and staff who benefited from the scheme believed that it was 
divisive and the cause of resentment. As PRP was already unpopular, staff were 
highly critical of SBS's proposals to introduce individual monitoring. There was 
also shop floor dissatisfaction with the use of pay scales, and workers wanted to 
return to the traditional standard pay-for-the-grade system. Moreover, the creation of 
a multi-tier workforce with higher rates of pay for SBS managers and specialists, 
whilst temporary workers were on lesser terms and conditions, in comparison to core 
ex-civil servants, also resulted in feelings of animosity. 
As discussed in chapter five, SBS introduced the Employee Bonus Scheme to 
incentivise and reward staff. However, the scheme was divisive as it did not equally 
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reward all workers for their yearly efforts, which runs counter to managerial efforts 
to foster a homogenous culture. Whilst shop floor staff remained sceptical, there was 
pragmatic acceptance with Colin realistically stating, "no one's going to tum down a 
few hundred quid at the end of the year." 
SBS have also introduced the Siemens Share Scheme, and there was a 70% staff 
uptake primarily due to the offer of£ 1, 000 worth of free shares from the company to 
those who participated. The fears of Willmott (1993), Wright (1994) and Kunda 
(2003) that this is an attempt at cultural colonisation are echoed in the quote from 
Angela, "they [SBS] are trying to get you to buy into the company in more ways than 
one." However, staff viewed this as a detached financial reward, and many sold their 
shares at the first available opportunity, simply regarding this as what Roberts and 
Wilkinson ( 1991) refer to as "extra dosh." Staff are not internal ising new values and 
beliefs, as Julie states, "I've bought some shares, I don't believe in them in all 
honesty ... it means bugger all to me." Hence, there is informal resistance on the shop 
floor to many of the changes implemented by SBS, together with a pragmatic 
acceptance of the benefits. 
The Ability of Employees to Restrict Organisational Culture Change 
In this section, I will examine two instances of where shop floor employees at 
National Savings have been able to limit SBS's culture change agenda. 
As discussed in chapter five, there was a questioning of existing quality 
procedures by SBS on the grounds of cost. This indicates that SBS failed to 
understand the ethos of the public sector. Once again, it raises the dilemma of a 
business 'partner' attempting to make a profit out of a non-profit organisation. Yet 
shop floor staff informally reverted back to long-established quality procedures, 
ensuring that the embedded culture and traditions survive. 
Whilst staff were dissatisfied with SBS's implementation of Team Working, as 
it did not offer them more job autonomy, they have been able to exert some influence 
under Lean. Critics argue that lean production is aimed at increasing output, whilst 
simultaneously reducing costs and eliminating jobs (Moody, 1997: ch. 5. Bradley et 
al, 2000: ch. 2). Shop floor workers interviewed were aware of the agenda behind 
Lean, and two workers were quoted in chapter five stating that they believed that 
Lean was about "doing yourself out of a job." However, workers have been able to 
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use their influence to make cuts with regards to resources rather than staffing levels. 
This is a form ofwhat Stephenson and Stewart (2001) term 'workplace collectivism', 
with workers protecting each others' jobs. Yet, as will be analysed next, temporary 
jobs were about to be sacrificed as SBS were given the go-ahead to offshore Civil 
Service work to India. 
The First Ever Offshoring of Government Work in the UK 
Towards the end of my research, in August 2004, SBS came up with another 
proposal which would result in the further fragmentation of the National Savings 
Account. Rather than outsourcing a peripheral area of work to another private 
contractor, they planned to offshore 250 government jobs to India. This is a 
significant act as it was to be the first ever offshoring of government work in Britain. 
The plans to offshore this work are directly linked with the Public-Private 
Partnership contract being extended by another 5 years. I shall locate this move 
within a broader theoretical framework of the globalisation of trade and employment. 
I will analyse the trade union's campaign against this offshoring, and assess how this 
decision may influence future union strategies. 
The debate around the globalisation of employment and the movement into new 
markets is a continually heated and polarised one. Modernisation theorists coming 
from a neo-liberal position claim that investment by multi-national corporations in 
the developing world stimulates economic growth and brings with it employment and 
training opportunities (Berger, 1987). However, critics argue investment by multi-
nationals is tantamount to neo-colonialism, whereby there is the exploitation of 
cheap 'Third World' labour for the benefit of wealthy 'First World' shareholders. 
Dependency theorists decree that this perpetuates inequalities as poorer nations 
become more and more dependent upon rich countries, as there is little active 
investment to allow the disadvantaged to improve their situation for themselves 
(Greider, 1997. Hirst and Thompson, 1999). 
Part of the deal for extending the National Savings PPP contract until 2014 
includes the offshoring of 250 jobs to India, which requires Ministerial approval 
(King, 2004). SBS claim that offshoring is necessary for organisational growth and 
reducing costs to the taxpayer (cited in Kearney, 2004). This will involve the 
offshoring of 250 routine clericaV data-input jobs to India, including 50 jobs at 
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DNS&I, but existing National Savings staff will be retrained and moved to other 
areas of the business (cited in Kearney, 2004. King, 2004). 
The PCS union claim that the aim of offshoring is to enable SBS to make a 
profit on the Public-Private Partnership deal. The union argue that SBS can save 
around £20, 000 per worker by hiring staff in India (cited in King, 2004), and 
through this move SBS are looking at saving around £50 million over the next 10 
years of the contract (PCS, 2004h). Whilst 250 low-skill jobs are being transferred 
to India, SBS are laying off 400 periphery agency workers (PCS, 2004h), so that core 
ex-civil servants can be redeployed to National Savings work or Third Party 
Business. As stated in previous chapters, agency workers are already marginalised 
as they are employed on inferior terms and conditions, even though some temporary 
workers are hardly 'temporary' as they have been working at NS&I for up to three 
years (PCS, 2004h). 
The PCS union set up a campaign against the proposed offshoring of work to 
India fearing that this could be the thin end of the wedge (PCS, 2004g); particularly 
with the current controversial trend of call centre work being offshored to India 
(Warren, 2005). Moreover, as already stated in the case of the proposed secondary 
TUPE to Astron, the union were given assurances by the government that the 
National Savings Account would not be broken up after the PPP (PCS, 2004g). 
There is no benefit to the British public, the British government or the 
Siemens workforce from these proposals. The only people who will benefit 
from these changes are Siemens shareholders, mainly in the USA and 
Germany. It would be scandalous if the British government were to collude 
with a large multi-national firm to ship work overseas simply because 
investors want to benefit from exploiting a low-paid and badly organised 
workforce abroad, whilst simultaneously damaging conditions at home. To 
make matters worse, the company are planning to sack 400 casual staff in the 
UK at the same time as it sends 250 jobs abroad. (A senior union official 
quoted in PCS, 2004i) 
Whilst offshoring is common in the private sector, the union reps and their members 
were particularly concerned for the precedent that this could set for the rest of the 
public sector (PCS, 2004g). 
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The union met Ruth Kelly, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, to put their case 
against the offshoring of Civil Service work (PCS, 2004g). However, 'New' Labour 
decided to approve the deal, despite earlier pledges not to fragment the National 
Savings Account (PCS, 2004h). The union reps and members were disappointed that 
the government rubber stamped SBS's proposals to transfer work to India in the 
interests of profitability (PCS, 2004j). Indeed, some of the union officials 
interviewed felt that 'New' Labour and SBS were determined to make this Public-
Private Partnership a success at all costs. Once again the government drove through 
this measure with very little in the way of compromise. The union were placed in a 
very difficult bargaining position, just as they were when the PPP was mooted, as a 
small number of members would effectively be taking on an increasingly intransigent 
employer and a government approved policy. The PCS union are now calling on the 
TUC to mount a campaign against future offshorings (PCS, 2004j). However, this is 
all a little late in the day, as the first offshoring of government work has been 
approved, which could lead to future transfers of public sector work around the globe. 
Now that this offshoring has been imposed, the vast majority of the agency workers 
will be disposed of, and that work will be transferred to workers in India who are 
traditionally on much lower terms and conditions (Greider, 1997). All of this, yet 
again, runs counter to SBS's claims of not being a cheap labour company. This 
offshoring of work to India also has potentially negative consequences for the ethos 
of public administration, as Civil Service work is being completed in a far away 
country by private sector employees, rather than on site by qualified and trained 
officials. Moreover, this move further transforms the organisational culture of 
National Savings, with the disaggregation ofthe account and growing job insecurity. 
New Subcultural Formations 
There appear to be new subcultural allegiances emerging under the new SBS regime, 
which are formed along grade lines. Theorists, such as, Trice (1993) and Brown 
(1998: ch. 3) state that shop floor subcultures typically emerge from shared group 
experiences. Moreover, as culture is dynamic and fluid, subcultures are constantly 
created and re-created as they transform over time (VanMaanen and Barley, 1985). 
Those who are most likely to identify with SBS are managers and specialists who 
have been recently promoted. As the majority of shop floor workers have not 
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benefited from such opportunities, they are not endeared to their new SBS employers. 
This is reflected in SBS Staff Surveys, where those shop floor workers who 
completed the survey were critical of SBS. However, many were apathetic and 
refused to complete the survey, with Julie stating, "I don't think they [SBS] would 
listen to what you said anyway ... they would fiddle the figures." There is clearly 
dissatisfaction from administrative workers to the direction of the organisation, with 
a tangible sense of loss, as they feel that the once safe and secure 'job for life' is now 
over. 
The End of the 'Job for Life': Future Hopes and Fears 
All of the workers and union representatives interviewed at National Savings were in 
agreement that after the PPP the previously accepted 'job for life' was over. They all 
missed the relative safety and security of Civil Service employment, and feared that 
now this stability had gone, it would never return. They were also in agreement that 
whilst they were still completing the same type of work, it was now a more 
pressurised working environment and the organisational culture was very different as 
it was clear that under SBS profitability was the main goal. 
However, worker opinions relating to their own future career trajectories, 
occupational identities and the success of this PPP project were again very much 
divided along grade lines. Those workers who had gained under the new SBS 
system of Open Vacancy Advertising, and were now managers and specialists, were 
the most positive in looking to progress further in the organisation. As discussed in 
previous section, because most of these employees were now working alongside their 
SBS counterparts, they identified themselves as now being SBS employees. 
However, other workers on the shop floor were more confused over their identities, 
as under the PPP they were neither civil servants nor fully-fledged private sector 
workers, and did not readily identify with SBS. The specialists and managers 
interviewed tended to believe that the PPP would be a success and that it would now 
be difficult to return to the old organisational culture and traditions of the Civil 
Service. 
However, the majority of staff at DNS&I remain administrative workers who do 
not identify with or have any affinity to SBS. These workers did not gain from 
promotions under Open Vacancy Advertising and feel that their opportunities for 
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upward mobility are very limited, although some have moved across to Third Party 
Business contracts. All of the administrative workers I spoke to wanted National 
Savings to return to the Civil Service for job safety and security. Although most now 
hoped that there would be more 'voluntary' redundancy exercises, so that they could 
leave the organisation once and for all. 
The major worry of all of the workers I interviewed at Durham National Savings, 
bearing in mind the difficulties that SBS have encountered with this contract, 
concerns the possible implications if this 'partnership' fails. Many workers felt 
unnecessarily pressurised by SBS managers to meet KPI targets and make cost 
savings, as discussed in previous chapters. A senior union official is in little doubt 
that the workers are the only safe part in this PPP equation. 
If this contract goes down the pan, if SBS go bust, this job [at National 
Savings] still has to be done. And with TUPE on the statute book, whoever 
gets the contract, these workers will still have their jobs, under their current 
terms and conditions. That, by the way, is a message we've [the union] tried 
to hammer home to members, but that hasn't actually sunk in. The only 
uncertainty in this process, as far as I'm concerned, is whether SBS can 
survive it, not whether we can, because the job needs doing and we are the 
only people by law who can do it. But SBS want the workers to think they're 
on a knife-edge to make them work harder. So they go on about losing the 
contract, not meeting the targets, not delivering this, not delivering that. The 
truth of the matter is the staff should say, "That ain't my problem, it's yours." 
SBS would argue, "We will get big fines, we'll go bust." The staff should 
reply, "It ain't my problem, because we'll still be here doing this when 
you've gone." (Steve, union official, interview, 2001) 
However, due to SBS continually emphasising profitability, KPI targets, bonuses, 
shares, etc, the workers do feel a very real responsibility to go that extra mile. 
Indeed, despite the assurances of the union, many spoke of their fears that they could 
be out of a job if SBS lose the contract. In addition, the proposed outsourcing of the 
DMU and the recent offshoring of work to India have exacerbated these fears of job 
insecurity. Moreover, the fragmentation of the National Savings Account has 
already started with some workers being forcibly moved over to Third Party 
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Business. Under the terms of the contract, SBS have to keep all three National 
Savings sites open until 2004 (NAO, 2003: 8), but several workers said that they 
were concerned that in the future the Durham office could end up being solely used 
for Third Party Business, with all core work being completed at the Glasgow and 
Blackpool sites. 
However, there are contingency plans in place if the PPP contract fails, and 
NS&I have appointed a 'Business and Continuity Manager' to oversee a number of 
scenarios. National Savings could return to the public sector for a temporary or 
prolonged period of time (NAO, 2003: 22). So the wishes of some workers may be 
granted, as they could return to being civil servants. A re-tendering process could be 
carried out so that the organisation remains a PPP, albeit with a different private 
sector 'partner', and SBS must cover all legal costs involved in this process (NAO, 
2003: 22). Some workers at DNS&I, and one worker who had left under via 
redundancy, said that they had heard on the office grapevine that SBS were planning 
to pull out of the PPP altogether. This is also covered under the contingency plans, 
and Siemens AG would face a massive fine of up to £250 million (NAO, 2003: 4 & 
22), not to mention the fact that the reputation of SBS would be in tatters. However, 
as the PPP contract has recently been extended to 2014 as part of the deal for 
offshoring work to India, this scenario seems unlikely. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated resistance to imposed organisational culture change at 
National Savings. This resistance operates on two levels. Firstly, involving 
organised opposition from the trade unions and their members. Secondly, there is a 
noticeable undercurrent of informal resistance on the shop floor, involving cynicism 
and desubordination to some of SBS's initiatives, along with the pragmatic 
acceptance of others. 
Regarding formal resistance, National Savings traditionally has a highly 
unionised shop floor culture. When the organisation was part of the Civil Service, 
industrial relations were relatively harmonious and stable under the Whitley 
framework. Indeed, there was reluctance on the part of National Savings 
management to introduCing some of the Conservative government's directives, such 
as, Market Testing and Agency Status. The culture of the union branch at Durham 
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National Savings changed when the 'Broad Left' became the majority grouping, and 
this helped generate opposition to many of the government directives aimed at 
changing the organisational culture. However, national intra-union tensions muted 
any effective opposition to Agency Status. Yet, there were two well supported 
strikes against Market Testing, taken at both group and national level. Hence, both 
the unions and National Savings management limited the impact of the 
Conservative's New Public Management agenda, as all Market Tested work was 
retained in-house. 
However, the appointment of Peter Bareau from Lloyds Bank to head the 
National Savings Agency was to prove to be crucial in changing the culture of the 
organisation. The deliberate recruitment of private sector managers is one of the 
central features ofNew Public Management (see Hood, 1991. Isaac-Henry, 1993. E. 
Wilson, 1993). Peter Bareau was instrumental in pressing ahead with the Public-
Private Partnership of the organisation. Whilst the main Civil Service unions merged 
nationally to form the PCS, the merger at group level was pragmatic and strategic in 
launching a campaign against the PPP of National Savings. Regarding mobilisation 
theory (see Tilly, 1981. Kelly, 1998), the union were able to generate support for the 
first ever industrial action to be taken against 'New' Labour. Yet there was also 
pressure from below, as many of the government directives introduced at National 
Savings were very unpopular with rank and file union members. 
Despite there being a 'partnership' between SBS management and the PCS 
union implicit in the Public-Private Partnership contract, the industrial relations 
culture has become increasingly fraught. Strike action was threatened after SBS 
planned to outsource the Document Management Unit, and there was ACAS 
intervention for the first time ever at National Savings over the individual monitoring 
of staff. The source of such tensions is directly related to the financial pressures on 
the contract and SBS's need to make a profit on this 'partnership' deal. This 
culminated in SBS being given the go-ahead to offshore the first ever government 
work to India, whilst simultaneously sacking 400 temporary employees. 
There has also been informal resistance from shop floor staff to many of the 
changes introduced by SBS. Whilst the PPP of National Savings was unpopular 
from the outset, SBS management tried to win the hearts and minds of employees by 
emphasising the new opportunities they would create. Although some staff have 
been promoted, there was shop floor cynicism as SBS failed to create the new Third 
258 
Party Business they predicted and encountered technological problems with the 
modernisation of National Savings. This culminated in the appointment of a new 
senior SBS management team, and brought with it mounting pressure to achieve 
profitability. Dissatisfaction with the direction of the organisation can be seen in the 
numbers of workers willing to 'volunteer' for redundancy. There has been the 
pragmatic acceptance of financial bonuses offered by SBS, such as, the Siemens 
Share Scheme and the Employee Bonus Scheme, but workers are not subscribing to 
new cultural values and beliefs. Far from workers being mere objects in this process, 
they have been able to exert their influence as embedded cultural traditions survive. 
The fragmentation of the NS&I Account, with the offshoring of work to India and 
the forced movement of staff to insourced contract work have heightened fears and 
anxieties over job security. Such increasing tensions cast further doubts over the 
claims made by integration theorists that there is one homogenous organisational 
culture that is agreed by all (see Ouchi, 1981. Peters and Waterman, 1982), and that 
senior management can placate trade unions (see Hampden-Turner, 1990. Schein, 
1991: ch. 13). Differentiation theorists, such as, Gregory (1983), Martinet al (1985) 
and Alvesson (2002) offer a much more realistic account of the competing interest 
groupings within complex multicultural organisations. 
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Chapter Seven - Conclusion 
The thesis has empirically investigated the process of organisational culture change 
before and after the Public-Private Partnership of National Savings and Investments. 
The theoretical core of the thesis is that New Public Management approaches are 
inextricably linked with attempts to manage, control and transform the culture of 
public sector organisations. In this concluding chapter, I will consider the continual 
efforts to change the organisational culture ofNational Savings and assess the impact 
that these directives have had on the lives of shop floor workers. I will then examine 
the theoretical significance of the research findings. 
As has been discussed in the thesis, National Savings is a 'brownfield' site with 
its own long-established cultures that are steeped in the traditions of the public sector. 
The department has a long-serving and highly unionised workforce, who regarded 
themselves as having a stable and secure 'job for life'. Given this context, attempts 
to transform the culturally embedded norms, values, behaviours and attitudes were 
always going to be fraught with difficulties. 
A series of Conservative government directives were introduced from the early 
1980s onwards with the concerted aim of changing the culture of the Civil Service. 
These initiatives included a number of distinctive characteristics, involving the 
application of business methods and techniques to the public sector. This trend was 
later termed New Public Management. Yet there was not one definitive model to 
follow, rather NPM evolved over time. However, these were top - down 
government initiatives, and Siehl (1985) and also Elisabeth Wilson (1993) warn of 
the difficulties of imposed organisational culture change. 
The introduction of the Financial Management Initiative was the first serious 
attempt at organisational culture change in the Civil Service, with the 
implementation of strict budgetary controls and performance indicators. However, 
as examined in chapter three, this directive had very little impact on the daily lives of 
workers at National Savings. Indeed, Anthony (1994) states that for culture change 
to be effective it must also alter the structure of an organisation. 
Agency Status changed both the structure and culture of the Civil Service. The 
creation of semi-autonomous government Agencies, through the separation of policy 
from service delivery, resulted in the fragmentation of a national, unified and 
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centralised Civil Service. Yet, as discussed in chapter three, there was management 
reluctance at National Savings to this government directive, but internal divisions 
muted any effective trade union opposition. As demonstrated in the thesis, the 
decentralisation of grading structures, pay, terms and conditions led to the 
development of Agency-specific cultures and identities at National Savings. This 
endorses the arguments ofFairborther (1994), Pyper (1995: ch. 9) and Horton (1996) 
that Agency Status ghettoised Civil Service departments, as they became 
increasingly cut adrift from one another. Whilst Agency Status had no immediate 
impact on working life at National Savings, it did mark the transition from a 
bureaucratic to a managerial service, with increasing pressure on staff to make year 
on year efficiency improvements. 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering was introduced to National Savings with 
the aim of improving efficiencies and making cost savings. Cleaning, catering and 
security were outsourced to private sector contractors in the 1980s. However, there 
was disapproval from shop floor staff to CCT as terms and conditions of already 
marginalised workers were cut. Indeed, there were continual difficulties as both the 
catering and cleaning contracts went through a number of different private sector 
operators. Peripheral privatisation was taken a stage further at National Savings with 
a series of Market Tests. As discussed in chapter six, there was trade union 
resistance, with an Agency-wide strike and a national Civil Service one-day strike 
against this Conservative government policy. In all, there were 13 Market Tests at 
National Savings and every in-house bid was successful. However, this did create a 
more commercial culture as staff were under increasing pressure to be just as 
efficient as the private sector. Whilst these changes involving commercialisation and 
peripheral privatisation were evolutionary in nature, shop floor workers were 
concerned and uncertain about the future. 
The most profound transformations at National Savings took place after the 
Public-Private Partnership of the organisation. The new Agency Chief Executive, 
Peter Bareau, was instrumental in spearheading radical organisational change. This 
endorses the claims of Isaac-Henry (1993) that senior managers were deliberately 
recruited from the private sector to transform the culture of public sector 
organisations. The Public-Private Partnership policy is a further development of the 
New Public Management agenda, with increasing private sector involvement in the 
delivery of public services. Originally a Conservative policy, the PPP was 
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reformulated under 'New' Labour as long-term deals are tied to strict performance 
targets based on a renewed emphasis of 'partnership' between the public and private 
sectors (Ruane, 2002). Hence, the two sectors supposedly complement each other, as 
the effectiveness and efficiencies of business work together with the customer 
service of the public sector. The reasons for the PPP of National Savings were that 
due to a lack of government investment under the Conservatives, the organisation 
lacked the new technology and e-commerce channels that all other modem financial 
organisations already possessed. Due to the huge costs involved in this exercise, 
under the PPP programme the finance, expertise and innovation of a private 'partner' 
could be used to deliver modernisation. 
Under the Public-Private Partnership the entire operational staff had their 
employment transferred over to SBS, a private sector company who had to prioritise 
making a profit on this 'partnership' deal. As discussed in chapter four, there was a 
'Honeymoon Period' at the start of the contract, and SBS did begin to transfer 
products over onto a new IT platform. They also modernised operations by 
introducing internet and telephone banking services, together with creating a 
customer profile system. Thus, customers now have greater choice, and product 
enquiries can be dealt with flexibly at all National Savings offices. SBS have 
reduced staffing levels through 'voluntary' redundancy exercises, and they have also 
been able to transfer surplus staff to newly acquired Third Party Business contracts. 
Previously there had been little movement in the internal labour market at National 
Savings for around a decade, SBS have since restructured the organisation and 
created a number of promotion opportunities. Productivity has improved under SBS, 
as 50 million transactions continue to be dealt with each year, and they are now 
processed by 2, 000 staff, as opposed to the 4, 100 employed at the start of the 
contract. SBS have also rewarded staff with an Employee Bonus Scheme, and 
attempted to gain their loyalty through the Siemens Share Scheme. However, SBS 
soon ran into major difficulties and complications in their attempts to transform the 
organisational culture ofNational Savings. 
As demonstrated in the thesis, shop floor workers were opposed to the PPP of 
National Savings from the outset as they saw it as a threat to job security. Indeed, 
there was a long-running campaign of opposition to the PPP, which resulted in the 
first ever industrial action to be taken against Tony Blair's 'New' Labour 
government. Yet SBS attempted to allay staff fears by emphasising the new 
262 
opportunities they would create through modernisation. However, a fundamental 
error on the part of SBS was that they underestimated the scale of business 
transformation at National Savings. SBS scrapped the old 'Legacy' computer system 
and brought in 'Tabler', a commercially available off-the-shelf IT package designed 
in Belgium. However, 'Tabler' had to be adapted to meet the needs of National 
Savings, and SBS were plagued with technical difficulties when they began the 
migration of products onto this new IT platform. SBS did not appreciate the 
complexity ofNational Savings products and processes, as the organisation has over 
30 million customer accounts. This resulted in SBS incurring fines of £2.1 million 
during the first 3 years of the contract, due to Key Performance Indicator penalties 
and for failing to meet full business transformation by December 2000. Together 
with escalating costs, SBS faced making significant a loss on this 'partnership' 
contract, rather than a profit. This resulted in direct intervention from Siemens AG, 
the parent company, with the instatement of a new SBS senior management team to 
run the National Savings Account. This marked an abrupt end to the 'Honeymoon 
Period', and the start of radical changes as SBS attempted to tum the contract around. 
'Voluntary' redundancy exercises began before the PPP of National Savings, 
primarily due to computerisation. Whilst there was no shortage of workers willing to 
'volunteer' for redundancy, SBS have since stretched staffing levels in an effort to 
reduce the wage bill. These transitions endorse the arguments ofTumbull and Wass 
(2000) and Worrall et al (2000) relating to 'survivor syndrome', in that those who 
remain are placed under increasing pressures and uncertainties. Several integration 
theorists (see Peters and Waterman, 1982. Schein, 1991. Kotter and Heskett, 1992) 
advise releasing staff who are unwilling to embrace organisational culture change. 
SBS have appointed their own managers to run operations and drafted in temporary 
staff, thereby creating a multi-tier workforce. However, rather than making best use 
of existing staff, their wealth of experience and tacit knowledge, SBS have offered 
redundancy in an attempt to culturally cleanse the workplace of Civil Service 
traditions. 
One of the advantages ofthe Public-Private Partnership ofNational Savings was 
that SBS would be able to redeploy surplus staff to new Third Party Business 
contract work, as a realistic alternative to redundancy. Despite raising the 
expectations of staff, SBS were only able to create just over half of the Third Party 
Business they had originally planned. This resulted in further redundancy exercises 
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to reduce the headcount on the NS&I Account, with other staff being compelled to 
move to new insourced contract work. Most of the Third Party Business contracts 
that SBS have acquired are for other Civil Service departments, which is redefining 
the boundaries of the service. In a further effort to reduce staffing levels, SBS have 
outsourced accountancy work. The company also proposed the outsourcing of 400 
jobs in the Document Management Unit, but strike action was threatened and the in-
house bid was successful. SBS have recently been given the go-ahead by 'New' 
Labour to offshore 250 government jobs to India, whilst simultaneously terminating 
the contracts of 400 temporary workers. This is significant as it is the first ever 
government work to be offshored, resulting in the fragmentation of the NS&I 
Account. 
Whilst SBS did generate a number of promotions, these soon ceased once a new 
cohort of managers were in place. The transition to a new promotion culture did 
create friction, with the delayering of management grades. SBS did introduce the 
Employee Bonus Scheme, but this was divisive as it did not equally reward all staff. 
In an attempt to mould company loyalty SBS launched the Siemens Share Scheme, 
but most staff interviewed regarded this as a detached financial bonus. 
There have been major changes in the organisational culture at National Savings, 
particularly after the Public-Private Partnership. This has resulted in an 
intensification of work, especially for those on the shop floor who have little job 
autonomy and control. All of the workers interviewed felt that the 'job for life' was 
now over, as they faced an increasingly uncertain future. 
Regarding the contribution of this research to theoretical understandings of 
organisational culture change, integrationist accounts of senior managers being able 
to control and transform the culture of their organisation for the mutual benefit of all 
members (see Ouchi, 1981. Peters and Waterman, 1982) are overly simplistic. 
Similarly, the claims of Schein (1991: ch. 15) that leaders can perceive the 
weaknesses in the culture of their organisations, unfreeze and alter core values, then 
subsequently refreeze the culture, are both impractical and unrealistic. Rather than 
being solely owned by senior managers, culture is the emergent property of all 
organisational members, it is fluid and transient, with its own embedded histories and 
traditions. 
Whilst the commercialisation and introduction of elements of privatisation at 
National Savings was gradual and evolutionary, the Public-Private Partnership was a 
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major transition. All of the operational staff were now employed by a private 
company, with very different goals, objectives and responsibilities to the Civil 
Service. However, there was a long-running campaign of opposition from the trade 
union and its members to the PPP of National Savings; and Siehl (1985) and 
Elisabeth Wilson (1993) warn of the difficulties of imposed culture change. It 
appears that SBS did not appreciate the embedded nature of cultural practices, norms 
and values prior to embarking on their programme of organisational culture change. 
Several theorists (see Frost et al, 1985. Nord, 1985. Anthony, 1994: ch. 3. Roberts, 
1997. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 8) emphasise that cultural traditions can restrict change, as 
the past clearly has an impact on the present and future cultural directions of the 
organisation. 
SBS underestimated the scale of the modernisation of National Savings. In an 
attempt to transform the organisational culture, SBS released vastly experienced ex-
civil servants rather than making best use of their tacit knowledge and skills. 
Moreover, SBS drafted in managers who had no experience of running an 
organisation like National Savings. The tensions and contradictions of a private 
sector 'partner' attempting to make a profit out of a non-profit public sector financial 
organisation have been highlighted throughout the thesis, particularly over the issue 
of customer service. These issues cast further doubts over the viability of 
'partnership' programmes between the public and private sectors. 
Integration theorists do not adequately account for resistance to organisational 
culture change. Whilst Hampden-Turner (1990) and Schein (1991) call for senior 
managers to pacify trade unions, they fail to address the contradictions that are 
inherent in the capitalist employment relationship. Indeed, there has been more 
industrial conflict at National Savings since the PPP than ever before, despite there 
being a 'partnership' between SBS and the PCS union implicit in the contract. 
Despite the claims of integration theorists that managers have the power to 
transform the culture of an organisation in order that staff will internalise new core 
values, there has been informal resistance at National Savings. Workers have not 
been mere objects in this process who simply subscribe to managerially defined 
norms, values and beliefs. Indeed, workers have been able to limit some of the 
potentially damaging initiatives proposed by SBS, as the embedded public service 
traditions survive. There has been pragmatic acceptance of financial rewards, for 
example, the Siemens Share Scheme, but this has not resulted in workers embracing 
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new SBS values. Moreover, many of SBS's proposals have been deeply unpopular 
with shop floor staff, such as the offshoring of government work to India, and 
employees interviewed yearn for the return of the security and stability of the 'job for 
life'. 
Rather than possessing one homogenous, shared and agreed culture, National 
Savings is clearly a multicultural organisation. This endorses the arguments of 
differentiation theorists that subcultures are nested and overlapping, yet also complex 
and dynamic (see Gregory, 1983. Brown, 1998: ch. 3. Alvesson, 2002: ch. 7). Hence, 
subcultural allegiances vary, and workers are often members of more than one 
subcultural grouping at any one time, most notably the trade union. 
This thesis has demonstrated the complexities of organisational culture change 
at National Savings and Investments, in the context of New Public Management. 
The difficulties of changing the culture of an established 'brownfield' site with a 
long-serving workforce have been highlighted throughout. There has been both 
formal and informal resistance to many of the initiatives that were imposed at 
National Savings; reiterating the arguments of Siehl (1985) and Elisabeth Wilson 
(1993) that enforced cultural change is fraught with complications. The PPP 
signalled major cultural transformations at National Savings, but the change 
programme SBS embarked upon did not go according to plan. This endorses the 
arguments of Elsmore (200 1) and Alvesson (2002) that the culture of an organisation 
is difficult to control, manage and change, as culture is fluid, dynamic and 
multilayered. Whilst senior managers do have an influence on the culture of an 
organisation, the findings of the thesis echo the claims of Alvesson (2002: ch. 7) that 
the role of management is over-stated. Hence, culture is the emergent property of all 
members of an organisation. Therefore, organisational culture change is a contested, 
complex and protracted process. 
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